NON-PROLIFERATION, CHINA AND INDO-U.S RELATIONS

Amy Sands. "Nonproliferation Regimes at Risk" . CNS Occasional Papers, No 3, Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

This article addresses the threats to the nonproliferation regime. The rationale for global nonproliferation efforts is explicitly detailed early in the article:

"Despite considerable growth in nonproliferation efforts and widespread rhetorical support for the nonproliferation norm, the regimes appear threatened by an outbreak of weapons proliferation. Weaker [nonproliferation] regimes will lead to growing security threats, the increasing likelihood of violent conflicts, and the intensification of conflicts should they occur."

Sands notes correctly that significant progress has occurred in the past decade, including the voluntary "rollback" of several nascent nuclear arsenals. The most imminent threats stem from the failure of countries to comply with their agreements and the unpredictable bilateral relationships between the US and China and the US and Russia. Other problems include the primacy of domestic priorities in most states, difficult regional relationships, and the role of non-state actors.

Sands singles out Iraq, North Korea, and Russia as particularly dire cases of non-compliance. Russia is singled out for concerns about biological weapons and other proliferation. Curiously, China is left off the list of non-compliant states. Issues likely to reduce US-China cooperation on nonproliferation include the US pursuit of missile defenses; US support for Taiwan, and Chinese espionage. Critics could easily argue that China’s participation in nonproliferation efforts has been marked by subterfuge, deception, and outright violation.

Sands points to domestic politics in limiting the effectiveness of nonproliferation regimes. Domestic concerns in the US, which she condemns for weak leadership and internal divisiveness, and other important international players frequently curtail nonproliferation efforts. Regional dynamics severely constrain the opportunities for nonproliferation in Northeast Asia, West Asia, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Political resolution of existing issues may be a prerequisite to meaningful progress in the nonproliferation arena.

Sands notes the increasingly dual-use nature of these technologies. While nuclear facilities and space programs are (relatively) easy to identify, the same facilities that produce pesticides or medical prescription drugs can also be used for chemical weapons.

Sands is pessimistic about the future of the nonproliferation regimes, stressing that their absence might create a more dangerous world, without specifying how to strengthen them. Therefore, the article is descriptive and predictable. If multilateral efforts to stop proliferation are indeed failing, an assertion that is not yet proven, surely the investigation of more innovative political and military methods is worth the effort. These issues fall outside the scope of Sands’ investigation, but are food for thought. The past decade has seen significant innovation in the conceptual and technical means of responding to proliferation. Who, in 1989, would have predicted that the United States would make a bilateral deal to provide North Korea with nuclear reactors through third parties? Or, that the U.S., under a Democratic President, would opt for national missile defenses? Or, that theater missile defenses would become a currency of international politics. Her focus on the "traditional" nonproliferation path may obscure opportunities or trends that are worth further study.

R. Johnson. "Troubled Treaties: Is the NPT tottering?" The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Volume 55 No 2, May/June 1999.

The Nuclear nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the crown jewel of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The legal commitment to extend the NPT indefinitely, made in 1995, is inextricably linked to progress on a number of issues. The lack of consensus and the gaping political divide at the previous preparatory committee meetings (PrepComs) have led the author to question whether the extension of the NPT is likely to unravel before the 2000 Review Conference. The author’s prediction that the latest PrepCom would also be an exercise in disagreement between the Non-aligned and the "Western group" has been proven accurate.

The important areas for disagreement turned out as predicted. They were the lack of progress on Article VI of the NPT, the de facto violation of nuclear non-proliferation of NATO’s nuclear sharing provisions (Article I and II), the inconsistency of the NATO doctrine of first-use and the private assurances made by the US, UK, and France towards non-nuclear NPT members, and the status of Israel in the context of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. Despite this, the "Western group" won (winning Indonesia and non-Arab non-aligned nations), concluding with a document of "expected products" of the 2000 meeting that broadly reflected their interests. This indicates that fears about the relevance of the treaty are misplaced. She clearly underestimates the political capital tied up in non-proliferation by Washington.

Gerald Segal. "Does China Matter?". Foreign Affairs Vol 78 No.5, September/October 1999.

The provocative title sets the tone for this paper on China. The first three of its four sections asks whether China matters economically, militarily, and politically, and the fourth asks whether it matters if China does not matter. Segal proceeds to answer his own questions in the qualified negative. Segal makes a strong case that China is today an "overrated" power.

Economically, he notes that China matters less today than it did in 1800, even from the "now dubious" angle of purchasing power parity (PPP). Militarily, he refers to China as a "second rate" power, and suggests that talk of an US-Chinese strategic partnership is little more than recognition of Beijing’s nuisance value. Politically, China’s power is "puny" because of its vacillation about "how to manage the consequences of modernity and interdependence," the side effects of ideological weakening, and the economic uncertainties highlighted by the Asian crisis.

In the final section, Segal does not directly answer his own question about whether it matters if China does not matter. However, one can sense a qualified negative. He points out that China is "merely a middle power" which can be handled appropriately only if the West abandons its "pander complex" and adopts a strategy of "constrainment" as opposed to "containment."

Whether Segal’s position is eventually vindicated or not, this is one of the papers that Mr. Segal will be remembered for in the years to come. And deservedly so, for he had the gumption to ask a question that needed to be asked – even if the answer he provides is not likely to get him an A+ from that harshest of examiners, time.

While it is hard to argue with the notion that China is indeed an "overrated" power today, it is appropriate to say that Segal overstates his case. Economically, it may be true that China does not matter much in terms of "cold statistics" as the Asiaweek (Oct. 15, 99) critique of his paper put it. This is precisely why it will matter in the future. The potential market in China dwarfs that of Europe and the US. This is no abstraction. There are over a billion people who may buy that roll of Kodak film. No China-size market awaits European or US manufacturers in their home territories. Segal may be right, however, in suggesting that the West is erring too much on the side of caution.

Militarily, it is pertinent to point out that China has a fine understanding of power and how it can be used to state benefit. It is using its mischief-making capability to tweak Uncle Sam’s nose quite blatantly, on Taiwan for instance. While China may not be a power in Europe, it has considerable capacity to undermine American interests in Asia seriously. Its remote control over the two nuclear capable "rogues" in the region, North Korea, and Pakistan, is a testimony to this. Of course, it is not news that China cannot take on the US directly. But then who can, apart from Russia?China is by no means a "puny" political power. That it has chosen not to be aggressively anti-American at the UNSC only implies sufficiently good judgement. China had less to gain from actually undermining the US in Kosovo, for example, than from pretending to do so. If someone wants the best of both worlds – i.e. a darling of Western investors and a patron of the Third World outcasts – this is the way to go about it. It must also be remembered, China’s leaders are playing to a domestic audience.

Finally, it would have been a more interesting paper if Segal had elaborated on what abandoning the "pander complex" and "constrainment" means in practice. It appears that Segal was suggesting a tougher approach across the board from the West, reflecting the actuality of the various power functions. It is questionable whether that would be in the long-term interest of the West because that would generate a greater consciousness within China of its own weaknesses and may prompt measures to rectify them. Given the prevailing historical, political, religious, and economic compulsions of the day, a China that is less sensitive to its own weaknesses is less of a "threat." There is not much harm, in the meantime, to hedge your bets that there will come a day when every Chinese will buy a Kodak film. The West, too, is trying to have the best of both worlds – i.e. keep China uncertain about Western intentions and open to business at the same time.

I feel that, with the expansion of nuclear deterrent to other WMD threats it is doubtful if the P-5 are interested in negotiating a global NFU and with the indefinite extension of the NPT, it is doubtful if ever the goal of nuclear disarmament is attainable. This article is in the narrative tradition mixed with prescriptions of steps that India has to take to achieve its security. The first part could have been dispensed with as it is repetitive and has been already covered by others. The author’s forte is international relations and foreign policy and this paper with its excellent bibliography would make a valuable resource for students of those disciplines.