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The Indus Water Treaty

Subrahmanyam Sridhar

Executive Summary

Recent stresses and strains in the observance of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) [1] have had many analysts including this author believe that water sharing will take a politically charged dynamic and may even replace Kashmir as the primary source of conflict between India and Pakistan. Therefore it is important to have comprehensive understanding of the overall issues of the Indus system of rivers and the IWT as this article attempts to provide. It is formatted introduce the Indus river system, a brief overview of the principles of water sharing, the historical background leading up to the water crisis between India and Pakistan and the mediation by the World Bank, various provisions of the IWT, current disputes in water projects on the Indus River System bilaterally between India and Pakistan, and a look into the state of affairs of the Indus River System within Pakistan today.

Contents 
Introduction 
The Indus River System
The Indus Tributaries
The Indus Water Treaty 
Current Issues on Indus Water Sharing

Conclusions
References and Footnotes

Introduction

The 3rd World Water Forum  held at Kyoto , Japan in March 2003 sent simultaneous messages of hope and distress regarding the availability of water to meet surging worldwide demand in the coming decades. Its significance is especially serious in the Indian subcontinent, a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity and to three of the mightiest rivers of the world: the Indus , Ganges and Brahmaputra . Although these rivers have been subject to significant water sharing treaties among the various riparian states in the past, currently four major treaties govern them. These include the Indus Water Treaty (1960) between India and Pakistan , Sankosh Multipurpose Project treaty (1993) between India and Bhutan , the Ganges Water Sharing Agreement (1996) between India and Bangladesh , and the Mahakali Treaty (1996) between India and Nepal .

Recent stresses and strains in the observance of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) [1] have had many analysts including this author believe that water sharing will take a politically charged dynamic and may even replace Kashmir as the primary source of conflict between India and Pakistan. Therefore it is important to have comprehensive understanding of the overall issues of the Indus system of rivers and the IWT as this article attempts to provide. It is formatted introduce the Indus river system, a brief overview of the principles of water sharing, the historical background leading up to the water crisis between India and Pakistan and the mediation by the World Bank, various provisions of the IWT, current disputes in water projects on the Indus River System bilaterally between India and Pakistan, and a look into the state of affairs of the Indus River System within Pakistan today.

The Indus River System

The northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent is dominated by the Indus River and its system of upper tributaries (collectively referred to as Indus River System in this article.) Originating 17,000 feet (518 m) above sea level in a spring near Lake Manasarovar at Mt. Kailash [i], the Indus river along with the Brahmaputra [ii], Sutlej , and Karnali rivers are fed by massive Tibetan glacial waters to become a mighty river with further feeds from other glacial catchment areas in Karakoram and Zanskar ranges. The Indus then traverses a distance of 1800 miles (2900 km) through Tibet, India, Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), and Pakistan before draining into the Arabian Sea south of Karachi. On its way, it is further enriched by the waters of several tributaries, the most important and discussed in this article are Beas , Sutlej , Ravi , Chenab and Jhelum rivers. The western tributaries of the Indus that include the Swat, Kurram, Gomal, Kohat, Zoab and Kabul are not discussed herein. The river has been variously known as the Sengge[2] or Lion River by the Tibetans[iii], Abbasseen or Father of Rivers by the Pathans of present NWFP Pakistan, and Mitho Dariyo or Sweet River by the denizens of the arid Sindh.

Figure 1: Indus river and its tributaries with in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Courtesy of Panos Institute South Asia

Figure 2: Major tributaries and dams of the Indus river Courtesy of Indian Express

The Indus Tributaries

Sutlej : The longest of the five tributaries, the Sutlej originates near Mt. Kailash along with the Indus and runs a course of 964 miles (1550 km) through the Panjal and Siwalik mountain ranges and enters Pakistan through the plains of Indian Punjab. The Husseiniwala Headworks at Ferozepore is located downstream at the merger between of Beas and Sutlej , the closure of which on May 1, 1948 triggered the water crisis that prompted the IWT. These headworks supplied water to the then Princely State of Bikaner through a left-bank canal called Bikaner Canal and the state of Bahawalpur from the right-bank canal called Depalpur Canal . The huge 740 feet (225 m) high Bhakra Dam, which Nehru called “the new temple of resurgent India ,” [11] is also situated on this river. In addition another important headwork located on this Sutlej is Harike that feeds the Sirhind and Rajasthan canals. Within Pakistan , these eastern tributaries of the Indus known as Panjand combine at Mithan Kot.

Figure 3: Bhakra Dam Courtesy of Ministry of Irrigation, Govt. of Rajashtan  

Chenab : This 675 mile (1086 km) long river originates in the Kulu and Kangra districts of Himachal Pradesh and is fed by the tributaries Chandra and Bagha as it enters J&K near Kishtwar. After cutting across the Pir Panjal range, it enters the Sialkot district in Pakistan that built the Marala barrage across the river in 1968 with a maximum discharge of 1.1 million cusecs.

Jhelum & Kishenganga (Neelum): The Kishenganga river rises in the mountain complex west of Dras and south of Deosai plateau and is fed by a number of tiny tributaries and merges with Jhelum near Muzaffarabad in PoK. The Jhelum [iv] itself originates in the foothills of Pir Panjal near Verinag and flows through the four major cities of Anantnag, Srinagar , Sopore and Baramulla. Some important tributaries of the Jhelum are Lidar, Sind and Vishav.

Ravi : This 475 mile (764 km) long river rises in Himachal  Pradesh and runs a course of 102 miles (164 km) before joining Chenab in Pakistan after flowing past Lahore . The Thien Dam (Ranjit Sagar Dam) is located on this river at the tri-section of Punjab , Himachal Pradesh and J&K States and feeds the Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) which irrigates Northwestern Punjab .

Beas : This 290 mile (467 km) long river originates near Rohtang Pass in Himachal Pradesh and flows through Kulu Valley and the Siwalik Range . The Pandoh Dam is situated on this and diverts water to Sutlej through the Beas-Sutlej link.

The original infrastructure built by the British to harness and efficiently distribute the waters of these tributaries with a series of canals, barrages, and headworks has been augmented with construction of dams since independence by both India and Pakistan .

The Indus Water Treaty

The India Independence Act enacted in 1947 by British Parliament and the subsequent British withdrawal from India left the subcontinent partitioned between two independent states marred by demarcation problems along their international boundaries, the peculiar circumstances leading to the division, and the accession of a number of princely states especially that of Jammu & Kashmir straddling India and Pakistan as well as the complex riverine systems of Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra. Of these three rivers, the Indus presented a complicated set of issues stemming from thousands of kilometres of man-made irrigation canals and headworks that regulated the flow of its waters.  While all the rivers, except Indus and Sutlej , originated within Kashmir , the headworks located mostly in the Eastern Punjab were awarded to India .  Aside from the Punjab Boundary Commission suggestion that the canal-headworks system be treated as a joint venture, a proposition rejected by both countries, it had not deliberated water sharing of Indus River Basin due to a hasty partition that was completed  in a mere 73 days. Water sharing issues of Indus River System would later take over a decade to resolve.  Further complicating this issue, Pakistan covertly and later overtly sought to grab Jammu & Kashmir for various reasons including the desire to control the waters of these rivers that succeeded in instilling only distrust among Indian minds. 

After the Partition, both the nations agreed to a “Standstill Agreement” on Dec. 30, 1947 freezing the existing water turn systems at the two headworks of Madhopur (on the Ravi ) and Ferozepur (on the Sutlej ) until March, 31, 1948 . Any dispute that could not be resolved by the Punjab Partition Committee was to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal (AT) which had been setup under Section Nine of the Indian Independence Act by the Governor General to sort out difficulties arising over the division of assets. However, on the expiry of the arrangement and after not receiving an encouraging response to a reminder for talks issued by the East Punjab Government on 29th March 1948, and in the absence of a new agreement, the then Indian Punjab Government promptly stopped the water supply through Madhopur on April, 1, 1948. By a coincidence, the Arbitral Tribunal’s term also expired on the same day. In the meanwhile, the AT had accepted India ’s claims regarding seigniorage charges for the waters and ordered payment of the same by Pakistan .  At the invitation of East Punjab , the Engineers of the two divided-Punjab States met in Simla on Apr. 15, 1948 and signed two Standstill Agreements [5] regarding the Depalpur Canal and Central Bari Doab Canal to be in effect until Oct. 15, 1948 . The West Punjab Government agreed to pay:  (1) seigniorage charges, (2) proportionate maintenance costs, and (3) interest on a proportionate amount of capital. In its defence, the GoI cited such charges levied by the Punjab on the Bikaner state under the British.

However, the West Punjab Govt. refused to ratify the Agreement and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, then Liaqat Ali Khan, called for a meeting. The Finance Minister of Pakistan , Ghulam Mohammed, along with the Pakistani Punjab ministers, Shaukat Hayat Khan and Mumtaz Daulatana visited Delhi to work out an agreement [4] in the Inter-Dominion Conference held on May, 3-4, 1948. India agreed to resume release of water from the headworks, but made it clear that Pakistan could not lay claim to these waters as a matter of right and would levy seigniorage charges specified by the Prime Minister of India to be deposited in Reserve Bank of India , establishing Indian sovereignty over these rivers.  The Indian side also made assurances that the waters would be diminished slowly giving enough time for West Punjab to develop alternate sources. The West Punjab Government, for its part, also recognized “the natural anxiety of the East Punjab Government to discharge the obligations to develop areas where water is scarce and which were underdeveloped in relation to parts of West Punjab .” Soon the Pakistani Government falsely accused that they were coerced into signing this Agreement and made futile appeals to the Governor General Lord Mountbatten.  However, due to the hostilities between India and Pakistan on account of Kashmir and in the general environment of distrust and animosity, no further talks took place. Pakistan ’s suggestion in June 1949 to take the matter to the International Court of Justice at The Hague and widen the conflict across all rivers, was rejected by India . On November 1, 1949 , Pakistan unilaterally invalidated the Delhi Agreement and by July, 1950 stopped seigniorage payments into RBI. However, India continued to abide by the Agreement and supplied waters.

In 1951, David Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and a former Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, USA visited the two countries ostensibly to write a series of articles for the Colliers magazine (since defunct). Having had access to both the Governments at the highest level, Lilientahl wrote in one of his articles, “I proposed that India and Pakistan work out a program jointly to develop and jointly to operate the Indus Basin river system, upon which both nations were dependent for irrigation water. With new dams and irrigation canals, the Indus and its tributaries could be made to yield the additional water each country needed for increased food production. In the article I had suggested that the World Bank might use its good offices to bring the parties to agreement, and help in the financing of an Indus Development program.” Inspired by this idea, Eugene R. Black, then President of the World Bank visited the two countries and proposed a Working Party of Indian, Pakistani and World Bank engineers to tackle the “functional”, rather than the “political” aspects of water sharing. The two countries accepted this mediation [5] (which also had the backing of President Truman who wanted to remove the “kind of unfriendliness” that existed then between the US and India ) offer in March 1952 and sent their technical teams to Washington for further discussions. Subsequent meetings took place in Karachi in Nov., 1952 and New Delhi in Jan. 1953. The World Bank suggested that each side submit its own plans, which they did on Oct. 6, 1953 . The two plans, while concurring on the available supply of water, differed widely on allocations. [6] The table below, shows the initial, negotiated and final positions of both the countries.

Table 1: Indus River System Estimates and Allocations

Plan

India

Pakistan

Initial Estimate

119 MAF

118 MAF[v]

Initial Indian

29 MAF

90 MAF

Initial Pakistani

15.5 MAF

102.5 MAF

Revised Indian

All of the Eastern rivers + 7% of Western rivers

None of the Eastern rivers plus 93% of the Western rivers

Revised Pakistani

30% of Eastern rivers  and none of the Western rivers

70% of the Eastern rivers + all of the Western rivers

World Bank

Entire flow of the Eastern Rivers

Entire flow of the Western Rivers

However, despite all efforts, the wide gaps in the stands of the two countries could not be bridged, mainly due to the intransigence of the Pakistani side as the revised and final allocations show clearly above. The World Bank felt that an ideal approach to joint development of an integrated plan for Indus Basin as proposed by David Lilienthal was now impossible. In order to resolve the dispute, it finally stepped in with its own “settlement” proposals on Feb. 5, 1954 offering the three Eastern rivers to India and the three Western rivers to Pakistan . India accepted the proposal in toto on Mar. 25, 1954 while Pakistan gave only a “qualified acceptance” on July 28, 1954 . The settlement offered by the World Bank was closer to the Indian position as it repudiated the claims of Pakistan based on “historic usage”. An angered Pakistan threatened to withdraw from further negotiations. The World Bank proposal was then transformed from a “settlement” to a “basis for further negotiations” and the talks eventually continued for the next six years. [7, 8] In the meanwhile, the two countries signed an Interim Agreement on June 21, 1955 . As no conclusive agreement could be reached, the World Bank announced on Apr. 30, 1956 that the negotiation deadline has been indefinitely extended. [9] As is its wont, Pakistan , through its then Prime Minister H.S.Suhrawardy, issued a direct threat of war with India over waters, escalating tensions.  

Under the World Bank plan, Pakistan was asked to construct barrages and canals to divert the Western river waters to compensate the loss of Eastern rivers on the Pakistani side. During the period needed to do this, called the Transition Period, India was required to maintain the “historic withdrawals” to Pakistan  The World Bank then suggested a “financial liability” for India as replacement costs by Pakistan for the loss of  the three Eastern rivers. In the 1958 meeting, the replacement works and the financial liability to India were considered. India rejected Pakistan ’s proposal, known as the “London Plan”, for two large dams on the Jhelum and the Indus and three smaller ones on Ravi and Sutlej and several canals, all in all totaling USD 1.2 Billion. India ’s alternate proposal, known as the “Marhu Tunnel Proposal”, was unacceptable to Pakistan as leaving too much leverage on water flows in Indian hands. In May, 1959, the Bank’s President visited both countries and suggested a way out which involved India paying a fixed amount of £ 62.060 Million to be paid in ten years in equal installments and the Bank assisting Pakistan with help from donor countries. The international consortium of donors pledged USD 900 Million for Pakistan and the drafting of the IWT began in Aug., 1959.

The treaty was signed in Karachi by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Field Marshal Ayub Khan H.P., H.J. and Mr. W.A.B. Illif, President of the World Bank in a five-day summit meet starting Sep. 19, 1960 . However, it was deemed effective from Apr. 1, 1960 . The two governments ratified the same in January 1961 by exchanging documents in Delhi . Simultaneously an Indus Basin Development Fund was established with contributions from Australia , Canada , Germany , New Zealand , the UK and the US along with India ’s share of the cost. The Eisenhower Administration contributed roughly half the cost of the Fund, while the World Bank provided US$ 250 Million and the other donor countries together provided a similar amount. The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) of Pakistan was entrusted with the task of completing these tasks. The fund was subsequently extinguished after the completion of the projects as per Article XI of the IWT. The May 4, 1948 accord stood annulled after the signing of IWT.  The Indus Basin Project involved construction of two large dams, five barrages, one siphon and seven link canals as detailed below in Tables 2, 3,& 4,  to transfer 14 MAF of water from the Western rivers. [10] There are three systems of link canals. Two of the systems, the Rasul-Qadirabad-Balloki-Suleimanki System (R.Q.B.S.) and the Trimmu-Sidhnai-Mailsi-Bahawal System (T.S.M.B) connect the Jhelum River through to the Sutlej and the third system Chashma-Jhelum System (C.J) connects the Indus with the Jhelum .

Table 2: Engineering Construction Work in Pakistan as part of IWT - Canals

Link Canals Constructed in Pakistan under the IWT

From -To Rivers

Link Canal Name

Description

1. Jhelum Chenab

Rasul-Qadirabad

30 miles long; provides 19,000 cusecs Jhelum water to Chenab

2. Chenab Ravi

Qadirabad-Balloki

104 miles long; provides 18,600 cusecs water to Ravi

3. Ravi Sutlej

Balloki-Suleimanki II

39 miles long; provides 6,500 cusecs water to Sutlej

4. Indus Jhelum

Chashma-Jhelum

63 miles long; provides 21,700 cusecs water to Jhelum

5. Indus Ravi

Trimmu-Sidhnai

44 miles long; provides 11,000 cusecs water to Ravi

6. Ravi Sutlej

Sidhnai-Mailsi

60 miles long; provides 10,000 cusecs water to Sutlej

7. Indus – Panjnad

Taunsa-Panjnad

38 miles long; provides 100,000 cusecs water to Sutlej

Table 3: Engineering Construction Work in Pakistan as part of IWT - Reservoirs

Reservoirs Constructed in Pakistan under IWT

Mangla

On Jhelum at Mangla, Mirpur Distt. in PoK; completed in 1968

Tarbela

On Indus ; completed in 1977; Gross storage 11.62 MAF; Live storage 9.7 MAF; Generates 3478 MW power

Table 4 :Engineering Construction Work in Pakistan as part of IWT - Barrages & Syphons

Barrages Constructed in Pakistan under IWT

Marala

On Chenab ; completed in 1968; Max. discharge 1.1 Million cusecs

Qadirabad

On Chenab ; completed in 1967; Max. discharge 900,000 cusecs

Sidhnai

On Ravi ; completed in 1965; Max. discharge 167,000 cusecs

Rasul

On Jhelum ; completed in 1967; Max. discharge 876,000 cusecs

Chashma

On Indus ; completed in 1971; also has a reservoir of 0.75 MAF; Max. discharge 1,176,000 cusecs

Mailsi

On Sutlej ; a gated siphon; Max. discharge 429,000 cusecs

Table 5 :Other Engineering Constructions on the Indus River System

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Other Important Engineering Structures

Jinnah Barrage