The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) Report makes a number of recommendations based on its findings. These recommendations can be broadly categorized into four areas of reform - National Security Establishment, Intelligence, Armed Forces, and other. Let us examine the recommendations in these broad categories.

National Security Establishment reforms

The report recommends the establishment of a full time National Security Adviser (NSA), as the job is demanding in attention. Combining the offices of the Principal Secretary to the PM and the NSA will lead to information overload and both the functions cannot be fulfilled to satisfaction. A second echelon group of personnel is also suggested. A full time NSA is a laudable goal but this should be balanced with the bureaucratic setup in India. Creating a new office is not enough. It should have power and responsibility by Act of Parliament to ensure that the office is not under-cut due to bureaucratic squabbles. In order to sensitize the Establishment of the importance of assessed intelligence briefings; the report recommends periodic briefings on intelligence. This is good but sensitization occurs with education. Without education this recommendation could end up becoming a dog and pony show. A better approach would be to conduct short courses in the importance of intelligence at the National Defense College for those in the leadership track to raise awareness of the subject.

The report studies the lack of centralized decision making in the national security management structure. It bemoans the lack of integration of the civil and military wings of the Ministry of Defense and the absence of the position of the Chief of Defense Staff. It recommends the integration of the civil and military wings and the appointment of a Chief of Defense Staff. It rightly points out civilian control will increase with this measure. It also shows that finally India is shedding its colonial mind set. This is the only way after the nuclearization of South Asia. Clearly, some of the junior services have misgivings . However, with increasing emphasis on joint warfare new leaders will be created who are able to be force commanders instead of single service assets.

The Report recommends the creation of a white paper on the Indian Nuclear Weapon Program and Policy. Although the recent publication of books on this subject, are gratifying there are still gaps. These gaps provide opportunity for detractors. A major concern is the depiction of the ‘strategic enclave’, influencing the decision to test. This has to be dispelled. The West is obsessed by the Dr. Strangelove syndrome of out-of-control behavior. This is understandable, and it is necessary to avoid a ‘loose nukes’ scenario. However, Indian scientists deserve better than this characterization. The reluctance of the political leaders, involved in the weapons program, to acknowledge their role after the tests, has done a lot of damage to the Government of India. It has been depicted in many quarters as having been single-minded in deciding to test for political reasons. Clearly, all the evidence does not have to be made public but the important fact is to put on record that the decision to test was made after due deliberations on its impact. It is necessary to document the decision making process to clarify that observed mis-steps after the tests were primarily due to lack of information and misunderstanding by those not in the loop, rather than ad hoc decision making.

A major policy recommendation of the report is to have a declaratory policy for Line of Control (LoC) violations. This is very important as the report continually finds that Pakistan has erred repeatedly in reading the Indian response to cross border aggression and terrorism. There is merit in the suggestion that unless all elements are in place to support such a declaration it will not achieve its purpose. This means the NS apparatus, the Ministry of Defense and Armed forces integration and modernization of the forces. The current stalemate is due to the Pakistani threat to resort to nuclear weapons if there is any escalatory actions across the LoC to counter terrorism. Their doctrine also calls for a riposte strikes across the international borders into India. The force modernization policy has to be such that it can blunt the riposte wherever it is deployed and still execute the counter terrorism measures without having to resort to nuclear forces. There should be no ambiguity about the deployment of these forces in order to convey assured retaliation in case any thresholds are breached in anger or desperation. The force balance between India and Pakistan in the region of interest will be less than 1.5:1. As manpower is less expensive to match, India must increase the technological edge. A lesson can be learned from NATO plans for stopping Warsaw pact assaults during the Cold War. All this will be expensive and needs prudent resource allocation and expenditure.

The report recommends measures to win back alienated segments of population. The idea of India has to take hold in the minds of the population and the parochial tendencies should be discouraged. However, this should not be mistaken for appeasement.

Intelligence Reforms

The KRC report has an extensive set of recommendations in this area in view of the principal finding of total surprise in anticipating the Pakistani actions at Kargil. The Report starts by recommending augmenting the surveillance capability through satellite imagery. It is deplorable that despite having an advanced set of space systems - IRS series of satellites – these resources have not been adequately used. The establishment has been adamant about exercising shutter control on sale imagery of India and that would lead one to conclude that it was being tasked for this purpose. However, it appears that was not the case. Reasons include lack of sufficient resolution; equator-crossing occurring when most of the hills would be covered in fog, and other priorities. What this means is a radar based satellite is necessary in addition to what is available or planned. Their suggestion on two-stream approach for downloading and interpretation is dependent on the resolution desired. Current capabilities are better served with ISRO downloads and interpretation/quick look by Armed Forces personnel at ISRO site. Further processing of time invariant data for other uses can be at Armed Forces locations. With the move towards civilian imagery to 1meter resolution, this approach should be cost-effective.

The report recommends the acquisition of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the timely dissemination of acquired information to users. The report also suggests augmenting the Cheetah helicopter flights with other less vibration prone craft while the UAVs are acquired.

It also commends the acquisition of the tapes of the conversation between Pakistani generals and shows the progress achieved in this field by India. However, it calls for revamping technical/signals intelligence gathering in a single agency akin to the NSA in the US. This area appears to be a good area to integrate the assets in RAW and the Armed Forces for strategic intelligence. The forces still need their tactical units. All these recommendations show the tactical focus of the report on intelligence reform.

The report recommends the creation of a separate defense intelligence agency. This is a major recommendation and needs consideration due to the changed circumstances in South Asia after the tests. There is a need to obtain actionable intelligence useful to the forces for their deterrence and combat role. The civilian agency could concentrate on gathering strategic intelligence and assessments. The danger is that most of the recommendations being made are of a tactical nature and there is possibility of another surprise due to the tactical focus.

The committee suggests revamping the roles of existing agencies by having the technical collection fed into a premier national intelligence agency, which has access to all available inputs. This is similar to the charter of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the US. A committee to probe the failure at Pearl Harbor created the latter after the end of World War II. India has had to pay a high price for not learning from others. However, incomprehensibly, it does not call for designating the RAW as the premier national service although it is the most suited to the task given adequate resources. The head of RAW should be designated Director of National Intelligence ad the analysis wing restructured to ensure access to all available inputs. It needs estimates and assessment offices, mechanisms for interagency cooperation, and a reduction in the hierarchical nature of the organizations involved.

It further finds that the present system of collection and assessments is outmoded and does not deliver the all the available assessed intelligence. It recommends a thorough re-examination of the roles and missions of the intelligence system and a rectification of the deficiencies. The bane of Indian intelligence system has been the multiplicity of agencies working in compartments and not providing a centralized assessed estimates to the policy makers. The principal intelligence fault at Kargil was the focus on strategic issues to the neglect of tactical intelligence. This strategic focus was due to the lack of penetration of enemy organizations. Strategic intelligence was pursued since it did not require such skills. Hence, there is a need for technical means to overcome the obstacles. In addition, this needs resources - financial and human. Allocation of these resources is a government function that the report does not discuss.

Another issue not discussed is the bureaucratic nature of the organizations. The failure to pass on information and wait for proper channels is plain shirking duty and smacks of politicking and a measure of the lack of responsibility in the bureaucratic system in India. It is time to assess whether the civil service method of selection of personnel for this task has served India well in this matter. There has to be induction of fresh blood taken even by lateral induction of experts and an outlet has to be provided for service officials to quit who are disinterested and have lost the drive for public service.

The report further concludes that Pakistani action at Kargil was irrational and needs study. It recommends the extension of the pool of experts to include outside the government. It suggests the establishment of think tanks and country specialization at universities and exchange of interaction between the academia and the community. The report seems to ignore the fact that there already exists an infra structure for this type of activity- the eighteen area studies centers in the University system. However, these are neglected by the establishment and under-funded. In addition, the Ministry of External Affairs that should take a lead in the running of these centers is totally wrapped up in its bureaucratic aura.

However, the idea that Pakistani adventure in Kargil was irrational is questionable. Pakistan’s immediate objective was to occupy the heights to cut the road to Siachen. Its medium term objective was to grab territory and obtain possession in case of an internationally arranged cease-fire. Its long-range objective was to raise the bogey of nuclear escalation and bring in international mediation in Kashmir. All these got forestalled by the GOI not crossing the LoC and exercising restraint. To argue that Pakistan’s behavior was irrational is thus not correct. If the supposition is true then the whole deterrence issue becomes moot and will drive the cost of weaponization.

Armed Forces reforms

The KRC report makes a series of recommendations for revamping the Armed Forces including counter terrorist operations. The bulk of the recommendations is Army related but applies to the other services also. The Committee recognizes that proxy war at the borders and the terrorism is the twin short-term threats facing the country. In order to fight these they suggest adopting an integrated manpower and equipment policy for the Armed Forces, para-military and Central Police forces. They make some suggestions here which could improve the functioning of the secondary forces and thus allow the Armed Forces the task of fighting external forces. While the goal is correct, the manner of implementing should be carefully studied. The issue is the nature of the institutional culture of the forces. Armed forces should not be tied down fighting local insurgencies as it detracts from their mission. In addition, para-military and central police forces by nature face a different mission- controlling civilian unrest. If these are combined or personnel interchanged it could lead to wrong results. The via media is to improve the para-military/civil police forces in training and equipment. They should be deployed as the main insurgency fighting force as the Armed Constabulary force is meant to be. The armed forces have to be trained and equipped for fighting external forces. In addition, if that needs the creation of a National Guard or a Territorial Army, then we must pursue that route. There should be no confusion in the roles and missions of these types of forces. The goal should be to create highly effective force structures to combat these two short-term menaces.

An area not mentioned is the creation of joint commands combining all fighting assets. This becomes a necessity in order to optimize the resource utilization and is a follow-up to the recommendation to create a Chief of Defense Staff A notional structure would create theater commanders who control all force assets including civil forces. The principal border commands could be commanded by Army officers and the Southern Theater by naval officer. The Air Force could command the Central Theater with the strategic assets. These have to be accompanied by necessary skill upgradation in the combat colleges.

The related subject of border management is handled separately. The report recommends the integrated approach to the subject of border management, which has become complex due to multifarious threats – smuggling, narcotics, illegal immigration, and terrorists. Currently a multitude of agencies under separate ministries fight this menace and are quite ineffective.

On the important subject of Defense Budget, which is needed to carry out all reforms the report does not suggest any percentages but advises that force modernization dealing with high altitude warfare needs should have priority. The report while being correct in its stance of not recommending definite percentage of GDP should have suggested notional numbers as benchmarks in order to carry out the reforms suggested. The issue is in India recommendations are made without regard to affordability and remain un-implemented.

Other reforms

The report deals with media relations and management in this section. While describing Kargil as India’s first TV war, it points out the fact that there was no infrastructure to support the media at the front lines. There were no systematic briefings to the correspondents. This led to rumors and speculations being passed off as reporting. This did untold damage to morale of the fighting soldiers. It lauds the Army for reviving the war correspondent course at its College of Combat. This should be augmented with instructors from the other services so that a tri-service perspective is given.

While the report is correct about the role of the media in shaping the public perception, an important factor is Indian public is media aware and the functioning of the spokespersons was quite lacking. The daily press briefing was pathetic with three different spokespersons with bad accents. The quality of the microphones compounded the problem. All these led to unnecessary agony for the public. In addition, the foreign media was not given sufficient attention that could counter negative propaganda from the other side. As the war was equally for the mind and attention of international audience, this aspect should have been brought up in the report. The existing DVAP and other machinery was not pressed into service.

The report recommends creating an information channel for the Armed Forces akin to that existing in the US. However with availability of satellite channels the issue of entertainment in remote areas is moot. The important point is to be aware of the need to provide timely and accurate information to the troops and this can be done by other means like regular reports and briefing to existing outlets.

The report faults previous governments in not keeping the public informed of the threats and realities of national security. A suggestion is made to bring out policy documents on subjects of importance and war histories. This documenting is essential in a democratic nation. It also enables the creation of an informed public that understands the actions of the government. Another issue not delved into, but relevant, is the role of the civil service. It is time to examine how well India, is served by the current set-up of the civil services of different cadre. This has to be the subject of another commission.

Conclusion