KPS Gill as Director General of Police in Punjab has been identified more than any other single individual with the defeat of terrorism in Punjab. This article seeks to vindicate the author’s beliefs and strategies in dealing with the Punjab Crisis. Specifically, it asserts that (1) normalcy in Punjab could not be restored without a coherent civil-military plan that included a clear mandate for the security forces, preferably lead by the Punjab Police, to pursue those individuals and organizations that committed acts of terrorism, and (2) that such an effort will involve force, that the use of such force is not only the right, but also the duty of the state. Gill bears these claims out with statistics and a detailed narration. The article is aimed squarely against the sections of the Indian (and some Western) press, polity, human rights NGOs and the public who tend to oppose any use of state force. These same sections have leveled the most damaging claims of grave human rights abuse against Gill and the security forces. Gill however does not seriously deal with such claims in the paper.

The title is a little misleading, as Gill spends almost the entire first half of the paper describing the political scene, terrorist activities, and the Punjab Police in the years 1981-1987. He paints a convincing picture of a police force paralyzed, like the rest of Punjab by the unfamiliar phenomenon of terrorism gradually reshaping itself, despite a political establishment alternately unwilling and unable to provide coherent leadership. Gill addresses the contentious issues of the 1984 Operation Bluestar (for which he blames Indira Gandhi, rather than the Army), and the anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi instigated by members of Indira Gandhi’s Congress (I) party upon her assassination by a vengeful Sikh bodyguard later that year. In his words, "I regard Operation Bluestar and the November 1984 massacres as the two most significant victories for the cause of ‘Khalistan’…not won by the militants, but inflicted … upon the nation by its own Government … These two events, in combination, gave a new lease of life to a movement which could easily have been contained in 1984 itself." Whether the movement could have been 'contained' in 1984 seems questionable, given the descriptions of the state of police, public and political fear.

There are several sub-themes to this paper. The importance of a combined civil-military policy in successfully dealing with terrorism figures prominently. The article correlates the roller-coaster statistics of deaths due to terrorism and geographic distribution of such activities with the political strategies of different administrations at the state and central level. He saves his harshest words for the VP Singh and Chandrashekhar governments, whose misguided policies of terrorist recognition and negotiation reversed the dramatic and hard fought victories of 1988-1989. One of the other sub-themes is police primacy. Gill demonstrates that the Punjab Police bore the brunt of the effort at least in terms of casualties. It was also crucial in creating the intelligence gathering, processing, and dissemination machinery that allowed security forces to target terrorists and their support infrastructure. Gill is also explicit regarding his reservations over the use of the army in such operations. He describing the army as temperamentally and operationally unsuitable for such conditions, predisposed by nature to short term goals and local hostility and thus incapable of gathering the same depth and breadth of intelligence. He does however acknowledge their value as pools of manpower for major operations. The author denounces the mistrust of the army and paramilitaries towards the police. However, the author admits that the police did have a problem with motivation as well as a significant proportion of individuals with Sikh separatist sympathies - an echo of the Indian situation in Kashmir.

If one accepts the premise of police primacy, we must ask what made the difference between the police of 1983 and 1989, given that the ethnic demographics of the force remained roughly the same. The answer is talented and determined individuals at the top such as Gill, who in turn weeded and tended personnel to shape a force willing and capable of defeating terrorism. As a Punjabi with considerable police experience in the frequently insurgent North East of India and a Sikh who understood local peculiarities, he was exactly the right kind of person to be appointed DGP, Punjab Police in 1988. This is an important lesson learned that will does not articulate, perhaps out of a misplaced sense of modesty.

Gill is careful to stress the paramount importance role of public disenchantment with the forces of Khalistan in turning the tide. He attributes this turning to the inherent criminality of the terrorists. However, one may conclude that this had just as much to do with greater security from terrorist retribution due to security forces gains, as well as schemes such as Village Defense Committees, Home Guards and Special Police Officers. Gill also describes the hugely successful civil disobedience and political subversion that accompanied the 1990-1991 upswing in terrorist activity, that depended in at least in part on media amplification. Gill tacitly admits that the Punjab crisis could have continued for much longer if the separatists and their political fronts had not made the strategic error of boycotting the 1991 elections - a decision in which neither Gill nor the security forces played any part in. An electoral victory would have conferred the kind of domestic and even international legitimacy they could no longer extract at gun-point, while possibly fracturing the political consensus to defeat terrorism. This important issue deserved more attention.

This paper is a long but worthwhile read, valuable not least because it comes from the man who was in the hot seat. As far as counterinsurgency goes, Gill is conventional in that he adheres to the principles of minimum force, civil-military co-ordination, defeating subversion of the political system, and flexibility. However, the background to the separatist movement is limited to rhetoric rather than incisive analysis- possibly because Gill was not part of the scene in those times. A recommended reading list at the end for deeper study would have been greatly appreciated. One awaits the chance to read Gills book, 'Knights of Falsehood' which covers the entire period in greater depth. It remains to be seen whether it will take the shape of a COIN handbook, a history, a scholarly treatise, or further attempts at vindication, or a combination of the above.

Bharat Karnad.  'A New Strategy for the LoC & Low-intensity Warfare in Kashmir'. Faultlines 2, 1999: 116-137

This article is based on the thesis that international law is made by powerful countries to be twisted to subserve their interests. From this, it can be shown that in international law is incongruent and often contradictory, and that sticking to the letter of the law is responsible for the reactionary position that New Delhi finds itself in. The implication of this is that India needs to undertake actions that exploit the loopholes that the contradictions in International law permit it to do. In this, Karnad may appear to advocate that which he despises; nonetheless, his recommendations represent a maximalist position. It is instructive to note that the maximalist position is one that presses for Pakistani acceptance of the Line of Control (LoC) as an international boundary, and is in ironic contrast to the continuing actions of the Pakistani government.

The lesson of all the previous wars fought by India was crystallized in the lessons of Kargil, and that lesson is that India has not learned from its past. The danger in the Indian diplomatic and military success in Kargil is that the nation is very likely to use the success as justification for continuing its existing policies. Karnad is emphatic that any such status-quoism condemns India to dealing reactively with Pakistan dictating the tempo of the interaction.

The primary goal that Karnad advocates is the conversion of the Line of Control into an International Border. To achieve this aim, he advocates reciprocating the Pakistani strategy in its entirety; tackling Pakistan in the political-ideological realm; mounting Special Forces operations all along the LoC to grab territory; and assisting malcontents within Pakistan. Karnad justifies the violation of LoC from international law relating to Cease-Fire Lines, and the practical irrelevance of the Simla Accord. Karnad makes the distinction between violations of the LoC and the IB from a nuclear threshold standpoint, indicating that violations of the IB will raise the nuclear ante. It is unclear if his assumption that an Indian violation of the LoC will not raise the nuclear ante is justified, although this justification is based on Pakistani violations of the LoC.

The obvious dichotomy between what can be said and what must be done implies the necessity for a superior public relations infrastructure. Such an infrastructure, which does not exist currently, must be able to convince domestic and international pressure groups of the validity and necessity of the actions of the Indian government. As mentioned at the outset, Karnad’s recommendations are maximalist in nature. The past few years have witnessed a hardening in the Indian stand. If the subversive activities of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence in Kashmir and elsewhere in India do not subside it is quite likely that these maximalist stances will gain ascendancy. Clearly, the situation will become unstable as this occurs. This increasing danger, Karnad believes, is the only message Pakistan is likely to understand.

It is widely acknowledged that the three critical determinants of great power status are a security surplus, military and economic hard power, and political, social and intellectual soft power. Media management and public relations is a function of the state of intellectual soft power that is available and used. The Indian record of accomplishment in this area is reflected in its frequent failure to exhibit intellectual leadership, initiative, and creativity in international and diplomatic affairs. Other aspects of the lack of intellectual soft power are its frequent failure to anticipate problems both in domestic and international affairs. Ultimately, we must consciously pursue the creation of intellectual soft power, as it does not flow from economic hard power.

Sachdev seeks to analyze the lessons that emerge from the Kargil war in order to develop a better model for future interactions between the military and the media. The article establishes the importance of media management without entering the specifics of how this may be achieved. The history of defense journalism is briefly discussed to highlight the colonial baggage that the Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) continues to carry. It appears that no review of public relations from the military standpoint has been undertaken, and consequently, the lessons from the past have not been adequately learned. The bureaucratic hold over the DPR is described as "complete and unquestionable." The implications of bureaucratic rivalry between the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) are observed in the MEA presiding over media briefings of military operations. It is clear that the MEA has a role to play, but it is equally clear that the role of the MEA is not the role of the MOD. The culpability of the bureaucracy in this, as well as other matters of importance to national security, is indubitable.

Numerous instances of media mis-management from the Kargil war are recounted. These include a failure to rebut inaccurate and uncomplimentary rumors, delayed briefings giving the enemy the initiative to mould public and international opinion, poor management of international press, and inept handling of potentially positively explosive events (such as the return of mutilated bodies of Indian soldiers and the recovery of bodies of Pakistani soldiers on Indian soil). Although the author does not discuss it, the information management during the Atlantique incident, and the Indian Airlines hijacking to Qandahar illustrate that few of the lessons have been learned.

The author focuses on the content of the media briefings rather than on the methodology of these briefings. Clearly, a war fought on television owes as much to the images on television as much as the content of those images. Clearly, the MOD, Military, and the MEA need to groom spokespersons that are articulate, confident, and knowledgeable. This implies that these spokespersons need not be from the civil services, or the armed forces. The pragmatic implementation of the Official Secrets Act is also critical. Finally, the need for the different branches of government to work together is also noted. Information warfare is critical in the future and if we don’t prepare for it, history has shown us that we will unerringly repeat our past mistakes.

K. Prabha. 'Defining Terrorism'. Strategic Affairs. Vol XXIV No 1, April 2000.

Prabha analyzes the many definitions of a terrorist, in a search for a definition that fits all the important aspects of terrorism. This search for an all-encompassing definition is driven by the belief that recognizing terrorism is essential to preventing it.

The author presents many definitions of a terrorist and explains why they do not describe the terrorist problem in its entirety. The author suggests that the oft-quoted definition of terrorism as the use of violence against random civilian targets lacks the crucial aspect of international linkage in its description. The United Nations description of a terrorist as a criminal is characterized as misleading because it does not address the political motive that distinguishes the criminal from the terrorist.

The author concludes that terrorism may be defined as "an act or threat of an act of tactical violence by a group of trained individuals, having international linkage, to achieve political objectives." Clearly, this definition does not differentiate between state and non-state actors that pursue political goals through military intervention. It is possible that the blurring of the roles played by state and non-state actors was deliberate, and designed to draw attention to the role of the Pakistani government and its Inter Services Intelligence in aiding terrorists in India. However, by doing so it claims within its ambit any non-peacekeeping military operation launched across international borders and muddies the waters even further. Finally, it is unclear how the above definition makes it any easier to address the issue of terrorism prevention. Nonetheless, the article provides a useful bibliography and review of definitions of terrorism.

B. Chengappa. 'Pakistan’s Compulsions for the Kargil Misadventure'. Strategic Affairs. Vol XXIII No 7, April 1999.

This article seeks to examine the rationale for the Pakistani decision to cross the Line of Control (LoC) and occupy territory in the Kargil area. This article was published immediately after the war, and does not have the benefit of the Kargil Review Committee report or the coup in Pakistan, in formulating its conclusions. Further, the article does not analyze the success or failures of the various objectives. Nevertheless, its conclusions are generally valid because they have addressed the issue at a macro level.

The article concludes that the Kargil intrusion was driven by both political as well as military agendas. This is created by a congruence of long term considerations and short term needs. The long-term considerations involve strategic insecurity, small-nation-syndrome, asymmetry of power driven by India’s threat perceptions involving China and the equalization created by overt nuclearization. The short term needs is linked to domestic political compulsions and the role of radical Islam in the Pakistani polity.

The methodology adopted flows from the military asymmetry and the necessity of unconventional warfare. Although the author does not indicate this, it is clear that Pakistani nuclearization coincides with its escalation of unconventional warfare along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, and International Border (IB) in Punjab. With reference to Kargil, the military goals were to cut off the logistics route to Siachen, alter the status of the LoC, and provide a stimulus to the terrorism in Kashmir. The military goals also involved the threat of nuclearization to create conditions for a cease-fire and international intervention. The political goals were intended to crystallize attention away from the misgovernance of the Sharif administration, and to permit further consolidation of power. The diplomatic goals were the re-internationalization of the Kashmir issue and the involvement of the United States in a favorable resolution of the Kashmir issue.