NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE NEW CENTURY
ALTERNATE ARCHITECTURES, ALTERNATE FUTURES

DR TIMOTHY D HOYT

The collapse of the Cold War nuclear competition, sadly, has not led to the end of nuclear threats to international peace and stability. The promise of global disarmament, envisioned by statesmen from Nehru to Reagan and Gorbachev, remains unfulfilled. Nuclear weapons remain a potent symbol of international power, but their military utility is tempered by political concerns– a reflection of Clausewitz’s principle and the development of international norms against nuclear use since 1945.

The nature of nuclear policies and threats is evolving rapidly, and the new millennium will see a new series of challenges. This paper will briefly outline a few of the key issues, examining changes in the international system, new problems in regional security systems, the direction of policies in specific countries, changes and threats to the nonproliferation regime, and the impact of new technologies on nuclear threats and questions. It will conclude by outlining three possible futures for the 2025 period.

The International System – From MAD to Multipolar?

The end of the Cold War has inarguably reduced the threat of global nuclear catastrophe. In the mid-1980s, the combined arsenals of the superpowers numbered in the tens of thousands, and strategic forces were deployed on hair trigger alert. The ideological and geopolitical nature of the conflict made even minor skirmishes in the periphery potential flashpoints for escalation to nuclear exchange. The sheer number of warheads available, and their integration into warfighting strategies of both sides at all levels, meant that a superpower conflict could easily become a global catastrophe, as fallout and other environmental effects savaged noncombatant states and regions.

This threat has now virtually disappeared. The US, Britain, France and the former Soviet States have dismantled tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. Nuclear theory has shifted from debates over counterforce doctrines utilizing thousands of warheads to arguments over how small a nuclear force still constitutes a credible deterrent. Modernization of strategic forces has plummeted in priority, in funding, and in numbers of weapons deployed or replaced.

As a result, the nature of the nuclear threat has become predominantly regional. Potential or existing nuclear powers choose nuclear policies in response to existing or projected threats. These threats exist primarily in three specific geographic regions, and from three additional outside powers whose interests overlap some or all of these regions. The regions are the Middle East/South Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Rim/North Asia. The three powers of concern are the United States, Russia, and China.

Regional Nuclear Competitions - The Middle East/Persian Gulf

The competition of greatest concern historically concerns the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Israel is currently the only nuclear power in the region – a status not recognized under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but generally acknowledged by political leaders and strategic analysts. Israel achieved its nuclear weapons capability in the late 1960s, with substantial French assistance in the 1956-62 period (pre-NPT). Israel has never acknowledged testing a nuclear device.

Within the region, the primary response to Israel’s nuclear capability has been the quest for non-nuclear deterrent forces, primarily in the form of chemical weapons. Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Algeria, among others, have pursued this option and chemical weapons have been used in conflicts in the Persian Gulf and Yemen. The two potential nuclear powers are Iran and Iraq – while both face serious constraints, both states have also invested substantial resources on overt and covert nuclear facilities.

Despite the contentious nature of Middle East politics throughout that Cold War, it now appears to be the least dangerous of the regions under consideration. The political incentives for conflict and for nuclear development or use are declining, slowly but tangibly. The Middle East peace process has lessened threats to Israeli security, and Israel and its Arab neighbors appear to be gradually normalizing relations. Iraq and Iran remain concerns, but their proliferation efforts in the 1990s guarantee that they will be held under careful scrutiny. Both states face serious economic hardship, with or without the additional problems caused by sanctions regimes. The political and economic advantages of "hard-line" anti-Israel positions no longer attract most of the Arab states, and leadership turnover in the Arab world (so far) has largely favored regional peace, rather than reinforcing radicals. Obviously, the state of greatest concern in this respect is Saudi Arabia, but it does not appear to be straying far from traditional policies.

What impact will the region have on existing nonproliferation and arms control-related treaties and regimes? The impact appears minimal, for the near future. Israel has avoided testing its weapons for almost four decades, suggesting both a high confidence in their designs and also a willingness to rely on a carefully nurtured existential threat for deterrence. Neither Iran nor Iraq appears to be close to breaching the NPT in any significant fashion, and both are probably years from a potential nuclear test. The two areas where concerns should exist are the availability of long-range delivery systems and potential Israeli concern over fissile material controls. The region is flooded with ballistic and cruise missiles – a situation which is unlikely to change anytime soon. Israel must ultimately be concerned with the fate of its fissile material stockpile. The Dimona reactor has exceeded its useful lifespan, and should be retired. Efforts to determine and monitor global fissile material stocks will also, potentially, force Israel to reveal truths about the breadth and nature of its nuclear program, which it has, to date, kept secret.

Regional Nuclear Competitions - South Asia

It is difficult not to view the South Asian competition as the most threatening and volatile in the international system today. In the past twenty months, both India and Pakistan have tested multiple nuclear devices, tested or deployed new long-range delivery systems, and have carried out conventional or counterinsurgency operations in three separate areas of disputed Kashmir. India’s draft nuclear doctrine (DND), published at least in part in the interests of transparency, has caused more confusion than clarity, and is viewed by most analysts as a thoroughly political document demonstrating the wish list of the most hawkish factions in the National Security Council Advisory Board (NSCAB). Nevertheless, the DND’s vision of a nuclear triad and possibly a several-hundred weapon arsenal prompted a Pakistani response, envisioning a significant but "minimal" deterrent. Optimistic hopes that the South Asian arsenals could act as minimum deterrents in a non-weaponized or non-deployed form have almost certainly been shattered.

Some analysts have argued that the unveiling of nuclear capability should have a stabilizing impact on the subcontinent. This assumption appears overly optimistic. The political tensions underlying the Indo-Pakistani conflict, unlike the Arab-Israeli competition, are far from resolution, or even quiescence. The brief relaxation in tensions associated with the Lahore Declaration vanished after hostilities commenced in Kargil, and the coup in Pakistan hardly reassures India about Pakistan’s commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes. The recent hijacking represented a terrible political defeat for India – one which, rightly or wrongly, is blamed by many on the Pakistani government. Pakistan’s aggression in Kargil does not suggest that the existence of nuclear forces deters war – only that it deters certain kinds of wars, which Pakistan would have difficulty winning anyway (conventional medium-to-high intensity conflicts). Many analysts anticipate renewed low-intensity confrontation in 2000 – and the statements of both military and political leaders in both India and Pakistan this month suggest that tensions remain extraordinarily high.

Actions in the region have had an impact on the nonproliferation regime, and will continue to in the 21^st century. Both India and Pakistan remain non-signatories to the NPT and, from the perspective of the treaty, non-nuclear weapons states. This status is unlikely to change soon – their opposition to indefinite NPT extension and the determination of many NPT signatories to uphold the regime appear to be far too contradictory for early resolution. The two states may sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but if so it will be for reasons of their own, rather than proselytizing or threats from the US or other states. The most important measure for limiting nuclear capabilities in the region would be a meaningful fissile material cutoff, including a ban on future reprocessing or plutonium separation. This would limit arsenals on both sides to current levels of available weapons-grade material, sufficient for perhaps a few dozen weapons. Given the difficulties in verifying such an agreement, and the understandable reluctance of both India and Pakistan to freeze into an insecure nuclear posture, fissile controls do not seem likely in the near future.

Regional Nuclear Competitions – Pacific Rim and North Asia

North Korea represents the greatest threat of nuclear use in the international community, because of its traditional political unpredictability and the uncertain stability of the Kim Jong-Il regime. The seriousness with which North Korea’s neighbors take this threat is demonstrated by the 1994 Agreed Framework, which rewarded North Korea with Western-designed nuclear reactors (not to be delivered until at least 2006) despite its admitted breach of the NPT. This action probably did more to undermine the NPT than anything else in the 1990s. In addition, North Korea’s tests of long-range missiles have spurred Japan to new levels of military cooperation with the United States, including joint efforts on theater missile defenses (TMD) and increased responsibility under the Bilateral Defense Agreement. The decision by the US to deploy national missile defenses (NMD) was taken shortly after North Korea’s Taepo Dong test – this should not be viewed as mere coincidence.

The other potential nuclear competition in the region (see below) might be driven by Chinese nuclear policy. Both Japan and Taiwan could become nuclear powers, Japan in a very short time. Both states have sought TMD from the US in various forms, including already deployed Patriot systems. There is no current evidence that either state is seeking to activate its nuclear option. Taiwan is the most likely suspect, but violation of the NPT would almost certainly terminate US military assistance. Japan, as the only country ever attacked by nuclear weapons, has strong national and cultural objections to nuclear weaponization. There is no evidence that these objections are receding – in fact, the recent firing of a high-ranking Defense Ministry official for merely mentioning the possibility of Japan reconsidering its posture indicates that these objections remain quite strong indeed.

The possibilities for disruption of nonproliferation regimes in this region are quite serious. Continued threats to Taiwan and South Korea may, ultimately, drive one or the other to re-open covert nuclear programs, which were cancelled in the 1970s (under intense US pressure). North Korea has already violated the NPT once, and been rewarded for it, and is the foremost exporter of long-range missiles in the world. North Korea, despite its terrible famine and economic troubles, remains an immediate and significant conventional military threat to South Korea. The combination of North Korea’s threat and its political unpredictability make a firm stand on nonproliferation issues by other states in the region unlikely – some form of appeasement is a higher probability.

Key States – China

China is the most important of the "middle" nuclear powers for a number of reasons. First, Britain and France have both adopted existential nuclear postures, relying on submarine based deterrents and scrapping most of their land-based missiles and free-fall bombs. Second, China’s economic growth and position in the Pacific region make it a rising power in one of the world’s most important economic regions – a power with unmet territorial and symbolic goals. Third, China has made great steps, through indigenous research, international cooperation and overseas espionage, in modernizing its strategic arsenal.

China territorially overlaps all of the regions of potential nuclear concern except one – the Middle East. Even there, however, it remains a player due to its ambiguous role in multinational proliferation links. North Korea and Iran have apparent ties in development of ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles – links that may be facilitated by China, Pakistan, or both.

China’s role in South Asia and the Pacific Rim is more explicit. Indian elite’s assess their nuclear security requirements focusing primarily on Chinese capabilities. Proliferation and security linkages drive their perception of security threats between China and Pakistan. Chinese cooperation with Myanmar is seen as further encroachment in India’s unofficial "sphere of influence." Finally, Chinese strategic modernization is viewed with concern, as is its demonstrated use of ballistic missile for diplomatic coercion against Taiwan in 1995-96.

In the Pacific Rim, traditional Chinese ties with North Korea continue to raise suspicion regarding cooperation on nuclear and missile programs. The ASEAN states viewed China’s efforts to coerce Taiwan through ballistic missile "tests" with alarm. The combination of these tests and North Korea’s missile developments appear to have driven Japan to a fundamental reconsideration of its security policies. It is significant, however, that this new strategic direction increased US-Japanese cooperation and strengthened the alliance. There is no evidence, at present, that Japan seeks an independent nuclear weapons capability.

China is uniquely positioned to undermine a series of nonproliferation measures. While the PRC appears to be largely abiding by the letter of the nonproliferation agreements they have signed, strong suspicions exist about the transfer of components, spare parts, and other violations. China’s links with the leading rogue states, proliferation threats, and China’s own unrealized ambitions provide a wealth of opportunity for clandestine activity. China’s understandable concerns about recent US decisions to develop TMD and NMD capabilities in the Far East provide a possible rationale for violations of nonproliferation protocols. While China’s strategic doctrine remains unclear, historically the PRC has relied on a more existential deterrent approach at the strategic level – the growth of its strategic arsenal has been modest, in comparison to earlier nuclear powers.

This could easily change, given the combination of potential missile defense capabilities in Taiwan, Japan, India and the US. Two possible responses China could opt for would be either significant expansion of the strategic arsenal, capitalizing on new warhead and missile designs covertly obtained from the US and USSR, respectively, or an increase in the number of longer-range missiles (IRBMS, vice M-9/11s) deployed in order to defeat the limited intercept capabilities of the TMD systems now in development. The latter possibility would follow the pattern of the superpowers, of modernizing to longer-ranged systems as that technology became available. While it might be aimed primarily within the Pacific Rim, it would also obviously threaten targets in Russia and South Asia. A third alternative might be to increase the peripheral threats to US interests through accelerated covert transfers and cooperation with "rogue" states (Iran, North Korea) in an effort to gain strategic maneuvering space vice the US – again, a policy whose effects could quickly spill across to other regions. Finally, even if China refrains from more provocative acts, the combination of declining superpower arsenals and Chinese strategic modernization increases the PRCs relative strategic capability and makes it a more important player in future arms control negotiations.

Russia

While China has become the most important of the middle nuclear powers, Russia remains by far the most problematic. Domestic instability, at times verging on anarchy or kleptocracy, raises legitimate concerns about the safety of Russian nuclear facilities, weapons, and materials. Russia both borders and has close political and military ties in all three nuclear regions, in addition to its history of mixed cooperation and confrontation with both China and the US.

According to US intelligence estimates, Russia remains one of the most problematic proliferators in the international system. Russian technical assistance has been identified in missile programs in China, Iran, and India, among others, despite Russia’s purported adherence to MTCR. Episodic reports of stolen or sold Russian tactical nuclear weapons appear every year or so – fortunately, these reports are usually based on the same originally erroneous information from the early 1990s. Russia has also become a prolific supplier of advanced conventional weapons in an effort to obtain hard currency. The new policies of less-restrictive arms sales occasionally appear to contradict long-term Russian interest, as in the case of the sales of Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft to China.

More troubling than the proliferation, however, is the change in Russian nuclear doctrine and posture. The rate of Russia’s economic collapse has only been exceeded by the rate of erosion in Russia’s defense budget and military capabilities, demonstrated in Chechnya and publicly debated during the Kosovo crisis. As a result, Russia has prioritized strategic and nuclear forces – a logical choice, as these weapons provide the most "bang for the buck," as well as retaining considerable symbolic and political value. With this prioritization, however, has come a series of changes in doctrine which are more disturbing. Russia now relies on tactical nuclear weapons in the event of conventional attack. It has formally announced that "information warfare" attacks on Russia will be treated as strategic strikes – warranting nuclear response and possibly preemption. Russian strategic weapons themselves are becoming unreliable for lack of maintenance and overhaul. Lack of funding has degraded Russian command and control and early warning capabilities, severely complicating decision-making in a crisis.

The future of Russian strategic forces is far from clear. The Duma, for a variety of domestic and foreign policy concerns, continues to refuse to consider START II, even though it appears clear to Western observers that Russia cannot afford to maintain even a START-II sized arsenal. The US decision to deploy NMD will almost certainly require changes in the ABM Treaty, something Russia remains rhetorically opposed to. The threat of countering NMD with a new round of strategic modernization, however, should not be taken as the start of a new superpower arms race. In the first place, a 100-200 launcher NMD capability will hardly degrade Russia’s strategic threat to the US. In the second place, Russia cannot afford a new arms race. However, the psychological impact of NMD deployment and ABM abrogation or re-negotiation may significantly affect Russo-American cooperation and relations.

United States

The United States, despite an occasionally strident commitment to nonproliferation, remains enigmatic and inconsistent in its nuclear policies. The role of domestic and bureaucratic politics in the bizarre machinations of American nuclear policy shouldn’t be underestimated – for example, nuclear laboratories independently pursue new weapons designs in an effort to legitimize their continued existence and provide work for a highly trained pool of specialists. Similarly, the absence of serious thought about the role of nuclear weapons in the 1990s or into the next century is apparent. Press reports state that the Joint Chiefs of Staff think the US nuclear arsenal can and should be cut to levels significantly below those specified in START II. At the same time, however, influential Senators attack the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on the grounds that it will not allow us to maintain a sufficiently reliable nuclear arsenal.

The cognitive dissonance surrounding US nuclear policies can be demonstrated most effectively by examining two cases: NMD and the issue of global nuclear disarmament. The decision to deploy an NMD capability, which Pentagon officials assume will violate the ABM Treaty in both physical characteristics and deployment site, was reached as the result of a North Korean missile test. Given the far graver threat the US faced in the 1980s, this response would be almost comical, if it did not raise a series of possibly disruptive responses from China, Russia, and the nuclear regions. The cascade effect of either Russia or China deciding to increase current rates of strategic modernization on South Asia and the Pacific Rim is potentially quite significant, as is the impact of changes in proliferation policy by either of those states.

Similarly, the United States has not fully considered the potential for global nuclear disarmament – a policy agreed to by President Reagan at Reykjavik in 1986. In the early 1990s, with the establishment of UNSCOM and the rapprochement between the US and Russia, the time was ripe for a bold move in this direction. A public re-stating of this commitment would have reinforced the NPT to at least as great a degree as the indefinite extension of 1995. In the changing world of the 21^st century, does the US require deployed nuclear weapons for its security? Or to guarantee its influence in world affairs? Nuclear weapons hardly seem vital to the US, and surely as Americans sought to convince others of the benefits of non-nuclearization or non-deployment, it would have been worthwhile to consider these options for our own forces. Many of these policy debates, however, have been carried out in isolation, or have been carefully compartmented for reasons or bureaucratic or party politics. The corrosion of the nonproliferation regime can largely be blamed on US inconsistency and misguided policy, the CTBT debate representing a classic case. There is little evidence that either clarity or realism will infect US policy any time in the future.

Where do we go from here? The nuclear world in 2025.

In an age of rapid and constant political and economic change, any prediction of events 25 years in the future should be taken with a large grain of salt. Rather than make specific predictions, it’s worth looking at three different broad possibilities as archetypes.

A multipolar nuclear world

Many analysts argue that the world is moving towards a multipolar balance, based either on the growth of some developing states or the economic integration of crucial regions. Examining the nuclear balance, however, the potential for a truly multipolar nuclear world appears fairly negligible, barring catastrophic political change combined with the collapse of the NPT. The major economic powers envisioned for the coming century include the European Union (EU), Japan, China, India, Russia, and the US. Further potential great powers might arise out of some coalition of South American or Southeast Asian states. Both the EU and Japan face tremendous barriers to becoming independent nuclear powers. In the case of the EU, the difficulty of combining existing French and British nuclear forces under multinational command and control appears insurmountable. In the case of Japan, there is currently no significant public support for a change in Japan’s nuclear policy or status.

A multipolar world might include:

• Several powers (the US, Russia, and China) possessing arsenals with thousands of nuclear weapons;
• Several middle powers (India, Israel, Britain, France, and perhaps Pakistan) with arsenals with dozens to hundreds of weapons;
• A few states with small arsenals (North Korea, Iraq, Iran, possibly Taiwan or South Korea, Libya).

Arguably, this world would be no more or less stable than the international system today. Nuclear weapons do not impose stability by themselves – while they change the cost-benefit calculations of potential aggressors, they do not resolve longstanding political conflicts. Nonproliferation supporters would argue that, in fact, the increased numbers of nuclear powers would make nuclear use more, rather than less likely. Combined with the deployment of limited defenses by many powers, the increasing lethality and accuracy of conventional weapons, and the declared intention of some states to pursue asymmetric strategies based on nuclear threats, the potential for nuclear use might indeed be somewhat greater in this environment.

A disarmed world

Another possibility is that sanity would overwhelm the international system, and nuclear weapons would gradually be banned. The obstacles for verification are, obviously, formidable. However, if "minimal" or "existential" deterrence becomes recognized by most states as both rational and persuasive to potential adversaries, disarmament could make strategic sense.

Existential deterrence probably fails in the threat of immediate conquest. Most of the nuclear powers today, however, do not face such a threat (the exception might be Israel, although that is receding rapidly). Therefore, provided some infrastructure exists to re-create weapons in the event of a change in conditions, an existential deterrent posture based on non-assembled weapons is at least theoretically possible. If a state cheats at the margins and hides a few weapons, this will not provide a sufficient edge to allow an overwhelming strike against most of the current nuclear powers, and those which are vulnerable (Israel, Pakistan?) might be reassured by a combination of defenses and international or multinational guarantee.

This is a highly optimistic scenario. It requires US commitment to nuclear disarmament. This kind of solution might result in part from the collapsing civilian nuclear energy market (lowering proliferation threats as a generation of reactors is phased out and replaced by alternative energy sources).

Business as usual, but with defenses

Ironically, the single most important force affecting nuclear futures and the proliferation question may be the development of quasi-effective active defenses against ballistic missile attack. While these weapons will never reach 100% effectiveness, their presence changes the strategic calculations an adversary must make when considering a nuclear strike. Their dual-purpose nature, attacking in many cases both aircraft and missiles (ther two militarily preferred methods of non-battlefield delivery), increases their military utility. This utility will have the impact of increasing economies of scale and lowering unit costs until, at least in theory, they will be as affordable as other types of routine military equipment.

A world with effective missile defenses will not be a nuclear-free world. Again, missile defenses cannot stop a determined opponent, or the terrorist truck bomb. They cannot be relied to deter a desperate opponent, reeling from a crippling conventional assault – at the extremes, nuclear weapons still represent a potent threat. But in most situations they will pose a significant complicating factor in an adversary’s nuclear calculations, making it more difficult for them to use nuclear weapons to coerce.

This is particularly the case when adversary’s possess relatively small nuclear arsenals. Against North Korea, for example, the combination of a deployed TMD/NMD system represents a significant defense – enough to provide political reassurance for the US and Pacific Rim states, but not enough to allow a more aggressive military response to deal with the North Korean problem (something akin to "rollback", for instance). For this reason, missile defenses could (in theory) play an important role in nonproliferation policy. Against arsenals the size of Pakistan’s or India’s (generally estimated at less than 100 warheads worth of separated, weapons-grade fissile material as of late 1999), missile defenses have a significant impact on crisis stability. Both sides currently, and for the immediate future, rely on relatively slow, shorter range missiles (Prithvi, M-11, and possibly Ghauri, which ATBMs can intercept) and aircraft. Purchase of a few batteries of Patriots or S-300s introduces considerable uncertainty into an adversary’s nuclear calculations. Evidence of the impact of this kind of capability may soon be apparent in the Middle East, where Israel’s ARROW system will limit the ability of Syrian, Libyan, Iraqi, and Iranian missiles, whether armed with chemical or nuclear warheads.

What does a world with effective defenses look like? For one thing, defenses may well strengthen nonproliferation norms – if small arsenals become less dangerous, the benefits of breaching nonproliferation commitments nearly disappear. Defenses also benefit existing political relationships. U.S. allies, for example, can obtain the tools necessary to assure their security (ATBMs) without having to threaten their political relationship with the US by pursuing a nuclear option. India, China, and Iran, which do not have close bilateral security ties with the US, are pursuing Russian ATBM options against regional threats. But these systems are sufficiently attractive to seep across Cold War ideological boundaries – South Korea seriously considered the S-300 Russian ATBM, as did several states in the Persian Gulf.

A world with effective defenses, therefore, may look little different (in terms of nuclear proliferation) than the world today. Rogue states may still choose to proliferate for regional reasons (Iran, Iraq, Libya), but the consequences of that proliferation will be lessened. Two or three major powers, a small number of middle powers, and a couple of small nuclear powers may still be the result in 2025, but the ability of the latter two groups to influence or destabilize global security will be significantly smaller.

Conclusion

This represents, obviously, a broad-brush approach to the topic of nuclear futures. It barely touches on the myriad of possibilities and potential threats facing the international community in the future. The 1990s were a period of severe disappointment and lost opportunity. Changes in international political relationships, in economic ties, in energy sources, and in military technology offer the possibility for a very different and (perhaps) optimistic new future. The potential of these changes, however, can only be realized through creative and thought and innovation. Where we go from here remains enigmatic, but we should try to avoid the mistakes of where we’ve already been.

Dr. Hoyt is Director of Special Programs and Adjunct Professor for the National Security Studies Department, Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. He is also an Adjunct Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own, and not those of the U.S. government or any government-affiliated organization