There is a persistent strain of commentary in the Indian media which smacks of defeatism and a corrosive self-doubt. Rarely is analysis based on a "we can" approach. More often than not, it is a fearful or cynical "can we?" frame of mind. In reality, though, India is stronger than her detractors within and abroad realise, more resilient than some of her own daughters and sons have the courage or desire to admit. As we enter a new millennium, there are many reasons for India to feel confident of assuring for herself a secure, prosperous and dignified future.

A Macro Perspective

It is clear that the "new world order" was and is little more than a soundbite to match Bush’s absurd vision of a "thousand points of light". It’s a new world alright, but this "order" business is rather unnerving. You see, someone has to impose order and when that someone is neither elected nor appointed by any representative procedure, then the situation becomes singularly undemocratic – not the sort of pluralistic, even chaotic, democratic, non-absolutist approach we troublesome Indians seem to prefer. What we have today is a world where the policeman is also the prosecutor, judge and jury and this paragon of justice has openly declared that prosecution of criminals will be selective – depending primarily, but not exclusively, on the self-interest of the of the self-appointed sheriff.

The US, which is the sole superpower, has arrogated for itself and its allies the right to punitive intervention anywhere in the world, based on its own interest assessments and value judgements. This is, in fact, a natural phenomenon when there is a predominant power and it is not to be seen as a characteristic unique to the US. Indeed, the failing lies with those on the receiving end, for not recognising moral posturing for what it is almost always bound to become – a veil for the pursuit of interest.

There are no effective non-violent control mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms with sufficient independence or credibility to dissuade this sole superpower from a course of action that it may decide upon. Nominal control mechanisms, such as the UN, the ICJ, the WTO, some NGOs and so on have shown only a limited capability for dissuasion.

More precisely, it has been demonstrated time and again that the US has a predilection for (a) ignoring these mechanisms in its own geo-strategic, economic and political pursuits, and (b) using them as instruments for the same.

In such a context, therefore, it is instructive to divide the world into countries that are (1) allies of the US, (2) neutral or ambivalent about American "leadership of the free world", which is self-assumed, and (3) enemies of the US. A more discrete classification is possible, but let’s keep things simple. It would not be inaccurate to say that India falls into the second category of countries, i.e. those that are neutral or ambivalent about the role the US is playing in the world today.

It is also instructive to keep in mind that the primary "legitimate" instrument of coercion or punishment remains the UN Security Council and that its five permanent members wield the power to collectively inflict punishment on others or unilaterally veto punishment against themselves. Note, however, that the balance of power within the council is out of kilter to the extent that dissenting powers are limited to abstention rather than a veto – although there is a price, sometimes in cash, paid by the main power.

Even so, sometimes there is a suspicion that "principle" may prove more powerful, or that the price might be too high, in which case the sole superpower sidesteps the council, as it did in Kosovo, and before that in the case of the "no-fly zone" in southern Iraq. The result is a weakening of the credibility of the UN, ironic because this is an instrument the US will need increasingly in the coming years.

In a situation such as the one described above, it is tempting to throw up one’s hands and say, well we might as well succumb to American demands on the gamut of economic and strategic issues. Indeed, this might have its benefits: rapid access to development finance, improved trade terms, newfound understanding of our strategic concerns, technology transfer, not to mention good press. But is that the course that would benefit the long-term interests of our country?

Apart from the Europeans, the record of America’s relationship with its allies in Asia and the Middle East is rather patchy. Look at the condition of its allies in South and South-East Asia. India is best acquainted with the case of Pakistan, which has basically been prostituted. It was used and abused since the 1970s and was dumped soon after the Cold War ended. Now, it is subject to insult on an almost daily basis by one US official or another on one issue or another. Look at Indonesia, where America’s darling boy of the spice islands – none other than Suharto – is now the devil incarnate. The poor man did not know what hit him when America, whose anti-communist interests he had adhered to faithfully for decades turned around and asked him about how his children were making their money and why East Timor should not be given independence. He was dumped quite unceremoniously.

Consider Japan, subject to incessant condescending lectures on the virtues of an American-style economy, not to mention the occasional threat and unilateral trade measure as well as the unique demand for "minimum import quotas" in recent years. See the Middle East, where virtually all of America’s allies are authoritarian states whose populations are patiently nursing a deep hatred of America – though not all things American – waiting for the day when they can avenge a myriad perceived wrongs against Uncle Sam (or should I say the "Great Satan"?). Meanwhile Iran, which is labelled a "rogue nation" by the US, has perhaps become the most democratic Islamic state at present. (Turkey is a secular state).

Of course, American ties with Europe are not hunky dory either. Now that the sole superpower is feeling its oats, there’s been beef and banana skirmishes on the trade battlefield. These portend further battles to come and, one vaguely expects minor or full-fledged trade wars before too long.

Whither India?

Does the apparent overwhelming strategic superiority of the sole superpower constrain India any more than the Cold War did? It does not. Indeed, the current global atmosphere of uncertainty provides the right circumstances for India to assert herself in a determined fashion and assure her own interests in a pro-active manner. It is as good a time as any to forge a stronger position in the emerging hierarchy based on the calculus of economic and political power while the West’s "moral authority", such as it is, declines under the bombs of Kosovo, Iraq, Bosnia, Serbia, Sudan and Afghanistan – notwithstanding British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s talk of a "new moral crusade".

There are plenty of opportunities. Let us begin with the basic assumption that the status quo of India’s place in global affairs is far from optimal and therefore that any change which occurs in that status quo and which can help improve the relative position of the country must be encouraged and taken advantage of.

N5 & P5

Pillars of global order in the cold war era – namely the UN and the nuclear club – are being shaken. India has breached the nuclear barriers with Shakti I-V and done it with containable negative repercussions. With Shakti, we have effectively signalled our military veto power from outside the UN Security Council’s permanent membership – a group which is looking increasingly anachronistic.

Yet being outside the P5, India lacks the ability to veto UN resolutions that are inimical to us – like the one passed after the Shakti tests, and the one which is occasionally waved about by China when it demands that we roll back our nuclear programme. Russia has represented our interests reasonably well, but as the post-test resolution showed it cannot be depended upon in all critical situations in view of its own vulnerabilities.

Thus it is in our interest to pursue a permanent membership seat, and at the same time do our best to ensure that the credibility of the P5 – indeed even the UN - is undermined. In this way, we can either get permanent membership (at which point we can seek to strengthen the UN) or hasten the organisation’s demise. Either way we improve our relative position. What we must seek to avoid is an indefinite extension of the status quo. This should not prove too difficult, even if only because change is inevitable. Germany, Japan, Brazil and Italy are among countries battering at the door of the P5, and still more – Iran, N. Korea and Japan – quietly preparing the ingredients needed to cook up a nuclear storm, only if necessary of course.

Therefore, it will not be our burden alone to seek change in the status quo. We merely need to be watchful and prepared to exploit new openings that are bound to emerge. In other words, we must become skilled at turning fluid situations into long-term gains, at spotting opportunity in confusion, at turning opportunity into advantage. Indeed, there are indications that, after a long bout of uncertainty and dithering, the Indian foreign affairs and defence bureaucracy has begun to take a more pro-active approach to our strategic concerns.

In the meantime, we are bound to be rocked by the elements of violence exported by our neighbour Pakistan. The Christmas Eve 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 184 from Kathmandu to Delhi is a case in point. It demonstrated the new war that India is facing, a war in which the aggressor, a weaker power, denies aggression because that is the low cost option. But this too presents opportunities which Indian decision makers are beholden to exploit. The "proxy war" which Pakistan is waging against India can be the petard on which that country is itself hoisted.

Indian diplomacy must focus on forging links or enhancing existing ones with like-minded countries. Media management must create the linkages between global terrorism and Pakistan in the mind of the international community. Most of all, it will require that our diplomats shed the traditional preference for reticence for naming names and calling a spade a spade.

India & The US

Finally, to the question, "Should we become an ‘ally’ of America in such a world?", the answer must be "No" – insofar as an "alliance" means being co-opted into or volunteering to lend verbal or material support to a policy line with which we cannot agree on a fundamental level – i.e. on moral, commercial or strategic grounds.

Yet the answer should be "Yes", that India can and will be a friend of America, that we can be a supporter of its policies on a case-by-case basis, that we can be a partner in commerce and in strategic matters – insofar as it is understood and accepted that we take those decisions in cognizance of our own interests. We will expect no more or less from America in its conduct of relations with India. Gradually, as such a friendship matures, a greater coincidence of interests will become self-evident and self-sustaining. This kind of friendship will be longer lasting and of greater value to both great democracies, and ultimately a more dependable anchor on which to base co-ordinated global policies because it will be borne of consensus not control or diktat (however smoothly phrased). If this is the kind of friendship America desires, it will find a true friend in India.

India is ready for such a friendship, and has been for some years. That is only natural. Being the weaker power, India appreciates more keenly the mutual benefit that would accrue from such a friendship, because the relative value of such benefit is greater to India in the short-term. For the US, the benefits while similar would be relatively of less value. It is quite certain, nevertheless, the benefits for both countries will even out in the long-term.

However, this writer does not yet see that the US is ready for such a friendship. As countless observers have pointed out, India is but a blip on the American policy radar – albeit one that is blinking with increasing frequency. While there are those among its elites who take the long view and articulate it in favour of India, they are for the most part yet to make any considerable impact – again it must be noted that some impact is being made, nevertheless. But for a friendship such as the one envisaged, much more is required in terms of articulation and declaration from the American side, as the greater power, which can then be matched from the Indian side.