Safeguarding
Indian interests in the unipolar world
A.
Das
The
collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980-early 1990s[i]
impacted every player on the international stage. Its most direct impact on India has been the extraordinary
extent to which American sensitivities have since influenced India’s relations
with the world at large. As a
matter of course, Indian decision-makers factor in possible U.S. reactions to
potential Indian actions as a determinant of national policy[ii].
In other words, an increasingly large swathe of India’s external
relations have to be viewed through the prism of the Indo-American relationship
till a more multi-polar global scenario emerges.
This
paper is an attempt to define an optimal approach for managing this
relationship.
Historical
background
The
dictum "no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent interests"
is regarded as a basic principle governing serious debates on geopolitics and
international affairs. Further,
even interests are not permanent but subject to constant modification and
fine-tuning, thus resulting in actual policies and subsequently, plans.
In
the 1940s[iii]
and 50s[iv],
it was in the Anglo-American interest to support and buttress the Indian
republic as a role model for the emerging post-colonial world.
India’s choice of democracy as opposed to communism or totalitarianism
was only part of the motivation. The
more significant issue was the Indian leadership’s conviction that India shall
not bear grudges[v]
against the west.
The
Republic matures
The
Mahatma during the freedom struggle and Pandit Nehru after Independence had
ensured that the Indian republic presented a supine and non-threatening picture
to the outside world. But, a
reading of the Mahatma’s Autobiography[vi]
and Panditji’s numerous writings[vii]
brings out subtle differences in their views.
While the Mahatma’s belief in non-violent struggle was completely
heart-felt, his decision to choose non-violent mobilization was driven primarily
by his conviction that it was the only tactic with any acceptable probability of
success. His responses to Lt. Gen.
K.M. Cariappa’s[viii]
queries on the subject during the Jammu & Kashmir operations of 1947-48
attest to this[ix].
On the other hand, like other leading figures of the era, Panditji
derived his belief in the Mahatma’s methods of political mobilization
second-hand from the Mahatma. Hence his understanding of the underlying logic was a tad
superficial. The widespread
fetishization of "Gandhianism" among the Congress leadership[x]
well into the early 1980s is a direct result of this disconnect.
More
than the events in Jammu & Kashmir during 1947-48, the 1962 debacle on the
Tibetan frontier was a seminal event that illustrated to the thinking public in
India that Independence had changed the rules of the game[xi]
as far as national security affairs were concerned. It could be argued that Chairman Mao stood a better chance of
acquiring India under his wing by largely non-violent methods centering around
the Communist Party of India (CPI), than by his "teach a lesson"
strategy”[xii].
But, such subtlety was rare in that dogged long-marcher[xiii].
The
last twenty years have seen both generational and ideological churnings in the
Indian body politic. The Indian
self-image of an increasingly strong and prosperous nation is no longer easy to
rubbish as wishful thinking by outsiders. Not
that some will stop trying[xiv].
U.S.
imperatives
It
is fair to say that the U.S. favors an India that continues to be
non-threatening. That would mean
that the U.S. would continue to deepen its economic, social, cultural and
military ties with India. The more
entangled and inter-twined the institutions of the two countries are, the better
things look from the U.S. perspective as this enhances U.S. leverage on India.
This inter-twining is largely in India’s interest as well, as it grants
India access to technology and capital. But,
India can expect periodic exertions of psychological, economic and political
pressure from the U.S. to materialize whenever the U.S. feels the need to
"guide" Indian behavior[xv].
A
conceptual "box" exists within the minds of American planners and they
will do what they can to keep India within that box.
In other words, IT parks[xvi]
are fine but ICBMs[xvii]
are not. Mobilization against
terror-sponsors is fine, movement against terror-sponsors is not[xviii],[xix].
Given their way, these planners would rather see an Indian elephant[xx]
that resembles the hapless Gajendra[xxi]
than the glorious Airavata[xxii].
Indian
interests
At
a minimum, thinking Indians would like to "break out of this box".
One indicator of a successful "break out" would be carte
blanche to prosecute unlimited war against the perpetrators of periodic
barbaric acts in India that sit fairly unmolested across the Line of Control in
Jammu & Kashmir and the International Border elsewhere in India’s
northwest. Another would be a substantive and meaningful multi-lateral
economic development roadmap that would enable India to take up a seat at such
financial high tables as the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development)[xxiii] and the G-8 (Group of
Eight Industrialized Nations)[xxiv].
A third would be an invitation to join the P-5 (Five Permanent Members of
the United Nations Security Council)[xxv].
One need not have inherited Vishnu Gupta Chanakya’s[xxvi] genetic material to
deduce that these are utopian expectations, to say the least.
The
paradigm of respect
"Winning
the respect" of the Americans would lead to a successful "break
out". Nations that have
"won the respect" of the Americans include the British, the Germans,
the Russians, the Japanese, the Chinese and the Vietnamese.
The
British, in American eyes, are like the "Swayambu Lingam"[xxvii]
in Shaivaite[xxviii]
lore, imbued with noble qualities by nature.
The Germans have earned their respect from the Americans time and time
again, from Gen. Baron von Steuben[xxix]
in the American Revolution, to the German exploits during 1914-1945.
The Russians will go down in American history as the only nation to have
posed an existential threat[xxx]
to the Americans. The Japanese
victory in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War[xxxi]
was a seminal inflection point in the evolution of 20th Century
American policies in East Asia. The
Chinese in Korea impressed[xxxii]
Harry Truman, that paragon of American spunk. The Vietnamese can legitimately
claim to have defeated 3[xxxiii],[xxxiv]
of the P-5.
A
victory too Pyrrhic?
As
elected leaders of a democratic republic, Indian decision-makers cannot
consciously make choices that impose unacceptable costs on the citizenry[xxxv].
"Winning the respect" of the International Community as the Germans,
the Russians, the Japanese, the Chinese and the Vietnamese did would be
unconscionable, as it would entail many Indians dying and many more regressing
into poverty. India will have to
blaze its own trail towards respect, devoid of unacceptable deaths and
destruction.
A
journey already begun
It
is not uncommon among American families to have one member become a College
Professor, another a Soldier, another a Stock Broker, and still another a Chef.
Some individual Americans may even spend time in each of these diverse
occupations through the course of their careers.
Tocqueville interpreted this very commendable American phenomenon as
"classlessness" [xxxvi]
while Swami Vivekananda praised Americans[xxxvii]
as "Karma Yogis"[xxxviii]
and "True Vedantins"[xxxix]
for the very same quality. Americans
take this psychographic dexterity as a given[xl]
both in themselves and among others, viewing its absence as abnormal and as a
shortcoming.
Historically
in India, these four professions would rarely have come together in the same
family because they typify "Brahmin", "Kshatriya",
"Vaishya" and "Shudra" trades respectively[xli].
The sooner this dubious interpretation of the “Chatur Varna”[xlii]
construct gets shed in India, the better for the national interest.
Till then, these misinterpretations will color outsiders’ perceptions
of India, though they will not impair truly insightful deductions about the
Indian republic.
Achievements
of Indians and Indian-Americans in the Sciences and in Business are slowly
making their way into the greater American sub-conscious.
Characterization of Indians as being "a Math-Wiz"[xliii] and as being "well
off"[xliv]
is a fairly common phenomenon in 21st century America.
In due course, Indians and Indian-Americans will get credit for being
good, hard working, law abiding members of the "Service Professions"
as well, as long as a modicum of Indian immigration to the U.S. continues.
Sections of the extreme right in America have always complained about
"demographic forward deployment"[xlv]
by various other cultures, though an overwhelming majority of Americans are
broad-minded and friendly to Indians.
But,
of real relevance in the national quest to "win respect" are not these
"Brahmin", "Vaishya" and "Shudra"
accomplishments. The issue is to
unmistakably demonstrate "Kshatriya" prowess to the Americans,
without even remotely confronting them directly. Needless to say, this "Kshatriya" component
of national respect will have to be won not on the North American continent, but
in the sub-continental neighborhood.
The
American Example
The
U.S. itself can serve as a very appropriate role model for an India seeking to
establish itself as a legitimate Great Power.
From the time of the American Revolution to the time it burst onto the
world stage as a major player during World War I, the U.S. can be seen as having
undergone a century-long rite of passage as an emerging nation.
Significant
events constituting this passage include
·
The trans-oceanic victory against the Barbary Pirates in
the early 1800s[xlvi]
·
American steadfastness against Britain and Canada in the
War of 1812[xlvii]
·
Demonstration of American national strength in prosecuting
war with Mexico over Texas and in pressing home the advantage afterwards in
terms of advantageous territorial absorptions [xlviii]
·
U.S. resolve in contravention of international law and
custom during the civil war naval action against the CSS Florida in Brazilian
territorial waters outside of Bahia[xlix]
·
American initiative in leveraging the USS Maine incident to
wage an inter-oceanic war with a weakened Spain, resulting in the acquisition of
a major Pacific foothold in the Philippines, apart from Caribbean strongholds in
Puerto Rico and Cuba[li]
The
most notable characteristic of these demonstrations of America’s strength and
its gift for independent action is the relative economy of effort in terms of
personnel and materiel losses. In
other words, the price paid by the American citizenry to support their national
efforts to carve a place for themselves among the great powers of the day was
well within acceptable bounds (the American Civil War was an entirely different
matter in terms of losses, but that conflict was more about impressing one’s
fellow countrymen).
The
will and the way
The
Indian nation state has also shown its own sense of purpose and resolve several
times since its very infancy. These
instances include
·
Sardar Patel and V.P. Menon’s integration of the princely
states[lii]
into the Indian Union in the face of British obduracy during 1947-49
·
The liberation of Goa[liii]
in 1961 from NATO[liv] member Portugal’s yoke
·
The liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 despite the pressure
of the Nixon-Kissinger nuclear threats[lv]
·
The grant of full and proper statehood[lvi]
to Sikkim in 1975 despite international opposition
·
The forceful gate-crashing of the Nuclear Weapons Powers
Club in 1998 through the testing of multiple designs of fully-weaponized nuclear
devices at Pokhran[lvii]
Even
so, India has thus far not shown the world that it is fully capable of truly
breaking its geopolitical shackles once and for all. Though national resolve has been amply demonstrated, national
strength and power have not yet been undeniably unsheathed.
A
two-pronged strategy
Indian
military prowess will impress the American-led International Community if India
repeatedly does two things:
a)
Demonstrate capabilities that they have not
demonstrated
References
[i] Stephen
Kotkin, “Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000”,
OUP, ISBN: 0192802453, pp-18-27
[ii] Ashutosh Mishra,
“Talbott - Jaswant Talks: Vying for distant possibilities”, JNU, 6
August 1998, http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/128-usr-asutosh.htm
[iii] March 1942 Correspondence
between Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the US, 1941-46 and Sumner
Welles, Acting U.S. Secretary of State, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box36/t327k02.html
[iv] President Truman’s State
of the Union Speech to the U.S. Congress, 1954, http://www.intac.com/~rfrone/history/1953-sou.htm
[v] Inaugural address to the
Indian Constituent Assembly by Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha, its Provisional
Chairman, 9 December 1946, http://alfa.nic.in/debates/vol1p1.htm
[vi] M.K. Gandhi, My
Experiments with Truth, Beacon Press Edition, ISBN0-8070-5909-9, pp 318-319
[vii] Jawaharlal Nehru,
“Glimpses of World History”, Oxford University Press; ASIN: 0195623967,
pp 214-215
[viii] Then General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, Indian Army Western Command, later General and
Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, still later Field Marshal
[ix] K Subrahmanyam, “Arms
& the Mahatma - No place for pacifism in security”, the Times of
India, 8 May 1997
[x] http://www.mkgandhi.org/biography/gndnonv.htm
[xi] Ashutosh Varshney,
“US-China relations, not India-Pakistan, are the real cause for
concern in south Asia”, the Financial Times, 6 August 1998
[xii] Amulya Ganguli,
“Marxist Blunderbuss”, the Hindustan Times, 24 January 1997
[xiii] http://www.megastories.com/china/glossary/march.htm
[xiv] Stephen P. Cohen, Michael
H. Armacost, “India: Emerging Power”, the Brookings Institution; ISBN:
0815700067, pp 230
[xvi] President Clinton’s
address in Hyderabad, 23 March 2000, http://www.rediff.com/business/2000/mar/24usprez.htm
[xvii] The Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/np/mtcr/mtcr.html
[xviii] U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell, Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner, 10 June 2002, http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/powell.html
[xix] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28823-2002Aug16.html
[xx] The elephant has often
symbolized India, much like the Bald Eagle, America and the Lion, England.
This is notwithstanding the Tiger being India’s national animal and
the Ashokan Lions of Sarnath enjoying pride of place in the national seal.
[xxi]From the Bhagwad Gita.
Kingly elephant rescued from a preying crocodile’s jaws by Lord
Vishnu.
[xxii] From the Vishnu Purana.
Four tusked elephant. Steed
of Indra, King of the celestials. Invincible
on the battlefield.
[xxiii] http://www.oecd.org/EN/home/0,,EN-home-0-nodirectorate-no-no-no-0,FF.html
[xxiv]
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca
[xxv]
http://www.un.org/Docs/scinfo.htm
[xxvi] Indian Civilization’s
foremost geopolitical thinker. See
http://www.top-biography.com/9046-Chanakya/
[xxvii]Natural formation
representing Lord Shiva and consequently, a deity deemed worthy of
veneration. See http://
www.srividya.org/Articles/Shivalingam.pdf
[xxviii] The worship of Lord
Shiva. See http://www.shaivism.com
[xxix]Prussian infantry
officer, imparted professional training to the Continental Army as a member
of Gen. Washington’s staff. See
http://www.steubensociety.org/
[xxx] http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/01/
[xxxi] http://www.russojapanesewar.com/index.html
[xxxii] Chen, Jian. China's
Road to the Korean War : the Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. New
York : Columbia University Press, 1994, ISBN: 0231100256 , pp 121
[xxxiii] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/vietnam.htm
[xxxiv] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/prc-vietnam.htm
[xxxv] A.B. Vajpayee,
“Musings from Kumarakom”, New Year’s Eve 2001, http://www.meadev.nic.in/speeches/pm-musings.htm
[xxxvi] Alexis de Tocqueville,
“Democracy in America”, 1835, Volume I, Chapter 3, http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/1_ch03.htm
[xxxvii] Nicholas Phillips,
“Sanatana Dharma”, the Concord Review of Books, Winter 1999, pp 5,6
[xxxviii] Those who attain
salvation through noble actions.
See http://www.susankramer.com/KarmaYoga.html
[xxxix]Those who know
themselves, nature and divinity. See
http://www.geocities.com/neovedanta/a60.html
[xl] Dale Carnegie et al,
“How to Win Friends and Influence People”, Pocket Books; ISBN:
0671723650, pp 32-37
[xli]Social stratification
traditionally based on occupations. Later ossified across generations. See http:// www.hindubooks.org/sudheer_birodkar/
hindu_history/caste2classes.html
[xliii] Unsigned Editorial,
“The Daily Illini”, 23 October 2000, http://www.dailyillini.com/oct00/oct23/opinions/
[xliv] Congressman Rush Holt,
D-NJ, Comments at Friendship Summit, 5 January 2002, Bangalore, http://www.rushholt.com/newspapers/indiatimes.html
[xlv] Patrick J. Buchanan,
“Death of the West”, Dunne Books; ISBN: 0312285485; pp 8, 14
[xlvi] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/barbary.htm
[xlvii] http://www.orbat.com/site/data/historical/usa/usn1812.html
[xlviii] http://www.dmwv.org/mexwar/concise.htm
[xlix] http://www.csnavy.org/cssfla.htm
[l] http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org12-6f.htm
[li] http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/
[lii] "Story of
Integration of Indian States", V.P. Menon, Advent Books; ASIN:
0861314654, pp 24,25
[liii] http://goatourism.nic.in/fjipgoa.htm
[liv] American-led military
alliance in Europe. See http://www.nato.int
[lv] C. Raja Mohan,
“India, U.S. bury the ghosts of 1971”, the Hindu, 7 December 2001
[lvi] http://sikkim.nic.in/sws/sikk_his.htm
[lvii] The 1974 test was
officially not termed a weapons test, but as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE).
See
C.V. Sundaram, “Atomic Energy
in India – 50 Years”, NIAS News
[lviii] http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Images-1984.html
[lix] http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1970s/Siachen.html
[lx] http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-4/harry.html
[lxi] http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Kargil/Shenag.html
[lxii] U.S. Senate Hearing on
"Crisis in South Asia: India's Nuclear Tests", 13 May 1998,
http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/helm0513.htm
[lxiii] http://newsarchives.indiainfo.com/spotlight/nuclear/
[lxiv] http://www.fas.org/irp/wwwinfo.html
[lxv] Ashley J. Tellis,
“India's Emerging Nuclear Posture”, RAND Corp., ISBN: 0-8330-2774-3
MR-1127-AF, 2001, pp 7-14
[lxvi] http://encarta.msn.com/find/concise.asp?mod=1&ti=761568357&page=2#s37
[lxvii] President Bush’s
State of the Union Speech to the U.S. Congress, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html
[lxviii] http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/07/17/leone.peacekeepers.02/
[lxix] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/919992.stm
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