INDIA'S MISSILES: WITH LITTLE HELP FROM ANYONE

DR MATT THUNDYIL

It has been repeatedly asserted that India's missiles were developed "with a little help" from America and her friends (1). It has been repeated often enough that it has become axiomatic (1-3). We shall examine, in detail, the credibility of the various allegations that are made. Further, we shall explore whether the spotlight on the claimed pedigree is warranted. Finally, we shall examine the purpose of these attempts to discredit and misinform.

Before proceeding any further, we must examine the scientific and engineering method. The issue of pedigree in the context of engineering design is critical in debating whether Indian missiles were either "imported directly, or copied from imported designs." One of the greatest mathematicians this millenium, Sir Isaac Newton said: "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." From a technical standpoint, for a rocket to be "derived" from another, it must be obtained from the "original" either by copying the designs, or by some slight, non-critical modifications of the original. Mere juxtaposition of information to suggest linkage is technically insufficient. Sony invented the Walkman, but numerous other firms have their versions of the same concept on store shelves. This does not imply that the electronic innards of these are copied, or derived from Sony. Only the concept was copied, and this is the hallmark of the scientific method. Newton called it standing on the shoulders of giants.

It is alleged that India’s Agni missile is the result of American, German and French help to India’s space program. Briefly, it is alleged that the first stage of the Agni is the first stage of the SLV-3 rocket, and that the SLV-3 rocket is "an exact copy" of the American Scout rocket (1, 2). It is then alleged that the second stage of the Agni is "its version" of the French Viking (1). The guidance, composite materials and rocket testing technology are alleged to have been "given" to India by the Germans(1). Finally, it is alleged that India’s next generation of missiles will be designed with American equipment (3), in the form of computers and printed circuit boards.

Rockets and missiles are a highly complex combinations of complex systems. To allege that India's SLV-3 is "an exact copy of the Scout,"(2) implies that every system was merely assembled and integrated from a detailed design of the Scout. We must recall that the design specifications for any rockets runs into thousands of pages. There is no evidence that any such blueprints were transferred, or copied by Indian engineers. Unclassified technical reports on the Scout are acknowledged to be transferred, but not actual blueprints(1). The designs of the Scout, and the rocket itself has been transferred to other European nations, which have not gone on to develop the launch capability that India has developed.

Is it even honest to assert that the SLV-3 was derived from the Scout? India's Space Research Organization's (ISRO) SLV-3 was designed to fulfill the same role as the Scout (i.e., put small satellites in Low Earth Orbit). It is therefore not surprising that there is superficial similarity in their shapes. However, it requires significant evidence to jump from this superficial similarity to the claim that "its design is virtually identical to the Scout's." It is necessary to re-emphasize that rockets are highly complex systems, and to compare two rockets by their external appearance is highly dubious.

Even a slightly deeper analysis will indicate that the SLV-3 rocket stages have a different diameters, and different L/D ratios. The various Scout stages were culled together from an inventory of military rocket motors and consequently used a variety of solid fuels including polyurethane. The SLV-3 used hydroxyl terminated poly butadiene (HTPB) in all its stages (4). The second stage of the Scout used the Castor stage. The Castor motor used HTPB as the solid fuel. Significantly, the Castor used a different oxidiser with the Castor stage using acrylic acid (5), whereas the SLV-3 used red fuming nitric acid (RFNA) (4). It is unsurprising then, that propellant weights were also different. The information about the fuels is key, given the relatively short spectrum of solid fuel chemicals. The thrusts and burn times of the different stages are all different. Moreover, the SLV-3's payload is considerably lighter and its fairing is shaped differently. Additionally, the SLV-3 was the first rocket to use proportional control for its first stage control systems with a sharing logic software (6). Given the extent and depth of difference, it is clear that the SLV-3 is neither a "copy" nor "derivative" of the Scout. It is worth recalling the words of a far more technically astute person, Werner Von Braun: "If you want to do anything in rocketry, do it by yourself. SLV is a genuine Indian design." (4)

The cooperation between Germany (Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fur Luftfahrt und Raumfahrt e.V. - DLR) and India (ISRO) receives special attention from Milhollin. Milhollin claims that Germans gave India help in guidance, rocket testing and composite materials (1). The assertion that India tested her SLV-3 in a German wind tunnel contradicts the earlier assertion that the SLV-3 is an "exact copy of the Scout."(2) Clearly, if one is merely assembling a copy there is no need for verificatory wind tunnel tests. In the context of the alleged indispensability of the help received from the Germans, it is necessary to return to the discussion about the scientific method. Training in unclassified (albeit high tech) areas, that are often available in any reputable graduate program does not constitute anything more than just that -- training. This training is an integral part of science. If it was not, consistency of logic insists that any textbooks of advanced physics or applied math be regarded as "dual use" items, worthy of control. The relationship between DLR and ISRO was one of cooperation for mutual benefit. The development of autonomous payload control was a joint venture that took over 6 years to complete. To claim that "the Agni owes its brains to German engineering," Milhollin is reduced to obliquely asking whether it is possible that Indian scientists could "block from their minds everything they had learned from the Germans?" If one can honestly comprehend the scientific method, it is not necessary to demand that Indian scientists "block everything they had learned" earlier as they build newer and better systems. Milhollin makes a similar claim with respect to cooperation with the French in liquid fuel propulsion. Milhollin notes that India's Vikas engine is "its own version of the Viking," and then contradicts himself when he admits that Indian scientists were part of the development of the Viking itself. Finally, the Agni’s liquid fuelled second stage is not based on the Viking engine, and does not use the fuel and oxidizer combination used in it.

The issue of computers is rather interesting. India has developed and sold some of the fastest supercomputers in the world in the last decade. Much of its progress in this field coming as a direct result of its difficulty in obtaining a supercomputer from Cray. Neither of the two computers that Milhollin refers to is even close to being the fastest computer in Indian Institute of Science (IISc), the institute in question. The first Indian Supercomputer developed by the Center for the Development of Advanced Computing (CDAC) called PARAM has the ability to perform 100 billion floating point operations per second (100 Gigaflops), compared to the 6 Gigaflops performance of the IBM obtained by IISc (7). Both the Bhabha Atomic Research Corporation and the Defence Research and Development Organization have their own supercomputers capable of faster speeds than either of the imported computers. Clearly, Mr. Milhollin’s claims are devoid of substance and nothing more than oblique suggestions masquerading as intelligent analysis.

Throughout this article, the resonant theme is that of scientific pedigree. Present advancement based on, now obvious, earlier advancements are the very foundation of scientific progress and method. The focus on technology transfer is of understandable importance given the centrality of nuclear weapon and missile non-proliferation in the West. Policy formulation demands clarity in the distinction between actual transfer of technology (as in Chinese espionage, Chinese nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan, and Chinese, North Korean and Pakistani collaboration in missile development, etc), and technology development. The American space and missile program was literally built by German engineering under the stewardship of Von Braun. However, it is clearly naïve to claim that any achievement of the American space establishment owes its "brains to German engineering." The Indian space program was not built on the back of stolen, copied or transferred technology. There is no denying that some of the best Indian rocket scientists were trained abroad, but it is equally undeniable that some of the best of them were also homegrown. The Indian space program is founded on a solid, committed, technical base. It is the same commitment which has resulted in India being home to the second largest scientific manpower in the world, and in supplying American graduate schools with their brightest and most successful students. Ultimately, the entire thesis built up by Milhollin consists of oblique suggestions, careful juxtaposition, half-truths and baseless extrapolation combined with an ignorance of technical detail.

It is not without good reason that these allegations are made. They are directly linked to the injunction to preserve the status quo in global geopolitics. The critical determinants for achieving great power status are security surplus, military, scientific and economic hard power, and political, social and intellectual soft power. Creating paranoia regarding the "dual use" of advancements in science and technology is aimed at restricting the flow of scientific information to developing countries such as India. This is designed to prevent their acquisition of scientific and economic hardpower. Further, these allegations are designed to extract information from India regarding its advances in these fields. In recent years, following the 1998 nuclear tests, we have witnessed both aspects of this technique. Indian scientists were prevented by immigration impediments from attending conferences in the US, and American scientists were barred from attending conferences in India. The doubts exhibited in the Western media and US Congress regarding the success of the Indian tests is an example of the latter aspect of this technique. Despite this, it is important that these allegations be rebutted. In the case of the nuclear weapons program, the aim is diminishing the credibility of the Indian deterrent. A final aspect of this technique is that it serves to diminish Indian achievements, and consequently detracts from the commercial and other opportunities possible.

References:

1. Milhollin, G., "India’s missiles – With a little help from our friends," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November 1989

2. (http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/misshelp.html)

3. Milhollin, G., Testimony before the US House of Representatives (Committee on Science), June 25, 1998. http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1998_h/980625-milhollin.htm

4. Milhollin, G. "Made in America: How US Exports helped fuel the South Asian Arms Race," The Washington Post, June 7, 1998 http://www.himalmag.com/July98/Nuclear%20bomb/nuclear38.htm

5. Kalam, A. P. J., Wings of Fire. New Delhi, Penguin India 1996.

6. http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4201/ch12-4.htm

7. Abdul Kalam, A. P. J. and Y. S.Rajan. Vision 2020. New Delhi, Penguin India 1997.

8. Bhatt, A. "US N-Expert’s claim refuted" Indian Express (June 14, 1998) http://webpage.com/hindu/daily/980614/02/02140005.htm

The author would like to acknowledge valuable discussion with V S Natarajan and other participants in the Bharat Rakshak Forum.