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The Narcotics Trade in South West Asia: Geography and Production
T. Raghavan
Executive Summary
The globalization of trade coupled with the growth of transnational banking has been accompanied by a transformation of organized crime into transnational criminal enterprises. Due to the extraordinary profits derived from the narcotics trade, criminal organizations have gained enormous economic and political power in certain parts of the world. During the Cold War, these organizations mated with national political agendas and associated terrorist organizations. Weak states with non existent law enforcement mechanisms allowed opium cultivation and refinement without interference and thereby empowered
nacro-terrorist organizations. A major component in the strategic calculations of South-West Asia is the narcotics trade. Since the 1980's, the narcotics trade in Afghanistan and Pakistan played a crucial role in the history of the region.The article attempts to give a basic idea of the infrastructure directly involved in the drug trade, and sets the stage for future discussions on other dimensions of the drug trade in the region.
Contents
Introduction
Drug
Production in Afghanistan
Routes for the trafficking of
drugs
Summary and Conclusions
References and Footnotes
Introduction
The globalization of trade coupled with the growth of transnational banking has been accompanied by a transformation of organized crime into transnational criminal enterprises. Due to the extraordinary profits derived from the narcotics trade, criminal organizations have gained enormous economic and political power in certain parts of the world. During the Cold War, these organizations mated with national political agendas and associated terrorist organizations. Weak states with non existent law enforcement mechanisms allowed opium cultivation and refinement without interference and thereby empowered nacro-terrorist organizations.
A major component in the strategic calculations of South-West Asia is the narcotics trade. Since the 1980's, the narcotics trade in Afghanistan and Pakistan played a crucial role in the history of the region. The undemocratic nature of governments in Pakistan coupled with two decades of civil war in Afghanistan promoted a potent and deadly nexus of terrorist networks with key players in the drug trade. In the 1980s, narcotics trafficking networks were also used to smuggle men and arms across borders. This played a significant role in the strategy of arming and supplying Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s. At the same time key elements of the Pakistani polity became active participants in this trade. Several senior members of the Pakistani Army reaped huge profits from this trade [i].
The drug trade caused a considerable rise in the levels of drug addiction in Pakistani and Afghan societies. This is especially prevalent in the Northwestern region of Pakistan. Simultaneously, it became a major component of the Afghan economy. According to U.N estimates, the total opium economy stood at an estimated $2.8 billion or 60% of the total Afghan GDP in 2003. Therefore, it is important to understand the contours of this trade and its implications for the region. This article first attempts a brief summary of UN data on Opium cultivation in Afghanistan, followed by a discussion of the major drug routes originating from Afghanistan into neighboring countries. The article attempts to give a basic idea of the infrastructure directly involved in the drug trade, and sets the stage for future discussions on other dimensions of the drug trade in the region.
Drug Production in Afghanistan
Poppy cultivation is widely prevalent in Afghanistan. In the past ten years, the cultivation of poppy has spread to virtually every province in Afghanistan. The yearly output of poppy has also steadily increased in the last two decades (See figure below).
Corresponding with the increase in opium production, there has also been an increase in the farmland under poppy cultivation. In 2004, the amount of farmland under poppy cultivation rose by 61% over the previous year's total to 131,000 hectares according to UN estimates. This is the highest recorded area under opium cultivation in Afghan history. Clearly, there are powerful economic forces at work which drive the rising output of narcotics from Afghanistan. The amount of land under poppy cultivation is about 2% of the total arable land available.
While there has been an almost consistent increase in land under poppy cultivation, as well as opium yields, there has been no simple trend in the farm gate price of opium. This is displayed below.
It is very interesting to note that the sharp rise in opium prices in 2001 coincided with a very drastic reduction in the amount of opium produced in the same year. The price again shows a marked decline in 2004, probably reflecting the delayed market response to the production change in 2001. However, it must be noted that the price in 2004 is still more than twice as much as the corresponding price in the years preceding 2001. There are very strong incentives for Afghan farmers to cultivate poppy in lieu of traditional cereal and other crops. This is borne out by the conclusions of several U.N surveys done on the subject. The U.N report estimates that the gross income per hectare from poppy cultivation (~$4600) is about 12 times the income from a corresponding wheat crop (at ~$390/h.a). This does not take into account the relative costs for the cultivation of the two crops.
The provinces with the maximum cultivation are in Eastern Afghanistan bordering
Pakistan. The provinces notable for their opium output are Hilmand, Urugzan, Nangarhar and Badakhshan, followed by Qandahar and Zabul. Conveniently, the bulk of the refining and distribution of opium is controlled by Pakistani drug cartels.
Refining of opium occurs in the areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan. Available information indicates that major drug routes through Pakistan have Peshawar and Quetta as their nodal points. It is also noteworthy that the Eastern provinces of Afghanistan (Hilmand, Qandahar, and Urugzan) were Taliban strongholds.
Startling growth in poppy cultivation has occurred even in provinces where cultivation was minor in previous times. Upto 12% of Afghanistan's land area is arable and can be utilized for agriculture. This amounts to about 8,054,000 hectares. In theory, there is abundant land available for conversion to opium cultivation. Currently, the total amount of land under poppy cultivation is about 2% of all arable land available.
Corresponding to the rise in opium cultivation in Afghanistan, there has been a significant reduction of land under poppy cultivation in Pakistan, according to official figures. The area under cultivation in Pakistan fell from 32,000 h.a in 1978 to 5,215 ha. in 1995 [iii]. This can be understood in the context that the bulk of the cultivation has simply shifted into Afghanistan, where it can be performed in a relatively unfettered fashion. Successful efforts to curb narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan would be promote reversal of this trend.
A crude estimate of the income generated by Afghan farmers can be made by
multiplying the farm gate value for the year with the corresponding total yield. For 2004, this estimate indicates a total income of ~$400 million. UN estimates put this figure as closer to about $600 million. This can be used to estimate the incomes involved in smuggling the opium across the border as well. Afghanistan is likely to remain a major source of opium in the world's narcotics markets. The lucrative nature of the opium trade incentivized the spread of poppy cultivation from a few provinces in the 1980's to all of the provinces in Afghanistan today. Another glance at the map illustrates the strategic position of the major areas of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. They are situated near exit routes from Afghanistan and close to major population centers in the neighboring country.
Routes for the trafficking of
drugs
Precursor Chemicals
The refining of raw opium requires the smuggling of precursor chemicals. The most important precursor is acetic anhydride. This is legally produced by chemical industries in the region, especially in India and China. Most of anhydride is diverted from legally manufactured consignments. The diversion is performed by several means ranging from front companies to purchase the chemical, pressuring legal manufacturers, and outright theft of the chemical. These chemicals are smuggled from most of the countries in the region into Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In recent years, the patterns of the smuggling have undergone changes. These changes are in response to stronger restrictions and monitoring regimes on the manufacture of acetic anhydride in India. New routes from Central Asia seem to be indicated by the increasing captures of acetic anhydride in Central Asian nations like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan [vi].
Narcotics Smuggling routes
There are two major routes through Pakistan for the transit of narcotics [iv]. The
Northern route passes through the Northwest Frontier province (NWFP), probably with Peshawar as a major nodal point. The Southern route is through Balochistan. It is also known that some of the important drug barons are based out of Peshawar and Quetta [x]. Afghanistan is the origin of Western and Northern drug routes into Iran and Central Asia. Herat served as an important transit route into Iran. However, due to a major crackdown, the bulk of opium now transits either through Pakistan or through the Northern routes [iv]. Recently, the province of Badakshan became a major opium cultivation centre. Correspondingly, there have been sizable captures of narcotics along Central Asian routes. A map schematically describing the major routes into Iran is shown below.
The routes through Pakistan consist of two primary branches. The Northern route begins in territory controlled by the Shinwari tribe in Nangarhar and enters into the
NWFP in Pakistan. The Pakistani end of this route appears to be controlled by constituents of the Afridi tribe [iv,v]. The Southern route emerges from the
main poppy growing provinces of Qandahar and Helmand. It enters the Balochistan
province in neighboring Pakistan at Dalbandin, then moves through Punjgor and Turbat, finally reaching ports at Gwadar, Mand or Pasni. The product is then put on small boats for distribution worldwide. A map giving a schematic description [vii] of the routes through Pakistan into India is shown below.
Summary and Conclusions
From the data and information presented in this article, it is notable that opium production in the region has increased at a significant rate over the years. The market for the consumption of opium and other narcotics is also entering a growth phase given the economic changes in the region. Additionally, the borders of Afghanistan are poorly policed and control over the flow of drugs in the region is extremely difficult. While present trends do not show this, there is also the possibility of opium cultivation entering into Central Asian due to the weakness and flux inherent in those political systems.
The enforcement of curbs and controls on the drug trade is further complicated by
the fact that actors in the drug trade wield considerable political power in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the 1980's and 1990's when the drug trade was smaller, key officers in the Pakistan Army who were actively involved in the drug trafficking business. An example of this is the late General Fazle Haq, former Governor of the NWFP in Pakistan. Correspondingly, the bulk of Afghanistan's warlords who were earlier active against the Soviets, formed the Afghan component of the drug networks set up by the Afridis [vii, viii]. Among them was the rich and powerful Haji Abdul Qadir [viii], the governor of Nangarhar province who was
assassinated in 2002. In a significant move, 11 members of the Afridi networks in Pakistan, were indicted by US authorities recently for drug trafficking and money laundering. Currently, nine of the 11 are in American custody [ix]. President Hamid Karzai’s attempt to assert the government's writ across the country is linked to his ability to establish control over the narcotics trade in Afghanistan. The recent indictments against the Afridi family must be interpreted in this context.
The trafficking of drugs and precursor materials is only a small aspect of the
narco-terrorist trade in the region. While this article has dealt solely with these aspects several questions need to be examined. Among them are questions about the structure of the financial underpinnings of this trade, and the effect of this trade on the polity of the nations in the region. This article has made a modest beginning in an attempt to understand some of the trends involved in the cultivation and trafficking of opiates, and future articles will elucidate some of the other questions.
References and Footnotes
[i]Articles in the Friday times and The News, of Pakistan dated Sept 22-23, 1994. The
text can be found at: http://www.india-emb.org.eg/Section%207E/English4.html
[ii] http://www.unodc.org/afg/en/reports_surveys.html
UNODC drug reports and surveys
on Afghanistan.
[iii]
http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/narcotics-division/publications/victim.jsp
[iv] http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=11023
dated 31/3/05, by Umar Khan
in International Relations and Security-ISN security watch, Zurich, Switzerland.
[v]Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Jane's Intelligence Review. Vol 10, No.03 pp 32-35
[vi] http://www.unodc.org/afg/en/reports_surveys.html
Illicit Drug Situation in the
countries neighbouring Afghanistan (2002).
[vii]
http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott/qf5.html
[viii]
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/DGO9Ag02.html
"Afghanistan:A body
blow to the U.S, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times, Jul 09, 2002.
[ix] http:/www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2003/09/sec-030917-rferl-160855.html
[x]CIA Intelligence Report (1998) “Afghan Drug trade flourishing under the Taliban”, declassified
under the freedom of information act, Sept 2003. Available at
http://www.nsarchive.org
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