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Partnering the United States: India’s Window of Opportunity
Amit Gupta
After years of fielding Indian complaints that the United States did not take New Delhi seriously and favored Pakistan, the Bush Administration has brought about a qualitative change in the relationship. The United States has taken the position that it should help India be a major power in the international system and that India will be a partner in the preservation of international stability and in the promotion of democracy. Central to the shift in policy has been the recognition of India as a de facto nuclear state and the willingness to transfer civilian nuclear technology to India. At the same time, Washington will not ask New Delhi to put its nuclear weapons program under safeguards. In India, however, the results of the Bush-Manmohan Singh summit have been met with mixed reactions.
The nay-sayers have pointed out that it reduces India's autonomy in international affairs, puts constraints on Indian attempts to attain technological self-reliance, and brings India too close to the United States. It is time, to move beyond the zealotry of nonalignment, self-reliance bravado, and to think creatively about the U.S.-India relationship.
What needs to be stressed is that this is a comprehensive agreement, one that assumes the convergence of strategic worldviews between the two countries. It also attempts to bring about the long-term economic development of India. It will lead to a buildup of the country’s technological capability; an improvement of its agricultural base; an enhancement of its infrastructure; cooperation in energy development; and greater interaction between Indian and American CEOs’. India and the United States will also work for the global promotion of democracy. Additionally, the United States is willing to open the conventional arms technology cupboard for India.
Indian multilateral zealots, nonalignment bigots, Cold War era Marxists, and self-reliance enthusiasts need to recognize that the relationship works to India’s advantage since it promotes New Delhi’s aspirations to be a major power in international affairs. More importantly, it will permit India to withstand a China that is politically, economically, and militarily starting to dominate Asia. There are several reasons why, therefore, Indian analysts and policy makers must look favorably upon the results of the summit and the emerging relationship between the United States and India.
The Political Imperative: The Indian Model of International Relations
Indian perceptions of international relations have remained fairly consistent since the times of Jawaharlal Nehru although the ability to achieve these ambitions has varied due to the lack of resources or power capabilities. In fact, India has pursued a different model of international relations in that it is not interested in competing to be the first of second power in the international system. Instead, Nehru’s model of Indian foreign policy rested on the assumption that India was a reformist state. Typically, the international system is viewed as being divided between status quo and revolutionary states. Status quo states are those that seek to maintain the structure of the international system and the order that ensues from it. Revolutionary states seek to partially or completely dismantle the international structure and the order that goes with it. Revolutionary states have, in recent years, been described as rogue states, states of concern, and more recently, the axis of evil.
India, on the other hand, is a reformist state. A reformist state is one that by and large accepts the structure and order of the international system but wishes to make incremental changes to it in order to improve its own power potential and status within the international system. Nehru envisaged such a position for India when he suggested that while India was a poor country it was a great country that had a pivotal role to play in world affairs. This role was to try and achieve the needs of world peace and freedom that were not only part of the post-colonial revolution occurring in the post-second World War world but also critical to India’s internal development and national security objectives. [i]
As a reformist state, India has sought to participate in maintaining the status quo in the international system while incrementally reshaping it so that New Delhi gets a greater say in world affairs. Thus India has been a consistent supporter of the United Nations and participated in over fifty peacekeeping operations. But India’s long-term objective is to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. India has refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but at the official level has refused to assist in the proliferation of nuclear weaponry or its associated delivery systems.[ii] Similarly India has joined the Antarctic Club and is a Pioneer member of the Law of the Seas treaty thus signaling its commitment to international law yet ensuring that it would influence decision making in both bodies.
Nearly six decades after independence, Nehru’s views on international affairs remain relevant. Optimally, the use of force requires multilateral force structures and the legitimacy bestowed by multilateral institutions. Further, in a globalized world where economic disparities are not only rising but are increasingly visible and therefore greater sources of tension, a commitment to global development becomes all the more pressing.
Second, India is not interested in competing to be the number one or two nation in the international system. In the short to medium term, it is content to be number four, five, six, or seven. Once you are not interested in competing for the top position then it really does not matter where you fall in the power hierarchy, whether you are a number four or number seven is irrelevant, since you will have sufficient power and influence to have your voice heard in the international system. More importantly, it does not put the country in the situation where it has to wage an expensive global military and economic competition to compete for the first or second spot in the international power hierarchy.
Third, successive Indian governments have laid emphasis on the economic development of the nation. No Indian government has sought to bankrupt the country through excessive military expenditure. India remains committed to the overall development of the country and, in fact, the 2004 elections showed that the government could not afford to avoid a commitment to broader economic development. Given the relevance of Nehruvian thought it becomes apparent why the new agreement with the United States is important to Indian global aspirations and domestic interests.
A partnership with the United States provides India with the greater voice it seeks in international affairs. As the United States deals with issues like counter terrorism, counter proliferation, and the spread of democracy, India can use its position to help modify the debate within the American policymaking establishment. More pertinently, the Indian position on nuclear weapons and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has paid off since it has been recognized as a de facto nuclear state by Washington. Discussing the need for changes in the U.S.-India relationship, I wrote that India needed to be legally recognized as a nuclear power because, “….it would lead to a change in the policies of all the
de jure nuclear powers that continue to deny India its rightful nuclear status. Further, the lack of a legal nuclear status prevents the transfer of vital technologies that India requires for its own modernization and economic development.
[iii]”
As India obtains civilian nuclear technology and develops its nuclear power generation capability it is also adhering to international safeguards and working against the illegal transfer of nuclear technologies and materials. At the same time, it retains a nuclear weapons program and the minimum credible nuclear deterrent. As nonproliferation continues to be a major international concern, India can lead by example and help reshape international policy on nuclear transfers. The fact that a country is allowed to retain its nuclear arsenal yet sign up to be a responsible member of the nuclear club, not only permits a more realistic appraisal of nuclear issues but allows other de facto nuclear states like Israel and Pakistan to be successfully brought into the nuclear fold. It may also provide the yardstick by which to judge how other grey area nuclear states may be made to adhere to global proliferation regimes.
The Energy Imperative
While western governments remain concerned about terrorism, the fact is that the next sets of conflicts in the world are going to involve energy and natural resources like water. The emergence of the Chinese and Indian economies has driven the price of oil up and it seems likely that high petroleum prices are here to stay. If that is the case, then an alternative source of power will have to emerge and in the Indian context nuclear power holds great promise. Those questioning the deal with the United States argue that it will adversely impact on India’s quest for self-reliance in civilian nuclear technology. The case has considerable merit since India’s ambitious plans for nuclear power generation were hurt by the embargo imposed by the west following the 1974 nuclear test. The fact of the matter is that India’s Department of Atomic Energy has a disappointing record as far as the development of indigenous power generation program is concerned. Indian efforts in this area have been marked by delays, technical glitches, and cost overruns that have essentially led to only a small portion of India’s energy needs being met by nuclear power—nuclear energy accounts for about 3.75% of total electricity generated in India.[iv] Yet overall economic development, and the greater external economic investment needed to facilitate it, will require abundant amounts of energy, particularly electricity.
Those who caution about the dangers of reliance on the United States also need to recognize that what would really hurt the Indian economy is not the potential loss of autonomy through energy cooperation rather the flight of the $100 billion plus foreign institutional investment in India. This is a likely occurrence if the economy does not maintain its robust nature and high growth rates due to lacking power generation capacity and inability to match the demand from new industries.
The Military Technology Imperative
If India is to make the leap to the next generation of war fighting capability, it will have to successfully integrate net centric warfare into its doctrine. The technology to do so can only come from the United States. Similarly, if the credible minimum nuclear deterrent and the policy of no first use is to work then India will have to put a ballistic missile defense program into place to reduce the damage caused by a nuclear attack and to raise the threshold at which India has to retaliate in kind. Despite the hype about Israeli and Russian technology, the United States is the world leader in this field and it would be in India’s overall interest to develop such a military technology linkage with the United States.
From an Indian perspective, doubts remain about the United States’ reliability as a supplier of weapons technology. Successive embargos and technology shut-offs have led to an understandable reluctance on the part of Indian officials to invest in American weapons systems. But in the long run, the only guarantee that this will not happen lies in the growing political closeness of the two countries. If both countries were to see higher levels of political and military cooperation then the issue would become irrelevant. In the short-term, however, it will continue to cause suspicion and hesitancy in New Delhi. The only way out of this situation will be to start a foreign military sales relationship that brings in some weapons systems and then see if a degree of trust develops between the two countries.
The China Imperative
Certainly, the United States has a major economic relationship with China that will be difficult for either country to break. In 2004, China bought $34.7 billion worth or American goods while selling $196.6 billion worth of goods to the United States, leading to a trade deficit of $161.9 billion.[v] But China remains a totalitarian state with whom the United States can do business but has divergent political views and values. Most international observers, therefore, see the United States and China entering into a rivalry that is spawned by competing needs for energy and the drive to maintain power and influence in the international system. For instance, the status of Taiwan is just a symptom of a more fundamental disagreement between two major powers.
From an Indian perspective, the relationship with China has improved significantly due to the efforts of the Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh governments. The Chinese have recognized the status of Sikkim, there is a commitment to resolve the border issue, and bilateral trade has topped $14.5 billion. But there remains room for caution in the relationship. Pakistan is a loyal ally of China and Beijing has yet to take significant steps to lower the military relationship with Pakistan. Secondly, China will expect India to be the number two or three country in Asia just as it expects Japan to play a subordinate role to it in the future. India may not want to compete for the position of the primary power in Asia but the danger with the Chinese approach is that India may well have to end up settling for the economic and energy crumbs from the table. China’s domination of the region may well make it a behemoth that consumes the bulk of energy resources and thereby excludes other countries from getting their rightful share for national development. Further, as China’s military capability grows it strengthens its ability to bring about precisely this form of exclusion in Asia, for example, blocking off the Spratley Islands from foreign oil exploration ventures.
For an India that continues to be concerned about Pakistan and is seeking its own energy resources and developmental needs for external growth, a competition with China is likely to ensue. If that is the case, a strong relationship with the United States not only balances off China but forces Beijing to behave in a way that is more acceptable to Indian interests.
To sum up, a closer relationship with the United States will help develop India and bring it to the major power status that it seeks and deserves. It is time for the Indian leadership and policy makers to boldly go where no Indian has gone before.
Amit Gupta is also a Senior Research Fellow for U.S. Studies at the Observer
Research Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed in this paper are his own.
Footnotes
[i]The best discussion of the assumptions, motivations, and style of India's foreign policy is provided in Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 1-27.
[ii] For a discussion of the restrictive nature of Indian arms transfer policies see Amit Gupta, "I want my M-i-G: How India's Force Structure and Military Doctrine are Determined," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 5, May 1995, pp. 441-458.
[iii]Amit Gupta, The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests," Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, February 2005, p. 16.
[iv] Ila Patnaik, "Dispelling the Spooks about Nukes," The Indian Express, July 25, 2005.
[v]U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, available at,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2004
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