Inaguration of Vijay Stambh memorial at Jaisalmer (Above) and as it is seen today (Below)
POINTS TO BE EXAMINED
- NIGHT RAIDS -This Station had no night interception capability. L/ 70 Anti Aircraft Guns were not available. Enemy attempted a total of 11 night raids (3 low level and 8 high level). All low level raids met with hot, reception from L/60 guns. On high level raids no fire was opened in order to conceal location. A very negligible damage was caused by low level raids.
- GROUND DEFENCES – The domestic area had no ground defence element and had to be arranged locally through personal liaison.
- FORCE AVAILABILITY – Inadequate force vas made available to the Station till 7 Dec 71. Had the enemy mounted day light raids and provided air cover for his advancing Amour, perhaps the course of battle in this sector would have been different.
- MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT – Inadequate man—power and equipment vas available due to Sqn’s double commitments at JAMNAGAR AND JAISAILMER and second line facility at JAMNAGAR. The man-power had to be supplemented on the spot by releasing unskilled BORDER ROAD Labours to help the Armament Trade to cope up with pressure of work.
- WEAPONS – The Station mostly used HC-T-10 Rockets and 30 mm HE Bullets. On examination of the destroyed tanks it was revealed that the 30 mm caused maximum damage and vas solely responsible for setting the tanks on fire. The T 59 tanks carried extra barrel of fuel and fuel In their tanks which vas easily exposed to the front gun fire. A sequence belting with SAP/HE/Incendiary bullets be examined.
- BASE ACTIVATION – Activation of these C&MU’s and MEMU’s in the absence of their turning into regular MINI WINGS be more closely examined. Where heterogeneous man power from all over is to be pumped in, allied facilities, in regard to class IV be kept in mind. Inview of security and discipline on these forward bases no civilians Class IV be routed, only NC’sE be thought of.
On imminence of hostilities automatic grants/ sanctions for operating Officers and SNCOs messes be given to prevent any initial hardship and unnecessary paper work.
- COUNTER AIR MISSIONS – Two aircraft strikes at airfields are considered tactically unsound. The strikes should be not less than four aircraft and if the rockets are to be carried an escort be thought of , as the rocket launchers seriously impare the fighting capability of the aircraft.
TOTAL EFFORTS, AMN AND DAMAGES ENEMY AND OWN AT A GLANCE
Total No. of sorties – 222
Total Qty. of Amn Exp – 30 mm HE – 26238 Rds.
……………………Rocket T-10-1196
……………………Bombs 1000 Lbs – 2
Own Losses – NIL
Enemy Losses – Destroyed: –
……………………41 Tanks
……………………2 Aircraft
……………………126 Vehicles
……………………13 Arty Guns
……………………1 RCL gun
……………………18 Goods Trains
……………………190 Goods Wagons
……………………2 Railway Engines
……………………2 Godowns
……………………10 Oil Tankers
……………………2 Ammunition dumps
……………………130 Camels.
Enemy Damages – 37 Tanks
……………………10 Vehicles
……………………10 Goods Trains
……………………1 Mil Spl Train
……………………4 Train Engines
……………………34 Goods Wagons
……………………3 Factories
AWARDS & DECORATION
SI Service Rank Name & Initials Unit Decorations/
No. No. Award Earned
- 4494 WG CDR MS BAWA, WM 14 C&MU AVSM
- 4340 WG CDR MN SINGH “ M-in-D
- 4692 WG CDR DM CONQUEST 122 SQN AVSM, VrC
- IC-7470 MAJOR ATMA SINGH 12 A O P VrC
- 5059 SQN LDR RN BALI 122 SQN VrC
- 5270 SQN LDR SDL TULLY 122 SQN M-in-D
- 4956 SQN LDR FJ MEHTA “ VrC
- 5008 SQN LDR GV HINGORANI “ M-in-D
- 5783 SQN LDR JAGBIR SINGH “ VrC
- 6334 SQN LDR DK DASS “ VrC
- IC-15466 CAPT D MATHUR 12 A O P M-in-D
- IC-22304 CAPT KC SHARMA 105 GLSEL SM
- 6742 FLT LT KS SURESH 122 SQN VrC
- IC-16285 CAPT PPS SANGHA 12 A O P VrC
- 8991 FLT LT D YADAV “ M-in-D
- 8392 FLT LT G KAPUR “ M-in-D
- 9447 FLT LT R GOSAIN “ VrC
- 8378 FLT LT MP PREMI HTS VrC
- 14884 WO GOSWAMI 122 SQN M-in-D
- 213462 SGT HARIHARAN 12 A O P M-in-D
- 231205 CPL VALADHANDAYUTHAN “ M-in-D
- 247447 CPL PILLAI BP “ M-in-D
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