Since the end of the Cold War, public discourse in the United States has stressed the need for a new paradigm within which to situate its external policies and priorities. Regarding South Asia, opinion has grown since 1996-97 that US policy toward the region is flawed and only capable of yielding partial dividends. At the same time, there is an obvious lack of consensus on what should be the precise determinants of an appropriate and effective policy toward the region. The elusive search for policy equilibrium manifests itself in a variety of ways. This includes the search for a balance between non-proliferation and arms control objectives on the one hand, and between trade and security imperatives on the other.

The spectrum of US public policy discourse represents all shades of opinions, ranging from "near total isolationism" to "limited engagement" to "all-embracing engagement." This same plurality obtains in US policy toward India. To be true, there is a clear preponderance of non-proliferation voices in the US policy over the more eclectic variety. But overall, the multitude of opinion within the discourse is as characteristic of the US presidential system as indeed it is of the Indian parliamentary system. The Indian government should not only recognize this plurality but also take advantage of the resultant dynamic. It should recognize that while there are formidable adversaries on the Capitol Hill, there are significant allies as well. Signals emanating from New Delhi need re-calibration such that they create a domain of "construction interference" with the signals from Washington, and "harmony" instead of "static" is the ultimate policy outcome.

Interactions with policy actors in the senior echelons of the US government indicate that the Indian officialdom have failed to calibrate their approach so as to optimize the gains from this bilateral relationship. Some of these interactions occurred just prior to the 9th round of the Singh-Talbott talks and included detailed meetings in Washington at the Departments of State, Energy, Commerce and Defense with key participants in the strategic dialog process.  While the menu of Indo-US dialogue is rich and varied, the following comments will be confined to the framework of discussion in the Singh-Talbott talks.

The meetings unambiguously conveyed a sense of stolid resignation on the US side that the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in New Delhi would prefer to control not just the framework of discussion, but also the constituent units of who the Indian side would bring to the negotiating table. Given the vast experience of MEA in framing and conducting foreign policy, there is certainly nothing injudicious about it retaining control of the overall negotiating process. But when this control extends to effectively ruling out agency-to-agency dialogue with the US counterparts across the range of topics identified within the framework of Jaswant-Talbott talks, it appears as being overly circumspect and probably counterproductive.

I referred earlier to the fact that while there is greater recognition in Washington that India needs to be upgraded in the US strategic calculus from its current peripheral position, there is scant agreement on how to effect this change. The cause as well as the effect of this situation is that the "non-proliferation voice" is able to dominate the US policy agenda toward India. To counteract this dynamic, the Indian government needs to take at least two steps.

One, it should permit agency-to-agency dialogue which would seek to identify the technical, economic and strategic costs and benefits to each side of pursuing any specific policy trajectory. While final agreement on any of these can still be subject to the overall approval of the MEA and the government of India (GOI), clearer enunciation of the probable costs and benefits would strengthen the hands of the pro-India segments in the US policy discourse. A careful use of select Track Two actors, operating synergistically, can also highlight the domain of bilateral convergence and catalyze the process without contaminating it.

And two, MEA/GOI should adopt a more flexible stance wherein disagreements in certain sectors should not inhibit substantive negotiations in other sectors. The Chinese diplomatic practice is instructive in this regard. In spite of sharp disagreements across a range of highly sensitive issues, Beijing has persisted with cooperation in others while carefully cultivating sympathetic voices in Washington.

To be fair, the Indo-US dialogue is partly a hostage to Washington’s almost puritanical pursuit of the non-proliferation agenda. It needs to be bluntly reminded that non-proliferation is but one arm of the tripod undergirding international security, the other two being arms control and disarmament. But Washington’s purists will not climb down from this convenient high ground because of the fear that acquiescing to the Indian demands could dismantle the global non-proliferation architecture that it has built so painstakingly. This is precisely where the benefits of agency-to-agency dialogue come in. Identification and better enunciation of the costs and benefits of engagement with India would serve to highlight the larger domain of strategic convergence between the two sides.

There are two inter-related issues that are significant in this regard, one each on the US and Indian side. Dating back to the end of the Cold War, the US Department of Defense (DOD) has been conducting studies to assess the market trends and technology needs in the area of advanced conventional weapons (ACWs). Most studies concur that the Pentagon needs to invest considerable additional technical and financial resources into maintaining and enhancing its edge in the development of futuristic ACW technologies. However, its overall effort to develop a state-of-the-art technology R&D base is a mixture of DOD money and private collaboration. As such, it is difficult to arrive at a consensus on whether profits or strategic gains should be the real axis for the measurement of success of a given initiative (1). Indeed, often the Pentagon can or needs to purchase only, say, thirty percent of the sophisticated ACWs from large US-owned multinationals like Boeing or Lockheed Martin.

At the same time, DOD also recognizes that, for instance, Lockheed Martin’s ability to remain a technology leader in the global market depends in part upon the volume of sales worldwide from which it can reinvest a significant portion for further technology upgradation. As such, DOD has limitations on how much it can dictate Lockheed’s sales behavior, or how much of it can be curtailed on grounds of national security and diffusion of ACW technology. Paradoxically, DOD’s ability to benefit from Lockheed’s state-of-the-art technology is in turn a function of how much business Lockheed can generate for its products worldwide. In this context, efforts to stem technology diffusion operate on a competing axis with relatively unrestricted flow of technology. This in turn means that "responsible" behavior on part of Lockheed is the best guarantee for the Pentagon that US technology R&D lead is not frittered away by Lockheed’s commercial pursuits.

Over and above maintaining a close and collaborative relationship with companies like the Lockheed Martin, the Pentagon is also searching for collaborations in select sectors with other countries. In this context, the scope for Trans-Atlantic R&D collaboration has certain limits. The European R&D efforts have reached a stage where instead of concentrating on national resources to emerge as market leaders, they are seeking to pool their resources to create an integrated European technology R&D base. As such, across the board collaboration with the Pentagon or US multinationals is obviously ruled out, especially since the latter are the market leaders and capturing a greater share of the global market from them is the object of this exercise.

In part owing to this limitation on Trans-Atlantic collaboration, the Pentagon is seeking cooperation in the development of select ACW technologies with other US allies or friendly states. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Israel, Hungary and India are potential candidates in respective sectors.

Now let us turn to the Indian side of the equation of Indo-US defense cooperation. As the chief technology generator for GOI, the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has been engaged in several ambitious projects. Many of these have suffered from cost and time overruns, complicating the task of DRDO and forcing the Indian armed forces to shop abroad to secure requisite equipment. The successes of DRDO’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) on the missile front are an exception in this regard. Many other projects including the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the Arjun main battle tank (MBT), the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), and the submarine program (under the Advanced Technology Vessel or ATV initiative), have hit technical snags and consequently not met the operational specifications of the armed forces.

The DRDO has entered into long-term technology collaboration with Russia under the broad rubric of Indo-Russian Military Technical Cooperation (MTC). While Russia is a time-tested and valuable partner for India and DRDO must continue to pursue this avenue, there are certain in-built limitations to this collaboration (2). Many Russian weapons systems employ technologies that make them unsuited for integrating into a major Western weapons platform. If India wishes to produce ACWs with an eye to exports, its ability to capture niche markets will to that extent be limited by the lack of inter-operability of the Russian weapons systems with the Western systems that many potential importers might already possess.

One possible solution for DRDO is to explore technical collaboration with Israel and France for "bridge technologies" that will make the Indian export-variety ACWs more fungible and compatible with the Western weapons platforms. Alternately, or preferably in conjunction with the former, DRDO/GOI should engage in technical discussions with the Pentagon on identifying areas of defense cooperation. Some of this had already begun under the auspices of the Indo-US Defense Policy Group (DPG) and its subsidiary, the Joint Technology Group (JTG), talks. Collaboration regarding mission computers and avionics of the LCA, and their user trials aboard the F-16s, were concrete evidence in this regard. Although the DPG/JTG process has been in suspended animation following the Indian nuclear tests, the same can be resumed given requisite technical will and political adroitness on part of GOI. Further, India’s indigenous capabilities in areas such as software, electronics, solid state physics, metallurgy, etc make it an attractive potential partner for the Pentagon in seeking technology collaboration.

Regardless of the ultimate extent of cooperation possible under this initiative, it is a track worth pursuing. As such, if MEA will hold off all agency-to-agency discussion until consensus on larger issues such as CTBT are reached, the benefits from this potential cooperation will be lost. To be sure, defense cooperation can still resume once the larger issues are resolved. In the meantime, however, if the Pentagon has entered into medium- or longer-term cooperation with other partners, it would circumscribe the areas in which DRDO can cooperate with the Pentagon. Above all, if the US side gains practical confidence in the institutional transparency and integrity of the workings of the DRDO labs, this could translate into relaxing controls on transfers of advanced, including dual use, technologies to India.

All of this does not imply giving away sensitive information to the US side. But if DRDO wishes to improve its performance record, as well as become a major player in the international arms exports market, selective engagement with the United States can yield handsome dividends. And MEA can still retain control of the overall process of Indo-US dialogue. But agency-to-agency substantive talks can in the interim identify specific areas of bilateral cooperation, which in turn might actually complement the search for greater bilateral strategic engagement.

In the remaining space, I will briefly comment on each of the five benchmarks in the Indo-US dialogue. The first benchmark relates to Indian signature on the CTBT. GOI should categorically state whether the Shakti series of tests in May 1998 have validated the technical and operational parameters of its intended nuclear force. It should also indicate whether it possesses the requisite confidence level in its sub-critical testing facility to maintain the credibility and longevity of its proposed arsenal. If no more open tests are required for the above two, there should be no hesitation in formally adhering to the treaty. On the other hand, if a certain number of additional tests are still necessary, it should forthrightly state the timeframe within which remaining tests will be conducted and the data analyzed, after which it will adhere to the treaty forthwith. Fudging on either of the two would endanger the safety of the proposed nuclear force, erode the confidence of the domestic armed forces, degrade the credibility of the proposed arsenal in the eyes of the adversary, and also tarnish its image within the informed segments of the international security community.

And if GOI has taken a political decision to not conduct any more tests, it should not hold back its adherence to the treaty for any political concessions from Washington. And above all, its decision on the treaty should be regardless of the process and outcome of the CTBT ratification debate in the US Senate. In the final analysis, such a clear articulation of the Indian stance would have greater payoffs than a protracted domestic debate that might even sully its international negotiating posture.

The Indian position on the FMCT should be equally clear. Given the high costs of establishing and maintaining an adequate, reliable and secure nuclear force is an expensive proposition. Instead of getting caught up in the seductive logic of building a massive arsenal, India should make a clear determination of the size of the arsenal, type of warheads needed, adequate delivery capability, and the associated C³I systems. Admittedly threats to national security are ever changing. As such, rigid or static assessments make for inflexible or inadequate response. This leaves India with two options. One, to never submit to any international arms control agreement. Or two, to make a medium- or long-term assessment of the likely need for fissile materials, in light of the existing stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material, and then accordingly state its position on the FMCT. And if the threat environment changes sufficiently to warrant a new response, the country can always cite threats to "supreme national interest" permissible under all treaties and withdraw. However, and aside from such extreme probabilities, under no circumstances should India agree to Pakistan’s self-serving demand that each side eliminate the existing fissile stockpile as part of the overall process of submitting to the FMCT. It is well known that India’s strategic theater encompasses threats other than from Pakistan. Therefore, such calls should be rejected forthwith and without any diffidence or ambiguity.

On the issue of conducting missile tests or pursuing missile development programs, there should be equally little ambiguity. While the MTCR does not constrain domestic missile development programs, it does set strict technical limits on their transfers (range not exceeding 300km and payload not exceeding 500kg). Thus joining the regime would rule out most of Indian missile export plans should they be a serious consideration. Further, membership in MTCR does not ipso facto entitle one to receive any specific set of civilian space technologies or cooperation with the other members. The selective manner of offering such cooperation, as evidenced in the case of Brazil and Ukraine, is a reminder to India to carefully weigh the costs and benefits prior to submitting to MTCR (3). This, of course, does not mean a license for India to engage in an open-ended missile development program. Additional tests of missiles that are essential for establishing requisite delivery options for the proposed "credible minimum nuclear deterrent" (CMND) must be carried out. This may envisage flight tests to validate operational reliability, accuracy, and with dummy warheads that need to be mated with the shape of the missile cone, etc. However, pursuit of the ICBM capability, that clearly exceeds the CMND parameters, will have a high resource as well as policy cost. The country needs to carefully assess the two prior to embarking on any course of action.

The Indian position regarding export controls is even stronger and clearer. It has enacted and long maintained tighter controls than most countries, certainly more than the P-5 states, over exports of weapons of mass destruction, components, and related technologies. But strangely, the country has shied away from a clearer dissemination of the stringent controls that it has voluntarily imposed over a range of wherewithal and related know-how. Partly as a consequence to this approach, it has neither received the considerable economic benefits and strategic leverage that such transfers would have yielded, nor did it receive international recognition for its responsible behavior.

It is time for GOI to enunciate the degree of overlap between what it controls and what the relevant regimes seek to control. This is true about the dual-use material covered under the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group versus Zangger Committee, the chemical precursors covered under the Australia Group versus the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as civilian space versus missile-relevant items covered under the Missile Technology Control Regime. Such enunciation and associated policy formulation would pave the way for India to pragmatically engage these regimes in seeking the common ground for its induction or co-habitation. In turn, this would facilitate transfer of strategic commodities and technologies to India that is vital for pursuing its developmental priorities.

Finally, on the issue of engaging Pakistan in a series of CBMs, the framework has become simpler if more sterile. It does not make much sense to engage in CBMs with a country that is engaged in an interminable conflict with India (4). Events such as the Kargil conflict, renewed insurrectionary activity in Kashmir and beyond, as well as covert support to the militants freed following the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight, further underscore the negative dynamic. Besides, despite achieving the so-called "parity" on the nuclear weapons axis, the country shows no signs of moving away from an adversarial posture toward India. Instead, the parity has actually led the Pakistani decision-makers to conclude that it can be a license to renew sub-state level conventional conflict, secure in the knowledge that the nuclear weapons make them immune from threats of an Indian retaliation. This is a very dangerous, and ultimately a self-fulfilling proposition. Regardless, the objective conditions are clearly not ripe for India to engage Pakistan in any meaningful effort at negotiating CBMs.

In conclusion, it bears iteration that India has a sovereign right, like all nations, to make a technical assessment of threats to its national security, and then take steps to respond to those threats. Of course, such steps have to be tempered with its commitments and obligations to regional stability and international security. But enunciation of national interests and policy priorities must stem from this standpoint, and not become a function of political gamesmanship or posturing. As the nation prepares for the first visit of a US President in over two decades, Indo-US relations are poised on the cusp of significant possibilities. A strategically grounded and pro-active policy approach will go a long way in turning them into tangible and mutually beneficial realities.

Dr. Anupam Srivastava is the Director of the South Asia Program and Senior Research Associate at the Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, USA.