Nurturing an Anti-India Ethos

Even before the umbilical cord of this offspring was cut by the British midwife, Pakistan had turned around and kicked its unwilling mother, India - with the tribal incursion in 1948 aimed at grabbing Kashmir despite the Standstill Agreement. The pattern of behaviour established then has been repeated time and again: tribal incursions in 1965 leading to a war, because Pakistan thought India was weak enough to be attacked (after a drubbing handed out by the Chinese), and the 1999 incursions in Kargil because it thought India would not have the will to retaliate and, if it did, would not be able to retake the heights.

Pakistan is still convinced of the "brilliant tactic" of invading Kargil and its surroundings. For a population bred on a selective and romanticised pseudo-history of glorious Islamic invaders sweeping across the mountain passes to lay waste to India, the tactic of tribal incursions will naturally appear to seem both militarily brilliant - because victory can be claimed and defeat plausibly denied - as well as historically satisfying. Indians are aware of the deliberate intent with which Pakistan names its missiles Ghauri, Ghaznavi, Abdali and so on - all were marauding Muslim military leaders renowned for their brutal campaigns against the Hindu population of the subcontinent over the past millennium.

It should not, therefore, be surprising that there has never been a single initiative from the Pakistani side based on the "live and let live" principle. From the start, it has focused its anti-Indian ethos around the Kashmir issue, which is conveniently intractable. Convenient, because in the 50 years that have now passed since both countries got independence, every time India has worked to negotiate some kind of settlement - or interim settlement – for Kashmir yet another military flare-up ("tactically brilliant") has put paid to hopes for durable calm in the area.

The generosity displayed by India after the comprehensive defeat of Pakistan in 1971, by returning vast tracts of territory as well as some 95,000 POWs for nothing in exchange, was reciprocated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the following manner: he tore up the 1972 Simla Agreement as soon as he returned to Islamabad. That agreement, with the "soft border" it envisaged for Kashmir, would have gone a long way towards blunting the hard-edged incompatibility of the current positions of either country while sparing the Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) a decade of unremitting bloodshed.

The Lahore Declaration of 1999, achieved initially with the discreet prodding and then the unreserved support of the US, faced a far more ignominious fate. Even while that accord was being signed, Pakistan was sending its soldiers as well as "mujahedin" fighters across the LoC to occupy Indian territory. This was going on as Indian Prime Minister AB Vajpayee visited the symbolically important Minar-e-Pakistan and declared there that India wished the best for Pakistan and wanted mutual friendship and good neighbourliness.

Vajpayee's efforts were not seen by much of the Pakistani media (both Urdu and English) as a gesture in favour or lasting peace, of friendship or even simple goodwill. Rather many, if not most, Pakistanis preferred to view the Lahore Declaration as a "surrender" or a "betrayal" by the Sharif government. Western readers are urged to recognise that, from the Indian perspective, it is becoming increasingly difficult to discern which is worse – i.e. in talking to Pakistan or in not talking to Pakistan.

Pakistanis were goaded into their beliefs about the Lahore Declaration by the majority of politicised Islamic leaders in the country. Their attitude towards the declaration was one of unremitting hostility expressed in the highest decibel from the mosques and madrassas. Not many in India were surprised when the Kargil "almost war" began that very few opinion makers in Pakistan questioned the wisdom of the military establishment in launching that adventure. The majority of Pakistani intellectuals and public opinion lapped up the propaganda that Pakistan had made a brilliant military move and that India was on the verge of "vacating" the Siachen Glacier, of Kashmir being cut off from the rest of India, and so on.

Consequently, the rude shock of forced withdrawal following a supplicatory visit by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Washington was quickly converted into another myth: Sharif, for unspecified "secret" and perhaps personal reasons, had betrayed Pakistan when the military was on the "verge of victory" over India. At least one Pakistani officer has more recently been peddling yet another theory: India had forced Pakistan into invading Kargil and its environs.

Perceptive observers will have noted that in all this time, there has never been any question in Pakistan that the notion of trying to take over territory by miltiary force is itself wrong. No, rather their focus is on why the operation failed. If anyone has seen any article in the Pakistani media questioning the ethical or moral rightness of trying to change borders by force, during or since Kargil, let this writer know.

And therein lies the crux of the problem: Pakistan, the first nuclear power under a military dictatorship and the first Islamic state with a declared nuclear capability, does not consider itself bound by the rules of the game as played by the nuclear powers for the past 50 years.

This is not to say that there is no one in Pakistan who understands the rules of the game. There are many who do, especially in the higher echelons of the military establishment, but for historical, cultural and religious reasons they are not convinced of the immutability of these rules, as the Kargil incursion showed. In other words, awareness and understanding of these rules does not necessarily translate into belief in and commitment towards them.

These realities are cocooned in another myth which has wormed its way quite thoroughly into the psyche of the average Pakistani, due to repeated references in the media as well as statements by demagogic leaders, both military and civilian. This is the myth of the "cowardly Hindu". Radical Islamist leaders advocating violence against India have used these terms to define Indians (regardless of religion) for decades. The idea that "one Pakistani equals 10 Indians" was fashionable within the military establishment during the 1960s, but since the 1971 war it has been replaced by the more "realistic" notion that the "Indian soldiers are cowards". This thinking persists in the Pakistani military establishment today, and post-Kargil speeches by the military dictator, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, reverberate with similar sentiments.

Labelling of this sort fits comfortably within the broad anti-India ethos that has affected every layer of Pakistani society. It merges perfectly with the historical perspective of Muslim invaders repeatedly attacking and laying waste to Hindu kingdoms. When the Kashmir issue is put before the Pakistani public in this kind of psychological and historical framework , it is not hard for the average Pakistani to see the logic and necessity of sending mujahedin over the border. It has been easy for Pakistani political leaders to talk of a "thousand year war" against India to get the masses to vote for them. It is not difficult for military leaders to convince the public of the "brilliance" of a military incursion. And, so long as this anti-India mindset remains, it will not be too difficult to do so again in the future. Therein lies the danger to India of a stable and prosperous Pakistan.

What Does Stability Imply?

When the issue of a stable Pakistan is raised under these circumstances, it would not be unnatural for Indians to ask: what does "stability" imply? For the Security Council permanent (P5) powers, a stable Pakistan is one that does not do anything to threaten their interests. At the most basic level, this means a Pakistan which pays its debts on time, does not export terrorism through Osama Bin Ladin or others, does not export nuclear materials or expertise, does not export drugs and persuades the Taliban to stop it as well, does not raise the temperature on the LoC to the extent that demands external intervention, and tries to maintain a modicum of civility and predictability in its political institutions even if it is not necessarily democratic.

These elements can be regarded as the bare minimum of what a stable Pakistan implies to the P5. Additional, but not necessary, elements from the perspective of most members of the P5 would be an end to attacks across the LoC by Pakistan-based or supported fighters, some kind of a treaty which finalises border arrangements (as existing or adjusted) with India and a measure of trade and economic cooperation.

Yet are these conditions by themselves sufficient to prevent Pakistan from being a threat to Indian interests? Does this interpretation of stability address the long-term issues of peaceful co-existence, or do they merely shelve uncomfortable realities to be taken out at an undetermined future date? Will a stable Pakistan abandon systematic hate-mongering against India through its information and education systems? Can any assurance be given that a stable and economically prosperous, and therefore stronger, Pakistan will not launch yet another "tribal incursion" or "mujahedin attack" to capture Kashmir?

The reality is that stability as envisaged by the P5, and even some Indian think-tanks, does not address the underlying causes which have brought Pakistan to the pass that it is in today. The elements of stability mentioned above are necessary, but they are not sufficient for a lasting peaceful relationship between India and Pakistan. Indeed, they may even deceive Indian decision makers and strategists into a false sense of security and complacency, setting the stage for yet another disaster, just as the Kargil incursion caught military and political leaders napping because of the Lahore Declaration.

What India really needs is a stable Pakistan that is at peace with itself and its neighbours, including Afghanistan and Iran, a Pakistan that does not covet neighbours' territory based on arguments such as strategic depth (with Afghanistan) or religious issues (with India). On more than one occasion in recent years, Indian prime ministers have clearly and unambiguously stated that India does not covet the territory of Pakistan, nor seek its destruction. On the contrary, they have said that a prosperous and dynamic Pakistan is essential for the stability of all of South Asia. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's declaration at the Minar-e-Pakistan was unprecedented and highly symbolic in this regard.

Islamabad must first acknowledge that a prosperous and stable India is in Pakistan's interest. Then the elements of stability mentioned above must be allowed to come into effect through negotiations that include Kashmir. That India is prepared to acquiesce in such an approach was amply demonstrated in the 1990s, first through the Gujral Doctrine and then through the Lahore Declaration.

More importantly, perhaps, Pakistan must make a comprehensive and concerted effort to eliminate the anti-India ethos that pervades all layers of its society bar a few scattered members of the civilian "peacenik" elite, a bunch with little or no relevance in terms of policy planning let alone decision making. Only that can ensure long-term security, stability and good neighbourliness.

That effort would involve, to list the factors most obvious: (1) reforming the information systems in Pakistan - from schools to the media - so that they do not systematically indoctrinate Pakistanis with the idea that India is an enemy country; (2) putting a lid on the radical Islamist groups that openly espouse jihad against India on grounds that it is an "infidel" country where Islam is in danger; (3) permitting freedom of cultural and social exchange between the peoples of India and Pakistan within the full spectrum of civil and democratic rights; (4) making concrete and time-bound efforts to evolve into an Islamic democracy where there is no place for military coups; and (5) pledging "no first use" of its nuclear weapons after the Kashmir issue is resolved on the basis of a treaty agreement.

Will Wealth Have A Moderating Influence?

There are several points that militate against this possibility in the case of Pakistan. It has a large population of some 150 million that is rapidly expanding. By contrast there are about 3-4 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian people can be lifted out of abject poverty and even to a degree of prosperity within a decade of consistent reforms and injections of moderate sums of aid (say a billion or two/year). Palestinians of the West Bank have over the years become far more "Westernised" than the average Pakistani. Palestinians in general are among the better-educated and secular-minded populations among the Arabs overall. (My point is that the West Bank villager is not remotely comparable to the Pathan from the NWFP).

In Pakistan, we are talking of a literacy rate below 50%. Vast numbers of children are educated in some 40,000 deen madrassas (religious schools) rather than regular schools. The economy is controlled by some two dozen families comprising the "feudal elite". Their vested interest in the status quo is immense and may not be surmountable by the mohajir Gen. Musharraf. Even if it is surmountable, the sort of aid that is required to boost the Pak economy to the level that even a few hundred thousand people will not be prepared for Jihad is incalculable.

Furthermore, the basic fact to remember is that jihad is one of the Pakistani policy instruments for achieving strategic objectives, in this case the annexation of Jammu and Kashmir. An improved economy will not necessarily obviate its validity.

In the final analysis…

Without the promise and implementation of the elements of long-term stability mentioned in this paper, no agreement with Pakistan will serve the ultimate purpose of dispersing the poisonous atmosphere on the subcontinent. The question is whether Pakistan is prepared for such a turnaround, or indeed whether it even desires such a turnaround. Judging from the present situation, there is no justification for any optimism in this regard. On the contrary, jihad is the order of the day.

Gen. Musharraf has personally given a signal of approval for cross-border attacks calling the jihadis freedom fighters. Since he took power, the level of militant activity has heightened considerably. Although he has repeatedly called for talks with India, there is no indication, obvious to the general public, that he will back down from the path of confrontation. He has made it clear that he prefers to talk while Pakistan is holding the jihadi’s gun at India’s head.

Moreover, Musharraf has himself said that even if the Kashmir issue is resolved, Pakistan’s problems with India will not end. This is a mild version of what the radical Islamists are saying. There are enough and more calls from them for India to be cut into pieces, for the capture of "Hyderabad, Junagadh and Manavadar", for the ascendance of Islam over all of India and so on.

In this environment, a stronger Pakistan would only redouble its efforts to undermine stability and prosperity in India. Pakistani leaders have for decades been advocating a zero-sum game and have yet to articulate a positive sum scenario that was not meant primarily for Western (read American) consumption.

So how exactly does it help India to act on the basis that Pakistan’s stability and prosperity is in its best interest? On the contrary, weakening Pakistan and making it pay a high price domestically for its export of terrorism would perhaps be more effective in dealing with the problems that Pakistan pose to India.

It may be pertinent to point out also that the idea of a "failed" Pakistan being worse for India than the current situation must be re-examined. What does an unstable Pakistan truly imply? The nightmare scenario projected is one of loose nukes, refugees and a new wave of Taliban-style fighters armed with whatever is in the Pakistani arsenal surging into Kashmir.

The issue of "loose nukes" is a red herring. The military in Pakistan have firm control over the nuclear weapons and will continue to exercise it until there is total disintegration. At that point, say in a Somalia or Afghanistan like situation, which small group will have the capability or know-how to launch a nuclear-tipped missile against India, especially if India plays no obvious or active role in Pakistan’s descent into chaos?

Moreover, in the event of Pakistan’s collapse, does anyone really believe that the "international community" is going to sit by and watch the nuclear weapons dispersed. Not likely at all. The loose nukes situation in the former Soviet republics was just as bad, if not worse. The experience gained there can be applied with modifications for the Pakistani context, with the US playing a leading role with strong intelligence co-ordination with India. Apart from Punjab, the other provinces are not likely to be very resistant especially if becomes clear that Pakistan will not survive as one entity.

In this writer’s view the possibility of nukes being used is far higher if the Pakistani military establishment gets stronger and has more money in its pockets. Then it will be just a matter of time before they think up another "brilliant tactical" military strike.

As for Taliban-style fighters threatening India, can the situation get much worse than it is? Already over the past five months more than 1,500 militants are said to have crossed over the LoC, with another 3,000 or thereabouts waiting to make the crossing. Even more can be expected, as the snows melt over the Himalayan passes. In a chaotic Pakistan, even if the numbers of militants prepared to cross the LoC increase by a few thousand, India will at least have relatively more freedom for hot-pursuit, pre-emptive strikes at militant concentrations on the border, etc.

One does not, of course, want Pakistan to disintegrate. But if the objective of Pakistani policy is to cause instability in India and even speak of its ultimate destruction, then there is no question that the Indian response should not be a call for the strengthening and stabilising of Pakistan. India's interest in a stable Pakistan cannot, and must not, be a one-way street.