Security Research Review

 Bharat Rakshak > Security Research Review > The All Seeing Eye


Government Response to Left Wing Extremism

Vamsee Kiran Vedula

Executive Summary

The rapid spread of Left Wing extremism is posing a serious challenge to various states of the Indian Union. The ability of left wing groups to run a parallel government in their strongholds is undermining the authority of the Government and impeding the development of these areas. The cycle of violence is wastefully consuming already scarce resources. The Government of India has devised a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy to deal with Left Wing Extremism. This paper is an attempt to present the challenge posed by Left Wing extremism and the Government response to this challenge. 

Although there are dozens of Left Wing extremist organizations in India, the main thrust of this article is on Communist Party of India –Maoist. Most of the material presented here is obtained from various statements by Government officials, leaders, parliamentary debates and the yearbook published by the Home Ministry. Articles published on this topic by various authors are also used.

 

 

Contents

 

Introduction

A Brief history

Current Scenario

Government Response

Possible Future Scenarios

Conclusions

References and Footnotes

Introduction

At the dawn of the new millennium, India has not only emerged as a nuclear weapons state but also as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. It is expected that barring unforeseen catastrophic events, India would emerge as one of the three pillars of the world economy in the next two decades. In order to realize its full potential, India needs to overcome its internal and external challenges. 

Having faced four and half wars since independence, India had to develop a strong military to counter any challenge to the security of its citizens and the territorial integrity of the Union.

However, the internal security situation continues to remain the achilles heel of the Republic. For decades now, left wing extremism has continuously posed a serious challenge to the various states of the union. As Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh has rightly observed, “The internal security is our biggest national security challenge”. [i]

A Brief history

In order to understand left wing extremism in India, we need to look at the evolution of communism in India. Even before independence, a section of leaders argued that communism and socialism are ideally suited for a society like ours, which is divided along religion, caste, and ethnic lines. They argued that it was the only way to emancipate the vast number of poor people in India and create a classless and just society. This led to the creation of the Communist Party of India or CPI.

Formed on 26th December 1925, the Communist Party of India is one of the oldest political parties in the country. Before independence, because of a ban on all communist activities by British authorities, the communists were not able to build a strong nationwide organization. However, two campaigns led by communists immediately before and after independence is worth noting. One was the “Tebhaga movement”, led by peasants’ front of CPI “Kisan Sabha” in 1946. It was fought to increase the crop share of peasants from half to two-thirds, thereby reducing the share of feudal landlord to one-third.

Another campaign was against the brutal repression of peasants by feudal landlords during the regime of Nizam in the Telangana region. Although these two movements were not very successful, they helped communists to gain a strong hold in social and economically backward areas.

After independence, the Communist Party of India has emerged as the largest opposition party at national level. The first major crisis in the communist family came during the Sino-Soviet split and the 1962 Sino-Indian war. A large group of pro-China communists backed Chinese version of the events and blamed India to be the aggressor. The pro-Chinese faction agreed with China that the Soviet Union was following “Revisionism” and “Socialist Imperialism” and “Sectarianism”. This led to a split in the communist party into CPI (pro-Soviet) and CPI(M) (pro-Chinese) branches. While the Communist parties were struggling on ideological issues, a young communist leader by the name of Charu Majumdar was busy preparing his own plans to usher a “revolution” in India.

Charu Majumdar (1918-1972), son of a freedom fighter, was born in Siliguri, Darjeeling Dist. He took part in the “Tebhaga movement”, which gave him experience in organizing armed rebellion. He was deeply influenced by Mao Zedong and wanted to emulate the Chinese revolution in India. During the years 1965-1967, he wrote a series of eight articles arguing that the situation in India was ripe for armed rebellion. His documents formed the basis for Naxalism and were called the “Historic eight documents” [ii]. He was opposed to CPI/CPI(M) line of working within the framework of Indian constitution. In order to understand why he was opposed to the Indian state, it is important to grasp his view of the Indian government. He argued that the Indian government was a semi-colonial, feudalistic and imperial entity that needed to be overthrown. In an article [iii] in 1965 he wrote-

The government is failing to supply food to the people, so the people have become agitated. So it is in the interest of the reactionary bourgeoisie of India that India has attacked Pakistan. The US imperialist plan of the world war is also operating behind this war. By attacking Pakistan, the ruling class again wants to create a tide of bourgeois nationalism. But this time it is clear like daylight that India alone is the aggressor. So, as a result of the defeat of the Indian army, the anti-government struggle will fast crystallize among the masses. So Marxists want today that the aggressive Indian army should be defeated. This defeat will create new mass agitations. Not merely wishing that they should be defeated; Marxists at the same time should make efforts so that this defeat becomes imminent. In every province of India agitations should be created on the lines the mass agitation in Kashmir is progressing.

Picture source : http://paginavermelha.org/

He was also opposed to Soviet Union’s support to India. He viewed Maoist China as the rightful leader of the revolutionaries across the world. In another article titled “Carry on struggle against modern revisionism”, [iv] he argued how the help of the Soviet Union to India was revisionism – 

They have announced that they will give India an aid of Rs. 600 crores during the Fourth Five Year Plan. The idea that Soviet aid is strengthening India's Independence is extremely wrong. For, there is no class analysis behind this. We shall have to place clearly before the people our views against this support. If support is given to the government of India which is following the path of co-operation with imperialism, and feudalism, it is the reactionary class which is strengthened. So Soviet aid is not strengthening the democratic movement of India, but is increasing the strength of the reactionary forces in co-operation with US-led imperialism and the Soviet. It is the Soviet-US. co-operation of modern revisionism that we are observing in India—a satanic association against the people's liberation struggles in the future.

During the mid-1960s, he realized that the time was ripe to launch the revolution since the Government of India was struggling due to the 1962 and 1965 wars, and the bad economic situation in the country.

Naxalbari is a small village in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal. During the spring of 1967, the landless peasants, supported by hard line communists like Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal etc. forcibly occupied the lands belonging to their “class enemies”. The clashes were brutal. The communist government in power at that time was embarrassed by the behavior of its own cadre and put down the uprising ruthlessly. The left government dismissed the uprising as “Left Adventurism”, whereas hardliners called the left government’s policy as a “betrayal of Marxist ideology”. Even though the “Naxalbari uprising” was a failure, it marked the beginning of violent left wing extremist movement in India, and the terms “Naxalism” and “Naxalite” were born.[v]

In 1967, the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR - initially called AICCCR of CPI[M] but later changed to simply AICCCR) was formed by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal. On 22nd of April 1969 (coinciding with Lenin’s birthday), the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) was formed by AICCCR with Charu Majumdar as Secretary of the Central Organizing Committee. The AICCCR dissolved itself.

During 1969-72, fierce battles raged between CPI-ML and Government authorities resulting in large-scale violence and bloodshed. It went on until July 1972, when Calcutta police arrested Charu Majumdar. He died in Lal Bazar police station on July 28, 1972. His death was a body blow to the Naxalites across the country. With his death, the central authority of Naxalism collapsed. From then on Naxalite groups went through a series of splits and a few mergers. There were many instances of splinter groups targeting each other’s cadre. The center of gravity of Naxalism shifted from West Bengal to Bihar and Andhra Pradesh.

How ever, instead of looking at every single split and merger, we are going to concentrate on three “groups” and their splits/mergers. They can be loosely termed as “Charu Majumdar group”, “Maoist Communist Center” and “Peoples War Group”. Most of the Naxalite groups in India can be traced back to the first group.

The splits in Charu Majumdar group can be termed as natural because of the absolute tyrannical style followed by Charu Majumdar. He was not someone who would accommodate divergent viewpoints. He was fanatical about revolution and considered following mass line as dilution of ideology. The following excerpt explains his impatience to criticism:

Fourthly, the work of the mass organizations will have to be discussed and decided upon in the Party before it is implemented in the mass organizations. It should be remembered here that the policies of the mass organizations have been wrongly practiced so long in the Party. To hold discussions on Party decisions is not called democratic centralism. This thinking is not in accordance with Marxism. And from all this thinking the conclusion has to be drawn that the Party's programme will be adopted from below. But if it is adopted from the lower level, then the correct Marxist way is not implemented; in all these activities there inevitably is bourgeois deviations. The Marxist truth of democratic centralism is that the Party directive coming from higher leadership must be carried out. Because the Party's highest leader is he who has firmly established himself as a Marxist through a long period of movements and theoretical debates. We have the right to criticize Party decisions; but once a decision has been taken, if any one criticizes it without implementing it, or obstructs work, or hesitates to implement it, he will be guilty of the serious offence of violating Party discipline. 

As a result of having this idea of Party democracy as that of a debating society, the road for espionage inside the Party is thrown open. Naturally, the revolutionary leadership of the Party then becomes bankrupt and the working class is deprived of a correct revolutionary leadership. This petty-bourgeois sort of thinking inside the Party leads the Party on to the verge of destruction. And this is the manifestation of petty-bourgeois thinking inside the Party. Their comfortable living and attitude of undisciplined criticism reduces the Party to a mere debating society. This thinking becomes a hurdle in the path of building up a Party of the proletariat—strong as iron. [vi]

In the year 1968 itself, Andhra Pradesh group led by Nagi Reddy, D.V Rao and Pulla Reddy was booted out due to differences with Charu Majumdar. In the year 1971, Satyanarain Singh revolted against Charu Majumdar’s “Annihilation” policy and started his own CPI (ML) which is called CPI (ML) Satyanarain Singh Group (SNS). During Bangladesh liberation war, Ashim Chatterjee and Santosh Rana also left CPI (ML) due to Charu Majumdar’s opposition to the Indian Government’s position.

After the death of Charu Majumdar in 1972, Mahadev Mukharjee and Sharma assumed the leadership of CPI (ML). But the unity did not last long as Mahadev Mukharjee expelled Sharma. Another split in Mahadev Mukharjee camp came when CPI (ML) split between pro-Lin Biao and anti-Lin Biao groups. 

In the year 1974, the pro-Mao, Pro-Charu Majumdar, anti-Lin Biao faction of the CPI (ML) was reorganized by Subrata Dutta alias Jauhar and renamed CPI (ML) Liberation or liberation. This faction emerged as the strongest of all Naxal outfits and claimed to be rightful successor of Charu Majumdar’s CPI (ML). Vinod Mishra was elected as General Secretary of liberation in 1975 after Jauhar was killed in a police encounter. He led liberation for 23 years.

Vinod Mishra (1947-1998)[vii] took his first steps towards the ultra-leftist movement during the mid-sixties when he was doing mechanical engineering at Regional Engineering College Durgapur. While Mahadev Mukharjee and Sharma were busy splitting CPI (ML) in 1974, Vinod Mishra recognized the need to reconstruct the Naxalite organization afresh. This made him join hands with Subrata Dutta (Jauhar) and create CPI (ML) Liberation. Although he claimed to follow the Charu Majumdar line, he was the first Naxal leader to recognize the futility of armed rebellion against the Indian Government. Without explicitly renouncing the methods of Charu Majumdar, he started a “rectification movement” which was aimed at rectifying the shortcomings and lapses in the armed rebellion. As a part of this new line of thinking, liberation joined the mass mobilization and jumped into electoral politics in 1982 through a front organization called the Indian Peoples’ Front (IPF). The IPF was envisioned as a nationwide alternative to the Congress party. In the year 1989, IPF won a seat in parliamentary elections and the first Naxalite member entered the Indian Parliament. Although liberation justified this significant departure from the Charu Majumdar line, critics have pointed out that CPI (ML) Liberation has completed the full circle of coming back to the CPI/CPM line.

Picture source : http://www.cpiml.org/

The role played by Vinod Mishra in this turnaround was phenomenal. By comparing the writings of Charu Majumdar to Vinod Mishra’s works like “India of my dreams”, [viii] it is very clear that despite Vinod Mishra’s claim of being pro-Charu Majumdar, he was certainly not a follower of the Charuite line. Even after the death of Vinod Mishra, CPI (ML) Liberation still continues to be a peaceful organization. 

In Bihar, the left wing extremism is closely linked to caste differences, land related disputes and labor exploitation. Being an agrarian economy, the disputes regarding distribution of lands, minimum wages, working conditions, etc were contentious issues between largely upper caste landlords and landless lower caste poor people . Some of the landless poor drifted towards left wing extremism to fight against oppression. In the year 1969, the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) was formed by Kanhai Chatterjee and Amulya Sen. Although they supported the Charu Majumdar led CPI (ML), they did not join it. This group mainly consisted of lower caste and landless people and was extremely savage in executing landlords. The landlords belonging to the upper/middle caste saw this group as a threat to their dominance and raised private militias. Gangs like Ranvir Sena [ix] ruthlessly massacred Naxalites and those who were suspected to be Naxalite sympathizers. Unlike CPI (ML) which went through a series of splits, MCC remained intact. It merged with the Revolutionary Communist Centre, India (Maoist) to form Maoist Communist Centre (India) or MCC (I) in 2003. Again in September 2004 MCC (I) merged with Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War to form Communist Party of India (Maoist) or CPI (Maoist) and emerged as the most powerful Naxalite group in the country. 

In 1968, Due to the differences with Charu Majumdar, the Andhra Pradesh revolutionaries led by T.Nagi Reddy, D.V. Rao and Pulla Reddy were booted out of AICCCR. The splits that plagued CPI (ML) did not spare the Andhra Group either. In 1971, Pulla Reddy separated from T.Nagi Reddy and D.V. Rao and formed his own party. Pulla Reddy later joined hands with Satyanarain Singh (CPI [ML] SNS group). That unity did not last long and they parted ways again. 

Meanwhile, after the death of T.Nagi Reddy, D.V. Rao became the leader of Andhra group. During the early 70’s most of the Naxalite activity was concentrated around Srikakulam district region. The government forces successfully neutralized their influence by killing the top leaders like Appalasuri, Adibhatla Kailasam, etc. One of the biggest advantages of Naxalites in Andhra Pradesh is their ability to gather support among teachers, writers and civil liberties groups. These groups have successfully provided the needed justification for violence perpetrated by Naxals by highlighting the failures of Government and pointing out the excesses of police forces. A large number of movies, sympathetic to the cause of Naxalites are produced in Andhra Pradesh even today. The basic theme of the movies is always the same. The feudal landlords and Government collude with each other and perpetrate atrocities against innocent people and the hero turns into a Naxalite to punish the bad guys. It is interesting to note that every single top hero in the last 25 years has acted in at least one such movie. In the late 70s, Kondapalli Seetharamayya successfully rebuilt the Naxal movement, which had lost its steam due to the police actions. At one time as many as 74 dalams or guerilla groups operated in the Naxal strongholds. From Srikakulam area, the Naxals successfully shifted their base to Telangana region, especially Adilabad, Karimnagar, Warangal, etc. Unlike the Charu Majumdar line, the Naxalites in Andhra Pradesh were not averse to the mass line. However, by early nineties the government had slowly regained an upper hand over the Naxals. In September 2004, it merged with MCC (I) to form CPI (Maoist).

Current Scenario

As we have seen in the above section, Left Wing extremism in India is not a recent phenomenon. However, certain trends in recent years indicate that the threat from these organizations can increase by orders of magnitude, if strong, swift action is not taken. Left Wing extremists are transforming from “menace” to “serious threat”.

  • Two of the most powerful Left Wing organizations, CPML-PW and MCC-I have merged into single entity called CPI-Maoist [x]. It is a significant event since these two groups are responsible for 90% of the Left Wing extremist violence in India.[xi]
  • The situation in Nepal has serious security implications for India. The success of CPN (Maoists) will help the creation of compact revolutionary zone (CRZ) [xii] stretching from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh. This will allow easy movement of men and material through out the CRZ. It will also allow Maoists to increase their “zone” to neighboring areas of CRZ.
  • Because of the lack of uniform policy against Maoists across the states, the Maoists are easily finding safe heavens in states, which are not ruthless against them. After the Andhra Pradesh government has lifted ban on Naxals and invited them for talks, Maoists have quietly gathered strength and later on rejected peace talks blaming government of being stubborn. The effects of this action will be felt not only in Andhra Pradesh but also in all other Naxal-infested states.
  • Intelligence sources say that the sophistication of land mines and Improvised Explosive Devices used by Maoists is a result of training received from LTTE.[xiii]
  • There are reports about links between Maoists and Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The Maoists vehemently deny it and call it a “Government ploy” to malign the Naxal movement.[xiv] However, there can be no doubt that ISI would be more than willing to provide all kinds of “assistance” to bleed India from within. The ISI can also use Nepal Maoists to control Indian Maoists.
  • From 55 Districts in nine states in October 2003, the Maoists have spread their influence to 170 districts in 15 states by February 2005. [xv]
  • Around 1997 itself Naxalites were accumulating around Rs. 1000 million per year in Andhra Pradesh alone through extortions, kidnapping and loot. Similar amounts of money went to Left Wing extremists in Bihar as well. [xvi][xvii] 
  • In an unprecedented act, on 11th February 2005, a group of around 200 Maoists, which include 50 women, have attacked a KSRP camp in a school at Venkatammanahalli in Pavagada taluk of Tumkur district in Karnataka. In the attack, six Karnataka State Reserve Police personnel and a civilian were killed and five others were injured. [xviii]
Government Response

In order to tackle the growing threat of Left Wing extremism, the Union Government in co ordination with state governments follows a multi pronged strategy. The government strategy is elaborated in the annual report published by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs. It says 

“The central Government has adopted a multi-pronged strategy to tackle the problem of Naxalism which includes modernization and strengthening of state police forces, better training to police personnel, special task forces for intelligence based coordinated anti Naxalite operations, focused attention on developmental aspect and gearing up of the public grievances redressal system and encouraging local resistance groups at grass roots level” [xix]

On 15th of April 2005, addressing the conference of chief ministers on “Internal security and Law and Order”, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh categorically stated, “There could be no political compromise with terror” [xx]. In the same conference, the Union Home minister Shri. Shivraj Patil announced that the centre is willing to provide ''aerial support'' and ''armoured vehicles'' to state governments to supplement their efforts and resources against extremism [xxi]. Interestingly, for the first time, the Defense Minister, Shri. Pranab Mukharjee also participated in the conference, which is quite natural since there is a strong nexus between internal extremists and enemies of India across the border.

However, it is quite disappointing that a nationwide ban against Maoists was not imposed as expected. Instead a committee headed by Union Home Minister Shri. Shivraj Patil and comprising of nine Chief Ministers of Naxal affected states would be constituted to co-ordinate and evolve a common strategy to tackle extremism. [xxii]

There has been talk about equipping police forces working in Maoist infested areas with INSAS rifles. No further information is available regarding this news. Apart from setting up elite special security forces like “Grey Hounds”, the government is also providing special training to the police forces to tackle Maoists effectively. The Central Government would reimburse certain expenses incurred by states during this process. The government of Andhra Pradesh is planning to hire helicopters for surveillance of the movements of Naxal groups. The central government would provide the money for this. [xxiii]

To enable the nine badly affected States to undertake more effective anti-Naxalite action, the Ministry of Home Affairs has been administering the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme. Under the scheme, during the year 2004-05, Rs. 1098.52 lakhs have been provided to the state governments. This money would be spent among other things on expenses incurred on bulletproofing of vehicles, procurement of semi-automatic and automatic weapons, equipping vehicles with latest communication devises, reimbursement on expenditure incurred on raising IR battalion, etc. [xxiv]

The Left Wing extremists continue to enjoy support from certain sections of the society who try to justify their actions as a response to government apathy towards socially and economically backward sections of the society. The initial stages of Naxal movement has successfully attracted scores of brilliant students from IIT’s, REC’s etc who, inspired by Left Wing ideology, left their studies to join Naxals. Over the years, the movement has been reduced to mindless violence against everyone who does not agree with them. They continue to enjoy support among certain sections in most backward areas delivering “instant justice” through Robin Hood methods. In order to wean away public support to extremists from these places, the government has initiated Backward Districts Initiative (BDI), which would be implemented in 55 Naxal-affected districts. This scheme provides Rs. 15 crores per year per district for a period of 3 years starting from 2003-2004. This total amount of Rs. 2,475 crores will help in improving social and physical infrastructure of these districts, thereby reducing the ability of extremists to attract frustrated youth. [xxv]

Although the government has a rehabilitation scheme for surrendered Naxals, red tape and inefficiency in distribution of money is forcing the surrendered Naxals to once again revert to old ways or join criminal gangs. This is an area where state governments need to put in more efforts.

The connivance between political parties and the Maoists, although not a new phenomenon, is worrisome. In some cases, especially during election times, political parties come to a tacit agreement with Maoists. Accordingly, Maoists target the candidates of opposite party there by making it easy for a political party to win elections. After coming to power, the party will ensure that the police forces “go slow” against Maoists. In some other cases individual politicians use Maoists to kill their political opponents by paying them money. In order to stop political parties from giving large-scale concessions to Maoists, a nation wide strategy should be created so that political parties cannot arbitrarily remove or impose a ban on Maoists. 

Possible Future Scenarios

The future scenarios explained below is an attempt to look into the possible directions that Maoist movement in India may take in the next five to ten years. The possibilities are that the
  1. Situation would be roughly the same as today.
  2. Maoist threat may assume gigantic proportions and pose a grave threat to the security of Indian Union.
  3. Maoists might be Marginalized and Discredited.
According to the first scenario, the situation five to ten years down the line would be same as today wherein Maoists would be strong in their traditional areas and government would make sure that they do not spread their influence to other places. Regular battles between Maoists and police forces would take place just like today. Mostly the Maoists would have great influence in three states: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, and pockets of influence in other states.

The second situation would be a disaster for India. In this kind of scenario, the Maoists would consolidate their hold in the newly acquired regions and may expand into new areas. The situations like Kashmir or North East in a number of states would arise draining the resources of the nation. Inevitably, the armed forces have to be used to tackle this problem. This would weaken the nation on the external front. The economic opportunities would evaporate. Instead of taking advantage of the economic opportunities, India would be busy fighting for its stability. The most important cause for this scenario would be the neglect of the Government(s) in creating nation wide strategy to tackle Maoists. The current situation, in which one state government bans the Maoists and other state governments give them free rein is a recipe for this sort of disaster. 

The third scenario would occur if the government of India in co-ordination with state governments follows a more aggressive and focused nationwide strategy to neutralize the Maoist menace. Luckily for India, until now Maoist organizations still depend heavily on leadership. Hence eliminating the top leadership has helped the police forces quickly to gain upper hand over Maoists. In the third scenario, the government would ensure that Maoists are unable to build a strong organization and that the external link/support to Maoists is severed. 

Conclusion

Defeating Left Wing extremism is one of the most important requirements for the Indian nation in order to emerge as a strong, prosperous and peaceful nation. A uniform coordinated, nationwide strategy is required achieve this goal. One thing is certain in the Indian context: Left Wing extremists are destined to fail because in India it is evolution, not revolution, which succeeds.

References and Footnotes

[i] http://www.indiaexpress.com/news/national/20050415-0.html 
[ii] http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mazumdar/index.htm   
[iii] http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mazumdar/1965/x01/x01.htm 
[iv] http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mazumdar/1965/x01/x02.htm 
[v] http://www.cpiml.org/pgs/30yrs/hist30.htm 
[vi] http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mazumdar/1965/x01/x03.htm 
[vii] http://www.cpiml.org/archive/vm_swork/indexvmsw.htm 
[viii] http://www.cpiml.org/archive/vm_swork/2mydreams.htm 
[ix] http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/Ranvir_Sena.htm 
[x] http://specials.rediff.com/news/2004/oct/14jafri.htm 
[xi] Page 40, Annual Report 2003-2004 http://mha.nic.in/AR0304-Eng.pdf  
[xii] Page 41, Annual Report 2003-2004 http://mha.nic.in/AR0304-Eng.pdf  
[xiii] http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=172260 
[xiv] http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/oct/07gana1.htm 
[xv] http://www.hvk.org/articles/1204/83.html  and http://www.telegraphindia.com/1050306/asp/opinion/story_4460495.asp 
[xvi] http://www.rediff.com/news/aug/27pwg.htm  
[xvii] http://www.observerindia.com/analysis/A072.htm 
[xviii] http://www.hindu.com/2005/02/12/stories/2005021206610600.htm 
[xix] Pages 42-43 Annual Report 2003-2004 http://mha.nic.in/AR0304-Eng.pdf   
[xx] http://www.hindu.com/2005/04/16/stories/2005041606030100.htm 
[xxi] http://www.deepikaglobal.com/archives/ENG3_sub.asp?newsdate=04/16/2005&ccode=ENG3&hcode=99612  
[xxii] http://www.hindu.com/2005/04/16/stories/2005041612491300.htm 
[xxiii] http://www.hindu.com/2005/05/22/stories/2005052217050400.htm 
[xxiv] Page 43-44 Annual Report 2003-2004 http://mha.nic.in/AR0304-Eng.pdf  
And http://164.100.24.208/lsq14/quest.asp?qref=8151 
[xxv]Pages 44-45 Annual Report 2003-2004 http://mha.nic.in/AR0304-Eng.pdf 
and http://164.100.24.219/rsq/quest.asp?qref=93623  

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