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India-Israel
Partnership: Convergence and Constraints
Harsh V. Pant
Executive Summary
There has been a steady strengthening of
India
’s relationship with
Israel
ever since
India
established full diplomatic
relations with
Israel
in 1992, despite Indian
attempts to keep this flourishing bilateral relationship out of public view. A
flourishing Indo-Israeli relationship has the potential to make a significant
impact on global politics by altering the balance of power, not only in
South Asia
and the
Middle East
, but also in the larger
Asian region, which has been in a state of flux in recent times. However,
notwithstanding the convergence of interests on a range of issues between
India
and
Israel
, this bilateral relationship
will have to be carefully managed because of a host of constraints which
circumscribe this relationship. This study examines those factors which are
bringing the two nations increasingly closer and the constraints that might make
it difficult for this relationship to achieve its full potential.
Contents
Introduction
A
Historical Background
Convergence
of Interests
Constraints
Conclusion
References
and Footnotes
Introduction
There has been a steady strengthening of
India
’s relationship with
Israel
ever since
India
established full diplomatic
relations with
Israel
in 1992, despite Indian
attempts to keep this flourishing bilateral relationship out of public view.
This bilateral relationship assumed an altogether new dynamic and came under
full public scrutiny with the visit of Ariel Sharon to India in September 2003,
the first ever by a ruling Israeli prime minister. The excitement surrounding
this visit and the future prospects of Indo-Israeli relationship signaled the
sea change in relations between the two states. In sharp contrast to the
back-channel security ties that existed even before the normalization of
bilateral relations, India now seems more willing to openly carve out a mutually
beneficial bilateral relationship with Israel, including deepening military ties
and countering the threat posed by terrorism to the two societies.
A flourishing Indo-Israeli
relationship has the potential to make a significant impact on
global politics by altering the balance of power, not only in
South
Asia
and the
Middle East
,
but also in the larger Asian region, which has been in a state
of flux in recent times.
However, notwithstanding the convergence of interests on a range
of issues between
India
and
Israel
, this
bilateral relationship will have to be carefully managed because
of a host of constraints which circumscribe this relationship.
This study examines those factors which are bringing the two
nations increasingly closer and the constraints that might make
it difficult for this relationship to achieve its full
potential. First, the historical underpinnings of the
Indo-Israeli relationship are examined in brief. Subsequently,
the convergence of Indo-Israeli interests on some important
issues is analyzed with special reference to countering
terrorism and the growing defense relationship. Finally, the
constraints within which this relationship will have to operate
in the near future are examined.
A
Historical Background
India
recognized
the state of
Israel
in 1950, two
years after its establishment in 1948. However, diplomatic
relations were not established until 1992. (1) This was mainly
because of
India
’s support
and sympathies with the Palestinian cause.
India
was a
founder member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that was
supportive of anti-colonial struggles around the world and this
also meant strong support for the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO).
India
became one
of the first non-Arab states to recognize Palestinian
independence and also one of the first to allow an embassy of
the PLO in its capital.
India
’s
anti-Israel stance was also part of the larger Indian diplomatic
strategy of trying to counter
Pakistan
’s
influence in the Arab world and of safeguarding its oil supplies
from Arab countries. It also ensured jobs for thousands of
Indians in the Gulf, helping
India
to keep its
foreign exchange reserves afloat.
India
and
Israel
also ended
up on the opposite sides during the Cold War, with the
United States
strongly
supporting
Israel
, while
India
’s
sympathies were toward the
Soviet Union
. The
Congress Party in
India
, the
dominant force in Indian politics since
India
’s
independence in 1947, opposed
Israel
in large
part because it viewed
Israel
as the
analogue of
Pakistan
, a state
based on religion. This also hampered growth of Indo-Israeli
ties in the immediate aftermath of Indian independence.
Despite this, however, it is remarkable that
India
and
Israel
managed to
come together on a range of issues, especially the close
collaboration between the Indian intelligence agency, RAW
(Research and Analysis Wing) and
Israel
’s Mossad.
This collaboration was the result of a secret cooperation
agreement in the area of security, intelligence and military
equipment.
Israel
also never
hesitated to come to
India
’s defense,
publicly and vigorously, in most of
India
’s major
conflicts. While
India
got tacit
help and support from
Israel
during its
1962 war with
China
and 1965 war
with
Pakistan
,
India
’s
relations with
Israel
went
downhill in the early seventies with the worsening of the
Arab-Israeli dispute after the 1967 war.
It is also important to note that Jews have been a part of
India
for well over a thousand years. The most
distinctive aspect of the Indian Jewish experience is the
complete absence of discrimination by the host majority. Jews
have lived in
India
without any
fear of persecution, a fact that has been well appreciated by
Israel
. Even though
the Jewish population in India is estimated to be around
6,000—following the emigration of over 25,000 to Israel
between the 1950s and 1970s—the community’s contributions to
India remain substantive.(2)
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union
,
India
was forced
to reorient its foreign policy to accommodate the changing
international milieu.
India
also
embarked on a path of economic liberalization, forcing it to
open its markets to other nations. It was in 1992 that
India
granted full
diplomatic recognition to
Israel
, leading
India
and
Israel
to establish
embassies in each other’s country. Since then, the
Indo-Israeli bilateral relationship has attained a new dynamic
with a significant upward trend. However, while the exchanges in
diverse fields intensified, the overall connection deliberately
remained low profile. Such an approach was thought to be
necessary in order to insulate the other interests
India
had in the
Middle East
from being
affected by the Arab animosity towards
Israel
. In this
context, Ariel Sharon’s visit to
India
in September
2003 was an important benchmark in that it made clear to the
world that
India
was no
longer shy about its burgeoning relationship with
Israel
.
There was some concern that the recent change of government
in
India
, from the
Hindu nationalist, Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National
Democratic Alliance to the Congress Party-led United Progressive
Alliance (UPA), might be inimical to Indo-Israeli ties. But so
far they seem to be on track, with the new government, led by
the Congress Party, determined to continue on the path of
strengthening its relations with
Israel
. The first
foreign-ministry level consultations between the two countries,
after the assumption of power by the new Indian government, took
place in November 2004 in which the two sides took stock of
their bilateral ties and discussed various regional and
multilateral issues. This is part of annual bilateral
consultations between the Indian Ministry of External Affairs
and
Israel
’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, held alternately in
Jerusalem
and
New Delhi
since 1999.
This was followed by a meeting of the Indo-Israeli joint working
group (JWG) on counter-terrorism in
New Delhi
, also in November 2004, where the two sides agreed to step up
cooperation in multilateral forums and broaden the scope of
their interaction. This JWG was set up in 2000 to strengthen
cooperation between the two states in their fight against
terrorism.
Convergence of Interests
When Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon was given a red
carpet welcome during his visit to
India
in September
2003, the world was forced to take notice of how dramatically
the bilateral ties between
India
and
Israel
have grown
since the early 1990s. It has been argued that among
“India’s potential (and indeed current) antagonists are
countries and organizations which may pose a threat of Israel in
time to come or are likely to ally themselves with Israel’s
adversaries in some future conflict.”(3) Though this
relationship is multifaceted, it is particularly driven by the
menace of terrorism that afflicts both nations and by a
burgeoning defense relationship.
September 11,
2001
and its
aftermath also made the two nations realize the importance of
cooperating on a larger scale to counter terrorism.
Combating
Terrorism
Fighting terrorism is a major issue and challenge for both
India
and
Israel
. Both are
democratic, pluralistic states with large domestic Muslim
minorities, and both face the scourge of Islamist terrorism,
which is sponsored by their neighbors. This shared dilemma has
led to a better understanding of each other’s concerns.(4) It
was in this respect that the Indian national security advisor,
Brajesh Mishra, outlined a proposal in a speech to the American
Jewish Committee in Washington in May 2003 that India, Israel,
and the United States should unite to combat the common threat
of Islamic fundamentalism. He argued that democratic nations
that face the menace of international terrorism should form a
“viable alliance” and develop multilateral mechanisms to
counter this menace.(5) Israel also supported this and has even
gone to the extent of saying that an “unwritten and
abstract” axis with India and the United States has been
created to combat international terrorism and make the world a
more secure place.(6)
While there has been no attempt to form an explicit
alliance among the three states,(7) India and Israel have
definitely started cooperating more closely on the terror front.
India
has found it
increasingly beneficial to learn from
Israel
’s
experience in dealing with terrorism since
Israel
has also
long suffered from cross-border terrorism. And the terrorism
that both India and Israel face comes not only from disaffected
groups within their territories but it is also aided and abetted
by the neighboring states, mostly under non-democratic regimes,
increasingly capable of transferring weapons of mass destruction
to the terrorist organizations. States such as
Pakistan
in
South Asia
and
Iran
and
Syria
in
Middle East
have long
used terror as an instrument of their foreign policies. There
are, thus, distinct structural similarities in the kind of
threat that
India
and
Israel
face from
terrorism. It is also important to note that when the extremist mullahs
call upon their followers to take up arms in support of an
Islamic jihad, their topmost exhortations have always been the
“liberation” of all of mandatory Palestine, Kashmir, and the
annihilation of the United States.
This realization has drawn the two nations closer, with
India
being the
first close friend
Israel
has to its
east and
Israel
being the
first close friend
India
has to its
west. Israel, which has faced relative isolation across the
globe, views India as its strategic anchor in Asia.(8) Israel
also sees major benefits in coming closer to a country with a
big Muslim population, the second largest in the world, hoping
that it might help dilute the importance of the religious
component in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both states are also
islands of stability in an otherwise largely chaotic region
stretching from North Africa to the Himalayas, which some have
argued should be seen as a single strategic region.(9) The
search for strength in each other’s inner reserves is natural
for India and Israel in their quest for security and the fight
against terror.
As a result, a basic understanding has emerged between
India
and
Israel
that despite
the fact that circumstances surrounding the nature of terrorism
they face are different, there can be no compromise with terror.
The declaration signed during
Sharon
’s visit to
India
condemned
states and individuals who aided and abetted terrorism across
borders, harbored and provided sanctuary to terrorists besides
giving financial support, training, or patronage.
India
sees
Israel
as a source
providing training for its personnel and materiel in its fight
against terrorism, and
Israel
is more than
willing to offer
India
both
material and moral support in this regard.(10)
India and Israel not only exchange crucial intelligence
information on Islamist terrorist groups but Israel is also
helping India to fight terrorism in Kashmir by providing
important logistical support such as specialized surveillance
equipment, cooperation in intelligence gathering, joint
exercises, and cooperation to stop money laundering and terror
funding. The level of intelligence cooperation between
India
and
Israel
may be even
more extensive than between
India
and the
United States
. The tactics
used by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the guerilla and
urban warfare it wages against Palestinian terror in the
West Bank
and Gaza Strip can be fruitfully adopted by the Indian
security forces in countering insurgency. These tactics have
even been found useful by the
U.S.
forces in
Iraq
who had to
learn IDF strategy of urban warfare to tackle growing insurgency
there.(11)
Israel’s long experience in training, equipping, and
operating elite undercover units deployed in Palestinian towns
and villages to gather intelligence, spot targets, and engage
Palestinian gunmen, is useful for the Indian security forces
facing similar situations in Kashmir and the Northeast. Other
areas where Israeli know-how can be incorporated by
India
include
tactics aimed at lowering the risk of ambush, use of infantry
and commando units seeking out and destroying arms caches and
terrorist bomb-making capabilities, and the use of dogs,
robotics, and specially trained sappers to detect hidden
roadside mines.
Soon
after Sharon’s visit to India, India and Israel decided to
hold joint military exercises for their elite special forces to
further strengthen their defense collaboration.(12) The joint
special forces exercise is a logical next step, as it will allow
each force to demonstrate the distinctive skills each has
acquired in the context of their own regional conflict dynamics,
thus serving to complement and strengthen the force capabilities
of the each country’s force.
Israel
is expected
to train Indian soldiers for specialized anti-insurgence
strikes, adding to their training in desert, mountains, forests,
and counter-hijacking and hostage crisis situations.
India
primarily
wants this training in order to tackle cross-border infiltration
of insurgents in
Kashmir
from
Pakistan
, as well as
protecting other Northeastern states of
India
from similar
infiltration from other neighboring states.
India
has also
bought Tavor assault rifles, Galil sniper rifles, and night
vision and laser range finding and targeting equipment in order
to improve the capabilities of its forces to tackle insurgency.
India
has shown
interest in the counter-infiltration devices
Israel
uses in
Golan Heights
and
Negev
Desert
.
Defense
Collaboration
The ballast for Indo-Israeli bilateral ties is provided by
the defense cooperation between the two states with
India
emerging as
Israel
’s largest
arms market, displacing
Turkey
, with
Israel
becoming
India
’s biggest
arms supplier. With the end of the Cold War, the lure of the
Russian arms market for
India
has
diminished due to a high degree of obsolescence. Moreover, with
Israel
specializing
in upgrading Russian equipment, it has emerged as an alternative
source of hi-tech defense procurement as
India
has decided
to diversify its defense purchasing.
On the other hand, for
Israel
, empowering
the Indian military has meant becoming a major exporter to that
large, financially rewarding arms market. More than the harm to
the general Israeli economy caused by the conflict with the
Palestinians,
Israel
’s defense
industry has always been dependent on exports to reach a point
where it could produce enough to remain financially solvent. In
fact, in its vigorous search for new markets for its defense
products, Israel has emerged in 2002 as the fifth-largest
arms-exporter in the world.(13) In this context, Israel’s
growing defense relationship with India goes a long way toward
sustaining its own local defense industry, and this in turn is
also a significant boost to Israel’s economy as a whole. As a
consequence, the Indo-Israel defense partnership has reached a
critical mass in recent years.(14)
With huge investments in research and development, Israeli
weapon systems are considered the cutting edge in various areas
of the international arms market, even compared to American and
European products. This is primarily because a high technology
defense industry is a matter of vital national security for
Israel
. The extent
of
Israel
’s defense
industry reflects its precarious geopolitical situation of a
nation of about six million surrounded by a largely adversarial
Arab world many times its size. Despite enjoying a close
relationship with the
United States
,
self-reliance in defense is a mantra that
Israel
has followed
almost to perfection.
Israel
has also
adopted a pragmatic attitude with respect to weapon sales to
India
as opposed
to other developed states that have looked at weapons sales to
India
from the
perspective of balance of power in
South Asia
.
Israel
was willing
to continue and even step up its arms sales to
India
after other
major states curbed their technological exports to
India
following
India
’s nuclear
tests in May 1998.
From anti-missile systems to hi-tech radars, from sky
drones to night-vision equipment, Indo-Israeli defense
cooperation has known no bounds in recent times.(15) A large
part of the imported equipment to modernize the Indian Army
battalions as part of the Rs. 3, 290 crore investment is also
likely to come from Israel.
Israel
is also to
figure in the Indian Army’s plan to bolster its lethal
firepower, anti-IED (improvised explosive devise) and
communication capabilities. In the summer of 2004,
Israel
’s defense
industry was bidding for the upgrade of the Indian Air Force’s
Mig-27 strike aircraft, the avionics upgrade of the Indian
Navy’s Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopters and maritime patrol
aircrafts. Israel’s Soltam 155 mm Howitzers is one of three
contenders for the Rs. 5000 crore deal for purchase and transfer
of technology of about 1,000 Howitzer guns, the evaluations of
which are currently being undertaken by the Indian Army.
Israel
and
India
are also
involved in close cooperation in the upgradation of
Russian-supplied T-72 tanks, especially in making them night
operations capable, and in the upgradation of the Mig-21 Bison
aircraft.
India
has also
shown its interest in acquiring unmanned aerial vehicles with
negotiations going on for joint production of the high altitude
Herons with
Israel
. The Indian
Air Force is aiming for the Israeli Harpy missile, used for
silencing enemy radars, as a significant force multiplier. Some
other acquisitions from
Israel
in which the
Indian Air Force has expressed a keen interest in the last few
years include Delilah II bombs, crystal maze bombs, Pechora III,
surface-to-air missiles, and Pop-Eye beyond-visual-range
air-to-air missiles. The
U.S.
finally gave
its approval to
Israel
’s delivery
of Phalcon Airborne Warning & Controlling Systems (AWACS) to
India
after
initial reluctance about how this sale might impact the
conventional weapons balance between
India
and
Pakistan
.
India
’s AWACS
project involves the integration of the “Phalcon” radar and
communication system with the Russian Ilyushin-76 heavy
transport military aircraft.(16) The first of five AWACS is
scheduled to be delivered by 2007.
India
and
Israel
are also
currently negotiating the possible sale of the Arrow-II
anti-ballistic missile defense system to
India
, which wants
to strengthen its air defense capabilities. Though
Israel
is more than
willing to sell the system, it needs American approval since the
U.S.
was a
collaborator in the project. However,
India
has already
acquired the advanced “Green Pine” fire control radars from
Israel
. This is a
transportable phased-array radar which forms a crucial component
of the Arrow system and can detect and track incoming missiles
from up to 500km away.
It has also been argued that Israel could be acquiring an
element of strategic depth (crucial for a geographically small
state like Israel) by setting up logistical bases in the Indian
Ocean for its Navy.(17) Cooperation with the Indian Navy is seen
as vital for such a venture and it is occurring in various ways.
The Indian Navy plans to acquire about ten more Israeli
“Barak” anti-missile defense systems, in addition to the
seven already procured for its major warships. Barak provides a
close-in point defense system to
India
against
Harpoon and Exocet missiles acquired by
Pakistan
.
India
has also
approved the purchase of a $97 million Israeli electronic
warfare system for ships.
India
has decided
to launch joint programs with
Israel
in the field
of electronic warfare. With
Israel
’s strength
being sensors and packaging and
India
’s being
fiber optic gyros and micro-electromechanical systems, both
Israel
and
India
can neatly
complement each other in this area.(18)
India
’s attempts
to shore up its conventional defenses in order to counter its
nuclear-armed adversary,
Pakistan
, have been
greatly supported by Israeli weaponry. This includes
surface-to-air missiles, avionics, sophisticated sensors to
monitor cross-border infiltration, remotely piloted drones, and
artillery. It is instructive to note that
Israel
sent its
laser guided missiles to
India
during the Indo-Pak Kargil war of 1999, making it
possible for the Indian Mirages to destroy Pakistani bunkers in
the mountains. Also, when
India
was planning
to undertake a limited military strike against
Pakistan
in June 2002
as part of “Operation Parakram,”
Israel
supplied
hardware through special planes after a visit by the
Director-General of Israeli Defense Ministry.(19)
During
Sharon
’s visit to
India
,
Israel
reportedly
also took up the issue of developing an anti-ballistic missile
system with
India
.
India
is concerned
about the nuclear arsenal of
Pakistan
, especially
about its command and control as
Pakistan
’s military
not only completely controls the country’s nuclear weapons,
but it is also seen as sympathetic to the Islamist extremists.
Israel
is also
concerned about the proliferation of missiles in its own
neighborhood and about the possibility of Pakistani nuclear
weapon mutating into an “Islamic bomb.”
One of the most immediate effects of this close defense
relationship between
India
and
Israel
can be seen
in
Pakistan
’s worry
that the strategic balance in the subcontinent is fast tilting
against it. It finds it difficult to match the conventional
military capability of Israel-India combined.(20) It is
especially concerned about the sale of the Arrow anti-missile
system that would neutralize part of
Pakistan
’s nuclear
arsenal by seriously affecting its ballistic missile capability.
The Phalcon early-warning system will give
India
the
capability to look deep into
Pakistan
’s
territory with the result that it would be difficult for
Pakistani warplanes to move without being detected. The Barak
anti-missile system will protect the Indian Navy ships from
Pakistan
’s
missiles, giving the Indian Navy huge maneuver advantages vis-à-vis
Pakistan
.
Perturbed by this growing conventional asymmetry, Pakistan
has also indicated that it is re-examining its policy of
non-recognition of Israel in order to counter growing
Indo-Israeli relations.(21) Not much progress has, however, been
made on that front.
It would be fallacious, however, to view the Indian defense
spending as being directed mainly towards
Pakistan
.
India
has larger
aspirations of becoming a global political and military power.
Israel
’s
state-of-the-art weapon systems will help
India
in
restructuring its armed forces to meet the defense requirements
of the twenty-first century.
Defense cooperation between
India
and
Israel
has
continued even after the recent change of guard in
India
. The Vice
Chief of Indian Army, the Indian Navy Chief, and the Chief of
the Indian Air Force have visited
Israel
since the
new government assumed office in May 2004. These visits were
followed by the visit of a high-level Israeli Defense Ministry
officials and high-level executives from major armament
manufacturers. The new Indian Defense Minister made it clear
that there will be no change in the existing defense ties
between
India
and
Israel
after
apprehensions in some Israeli quarters that defense cooperation
might suffer under the new Indian government.(22)
Other
Areas of Cooperation
Though cooperation in the realm of defense and
anti-terrorism has driven
India
and
Israel
closer, the
two states are also making concerted attempts to diversify this
relationship. The emergence of
India
and
Israel
as
industrialized and technologically-advanced states makes their
cooperation on a range of fields meaningful and mutually
beneficial. There has been a six-fold increase in
India
’s trade
with
Israel
in the last
decade with
India
becoming
Israel
’s
second-largest trading partner in
Asia
in
non-military goods and services. India’s non-military trade
with Israel reached $1.27 billion in 2002 from just $202 million
in 1992, which is still not commensurate with the vast
potential.(23) Also, a single product, diamonds, accounts for
nearly 65 percent of total trade.
During his visit to
India
, Ariel
Sharon was accompanied by a large delegation of about 30
influential businessmen, eager to forge new contracts and open
new markets in
India
. This bears
witness to
Israel
’s
commitment to intensify its economic and trade relations with
India
. On his
part, the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, met top leaders
of the American Jewish community when he visited the
US
in September
2004 and praised their contributions to Indo-US as well as
Indo-Israeli friendship. The Jewish organizations in the
US
share a very
close relationship with the Indian-American community and
together they have been instrumental in shaping Indo-Israeli
ties.(24)
New areas of cooperation have also been identified by the
two states, including the agricultural sector, farm research,
science, public health, information technology,
telecommunications, and cooperation in space.
India
and
Israel
have decided
to set up a joint economic committee to identify new measures to
stimulate trade and a joint committee on agriculture to
stimulate greater cooperation in that sector. Israeli industry
is keen to take advantage of synergies with
India
in various
areas like telecom, information technology, and biotechnology.
Also, an Indo-Israeli CEOs forum comprising senior business
heads from both countries has also been established to
deliberate on trade and economic matters.
Israel
has offered
to help
India
with venture
capital funding for communications and information technology
projects, advanced agricultural technologies, and aerospace
engineering. In the agricultural sector, cooperation in areas
like afforestation in arid areas, desertification, pollution,
water conservation, recycling of wastewater, low cost
technologies for pollution control, and environmental monitoring
methods have been envisaged by the two states. Indian companies
are also hoping to sell more chemical and pharmaceutical
products in
Israel
and invest
in joint ventures there to gain better access to markets in
Europe
and the
United States
, which have
free trade agreements with
Israel
.
An overview of the range of the Indo-Israeli relationship
is provided by the variety of agreements signed during
Sharon
’s visit to
India
. The six
agreements covered the fields of environment; health; combating
illicit trafficking of drugs; visa waivers for diplomatic,
service, and official passport holders; education; and an
exchange program for cultural education.(25)
Given
India
’s strong
scientific and technological base,
Israel
is keen on
strengthening scientific and technological ties with India.(26)
Both nations are planning to double the investment under the
ongoing science and technology collaboration from $0.5 million
in 2003 to about $1 million by 2005.
Israel
has shown a
particular interest in collaborating with Indian scientists on
human genome research and with the Indian Space Research
Organization on better management of land and other resources
using satellites.
India
has evinced
an interest in the field of nano-technology that is at an
advanced stage of development in
Israel
.
Israel
will also be
installing a set of three wide-field ultra-violet telescopes on
India
’s GSAT-4
satellite that will be launched in 2005.
India
and
Israel
have decided
to set up a joint fund for research and development with the aim
of promoting technology-based trade and collaboration in tapping
the global market together.
Israel
’s Finance
Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Industries, Trade,
Employment, and Communications, Ehud Olmert will be in
India
in December
2004, seeking to expand trade ties further with focus on
improving cooperation in setting up infrastructure for research
and development.
In a relatively short span of eleven years of formal
diplomatic relations,
India
and
Israel
have
established a vibrant partnership. While
India
stands to
strengthen its defense and security apparatus as a result of
this partnership,
Israel
gets the
platform of the biggest democracy in the world, which offers a
huge market and is regarded as a strategic player in the region.
Constraints
Despite a significant convergence of interests between
India
and
Israel
on a host of
issues, there remain a number of constraints within which the
two states will have to chart out their bilateral relationship.
The
Palestine
Question
The most significant of these constraints, perhaps, emerges
from the Indian domestic political milieu.
India
cannot
ignore the sentiments of its substantial Muslim populace of
about 140 million that are overwhelmingly against
Israel
’s policy
regarding the Palestinians. Fear of alienating its Muslim
population has been a major factor that prevented
India
from
normalizing its relations with
Israel
for decades.
India
has also
been a strong supporter of Palestinian self-determination.
Though only few left-wing parties and Muslim organizations
expressed their vocal disapproval of Ariel Sharon’s visit to
India
, the
Palestinian cause remains popular in India.(27) The Indian
government, while welcoming
Sharon
, also made
it clear that it would neither dilute its traditional support
for the Palestinian cause nor abandon Yasser Arafat as the
leader of the Palestinians. Until his death, India saw Arafat as
a symbol of Palestinian nationalism and as such central to any
peace process in the Middle East, a view in complete contrast to
that of the Sharon government, which was in favor of expelling
Arafat and allowing for the emergence of an alternative
Palestinian leadership.(28) With Arafat’s death, the issue of
Palestinian leadership will probably no longer remain a point of
contention between India and Israel.
This disagreement over Arafat’s role is not to say that a
subtle re-evaluation of
India
’s
Middle East
policy is
not underway. Before 1992,
India
had made the
normalization of relations with
Israel
contingent
upon the resolution of the Palestinian issue. In 1992,
India
decided to
delink the two, making it clear that it was not prepared to make
an independent Palestinian state a precondition for improving
its relations with
Israel
. This was in
tune with the policy much of the world was already following.
Over the years, the Indian government has also toned down
its reactions to
Israel
’s
treatment of the Palestinians.
Sharon
’s policy
towards the Palestinians has evoked little more than mild
disapproval from the Indian government in recent years.
India
has also
begun denouncing Palestinian suicide bombings and other
terrorist acts in
Israel
, something
that was seen earlier as rather justified in light of the harsh
policies of
Israel
against the
Palestinians. A token visit by the Palestinian foreign minister
to
India
before the
Sharon
visit was
the only concession
India
made to
indicate that it remains concerned about the plight of the
Palestinians.
India
is no longer
initiating anti-Israel resolutions at the UN and has made
serious attempts to moderate
NAM
’s
anti-Israel resolutions.
There is also realization in
India
that
India
’s largely
pro-Arab stance in the
Middle East
has not been
adequately rewarded by the Arab world.
India
has received
no worthwhile backing from the Arab countries in the resolution
of problems it faces in its neighborhood, especially
Kashmir
. There have been no serious attempts by the Arab world to
put pressure on
Pakistan
to reign in
the cross-border insurgency in
Kashmir
. On the
contrary, the Arab world has firmly stood by Pakistan using the
Organization of Islamic Conference to build support for
Islamabad and the Jihadi groups in Kashmir.(29) There is a
growing perception in India that if Arab nations, such as
Jordan, have been able to keep their traditional ties with
Palestine intact while building a new relationship with Israel,
there is no reason for India not to take a similar route which
might give it more room for diplomatic maneuvering.
Despite
India
’s tilt
towards
Israel
in the
1990s, however, it will be forced to operate its bilateral
relationship with
Israel
within the
constraints imposed by its domestic politics and its interests
in the
Middle East
. It will
have to be careful not to let its relationship with
Israel
be projected
as a Jewish-Hindu axis against Islam.
Israel
’s handling
of the
Palestine
issue will
also be a major factor as it would be difficult for
India
to justify
its continuing support for
Israel
in case
Israel
’s policies
become blatantly harsh. Also, despite
India
’s
disillusionment with the Arab world, about three million Indians
work in the
Persian Gulf
and are
valuable foreign exchange earners.
India
also gets
about one-fourth of its oil supplies from the
Middle East
. In sum,
India
will have to
balance its growing relationship with
Israel
without
sacrificing its core interests in the rest of the region.
India
needs
Israel
as a
political and military partner but without being pushed into any
new confrontation with the Islamic world.(30) While Israel has
long faced enmity from much of the Islamic world,
India
's national
interests and large Muslim population makes it especially
careful to avoid such a fate.
It was in this context that concerns were raised about the
orientation of the new Indian government, led by the Congress
Party and supported by the Left Parties, towards
Israel
. When in
opposition, the current Indian Foreign Minister, K. Natwar
Singh, was critical of the previous government’s efforts to
promote Indo-Israeli ties at the expense of the Palestinians.
The Left Parties have also been very vocal in their support for
the Palestinian cause. However, so far there is little
indication that Indo-Israeli ties are suffering because of a new
dispensation in
India
. The new
government has argued that it’s ties with
Israel
would not
affect its support for the Palestinian cause.(31) And that had
been the position of the former Indian government too that was
led by the Hindu nationalist, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
The new government did make a symbolic move of sending its
Minister of State for External Affairs to
Palestine
, thereby
demonstrating its strong support for Palestinian independence.
It also called for measures to lift the siege imposed by
Israel
around the
headquarters of the former Palestinian leader, Yasser
Arafat.(32) Apart from these symbolic gestures, nothing dramatic
has happened that might force one to conclude that
India
’s ties
with
Israel
are under
reconsideration.
India
’s
Relations with
Iran
Another constraint on
India
’s enhanced
engagement with
Israel
is
India
’s
flourishing relations with
Iran
. In fact,
the RAND Corporation of the United States has termed this
relationship as “the Tehran-New Delhi axis” and in its
opinion, it is one of the ten international security
developments that are not getting appropriate attention.(33) And
this is primarily because of the impact that closer ties between
India and Iran might have on the Middle Eastern political
dynamic, and which might not necessarily help U.S. interests in
the region.
While an India-Iran axis seems far-fetched, relations
between
India
and
Iran
have
definitely been on an upswing in the last decade. This was
reflected in
India
’s
invitation to
Iran
’s Prime
Minister to be the guest of honor at the Republic Day
celebrations in January 2003. There are a number of factors,
such as the unipolar nature of the current international system,
India’s need to counter Pakistan’s influence in the Islamic
world, the increasing geopolitical importance of Central Asia,
and the need to strengthen economic and commercial ties, which
have been responsible for the growing convergence in Indo-Iran
interests in the post-Cold War period.(34)
On the other hand,
Israel
has a deeply
antagonistic relationship with
Iran
.
Israel
sees
Iran
as the main
supporter of the anti-Israeli Hizballah group in
Lebanon
. It also
blames
Iran
for actively
supporting extremist Palestinian groups that use terrorism
against the Israeli civilians.
Iran
’s policy
towards the
Palestine
issue can
become a major stumbling block in Indo-Israel relations as
Iran
not only
supports the
Palestine
cause and
the right of its people to reclaim occupied lands as their
homeland, but also follows a policy of non-recognition towards
Israel
, openly
calling for the elimination of the Israeli state.
Israel
, along with
the
United States
, has also
been putting pressure on
Iran
to stop its
suspected nuclear weapons program, with some reports even
suggesting that
Israel
could
consider taking military action against the Iranian nuclear
facilities. With
Iran
openly
calling for its elimination,
Israel
clearly sees
a nuclear-armed
Iran
as an
existential threat. While the
US
overthrow of
Saddam Hussein may have removed one of
Israel
’s enemies,
it also seems to have created new opportunities for
Iran
to increase
its influence in
Israel
’s
immediate neighborhood.
In this respect, Israel is concerned about India’s
growing ties with Iran.(35) It is especially worried about India
sharing with Iran some of the military technology that it is
receiving from Israel.
Israel
raised its
concern over
Iran
’s nuclear
weapons program and its impact on regional stability at the
meeting of the Indo-Israeli JWG on counterterrorism in November
2004.
Israel
would like
India
to
acknowledge the threat posed by a nuclear-armed
Iran
and would
like
India
to make
efforts to help in the stabilization of the volatile security
situation in
West Asia
.
While
India
and
Israel
need not
make their bilateral relationship a function of each other’s
relationship with any third country, both will have to manage it
carefully in light of
India
’s
relations with other countries in
Middle East
, and with
Iran
in
particular.
Israel
will remain
concerned about the direction of Indian foreign policy in the
Middle East
even though
India
might try
its best to keep its relationship with
Israel
insulated
from its bilateral dealings with other countries of the
Middle East
.
Ambivalent
Role of the
United States
India
’s ties
with
Israel
will also be
constrained by how far the
U.S.
wants this
engagement to go. Though the
U.S.
has welcomed
the growing ties between
India
and
Israel
, it has a
significant veto over
Israel
’s defense
exports. In 2000, the
U.S.
vetoed an
intended $2 billion Phalcon sale to
China
, ostensibly
because of
U.S.
fears of an
increased threat to
Taiwan
and to
U.S.
pilots in
the event of war with
China
. Though the
U.S.
has
generally approved hi-tech military exports from
Israel
to
India
, it has been
reluctant to give its nod to systems involving American
technology or financial input. The
U.S.
has
expressed its disapproval of the possible sale of
Israel
’s Arrow
anti-missile system to
India
, leading to
the suspension of talks between
India
and
Israel
on this
issue.(36)
This is not to deny, however, that the growing security
relationship between
India
and
Israel
has, to a
large extent, been nurtured with the help of the
US
. Many also
see a larger design behind the
U.S.
desire to
make the two states work closely with each other and the
US
, mainly to
counter-balance a rising
China
, which may
become
America
’s main
competitor in the coming years.
Also, since to a large extent defense cooperation is
driving the Indo-Israeli relationship, there is a real danger
that any decline in such cooperation may seriously undermine the
bilateral relationship. It is a distinct possibility that once
the
U.S.
arms market
becomes more fully open to
India
, the Israeli
market would lose its relative attraction.
India
and the
US
have already
signed an agreement that would lift US restrictions on
hi-technology trade with
India
, covering
cutting-edge technology pertaining to civilian nuclear energy,
space, missile defense, and hi-tech commerce.(37)
Perceptual
Differences on Terrorism
There are differences of perception between
India
and
Israel
on the issue
of terrorism. While for
India
,
Pakistan
is the
epicenter of terrorism,
Israel
reserves
that status for
Iran
.
Israel
might be
sympathetic to Indian concerns regarding
Pakistan
but it is
not ready to make new enemies.
Israel
would not
like to undermine the possibility of
Pakistan
normalizing
its relations with
Israel
at some
future date.
Israel
’s
Relationship with
China
and
Pakistan
India
would also
be concerned about
Israel
forging a
close defense relationship with
China
or even with
Pakistan
in the
future, which would have adverse strategic consequences for
India
.
Israel
is
apparently keen on reviving its bilateral relations with
China
after they
suffered a major setback when
Israel
cancelled
the Phalcon spy plane deal with
China
under
U.S.
pressure.
Counter-terror cooperation and defense trade seem to be driving
Sino-Israel relations just as in the case of Indo-Israel
relations.(38) Israel sees China not only as another huge market
for its defense products, but also as a significant global
player that can play a constructive role in favor of Israel in
multilateral forums like the UN. Though
Israel
’s
relations with
China
will
indubitably be conducted under the watchful eyes of the
United States
,
India
will have to
be concerned about the ramifications of close defense
cooperation between
Israel
and
China
, especially
in light of
China
’s close
defense ties with
Pakistan
.
Conclusion
Bilateral relations between
India
and
Israel
have
strengthened significantly in recent years with both nations
experiencing a convergence of interests on a range of issues. At
its heart, however, this relationship still remains driven by
close defense ties and recognition of a common foe in Islamist
terrorism. Though attempts are being made by both sides to
broaden the base of their relationship, significant constraints
remain, preventing this relationship from achieving its full
potential. Both sides will have to navigate their relationship
carefully through these constraints.
The current international environment, however, is
particularly favorable to a deepening of Indo-Israeli ties. How
far the two sides are willing to make use of this opportunity
depends ultimately on the political will in the two states. The
people of
India
and
Israel
have a long
history of civilizational contact and it is only natural for the
two states to cooperate more closely with each other on issues
ranging from defense cooperation and counterterrorism to trade
and cultural exchanges. There are significant mutual benefits
that the two states can gain from a vibrant partnership with
each other.
*Harsh V. Pant is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of
Political Science at the
University
of
Notre Dame
,
Indiana
(
United
States
). His
research interests include international security issues and
South Asian security.
References and Footnotes
- A detailed examination
of the Indo-Israeli relations in a historical context can be
found in P.R. Kumaraswamy, “
India
and
Israel
: Emerging Partnership,” Journal
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (December
2002), pp. 193-200.
- “Indian Jews and their
Heritage,” The
Hindu,
September 7, 2003
.
- Martin Sherman and M.L.
Sondhi, Indo-Israeli Cooperation as a US National Interest, Ariel
Center for Policy Research (ACPR) Policy Papers, No. 89
(Shaarei Tikva: Ariel Center for Policy Research, 1999), p.
9.
- For a discussion of
overlapping Indian and Israeli interests in the area of
counterterrorism, see Ilan Berman, “
Israel
,
India
and
Turkey
: Triple Entente?”
Middle East
Quarterly, Fall 2002, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 37-38.
- Brajesh Mishra’s
speech can be found at <http://www.meadev.nic.in/speeches/bm-nsa-ad.htm>.
- “Unwritten, Abstract
US-India-Israeli Axis to Fight Terror,” Indian Express,
September 11, 2003
.
- In fact, the
U.S.
was quick to deny any attempt at forging an
“Indo-US-Israel Axis.” See V. Sudarshan, “No
Indo-US-Israel Axis,” Outlook,
September 22, 2003
.
- Pramit Pal Chaudhuri,
“Why ties with
India
important to
Israel
,” Hindustan
Times,
September 6, 2003
.
- See, for example, Jim
Hoagland, “A Test of True Allies,” Washington Post,
November 8, 2001
and Samuel
Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993).
- Saurabh Shukla, “
India
,
Israel
tie up to combat terrorism,”
Hindustan
Times,
September 11, 2003
.
- Margot Dudkevitch, “US
Forces in
Iraq
Adopt IDF Strategy,”
Jerusalem
Post,
December 8, 2003
.
- T.C. Malhotra,
“Following Sharon visit,
Israel
,
India
prepare for special-forces exercise,” JTA
News,
September 26, 2003
.
- Abraham Rabinovich,
“With Asian Sales, Arms Hit Record,”
Washington
Times,
May 23, 2003
. See also, Sharon Sadeh,
“
Israel
’s Beleaguered Defense
Industry,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March
2001).
- Paul Watson, “Arms at
the Heart of India-Israel Embrace,”
Los Angeles
Times,
September 9, 2003
.
- Saikat
Datta, “Indo-Israeli defense deals get a big push,” Indian
Express,
September 11, 2003
.
- Guy Chazan and Jay
Solomon, “
Israel
to Sell Radar to
India
,” Wall Street
Journal,
September 5, 2003
.
- Martin Sherman, “From
Conflict to Convergence:
India
and
Israel
Forge a Solid Strategic
Alliance
,”
Jerusalem
Post,
February 28, 2003
.
- “
India
To Tie Up With
Israel
, US for E-Warfare Systems,” Indian Express,
September 2, 2004
.
- Shishir Gupta, “Next
Navy Chief goes to
Israel
to signal smooth bilateral sailing,” Indian Express,
July 11, 2004
.
- Haroon Habib, “Defense
Deal aimed at upsetting balance of power: Kasuri,” The
Hindu,
September 11, 2003
. Also see, B. Murlidhar Reddy, “Pak concern over
‘Indo-Israeli nexus,’” The
Hindu,
September 9, 2003
.
- Reddy, “Pak concern
over ‘Indo-Israeli nexus.’”
- Gupta, “Next Navy
Chief goes to
Israel
to signal smooth bilateral sailing.”
- “We need more
Business:
Sharon
,” Times of
India
,
September 11, 2003
; Also see, “
India
,
Israel
aim to increase Bilateral Trade,” Associated
Press,
September 9, 2003
.
- On the close
relationship between American-Jewish and American-Indian
groups, see Indrani Bagchi, “Canny Friends,” India
Today,
April 10, 2004
.
- See the bilateral
statement on friendship and cooperation signed between
India
and
Israel
during Ariel Sharon’s visit to
India
in September 2003, <http://meaindia.nic.in>.
- P. Sunderarajan, “
Israel
plans thrust on science and technology collaboration,” The
Hindu,
December 25, 2003
.
- “Imam leads Muslims in
Protest against
Sharon
’s visit,” Times of
India
,
September 9, 2003
.
- Pramit Pal Chaudhuri,
“It’s time to look beyond Arafat:
Israel
to
India
,” Hindustan
Times,
September 8, 2003
. Also see Pranay Sharma, “Terror & Truce mix for
Sharon
,” The
Telegraph,
September 9, 2003
.
- For a trenchant critique
of the Arab world’s policies towards
India
, see Abdullah Al Madani, “Indo-Israeli ties: Arabs have
None but Themselves to Blame,” Gulf News,
September 14, 2003
.
- Atul Aneja, “
West Asia
watching
Sharon
’s visit,” The Hindu,
September 8, 2003
.
- “
Israel
ties won’t affect
Palestine
ties: Natwar,” Indian Express,
July 12, 2004
.
- Atul Aneja, “
India
urges removal of siege on Arafat,” The Hindu,
September 18, 2004
.
- A brief analysis of this
“India-Iran Axis” by a RAND Corporation’s analyst can
be found in “Headlines Over the Horizon,” The
Atlantic Monthly, July-August 2003, Vol. 292, No.
1, p. 87.
- For a detailed
explication of Indo-Iran convergence in recent times, see
Harsh V. Pant, “
India
and
Iran
: An Axis in the Making?” Asian
Survey,
May-June 2004, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 372-377.
- “Tel Aviv worried
about
New Delhi
’s ties with
Iran
,” Times of
India
,
September 11, 2003
.
- Atul Aneja, “US
objects to sale of Arrow missiles to
India
,” The Hindu,
September 8, 2003
.
- Peter Slevin, “US to
Send
India
Nuclear, Space Technology,”
Washington
Post,
January 13, 2004
.
- Barbara Opall-Rome, “
Israel
,
China
to Revive Ties,” Defense News,
December 15, 2003
.
The
original article appeared in
Middle
East
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 2004)
Reprinted
by permission of author
|