C. Hobbes

The second anniversary of India’s overt nuclearization provides the opportunity to analyze that seminal event, with the benefit of time. Since the tests , India has clarified its nuclear doctrine, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has all but been consigned to failure, and India and Pakistan have gone to war over Kashmir. This article will not go into the rationale for nuclearization, and will only focus on the rationale for overt nuclearization. We will examine why the tests were conducted, whether the rationale of overt nuclearization has been justified, what the Indian nuclear doctrine appears to represent, and whether there is a need for further testing.

Need for Overt Nuclearization

The principal factors that drove overt nuclearization in 1998 were the threat to the viability of the Nuclear option, the "entry into force" of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the destabilization wrought by the Pakistani introduction of weapons delivery systems, and the continuing disputes with China. In addition to this are the issues of increased nuclear proliferation, declining prospects of nuclear disarmament, and changes in the strategic doctrines of the major powers [1].

We shall first consider the security environment that India finds itself in. The Chinese doctrine of No First Use (NFU) does not forbid the use of nuclear weapons on what they consider Chinese territory [2]. Given the border disputes with China, Indian analysts have justifiably concluded that this implies a threat of first use in any future border conflict. The only deterrence to this nuclear threat is a nuclear one. Pakistan, both as a covert and overt nuclear state, has maintained a policy of First Use to compensate for its conventional capability. Pakistan is documented as having conveyed threats on three separate occasions before the 1998 tests [3]. It has also maintained that it would not hesitate to attack Indian troops on Pakistani soil with nuclear weapons to prevent a comprehensive military defeat [4]. Taken singly, or together, it is clear that there can be no justification for a unilateral nuclear disarmament by India as long as the disputes with Pakistan or China remain extant. These explain why India needed to retain the nuclear option, but not why it needed overt nuclearization.

The impending "entry into force" of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) held out the prospect of degrading India’s nuclear option. The introduction of the Ghauri with the virtual acquiescence of Washington, India found recessed deterrence untenable. The nonproliferation agenda of the 1990s placed India in a situation, in 1998, where it was being forced to submit to being disarmed without any understanding, much less resolution, of its security constraints. The "entry into force" clause threatened punitive "measures" if India did not accede to the treaty. The CTBT and extant security concerns were the forces driving the nuclear tests [1].

Enhanced Security

The question of whether India’s security has been enhanced in the wake of its overt nuclearization, is a valid one. The Kargil War provides an opportunity to examine this. Detractors of overt or other nuclearization aver that without overt nuclearization there was an extant possibility of contemplating a calibrated attack into Pakistan during the Kargil War [5]. This is dubious, given the documentation of credible Pakistani threats in 1987, and twice in 1990 [4]. In this context, it is useful to consider whether India would have been able to deter a Pakistani attack without a credible deterrent of its own. In the end, India’s overt nuclearization and consequent confidence in its deterrent permitted it to undertake a responsible and calibrated response that paid military and diplomatic dividends.

It is also to be noted that the economic sanctions and diplomatic fallout stemming from the tests have all but disappeared. The United States has withdrawn most of its sanctions [6]. President Clinton had a highly successful visit to India in March [7]. The engagement of the United States in a strategic dialogue has been unparalleled in post-Independence Indian history, and is a direct result of the nuclear tests. These discussions have been extensive and have succeeded in creating a better appreciation of India’s security needs and its maturity.

Draft Nuclear Doctrine

The existence of a nuclear doctrine informs essential participants of the risks of particular actions. A clearly enunciated doctrine has the ability to increase deterrence while limiting an accidental nuclear exchange. The release of a draft nuclear doctrine intended for national debate is an event unprecedented in the history of the Nuclear Age. The essence of this doctrine is the assurance of No First Use and non-use against non-nuclear weapons states [8]. This necessitates the creation of a credible, minimum survivable second-strike deterrent. India does not address the issue of a non-nuclear attack with weapons of mass destruction such as chemical or biological weapons. Moreover, the choice of NFU was driven by the need for stable deterrence and emphasizes massive assured retaliation [9]. The emphasis on assured retaliation addresses the concerns of rapid escalation and accidental nuclear war. The deterrent called for is ultimately envisaged as being a land, air and sea based triad, although India has clarified that the near term will see a deterrent posture based on air and land based assets [10]. A clear chain of command is called for, and believed to be in place [11].

Credibility and Further Tests

The credibility of a nuclear deterrent depends on the existence of workable weapons, the existence of reliable, functional, and reasonably accurate delivery systems and the command and control of weapons, and the will to use these weapons. In the Indian context, with a focus on massive retaliation against counter value (major enemy cities and industrial centers) and counter force (enemy nuclear assets) targets, a credible weapon is one with a yield in the 20-200kT range. This implies the necessity for thermonuclear weapons. In addition, India is believed to have successfully tested a device based on reactor-grade material. This will extend the options available to weapons fabricators. Comments from various sections of the weaponization community indicate that the tests were successful [12]. Further, detailed rebuttals of dissenting opinions have been offered.

The issue of whether further tests are necessary for a credible posture is one that must be addressed. Any continuing questioning of Indian thermonuclear capability is likely to force India to demonstrate, by means of a full-scale test, its capability. There have been calls for this from sections of the scientific community [13]. In addition, are calls for tests of lighter weight payloads. There have also been calls for tests of enhanced radiation weapons. There is little doubt that India has the capability to develop these weapons. Given the Indian doctrine of assured retaliation, it seems unlikely that India would want to degrade the threshold of nuclearization. This, however, does not militate against retaining the capability to do so.

Conclusion

The Indian nuclear tests succeeded in securing the options necessary to deal with its extant security threats. They, further, succeeded in eliminating the threat of denuclearization held out by the CTBT. The tests drew attention to the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament. Finally, the strategic dialog with the United States holds out the prospect for a greater recognition of India’s role in Asian and international affairs.

1. Jasjit Singh, "India’s Nuclear Policy: The Year After," Strategic Analysis 23 (4) http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jul9-1.html
2. Tai Ming Chen quoted in Swaran Singh, "China’s Nuclear Weapons and Doctrine," in Jasjit Singh (Ed.) Nuclear India (New Delhi: Knowledge World in association with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses).
3. Kargil Review Commission http://www.alpha.nic.gov.in
4. Gurmeet Kanwal, "Does India need tactical nuclear weapons," Strategic Analysis 24 (2) 247-264. http://www.idsa-india.org/an-may-03.html
5. P. R. Chari, "Kargil’s Pokharan Connection," The Hindustan Times (April 25, 2000) http://www2.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/250400/detOPI01.htm
6. "A limited move," The Tribune (December 21, 1999) http://www.meadev.gov.in/opn/99dec/21tr.htm
7. C. Uday Bhaskar, "Clinton’s visit and the Nuclear Narrative," Strategic Analysis 24 (2) 207-219. http://www.idsa-india.org/an-may-01.html
8. Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on the Indian Nuclear Doctrine http://www.meadev.gov.in/govt/indnucld.htm
9. K. Subrahmanyam, "A credible deterrent," http://www.meadev.gov.in/opn/99oct/4toi.htm
10. Interview with Jaswant Singh http://www.meadev.gov.in/govt/eamint-nov28.htm
11. Gurmeet Kanwal, "Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India," Strategic Analysis 23 (10) 1707-1731. http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan00-5.html
12. Interview with R. Chidambaram http://www.meadev.gov.in/opn/99dec/04ie.htm
13. P. K. Iyengar, "In testing times – repercussions of signing the CTBT," Times of India (Feb 17, 2000) http://www.timesofindia.com/170200/17edit4.htm