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Bangladesh Under Siege
R. S. N. Singh
Since its inception,
Bangladesh
has been suffering from an identity crisis. In search of
identity, it has been oscillating between Islam and Bengali culture. This
dilemma manifests itself in the posturing of all its institutions including the
Armed Forces. Like most of the
countries born through a revolution, good governance has eluded
Bangladesh
.
The country is today characterized by extreme poverty, rampant
corruption, overpopulation, violent political culture, growing Islamic
fundamentalism and politicised armed forces.
Bangladesh
is the most densely populated nation in the world; wherein some 140 million
people are squeezed in an area of 144,000 sq km. To reach that level of density,
continental US will have to attract the entire world’s population.
As long as politics in
Bangladesh
remains mercurial and inimical, the country will continue to remain volatile,
with the perpetual possibility of a military take over in case of anarchy.
Military rulers have been at helm for more than 15 years out of the 33
years of its existence. The armed
forces continue to be treated with suspicion by political parties of all hues
and they seek to divide their loyalties by playing favourites.
The lack of political culture and governance has created ideal conditions
for breading of Islamic fundamentalists who are gravitating from the fringe of
political discourse to the core. The pernicious level that Islamic
fundamentalism has acquired in
Bangladesh
was evidenced by the 400 simultaneous bomb blasts on
17 August, 2005
, which covered all the 64
districts of the country barring one. The Islamic fundamentalist parties like
the Jamiat-i-Islami and the Islamic Okiyo Jote are now a part of
the ruling dispensation; a parallel that
Bangladesh
shares with
Pakistan
.
Internally,
Bangladesh
seems to be always on the boil because despite the fact that it has benign
India
as its only major neighbour. The present situation obtaining in
Bangladesh
is an outcome of historical and geopolitical processes.
Geopolitical Backyard
Before
its emergence as a separate country in 1971, the area, which now constitutes
Bangladesh
,
was historically the geopolitical backyard of the region. Although always a part
of the pan-Indian framework, its peripheral position meant relative neglect and
discordant evolutionary processes. Buddhism in the eastern part of
Bengal
,
now
Bangladesh
,
had persisted for many years compared to most other parts of
India
before being again supplanted by Hinduism. The process of Islamization beginning
in the early 13th century,
was more rapid as compared to other parts of the Indian subcontinent. The
conversion to Islam was a mass movement as a reaction to the reassertion of cast
ideology of Hinduism in the 12th century.
However, the embracing of Islam did not manifest in repudiation of Bangla
language and culture, which remained a vital force. Probably, the Pakistani
rulers, who were basically from
West
Pakistan
, underestimated the inherent strength and sway of
Bangla heritage including language. It was because of the language and cultural
factors that the ‘Monsoon Islam’ of the erstwhile
East
Pakistan
could not reconcile with the ‘Desert Islam’ of
West
Pakistan
.
Even under an able ruler
like Akbar (1556-1605), who assimilated present day
Bangladesh
into the folds of Mughal Empire in 1576, the area, which was bedeviled by
political disunity and piracy, was neglected. The region’s agricultural and
textile wealth was used to maintain a vast Mughal Army without any corresponding
returns in terms of good governance and development. The Mughals did very little
to extend protection to the people of the eastern part of Bengal and as per some
sources, in one year as many as 40,000 Bengalis were seized by Portuguese and
Arakenese pirates to be sold as slaves. During the British East India Company
rule,
West Bengal
had emerged as the nerve center of trade and commerce with the concomitant
benefits of development, employment opportunities and shared proximity with the
dispensation. This again resulted in the extremely lopsided and different
evolutionary processes between
East Bengal
and
West
Bengal
in favour of the latter. It was therefore not
surprising that a large populace in
East Bengal
supported the partition of
Bengal
in 1905 (annulled in 1912). Of course, religion also was a strong factor.
Islamic nationalism actually had its ferment in
East
Bengal
. It was here (
Dhaka
)
in 1906 that the first meeting of the All India Muslim League was held.
As part of
Pakistan
,
Bangladesh
(then
East
Pakistan
) was a case of neglect and discriminatory treatment in
many areas including the Armed Forces. The high defence expenditure and its
collateral benefits bypassed
East Pakistan
,
as most of the military establishments were located in
West
Pakistan
. The British mindset, with regard to Bengalis being
less martially inclined as compared to Punjabis and Pathans, persisted in
matters of recruitment. In 1956, the Pakistani Army had a total of approximately
890 officers (Major to Lieutenant General), out of which only 14 were from
East Pakistan
.
Of these, only one was of Brigadier rank. Out of 593 officers in the Pakistani
navy, only 7 were from
East Pakistan
.
The situation in the Air Force was little better, out of 640 officers, 40 were
Bengalis. The situation had marginally improved in the 60s. The dichotomy
between
East Pakistan
and
West
Pakistan
resulted in their separation in 1971 due to events that
spiraled beyond the control of Pakistani rulers. However, it would be wrong to
assume that all through the existence of
Bangladesh
(
East
Pakistan
) with
West Pakistan
,
there were no forces of attraction. Although, in the 1970 elections, in which
Awami League led by Sheikh Mujib had won all but two of the 162 seats allotted
to
East
Pakistan
in the National Assembly, less than 50% of the people
had voted for the party. Therefore, many political parties with their moorings
in
West Pakistan
had a sizeable constituency in
East Pakistan
.
Had it not been for some positive linkages,
Bangladesh
after independence may not have been able to build bridges with
Pakistan
so soon, as it did.
Geo-strategic location
Except
for
Myanmar
with which
Bangladesh
shares a 193 Km long land boundary, its remaining land boundary of 4096 Km is
shared with
India
.
The country is ringed by massive Indian landmass from all sides barring
south, wherein lies the
Bay
of Bengal
. This is a
geo-strategic truism and therefore it would be logical to infer that till
Bangladesh
emerges as a stable, prosperous and confident nation, it will continue to
consider
India
as its perennial and pervasive adversary.
There
is a section within the Indian strategic analyst community which is of the view
that the emergence of
Bangladesh
as a separate country was not in
India
’s
strategic interest. They contend
that volatile Bangladesh, as East Pakistan would have continued to consume the
concern and energy of the West Pakistani rulers, thus considerably diluting
their focus on Jammu and Kashmir. Moreover,
for
Pakistan
,
East
Pakistan
by virtue of its geo-strategic setting vis-à-vis
India
would have remained vulnerability – a soft underbelly of sorts.
Soon after
Bangladesh
gained independence, the Chinese leader Chou-en-Lai is attributed to have
remarked that ‘
India
has created a rock which will fall on its own feet’.
Nevertheless, the biggest strategic gain that accrued to
India
from the creation of
Bangladesh
was that
Pakistan
became bereft of a naval pressure in the
Bay of Bengal
i.e. in the vicinity of
India
’s
eastern seaboard and thereby also ceased to have a geographical interface of
South-East
Asia.
The
big brother syndrome with respect to
India
looms very large on
Bangladesh
’s
security horizon and therefore its threat perceptions are perhaps more imagined
than real. While to
India
,
Bangladesh
is one of the seven neighbouring countries; for
Bangladesh
,
India
is the only major neighbour. Therefore, there is a tendency to exaggerate
apprehensions or fabricate threats from
India
.
This has given rise to an anti-India lobby within the Bangla populace and
polity, which has severely impaired and inhibited some mutually very beneficial
cooperative proposals and ventures between the two countries. One such proposal
that has fallen victim to the imagined Indian threat is the
Bangladesh
’s
ambivalence over granting transit route to
India
(North East) through its territory. The India-fear has also led
Bangladesh
to forge close relationship with
China
and
Pakistan
,
the two countries, which it perceives
India
is disconcerted with. However, there is a segment in
Bangladesh
,
which is of the opinion that such strategic ploy of countervailing
India
could prove to be self-defeating in the long run.
In
most of its military training institutions and military exercises,
India
is referred to as an enemy.
Bangladesh
is conscious of the fact that it is not capable of undertaking any offensive
against
India
,
given the huge mismatch in the size and military capabilities of the two
countries. It has therefore adopted a wholly defensive strategy. Its military
strategy devolves around debilitating an Indian offensive by use of numerous
rivers and other obstacles, and preventing the fall of
Dhaka
for a sufficient period to allow the international community to intervene. It
also factors the use of guerilla warfare in its defence strategy against an
Indian offensive.
Deployment of Armed Forces
The
deployment pattern of the Bangladesh Army is on a geographical rather than any
operational imperatives. It has
seven Infantry Divisions and an
Independent Armoured Brigade. The 9
Infantry Division at
Dhaka
and 24 Infantry Division in
Chittagong
are considered important. The
division at
Dhaka
has played an important role in all the coups that
Bangladesh
has witnessed and is therefore considered to be extremely sensitive.
The division at
Chittagong
has been engaged in counter insurgency operations and has four brigades, as
opposed to other divisions that have only two brigades. A map showing deployment
of the Army and key Naval and Air Force bases is given here:
In
the context of India – Bangladesh security interface ‘The Bangladesh
Rifles’ (BDR), which has a strength of 60,000 personnel organized into some 45
battalions, assumes overwhelming importance, as it is responsible for the entire
length of border. The quality of its interface with its Indian counterpart is a
key determinant to peace, tranquility and development of border region between
the two countries. Given the vast magnitude of border problems, the cooperative
mechanisms between the BDR and Border Security Force (BSF) of
India
have to be sound. However, in the
last four or five years, there have been some bitter clashes between the two. In
April 2002, a 16 member patrolling party of the BSF in Meghalya were captured
and slaughtered by the BDR. Three
years later in April 2005, in another incident near Lankamara outpost 8 km from
Agartala, an Assistant Commandant of the BSF was brutally knifed before being
killed. While differences and
problems between the border forces is a normal feature and cannot be completely
ignored two incidents are indicative of the growing animosity that the BDR
harbours against the BSF. If the
trend escalates, it could lead to larger confrontations. The absence of any
military threat from
India
is also evidenced by the fact that
Bangladesh
having only 1,40,000 (approximately) armed forces personnel is the largest
contributor to the UN missions.
Bangladesh
–
India
:
Strategic Interface
Bangladesh
’s
security interface with
India
is on multitude of planes. It has the geographical luxury to impact on five
Indian states i.e. West
Bengal
(2216 Km),
Assam
(263 Km), Meghalya (443 Km), Tripura (856 Km) and Mizoram (399 Km).
It is nearly impossible to completely seal the 4096 Kms border and as
such its porosity can be reduced but not eliminated, even as about 3000 Km out
sanctioned 3287 Km of border fence has already been erected by
India
.
The threat emanating from
Bangladesh
to
India
is probably more insidious and therefore less discernible as compared to threat
from
Pakistan
or
China
.
That,
Pakistan
has gone overtly nuclear is not a totally unforeseen development since any
technology sooner or later finds fresh avenues like the flow of water. There is
atleast the comfort of deterrence, between two nuclear capable states. However,
in case of a soft state like
Bangladesh
,
the policy of deterrence has serious limitations. Some of the security related
facets upon which
Bangladesh
impacts in its strategic interface with
India
are :-
·
Demographic Assault on
India
:
As per
an estimate, the annual illegal immigration from
Bangladesh
is approximately
300,000 and the total number of Bangladeshi nationals in
India
is approximately
15 to 17 millions. There is hardly any state in
India
, where Bangladeshi
nationals are not residing. That, to many it is not a pronounced problem is
because of the fact that the size and large population of
India
has been able to
absorb such a massive influx. Nonetheless, in terms of numbers, more than
two-third of
Australia
’s population has
been added to
India
from
Bangladesh
. There are any
numbers of anti-India hawks in
Bangladesh
who openly espouse
theory of lebensraum.
·
Sanctuary to Indian Insurgent Groups:
Though
consistently denied by
Bangladesh
, there are a
number of camps of Indian insurgent groups, which include ULFA and NSCN(IM) in
the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHTs) of
Bangladesh
. Some of the top
leaders of ULFA have been operating with impunity from
Bangladesh
’s capital
Dhaka
. Probably, the
clandestine support to Indian insurgents is a matter of strategic leverage for
Bangladesh.
·
Smuggling of Weapons:
The
Bangladesh
territory has
become a conduit for weapon smuggling for Indian insurgents as well as
Myanmarese insurgents, which
Bangladesh
has been unable to
contain, despite vigilance and several crackdowns by
Bangladesh
’s Security
Forces. The Cox’s Bazar coast offers convenient landing points for arms
smugglers. As per a number of media reports, these smugglers obtain their
consignments from Ranong and Phuket (on Thailand’s Western Coast) and move it
by boats to Cox’s Bazar from where it is further transported by land route
along the India – Bangladesh border and India – Myanmar border. The coastal
area stretching from port of Chittagong through Cox’s Bazar and to Myanmar’s
border is not only notorious for arms dealing and gun running but is also the
strong hold of the fundamentalist party, the Jamiat-i-Islami and its
youth wing Islamic Chhatra Shibir and other more extremist Muslim groups
like the Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul Islami, which was allegedly established with
funds from Osama Bin Laden. The International Maritime Bureau because of high
incidence of piracy and armed robberies has declared the
Chittangong
Port
as the second most
dangerous port in the world. The Bangladesh-Myanmar border area is also home to
nearly 100,000 Muslim refugees and migrants i.e. the Rohingyas from Arakan (Rakhine)
state of
Myanmar
. The
Myanmar
authorities accuse
the Rohingyas of facilitating arms smuggling and having links with Islamic
extremist groups within and outside
Bangladesh.
·
Islamic Fundamentalism:
Much of
the blame for Islamization of Bangladesh polity should go to military rulers
i.e. Zia (1975-1981) and Ershad (1982-1990) who used political Islam to
legitimatise their rule.
Bangladesh
has indeed moved
very far from the socialist, secular and Bengali nationalist government that
Mujib had established after independence. The inclusion of fundamentalist
Islamic groups / parties like the Jamiat-i-Islami by the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) in the government has given them a great deal of
legitimacy. Ironically, the Jamiat-i-Islami, which has 18 seats in the
300-member parliament and two cabinet ministers (agriculture and social welfare
portfolio) were strident in their opposition to independence from
Pakistan
in 1971. Though
the Jamiat-i-Islami has mellowed down its stand with regard to its
Islamic agenda, its inclusion in the government has nevertheless provided fillip
to activities of Islamic fundamentalist groups. Another Islamic group, which has
presence in
Bangladesh
and is suspected
to have provided funds to the Al Quaeda, is Al Harmain Islamic
Foundation (a Saudi charity). It has office in
Dhaka
, which was opened
in 1997 and its network is believed to be spread in 38 districts of
Bangladesh
. In June 2004, the
US
announced that it
was moving against the organisation. As per some media reports,
Bangladesh
authorities have
forced the closure of Al Harmain due to the
US
pressure. The
other groups like Islami Okiyo Jote and Harkat-ul Jihad Islami have
been threatening to launch a Taliban style revolution in
Bangladesh
. The latter is
suspected of having links with Al-Quaeda and has allegedly provided
refuge to some Taliban members that fled
Afghanistan
.
o
In the recent period, another radical Islamic outfit, which has acquired
menacing proportions, is the Jammatul Mujahideen (JM) and its sister
organization Jagrata Muslim Janta
Bangladesh
(JMJB)
or Awakened Muslim Masses. The military head of JM – Siddiqur Rahman or Bangla
Bhai actively supports establishment of Islamic emirates in Muslim majority
districts of
Assam
, Rakhine Province
of Mayanmar and southern
Thailand
. The Private Army,
which is seen to be emerging as the Bangladeshi Taliban is active in western and
southwestern
Bangladesh
where they levy
taxes on villagers and compel men to don Muslim cap and women to wear Burqa. The
group with an estimated membership of 100,000 has carried out some most gruesome
killings in
Bangladesh
. In early 2004,
the Islamic fundamentalists carried out bomb explosion outside a mosque in
northern part of
Bangladesh
in which more than
100 people were injured. The British High Commission to
Bangladesh
was also injured.
The ranks of these radical organisations receive constant supply of recruits
from more than 60,000 madrassas in
Bangladesh
. A large number of
these are funded by proselytizing Arab charities.
o
Another factor that is contributing to the growth of Islamic
fundamentalism is
Bangladesh
’s export of
manpower to
West Asia
. Nearly three million Bangladeshi work there and by the time they come
back, some observers aver, they are completely steeped in Wahabi type intolerant
Islam. The growth of Islamic fundamentalism in
Bangladesh
not only raises
the specter of its export to India, but also renders
the country a fertile ground for anti-India activities by inimical powers like Pakistan.
·
Influence and Presence of Inimical Powers:
Bangladesh
being a soft,
vulnerable and underdeveloped country can easily be manipulated by powers that
are inimical to Indian interests. In a matter of just five years, consequent to
Mujib’s assassination in 1975,
Bangladesh
began to cultivate
close relations with
China
and began to
distance itself from
India
.
China
, which had blocked
Bangladesh
’s entry into the
UN, recognized it in 1974 and the two countries exchanged diplomatic missions in
1976. The defence relations between the two countries began to accelerate and
presently nearly 70% of the arms inventory of
Bangladesh
’s Armed Forces
is of Chinese origin. This overwhelming military dependence of
Bangladesh
on
China
has enabled the
latter to make inroads into various other economic facets including
infrastructural projects. Even though, the two countries have refrained from
conducting any joint military exercises, the magnitude of training and equipment
related cooperation is prodigious. The strategic import of this cooperation can
be gauged by the fact that
China
initially supplied
equipment at rates lower than the manufacturing cost. It’s only in the recent
years that the Chinese arms industry has begun to do business with
Bangladesh
on a competitive
and commercial basis. There have been regimes in
Bangladesh
under which Pak
ISI activities have flourished. The two countries have burgeoning defence
cooperation in terms of training, and procurement of weapons and equipment by
Bangladesh
from
Pakistan
. The commonality
of Chinese equipment has facilitated
Pakistan
’s forays in
Bangladesh
’s arms market.
·
As per some analysts,
Bangladesh
possibly cannot
source arms from
India
because it
considers it as her main adversary. Its probably reflective of the
Bangladesh
mind set that
purchase of few Ashoka Leyland trucks for the Bangladesh Army created a huge
controversy within that country. The other country, which has active defence
cooperation with
Bangladesh
, is the
US
. The two countries
have been conducting joint military exercises on natural disaster management
with unfailing regularity. However, post 9/11, there has been some change in the
content and tenor of these exercises. A permanent or even an indirect presence
of any extra-regional power in
Bangladesh
can upset
India
’s strategic
calculus.
·
Transit Route through
Bangladesh
:
The separation of
India
and
Bangladesh
based on religious
lines is not consistent with geography and deep cultural affinities. The
cooperative mechanisms between the two countries have been hostage to misplaced
distrust. One such cooperative mechanism that can enhance the economic
well-being of
India
’s northeast, is
the proposed provision of transit route facility by
Bangladesh
through its
territory. The distance between Kolkata (in
West Bengal
) and Agartala (in
Tripura) would be reduced from 1880 Kms to 740 Kms, if such a facility were in
place. Moreover,
India
’s North East can
be served well by the
Chittagong
port in
Bangladesh
due to its
proximity. In 1999, the
Bangladesh
government had
agreed to examine the proposal to allow trans-shipment of Indian goods through
its territory. However, this proposal sparked off a major controversy as the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), then in opposition, vehemently opposed the
proposal on the plea that it would jeopardize the security of
Bangladesh.
·
Supply of Gas / Gas Pipeline from
Bangladesh
:
The
proven gas reserves of
Bangladesh
is 150 billion
cubic meters. It currently consumes 9.9 billion cubic meters of gas that it
produces annually. Gas exploration and production in
Bangladesh
is being done in
partnership with the western companies for which
Bangladesh
has to defray the
cost over a given period. This is a difficult economic proposition and therefore
export of gas to other countries can substantially offset the financial burden.
The most accessible and cost effective market for supply of its gas through
pipelines could be
India
. Two national
committees had been setup in the recent past in
Bangladesh
to study the
proposal. They however averred that the export of gas to
India
was not possible
unless there were new discoveries of gas. Their conclusion was predicated upon
the envisaged economic growth rate of
Bangladesh
in next 50 years
and its corresponding impact on domestic gas requirements.
·
Bangladesh
can also
facilitate supply of gas from Tripura (
India
) and
Myanmar
to
West Bengal
(
India
) by permitting gas
pipelines traversing through its territory. The proposal was actively discussed
between two Bangladeshi companies i.e. Mohana Holdings and Banamco, and the Gas
Authority of India Limited (GAIL) in 1999. A Canadian company “Trans Canadian
Pipeline” had also showed interest in the project. The talks however did not
progress due to criticism from the anti-India lobby in
Bangladesh
. Nevertheless,
more recently in 2005, the
Bangladesh
government has
demonstrated very encouraging attitude towards a tri-nation proposal, which
envisages supply of gas by
Myanmar
to
India
through pipeline,
running through
Bangladesh
territory.
·
Assam
Corridor:
Bangladesh
’s strategic
location with respect to the narrow
Assam
corridor (200 Km
long and 21 – 65 Km wide), which links the Indian heartland with its
northeast, is a strategic irritant if not a threat. Some rabid anti-India
strategic commentators in
Bangladesh
treat this as an
Indian vulnerability and do not hesitate to propagate preposterous ideas such as
cutting off the Indian northeast in tandem with
China
, in the event of
India-Bangladesh hostilities. With the nuclearization of India and Pakistan, the
chances of long-drawn conventional war between the two countries has much
receded, nevertheless, in a conflict situation there is a possibility that
Pakistan may try to distract India by encouraging or manipulating Bangladesh to
adopt a belligerent posture.
·
Access to Naval Bases in
Bangladesh
by Foreign
Powers: The
naval bases in
Bangladesh
by virtue of their
location, strategically dominate the
Bay of Bengal
. There have been
numerous reports alluding moves by the
US
to acquire
permanent presence in the
Chittagong
base. Such a presence would enable the US to
further consolidate its position in that part of the Indian Ocean and also deter
any moves by China to seek a maritime foothold in that region through the aegis
of Myanmar. Post 9/11, it has become all the more important for the
US
to monitor and
dominate the
Chittagong
area, which is the hub of Islamic fundamentalism.
Pakistan
may have its own
vested interests in gaining such access to countervail the Indian Navy on
India
’s eastern
seaboard. There have been reports in the past that the
US
had offered to
upgrade
Chittagong
port and construct
a container terminal. Much to the credit of
Bangladesh
, it has spurned
any such overture that may entail a foothold by any foreign country.
Politicization of Armed Forces
The
politicization of Bangladesh Armed Forces was inherent in its conception and
construct. In 1974, some 28,000 Bengali military personnel were repatriated from
West Pakistan
.
These personnel were absorbed into an army dominated by former guerillas
(freedom fighters), many being civilians who were inducted as the reward for
their sacrifices. Soon, a rift developed between the repatriated personnel and
freedom fighters, which was to have profound consequences for the fledgling
nation. The rift between the two was further exacerbated when Mujib formed the
Jatyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defence Force). The intended aim behind the
creation of this force was to insulate Mujib’s regime against military coups.
By 1975, there were more than 30,000 personnel in the Rakkhi Bahini. The
repatriates had lamented that Mujib had destroyed the army by : disbanding the
East Bengal Regiment (composed of mainly of repatriates), diverting all new
recruits to Rakkhi Bahini, favouring freedom fighters in promotions, and
reduction of army’s budget in order to sustain the Jatyo Rakkhi Bahini. The
repatriates were also disconcerted with the regime’s pro-India and pro-Soviet
proclivities. On
15th August,
1975
,
30 middle ranking officers staged a coup and assassinated Mujib and most members
of his family. Thereafter, in
Bangladesh
there have been about 24 coups and counter-coups. Ziaur Rahman, who succeeded
Mujibur Rahman was also fell victim to assassination in 1981 at
Chittagong
,
by Major General Muhameed Manzur Ahmed (commander of 24th Infantry
Division) and his loyal troops. The coup was however crushed within 48 hours and
Manzur was killed while allegedly fleeing to the Indian border. The Army Chief,
Lieutenant General Hussain Ershad on
24th March
1982
,
staged the other major coup and ruled the country for eight years. Unlike
previous coups, there were no bloodshed and senior military commanders acted in
complete unison.
During
the period from 1975-1990, due to severe political unrest in the country, senior
officers of the Bangladesh Army virtually ran the countries affairs. It is
pertinent to note that the Ershad government was brought down only when the
Armed Forces refused to support him against the popular movement led by Khaleda
Zia and Sheikh Hasina. This period, also witnessed the ascendancy of army in
terms of protocol, budget and lucrative appointments usually held by civilians
in democratic countries. While assessing the level of politicization in the
Bangladesh Armed Forces, the historical influence of Pakistan Armed Forces of
which it was a part for 25 years, must be considered.
The
fortunes of the repatriated lobby and the freedom fighter lobby have fluctuated
in
Bangladesh
with the change in regimes. General Ziaur Rahman rehabilitated the repatriated
lobby at the decision-making levels, even though he was a freedom fighter. The
repatriated officers continued to be ascendant during Ershad’s regime. Begum
Khaleda Zia, on assuming power adopted conscious policy to dilute the influence
of the repatriated lobby by patronizing the freedom fighters, which was more out
of political exigencies than anything else. In her current tenure as Prime
Minister, the repatriated officers are holding most of the key posts. On the
other hand, the freedom fighter lobby had prospered during the regime of Sheikh
Hasina. There is a common view that all repatriated officers are pro-Pakistan
and all freedom fighters are pro-India, which is not entirely correct. Moreover,
these lobbies are now perhaps at the fag end of their existence. The new
generation of officers especially, the products of
Bangladesh
Military
Academy
,
which was established in 1975, are relatively apolitical and free of any
historical baggage. In that sense, there is a generational shift underway in
Bangladesh.
A
large number of older generation officers, irrespective of their repatriate or
freedom fighter background, have been apolitical and professional. A number of
Army Chiefs have tried to purge the Army of politicization. However, the
paranoia of the current
Bangladesh
polity with regard to the Armed Forces has resulted in some actions, which
provides impetus to the perpetuation of its politicization. It has become an
established practice with political parties (BNP and Awami League) to carryout a
complete reshuffle in the appointments of the officers in key positions on
assumption of power. The current BNP government also affected sweeping changes
in the Armed Forces. 14 out of 25 Major Generals and 50 Brigadiers were removed
or transferred within a span of six months. The government compulsorily retired
the Army Chief, the Naval Chief, and the Air Chief. Such moves denigrate the
image of the officers amongst their rank and file, as they view them more as
political tools rather than military commanders. Even the arms procurement
process has been completely politicized. No sooner, Begum Khaleda Zia took over
power in 2001, she took a decision to re-sell 8 x Mig-29 aircraft acquired from
Russia
during the Awami League regime on the pretext that the aircraft were incurring
heavy expenditure in terms of maintenance and spares. A frigate (BANGABANDHU)
acquired from
South Korea
in the year 2000 by the Awami League government, was also de-commissioned. The
political parties are therefore equally responsible for politicization of the
armed forces in
Bangladesh
.
Despite the mercurial politics, there is relative political stability in
Bangladesh
;
nevertheless it continues to remain a volatile country.
Armed Forces Division
The
fear and apprehension of the government with regard to the armed forces is
reflected in the institution ‘Armed Forces Division’ (AFD), which is
subordinated to the Prime Minister’s office. The organization, then known as
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, which was established by General Ershad in
1983, has been persisted by the successive civilian governments. Though, the
stated purpose of AFD is coordination between the three services i.e. training,
assessment of arms and equipment needs; however, by virtue of its proximity to
the Prime Minister it exercises extra constitutional authority.
Conclusion
The
intended message of the coordinated and simultaneous bomb blasts throughout
Bangladesh
was to demonstrate the wide reach and influence of Islamic terrorist groups.
Earlier, there were unconfirmed reports in the Time Magazine about a large
number of Taliban elements making their way to
Bangladesh
from
Pakistan
,
in the wake of operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in
Afghanistan
.
If
Bangladesh
is unable to come to grips with the growing Islamic terrorism within the
country, it is fraught with serious internal and external ramifications.
Internally, the specter includes a military takeover and externally an emphatic
military presence of extra regional power as part of ‘global war against
terrorism’.
On
02 April, 2004, the Bangladesh authorities seized 4730 of different types of
sophisticated arms including SMGS, automatic rifles, tommy guns, 27,000 hand
grenades, 840 rockets, 2000 grenade launching tubes and 11,40,520 rounds of
ammunition in Chittagong area. The
seizure proved the link of international rackets with local operatives enjoying
impunity from watchdog agencies.
After
travelling through
Bangladesh
,
the New York Times Magazine reporter Eliza Griswold concluded “The global war
on terrorism is aimed at making use of regimes like that of Talibans impossible,
in
Bangladesh
the trend could be going the other way”.
The
War of Independence of 1971 was engendered intense politicization of armed
forces. The fact that a large number
of officers and jawans, throwing aside their professional norms and indignantly
braking the canons of military discipline and chain of command, rose against the
establishment and joined the War, was itself a revolutionary step.
A study conducted by Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace ranked 60 states that are in the danger of falling into the
‘failed states’ category. The
study, based on various political, social and economic parameters ranked
Bangladesh
at 17th position,
while
India
’s
other neighbours are ranked :
Myanmar
– 26th,
Pakistan
– 34th,
Nepal
– 35th and
Bhutan
– 23rd.
Sri
Lanka
, despite its ethnic war, does
not figure in the failed or failing state category.
The study concludes that failed states export terrorism, large-scale
immigrants, drugs and weapons.
This piece first appeared in the Indian Defence Review Volume 20(3), and
has been reproduced here with the permission of the editor. The writer is
Associate Editor Indian Defence Review
|