The world around us is swirling with new information. Understanding the content and implications of the increasingly voluminous and complex information is critical to the strategic analyst. Gleaning meaning from this information enables the reader to make the leap from data to intelligence. To this end, this section on news and views features short analyses of well-researched papers. The conclusions and implications of these papers are presented. The papers that are chosen for review will be from globally recognized journals. In keeping with the charter of the Bharat Rakshak Monitor, these articles will focus on implications for Indian strategists. Further, we strive to present a balanced, zero-based thinking, approach where the conclusions drawn and implications suggested are derived only what is factual. These articles are designed to raise awareness and stimulate debate on a variety of issues relevant to India.

Matt Thundyil
Editor - News and Views

G.D. Bakshi. "Yugoslavia: Air Strikes Test of the Air War Doctrine". Strategic Analysis. Vol XXIII No. 5, August 1999: 791-807.

Bakshi begins with a short overview of air power doctrines, concentrating on the role of strategic bombing. He then considers two case studies, Vietnam and the Gulf War, to illustrate the evolution of air doctrine and to comment on its effectiveness. Bakshi's contends that despite tremendous technological progress, the situation remains much as it was in WW II: it is still not possible to "bring a country to its knees" using only conventionally armed aircraft. Thus, the synergy of joint operations remains an essential cornerstone of modern war fighting strategies.

Bakshi's main arguments are that air power (1) is effective only with precision guided munitions, hence expensive, (2) is vulnerable to simple countermeasures and passive defensive tactics, and (3) degrades morale minimally and "only hardens attitude." While the first two are hard to take issue with; the third is on less firm ground. Indeed, one can argue that the Serb withdrawal in Kosovo was not so much due to material losses as a loss of morale (and lack of support from "allies"). The political constraints in the Gulf War and in Kosovo (minimization of collateral damage and friendly casualties) were such that air power was almost uniquely qualified as the active, albeit sub-optimized, instrument of policy.

The complexity of modern conflict only reinforces Churchill: "Air power is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure or even to express in precise terms." Clearly, India's restricted air assets are nowhere near capable of performing on the level displayed over Kosovo by the United States and NATO (no AWACS, in-flight refueling, JSTARS, PGM reserves, etc.). The first two of Bakshi's arguments therefore apply directly and forcefully to the Indian setting.

S. Habib

Manpreet Sethi. "India's Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament: Efforts Must Continue". Strategic Analysis. Vol XXIII No. 3, June 1999: 393-406.

This paper discusses the rationale behind India’s nuclearization, an exploration of the "change in mood" in India over the question of nuclear disarmament, and an elaboration of why it is in India’s interest to pursue the total nuclear disarmament path. Elaborating on India’s pursuit of nuclear disarmament as an ultimate objective, the paper draws from perspectives of national security, national development, international security, legal obligation, and environmental imperative. The Western notion that India’s motives to test were driven solely by security imperatives is a somewhat flawed one. Clearly, prestige and status were considerations as well. In due course, both perspectives must reconcile the security and status motives.

In arguing the case that nuclear disarmament enhances national security, the paper falls into the trap of suggesting that New Delhi’s options have become more constrained than they were (when both were undeclared nuclear) or will be (if both disarm as part of a global deal). This implies that Islamabad has more room to maneuver in a low-intensity war. This assumes "restraint" on the part of India rather than Pakistan, a problem that also seems to plague senior Pakistani general. Indian analysts’ assumption of "restraint" can be understood, although it is not one that a serious planner will make, given that they are regarding Indian decision makers as being more risk averse and responsible than their Pakistani counterparts. Further, this is based on the unwise assumption that Indian warfighters are less prepared mentally to fight a nuclear war with Pakistan.

"It is now an accepted fact that the days of a total war are gone" is not borne out in the light of the evidence coming in that history has not quite ended. About China, the paper suggests that nuclear weapons give China an advantage over India – without drawing the congruent conclusion in the case of Pakistan and India.

It is also questionable whether disarmament would actually create a "safer neighborhood." To the contrary, without the general (as opposed to specific) restraint that nuclear weapons provide, the low-intensity war may quite easily develop into a full-fledged conventional confrontation. Finally, it is not clear how total nuclear disarmament can bring India any lasting "moral" benefits. One can occupy the moral high ground only when the ground is of varied elevation. The current situation is tailor-made to fit what this reviewer perceives to be the Indian mindset.

In total nuclear disarmament, we have the most moral and least attainable of the various nuclear arms control propositions. Supporting this represents the "optimal" strategic posture in every sense. Militarily, as it allows us to go on developing and deploying so long as others refuse to disarm. Politically, it is the most defensible among a range of postures of varying degrees of defensibility, and is easily explained to domestic and international opinion constituencies. In addition, economically, it fits well with the concept of "minimum deterrence" and allows for a financially sustainable build-up rather than a "nuclear arms race," which will have little support from Indian public opinion.

J.E. Menon

The question of whether the non-proliferation regime should, or will, survive is of great importance to India. Rajagopalan considers the construct of non-proliferation from within the Realist perspective of regime formation, to draw insight into the future of the non-proliferation regime. The article enables the reader to understand the philosophies of international relations.

Realism posits that there is no "common international interests," and any such interests were the interests of the strong states (or hegemons) in masquerade. This is echoed by Huntingdon’s "Clash of Civilization", and constitution of the "international community." Realists suggest that regimes form only when they fit the perceived national interests of a hegemon. Evolution and change occur under specific circumstances related to the balance of power. The national interest of the present hegemon (the United States) explains the dominance of the non-proliferation paradigm.

The predicted evolution of the international balance, and currency, of power will determine the predictions of the future of nonproliferation. As long as nuclear weapons are a currency of power, the dominant hegemon(s) will want to limit its horizontal spread. The realist perspective suggests that selective proliferation may aid Indian strategic interests, as they did Chinese interests in proliferation. For India, the advantages of the leveling of the playing field are primarily in relationships with major and medium powers. The disadvantage, for India, is vis-à-vis Pakistan.

The following conclusions are not drawn. The strategic imbalance with Pakistan is likely to grow and diminish the rivalry with Pakistan. India can be expected to be a respected power in a multi-polar world, and therefore stands to benefit by opposing nuclear disarmament. Since India is not likely, in the short or medium term, to become a global hegemon it may favor India to selectively proliferate (and thus oppose non-proliferation). For this, India has to ensure its de-facto, if not de-jure, acceptance as a nuclear weapon state.

M. Thundyil

The paper examines the basic question of what deters in order to develop strategies of deterrence for small nuclear forces (SNF). The author examines the three basic strategies. Deterrence by punishment seeks to inflict the fear of punishing retaliation to deter adversaries. It implies robust nuclear forces and a second-strike capability. Deterrence by denial of victory seeks to deny victory for the adversary if it resorts to first strike. It needs very high capabilities in the forces. Existential deterrence is the third alternative and seeks survivable forces to deter the adversary by creating uncertainty of the outcome. The author posits the consensus as requiring a survivable force that can hold out the threat of delivering "even one hydrogen bomb on one city" as being sufficient to deter. The paper examines each of these in detail and the relevance to SNF. It concludes that existential deterrence is most affordable, and thus suitable, to SNFs.

Missing from this discussion are the political factors and global strategic balance. The political nature of the challenger has some bearing on the relevant deterrence theory. Democratic states, as they are answerable to their citizens, have a lower threshold of pain. Totalitarian states, as they are not answerable, have a higher threshold of pain. Also targeting doctrine is different since the assets that are important for its functioning have to be targeted. This means a different mix of weapons.

The global balance of power comprises a number of regional balances - European, Pacific, Asian, and Mid-East. The European balance consists of US, France and UK, and Russia. This balance, at the end of the Cold War, is in equilibrium. This has led to force rationalization by France and UK who have chosen to deploy their posture undersea. In a sense, they are adopting an existential deterrence posture by emphasizing survivability.

The Pacific balance is comprised of Russia, China, and the US. Tensions in South China Sea, proposed theater missile defenses (TMD) in Japan, S. Korea and possibly Taiwan have the potential to create disequilibrium here. The Chinese force modernization and North Korean are source of instability. Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the US affect the Asian balance at a macro level and China, India and Pakistan influence this balance at the micro level. China's force modernization, Pakistani belligerence and the consequent Indian response to these contributes to the instability at the micro level. The US, Israel and Pakistan affect the Mid-East balance. The end of the Cold War has eliminated the Russians from this picture. There is a threat of 'loose' nukes from CIS states and rogue nations here. The robust US and Israeli deterrent postures should keep this in check.

The common factor in all the regional balances is the US. Its posture and perspectives have great impact on which strategy is adopted by a given nation. It is folly to assume that Diego Garcia represents the sole American involvement in the Asian picture. Hence, when a state has mixed challengers in a changing political situation, its doctrine of deterrence must also evolve.The paper does not specifically examine the Indian doctrine from the perspective of the theories it is based on. Secondly, it does not examine the evolution of doctrines in response to changes in the international balance of power. SNFs also have to change and adapt their doctrines based on the technological level of their challengers. For instance, ABM and TMD greatly reduce the assured destruction aspect of small forces. In the end, unless overtaken by events the choice of doctrine depends on the political climate of prevailing times. A mutually balanced world would mean the widespread adoption of existential doctrine. A departure from this would lead to either of the two other doctrines being adopted based on economics.

D. Ramana

The article is a very detailed collection of open source information about Chinese nuclear espionage in the United States. It discusses the circumstances that raised suspicions about Chinese espionage; the botched manner in which the U.S. administration attempted to deal with this breach of security; and the Cox Committee’s report on the Chinese nuclear espionage. The apathy of the Clinton administration in the face of this security breach is abundantly clear. The narrative adequately captures the differences of opinion in the U.S. regarding the leakage of nuclear secrets. While there is a consensus, of sorts, that security was compromised, there is much dispute over a) how the secrets were leaked, b) what kinds of secrets were compromised and c) how much China gained from it. The article also emphasizes that Chinese nuclear espionage in the U.S. dates back to the eighties.

The Chinese seem to have incorporated much of the purloined technology into their weapons programme. This is borne out by their test history of the late 1980s and 1990s. It is possible that some of the transfers blamed on espionage could have been intentional at the height of Cold War. Any direct military threat to the United States from China’s efforts is, at best, marginal. However, these transfers have serious implications for regional stability in Asia. Even if the Chinese only gained minimal insight into the design of lighter warheads, this threatens to upset the delicate balance that exists between China and its regional adversaries. More advanced nuclear weapons in the hands of the Chinese threaten to undermine the nascent level of deterrence that exists between China and India. Clearly, the main beneficiaries from the transfer of nuclear secrets, apart from the Chinese, are the designers and contractors who work on American nuclear weapons. Without the leakage of nuclear secrets, the latter were almost condemned to extinction.

Manpreet Singh. "US Pursuit of Nuclear Non-proliferation: Check and Checkmate". Strategic Analysis. Vol XXIII No. 6, September 1999: 909-922.

Manpreet Singh outlines the history of nuclear weapons (NW) proliferation from the days of the Manhattan Project to mid-1999. He also describes the stands of successive US governments on NW and attempts to control their proliferation. He concludes that the US attempts to enforce a ban on nuclear testing by other countries while eschewing nuclear disarmament for itself is unlikely to succeed. Indeed, it is almost certain to push other countries to acquire these or other weapons of mass destruction in their quests for perceived national security.

Firstly, Singh appears to see no difference in the two stated motivations for acquisition of NW, namely, a threat to vital national security and a threat to national status or prestige. The latter has been pejoratively dubbed as "national ego." The ordinary citizen may grudgingly sympathize with a nation that "goes nuclear" because of a perceived threat to its existence, but is unlikely to sympathize with efforts to boost national prestige or ego through the acquisition of NW. Sound analysis demands this distinction be made. One can easily justify the existence of NW ,from a security stand point, in the inventories of the US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and (one assumes) Israel, but not in the UK and France. Their inventories are obvious examples of national prestige dictating strategic policy. Thirdly, chemical and biological weapons are often regarded as "the poor man's nukes." Coercing poor nations into eschewing a nuclear deterrent will inevitably result in some of those nations seeking to acquire chemical weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW) for national-security reasons. The Serbian experience, coupled with open threats by NATO to apply that policy in other parts of the world, can only emphasize this point. The CW/BW aspect should be evaluated in detail.