Please email us with your comments or questions.
|
|
Pakistan Almost Exposed
Shiv Shankar Sastry
"The Idea of Pakistan", Stephen Philip Cohen, Brookings Institution Press, 2004. 367 pages including notes and bibliography.
Like Robert Bruce's spider, repeated effort seems to be going into writing the definitive book on Pakistan. Stephen Cohen's book, "The Idea of Pakistan" comes closest to describing the real Pakistan, but loses its way somewhat towards the end. While the descriptive part is excellent, the analytical part at the end is debatable.
The book starts with a brief history of Pakistan. Subsequent chapters deal with Pakistan seen from various lenses, indicated by chapter names like "The Army's Pakistan", "Political Pakistan", "Islamic Pakistan", "Regionalism and Separatism" and a chapter on the demography, education and economy of Pakistan. Cohen devotes the penultimate chapter to predict and describe what he feels might be the various "futures" of Pakistan given its history and dynamics. The final chapter is on American options in Pakistan where Cohen writes out a prescription of “American” medicine for Pakistan based on his diagnosis.
Chapter Seven of the book, entitled "Demographic, Educational and Economic Prospects" is a must read for educated Pakistanis, because it contains information that is well known outside Pakistan, but its ruling elite are either ignorant or are suicidally choosing to ignore the information.
Compared to earlier works on Pakistan, Cohen's work is notable in that he charts out new territory in three areas.
First, Cohen defines the "establishment" or the ruling elite of Pakistan as an oligarchy of about 500 individuals "whose membership depends on adherence to a broad set of values and norms, including a particular understanding of the idea of Pakistan" (Page 69). Members can include Army officers, businessmen, journalists, media experts and others who are loyal to a core set of principles. The establishment also has an important subset of Islamic nationalists (Page 70). Cohen believes that the Pakistani establishment borrows heavily from the ideology of the British Raj, creating a "paternalistic government" which would not share power unless required. The establishment is said to share the idea that India is the chief threat Pakistan, and must be countered militarily, thereby giving the military a primary role in Pakistan. Tied up with this idea is the need to keep the Kashmir issue burning and to make alliances to "borrow power" as needed for these requirements. The armed forces are considered a "model" and democracy is seen as good only as long as it does not interfere with the governance of the elite. The media need to be on a tight leash, and radical Islamic extremists could be a useful tool for state policy. Cohen also points out the Pakistani establishment's thinking that "something or someone will always come to Pakistan's rescue because of its location" (Page 270)
Second, Cohen is the first Western author to recognize a specific Pakistani psyche or mindset. He speaks of confusion in the minds of Pakistanis as to whether Pakistan is a moderate state created for Muslims, or whether it is an Islamic state where Islamic law will hold sway over everything else. Cohen defines the Pakistani Punjabi, whose dominance in numbers and influence in Pakistan are critical to this psyche. He writes: Punjabis can best be described as a cross between Texans and New Yorkers. They exude a brashness and zest for life (reflected through their rich stock of "Punjabi" jokes) and also include some of Pakistan's best educated and cultured elites, all of which can be irritating to non-Punjabis. For Punjabis, only the Pashtuns can compare in martial qualities and valor; attitudes toward Baluchis are dismissive, and toward Sindhis, contemptuous. (Page 224)
Third, Cohen has documented the role of Islam in the Pakistani mindset - Pakistan's "Islamic psyche" as it were. He writes "As some Muslims argued at the time of separation, if they could not rule over Hindus, then they had to be shielded from Hindu influence, not by becoming a separate but equal society, but a separate and superior one" (Page 35). Many elite Pakistanis characterized the "Hindu mind" as "scheming and devious" (Page 36). Another characteristic that Cohen recognizes is the deep need for "izzat" or honor, particularly in the Pakistani army, whose personnel are taught to seek revenge for real or perceived slights to maintain honor. Cohen characterizes the Islamic nationalist world view as being driven by a "notion of grievance" (Page 70) that Muslims everywhere (the ummah) are mistreated. The use of terrorism as an end in itself and not as a tool to achieve an end is based on analysis by Pakistani Islamists, as is the need to wage jihad or war which is a "religious duty inculcated in the Quran on the followers of Mohammed to wage war upon those who do not adopt the doctrines of Islam" (Page 120). The Islamists in Pakistan's establishment believe that Pakistan economic and military backwardness is because of its superior Islamic social greatness and a "worldwide conspiracy to prevent it from acquiring modern technology and weapons" (Page 174).
But beyond this, Cohen's understanding of the role of Islam in Pakistan seems to break down. This may be due in part to biases in Cohen's own perceptions that emerge as "Freudian slips" in the book. In two places (Pages 39 & 298) he states that Indians wanted Pakistan to fail but no references are provided to support this claim. Cohen seems to indicate that even terrorism directed at Indian groups and entities do not amount to extremism on the part of Pakistan. Cohen suggests that Pakistan's support of Sikh extremism in India was a "legitimate response" to India's support to the genocide triggered independence struggle in East Pakistan (Page 228). Cohen describes General Musharraf as moderate and "one of the most secular officers in the Army" (Page 113), despite General Musharraf's background in supporting Islamist terrorism and initiating a war against India. Such views may indicate a misreading of the role of Islam in Pakistan by Cohen. He contradicts himself by declaring the Pakistan army as a secular army, and that young officer recruits have political and cultural, but not ideological passions. In the same paragraph, Cohen says that for Pakistani officer recruits "India is a "Hindu" threat, abetted by the Christian and Zionist powers of the world" (Page 116). Cohen belongs to a genre of "South Asia experts" who believe that Islamic extremism used against India is compatible with a "moderate and secular" Pakistan, and it becomes Islamic terrorism only when directed against the US or its Western allies.
This deeply flawed viewpoint provides the leeway needed by the Pakistani establishment to maintain armies of Islamic extremists ostensibly for attacking India alone. When these armies turn against the West, the establishment claims to be secular and pro -Western and asks for more aid under the pretence that the "moderate establishment" will be overrun by Islamists. Cohen is unable to see the symbiotic relationship between the Pakistani establishment and the Islamists, and this blind spot has a great bearing on the prescriptions and solutions he has suggested.
In the chapter on Pakistan's "futures" Cohen writes of various possibilities that lie ahead for Pakistan, ranging from "more of same", to "Normal" democracy, and Islamic state or break-up. In all scenarios Cohen appears to be pessimistic about Pakistan, although he feels it is unlikely that Pakistan will break up, become an Islamic state or a normal democracy.
Cohen's prescription for Pakistan regarding what America should do can be summarized under five headings, namely: support the economy; nurture the Army; try to encourage democracy; revitalize secular education so that it replaces madrassas; and "shape" Pakistan's environment. This last point will be of particular interest to Indians.
Cohen believes that Pakistanis are paranoid about India and that they view "Indian society as the cause of their insecurity" (Page 319). As a result Cohen feels that India has a substantial role in the direction that Pakistan takes. Cohen then makes recommendations that would in all probability have just the wrong effect on Indian political and public opinion. He suggests that the US adopt a carrot and stick policy with Pakistan in which the Pakistan Army is awarded with military aid if it seen as being faithful in implementing American suggestions about education reform in Pakistan (Page 315). He believes that India should "make the kind of concessions that Musharraf can use to get the military and others to "bite the bitter pill" of a status quo settlement for Kashmir" (Page 323). Given that there is a wide gulf between Cohen's view of Musharraf and the Indian perspective, Cohen's disingenuous suggestion would be rejected outright by any self respecting Indian. For all Cohen's concern about South Asia he fails to make a clear analysis as to why it might not be to India's long term advantage to merely sit back and allow Pakistan to stew in its dysfunctional juices without making any concessions whatsoever.
A review would be incomplete without some brilliant "quotable quotes" that could themselves summarize Pakistan.
"Pakistan is a state hopping on one strong leg" (Page 128).
"About the only exportable human asset that Pakistan has in abundance is "boots on the ground"" (Page 235).
"The bomb confirmed the sought-for image of Pakistan as combining Islam and technology, never mind that most of the technology was either stolen from a European nuclear facility or provided by China" (Page 80).
"Pakistan's army is strong enough to prevent state failure, but not imaginative enough to impose the changes that might transform the state" (Page 274).
"Pakistani officials like Pakistani beggars, become alert when they see Americans approaching" (Page 327).
"Pakistan now negotiates with its allies and friends by pointing a gun to its own head" (Page 270).
In summary this book, despite its analytical shortcomings, is the single best reference work on Pakistan available today. It will surely find a place in the library of every Pakistan watcher.
|
|