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The
Indus Water Treaty
Subrahmanyam
Sridhar
Executive
Summary
Recent
stresses and strains in the observance of the Indus Water Treaty
(IWT) [1] have had many analysts including this
author believe that water sharing will take a politically
charged dynamic and may even replace Kashmir as the primary
source of conflict between India and Pakistan. Therefore it is
important to have comprehensive understanding of the overall
issues of the
Indus
system of rivers and
the IWT as this article attempts to provide. It is formatted
introduce the Indus river system, a brief overview of the
principles of water sharing, the historical background leading
up to the water crisis between India and Pakistan and the
mediation by the World Bank, various provisions of the IWT,
current disputes in water projects on the Indus River System
bilaterally between India and Pakistan, and a look into the
state of affairs of the Indus River System within Pakistan
today.
Contents
Introduction
The Indus River System
The
Indus
Tributaries
The
Indus Water Treaty
Current Issues on Indus Water Sharing
Conclusions
References
and Footnotes
Introduction
The
3rd World Water Forum
held at
Kyoto
,
Japan
in March 2003 sent
simultaneous messages of hope and distress regarding the
availability of water to meet surging worldwide demand in the
coming decades. Its significance is especially serious in the
Indian subcontinent, a region that is home to one-fourth of
humanity and to three of the mightiest rivers of the world: the
Indus
,
Ganges
and
Brahmaputra
. Although these rivers
have been subject to significant water sharing treaties among
the various riparian states in the past, currently four major
treaties govern them. These include the Indus Water Treaty
(1960) between
India
and
Pakistan
, Sankosh Multipurpose
Project treaty (1993) between
India
and
Bhutan
, the
Ganges
Water Sharing Agreement
(1996) between
India
and
Bangladesh
, and the Mahakali
Treaty (1996) between
India
and
Nepal
.
Recent
stresses and strains in the observance of the Indus Water Treaty
(IWT) [1] have had many analysts including this
author believe that water sharing will take a politically
charged dynamic and may even replace Kashmir as the primary
source of conflict between India and Pakistan. Therefore it is
important to have comprehensive understanding of the overall
issues of the
Indus
system of rivers and
the IWT as this article attempts to provide. It is formatted
introduce the Indus river system, a brief overview of the
principles of water sharing, the historical background leading
up to the water crisis between India and Pakistan and the
mediation by the World Bank, various provisions of the IWT,
current disputes in water projects on the Indus River System
bilaterally between India and Pakistan, and a look into the
state of affairs of the Indus River System within Pakistan
today.
The
northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent is dominated by the
Indus
River
and its system of upper
tributaries (collectively referred to as Indus River System in
this article.) Originating 17,000 feet (518 m) above sea level
in a spring near
Lake
Manasarovar
at
Mt.
Kailash
[i],
the
Indus
river along with the
Brahmaputra
[ii],
Sutlej
, and Karnali rivers are
fed by massive Tibetan glacial waters to become a mighty river
with further feeds from other glacial catchment areas in
Karakoram and Zanskar ranges. The Indus then traverses a
distance of 1800 miles (2900 km) through Tibet, India, Pakistan
occupied Kashmir (PoK), and Pakistan before draining into the
Arabian Sea south of Karachi. On its way, it is further enriched
by the waters of several tributaries, the most important and
discussed in this article are
Beas
,
Sutlej
,
Ravi
,
Chenab
and
Jhelum
rivers. The western
tributaries of the
Indus
that include the Swat,
Kurram, Gomal, Kohat, Zoab and
Kabul
are not discussed
herein. The river has been variously known as the Sengge[2]
or
Lion
River
by the Tibetans[iii],
Abbasseen or Father of
Rivers by the Pathans of present NWFP Pakistan, and Mitho
Dariyo or
Sweet
River
by the denizens of the
arid Sindh.
Figure
1:
Indus
river and its
tributaries with in
Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) Courtesy of
Panos Institute South
Asia
Figure
2:
Major tributaries and dams of the
Indus
river Courtesy of
Indian Express
Sutlej
:
The longest
of the five tributaries, the
Sutlej
originates near
Mt.
Kailash
along with the
Indus
and runs a course of
964 miles (1550 km) through the Panjal and Siwalik mountain
ranges and enters
Pakistan
through the plains of
Indian Punjab. The Husseiniwala Headworks at Ferozepore is
located downstream at the merger between of
Beas
and
Sutlej
, the closure of which
on
May 1, 1948
triggered the water
crisis that prompted the IWT. These headworks supplied water to
the then Princely State of
Bikaner
through a left-bank canal called
Bikaner
Canal
and the state of
Bahawalpur
from the right-bank
canal called
Depalpur
Canal
. The huge 740 feet (225
m) high Bhakra Dam, which Nehru called “the new temple of
resurgent
India
,” [11] is
also situated on this river. In addition another important
headwork located on this
Sutlej
is Harike that feeds
the Sirhind and Rajasthan canals. Within
Pakistan
, these eastern
tributaries of the
Indus
known as Panjand
combine at Mithan Kot.
Figure
3: Bhakra
Dam Courtesy of Ministry of Irrigation, Govt. of Rajashtan
Chenab
:
This 675 mile (1086 km) long river originates in the Kulu and
Kangra districts of Himachal Pradesh and is fed by the
tributaries Chandra and Bagha as it enters J&K near Kishtwar.
After cutting across the Pir Panjal range, it enters the
Sialkot
district in
Pakistan
that built the Marala
barrage across the river in 1968 with a maximum discharge of 1.1
million cusecs.
Jhelum
& Kishenganga (Neelum):
The Kishenganga river rises in the mountain complex west of Dras
and south of Deosai plateau and is fed by a number of tiny
tributaries and merges with
Jhelum
near Muzaffarabad in
PoK. The
Jhelum
[iv]
itself originates in the foothills of Pir Panjal near Verinag
and flows through the four major cities of Anantnag,
Srinagar
, Sopore and Baramulla.
Some important tributaries of the
Jhelum
are Lidar,
Sind
and Vishav.
Ravi
:
This 475 mile
(764 km) long river rises in Himachal
Pradesh
and runs a course of 102 miles (164 km) before joining
Chenab
in
Pakistan
after flowing past
Lahore
. The Thien Dam (Ranjit
Sagar Dam) is located on this river at the tri-section of
Punjab
, Himachal Pradesh and
J&K
States
and feeds the Upper
Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) which irrigates
Northwestern Punjab
.
Beas
:
This 290 mile (467 km) long river originates near
Rohtang
Pass
in Himachal Pradesh and
flows through
Kulu
Valley
and the
Siwalik
Range
. The Pandoh Dam is
situated on this and diverts water to
Sutlej
through the Beas-Sutlej
link.
The
original infrastructure built by the British to harness and
efficiently distribute the waters of these tributaries with a
series of canals, barrages, and headworks has been augmented
with construction of dams since independence by both
India
and
Pakistan
.
The
India Independence Act enacted in 1947 by British Parliament and
the subsequent British withdrawal from India left the
subcontinent partitioned between two independent states marred
by demarcation problems along their international boundaries,
the peculiar circumstances leading to the division, and the
accession of a number of princely states especially that of
Jammu & Kashmir straddling India and Pakistan as well as the
complex riverine systems of Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra. Of
these three rivers, the
Indus
presented a complicated
set of issues stemming from thousands of kilometres of man-made
irrigation canals and headworks that regulated the flow of its
waters. While all
the rivers, except
Indus
and
Sutlej
, originated within
Kashmir
, the headworks located
mostly in the
Eastern Punjab
were awarded to
India
.
Aside from the Punjab Boundary Commission suggestion that
the canal-headworks system be treated as a joint venture, a
proposition rejected by both countries, it had not deliberated
water sharing of Indus River Basin due to a hasty partition that
was completed in a
mere 73 days. Water sharing issues of Indus River System would
later take over a decade to resolve.
Further complicating this issue,
Pakistan
covertly and later
overtly sought to grab Jammu & Kashmir for various reasons
including the desire to control the waters of these rivers that
succeeded in instilling only distrust among Indian minds.
After
the Partition, both the nations agreed to a “Standstill
Agreement” on
Dec. 30, 1947
freezing the existing
water turn systems at the two headworks of Madhopur (on the
Ravi
) and Ferozepur (on the
Sutlej
) until
March, 31, 1948
. Any dispute that could
not be resolved by the Punjab Partition Committee was to be
decided by the Arbitral Tribunal (AT) which had been setup under
Section Nine of the Indian Independence Act by the Governor
General to sort out difficulties arising over the division of
assets. However, on the expiry of the arrangement and after not
receiving an encouraging response to a reminder for talks issued
by the East Punjab Government on 29th March 1948, and
in the absence of a new agreement, the then Indian Punjab
Government promptly stopped the water supply through Madhopur on
April, 1, 1948. By a coincidence, the Arbitral Tribunal’s term
also expired on the same day. In the meanwhile, the AT had
accepted
India
’s claims regarding
seigniorage charges for the waters and ordered payment of the
same by
Pakistan
.
At the invitation of
East Punjab
, the Engineers of the
two divided-Punjab States met in Simla on
Apr. 15, 1948
and signed two
Standstill Agreements [5] regarding the
Depalpur
Canal
and
Central
Bari
Doab
Canal
to be in effect until
Oct. 15, 1948
. The West Punjab
Government agreed to pay: (1)
seigniorage charges, (2) proportionate maintenance costs, and
(3) interest on a proportionate amount of capital. In its
defence, the GoI cited such charges levied by the
Punjab
on the
Bikaner
state under the
British.
However,
the West Punjab Govt. refused to ratify the Agreement and the
Prime Minister of Pakistan, then Liaqat Ali Khan, called for a
meeting. The Finance Minister of
Pakistan
, Ghulam Mohammed, along
with the Pakistani Punjab ministers, Shaukat Hayat Khan and
Mumtaz Daulatana visited
Delhi
to work out an
agreement [4] in the Inter-Dominion Conference held
on May, 3-4, 1948.
India
agreed to resume
release of water from the headworks, but made it clear that
Pakistan
could not lay claim to
these waters as a matter of right and would levy seigniorage
charges specified by the Prime Minister of India to be deposited
in Reserve Bank of
India
, establishing Indian
sovereignty over these rivers.
The Indian side also made assurances that the waters
would be diminished slowly giving enough time for
West Punjab
to develop alternate
sources. The West Punjab Government, for its part, also
recognized “the natural anxiety of the
East Punjab
Government to discharge the obligations to develop areas where
water is scarce and which were underdeveloped in relation to
parts of
West
Punjab
.” Soon the Pakistani
Government falsely accused that they were coerced into signing
this Agreement and made futile appeals to the Governor General
Lord Mountbatten. However,
due to the hostilities between
India
and
Pakistan
on account of
Kashmir
and in the general
environment of distrust and animosity, no further talks took
place.
Pakistan
’s suggestion in June
1949 to take the matter to the International Court of Justice at
The Hague
and widen the conflict
across all rivers, was rejected by
India
. On
November 1, 1949
,
Pakistan
unilaterally
invalidated the Delhi Agreement and by July, 1950 stopped
seigniorage payments into RBI. However,
India
continued to abide by
the Agreement and supplied waters.
In
1951, David Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley
Authority and a former Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, USA
visited the two countries ostensibly to write a series of
articles for the Colliers magazine (since defunct). Having had access to both the Governments at the
highest level, Lilientahl wrote in one of his articles, “I proposed that
India
and
Pakistan
work out a program jointly to develop and jointly to operate the
Indus
Basin
river system, upon which both nations were dependent for
irrigation water. With new dams and irrigation canals, the
Indus
and its tributaries could be made to yield the additional water
each country needed for increased food production. In the
article I had suggested that the World Bank might use its good
offices to bring the parties to agreement, and help in the
financing of an
Indus
Development program.”
Inspired by this idea, Eugene R. Black, then President of the
World Bank visited the two countries and proposed a Working
Party of Indian, Pakistani and World Bank engineers to tackle
the “functional”, rather than the “political” aspects of
water sharing. The two countries accepted this mediation [5]
(which also had the backing of President Truman who wanted
to remove the “kind of
unfriendliness” that existed then between the
US
and
India
) offer in March 1952 and sent their technical teams to
Washington
for further
discussions. Subsequent meetings took place in
Karachi
in Nov., 1952 and
New Delhi
in Jan. 1953. The World
Bank suggested that each side submit its own plans, which they
did on
Oct. 6, 1953
. The two plans, while
concurring on the available supply of water, differed widely on
allocations. [6] The table below, shows the initial,
negotiated and final positions of both the countries.
Table
1:
Indus
River
System Estimates and
Allocations
|
Plan
|
India
|
Pakistan
|
|
Initial
Estimate
|
119
MAF
|
118
MAF[v]
|
|
Initial
Indian
|
29
MAF
|
90
MAF
|
|
Initial
Pakistani
|
15.5
MAF
|
102.5
MAF
|
|
Revised
Indian
|
All
of the Eastern rivers + 7% of Western rivers
|
None
of the Eastern rivers plus 93% of the Western rivers
|
|
Revised
Pakistani
|
30%
of Eastern rivers and
none of the Western rivers
|
70%
of the Eastern rivers + all of the Western rivers
|
|
World
Bank
|
Entire
flow of the Eastern Rivers
|
Entire
flow of the Western Rivers
|
However, despite all efforts, the wide gaps in the stands of the two
countries could not be bridged, mainly due to the intransigence
of the Pakistani side as the revised and final allocations show
clearly above. The World Bank felt that an ideal approach to
joint development of an integrated plan for
Indus
Basin
as proposed by David
Lilienthal was now impossible. In order to resolve the dispute,
it finally stepped in with its own “settlement” proposals on
Feb. 5, 1954
offering the three
Eastern rivers to
India
and the three Western
rivers to
Pakistan
.
India
accepted the proposal in toto on
Mar. 25, 1954
while
Pakistan
gave only a
“qualified acceptance” on
July 28, 1954
. The settlement offered
by the World Bank was closer to the Indian position as it
repudiated the claims of
Pakistan
based on “historic
usage”. An angered
Pakistan
threatened to withdraw
from further negotiations. The World Bank proposal was then
transformed from a “settlement” to a “basis for further
negotiations” and the talks eventually continued for the next
six years. [7, 8] In the meanwhile, the two countries
signed an Interim Agreement on
June 21, 1955
. As no conclusive
agreement could be reached, the World Bank announced on
Apr. 30, 1956
that the negotiation
deadline has been indefinitely extended. [9] As is
its wont,
Pakistan
, through its then Prime
Minister H.S.Suhrawardy, issued a direct threat of war with
India
over waters, escalating
tensions.
Under the World Bank plan,
Pakistan
was asked to construct
barrages and canals to divert the Western river waters to
compensate the loss of Eastern rivers on the Pakistani side.
During the period needed to do this, called the Transition
Period, India was required to maintain the “historic
withdrawals” to Pakistan The
World Bank then suggested a “financial liability” for India
as replacement costs by Pakistan for the loss of
the three Eastern rivers. In the 1958 meeting, the
replacement works and the financial liability to
India
were considered.
India
rejected
Pakistan
’s proposal, known as
the “London Plan”, for two large dams on the
Jhelum
and the
Indus
and three smaller ones
on
Ravi
and
Sutlej
and several canals, all
in all totaling USD 1.2 Billion.
India
’s alternate proposal, known as the “Marhu Tunnel Proposal”, was
unacceptable to
Pakistan
as leaving too much
leverage on water flows in Indian hands. In May, 1959, the
Bank’s President visited both countries and suggested a way
out which involved
India
paying a fixed amount
of £
62.060 Million to be paid in ten years in equal installments and
the Bank assisting
Pakistan
with help from donor
countries. The international consortium of donors pledged USD
900 Million for
Pakistan
and the drafting of the
IWT began in Aug., 1959.
The treaty was signed in
Karachi
by Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru, Field Marshal Ayub Khan H.P., H.J. and Mr. W.A.B. Illif,
President of the World Bank in a five-day summit meet starting
Sep. 19, 1960
. However, it was deemed
effective from
Apr. 1, 1960
. The two governments
ratified the same in January 1961 by exchanging documents in
Delhi
. Simultaneously an
Indus Basin Development Fund was established with contributions
from
Australia
,
Canada
,
Germany
,
New Zealand
, the
UK
and the
US
along with
India
’s share of the cost.
The Eisenhower Administration contributed roughly half the cost
of the Fund, while the World Bank provided US$ 250 Million and
the other donor countries together provided a similar amount.
The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) of
Pakistan
was entrusted with the
task of completing these tasks. The fund was subsequently
extinguished after the completion of the projects as per Article
XI of the IWT. The
May 4, 1948
accord stood annulled
after the signing of IWT. The
Indus Basin Project involved construction of two large dams,
five barrages, one siphon and seven link canals as detailed
below in Tables 2, 3,& 4,
to transfer 14 MAF of water from the Western rivers. [10]
There are three systems of link canals. Two of the systems, the
Rasul-Qadirabad-Balloki-Suleimanki System (R.Q.B.S.) and the
Trimmu-Sidhnai-Mailsi-Bahawal System (T.S.M.B) connect the
Jhelum
River
through to the
Sutlej
and the third system
Chashma-Jhelum System (C.J) connects the
Indus
with the
Jhelum
.
Table 2: Engineering
Construction Work in
Pakistan
as part of IWT -
Canals
|
Link
Canals Constructed in
Pakistan
under the IWT
|
|
From
-To Rivers
|
Link
Canal
Name
|
Description
|
|
1.
Jhelum
–
Chenab
|
Rasul-Qadirabad
|
30
miles long; provides 19,000 cusecs
Jhelum
water to
Chenab
|
|
2.
Chenab
–
Ravi
|
Qadirabad-Balloki
|
104
miles long; provides 18,600 cusecs water to
Ravi
|
|
3.
Ravi
–
Sutlej
|
Balloki-Suleimanki
II
|
39
miles long; provides 6,500 cusecs water to
Sutlej
|
|
4.
Indus
–
Jhelum
|
Chashma-Jhelum
|
63
miles long; provides 21,700 cusecs water to
Jhelum
|
|
5.
Indus
–
Ravi
|
Trimmu-Sidhnai
|
44
miles long; provides 11,000 cusecs water to
Ravi
|
|
6.
Ravi
–
Sutlej
|
Sidhnai-Mailsi
|
60
miles long; provides 10,000 cusecs water to
Sutlej
|
|
7.
Indus
– Panjnad
|
Taunsa-Panjnad
|
38
miles long; provides 100,000 cusecs water to
Sutlej
|
Table 3: Engineering
Construction Work in
Pakistan
as part of IWT -
Reservoirs
|
Reservoirs
Constructed in
Pakistan
under IWT
|
|
Mangla
|
On
Jhelum
at Mangla, Mirpur
Distt. in PoK; completed in 1968
|
|
Tarbela
|
On
Indus
; completed in
1977; Gross storage 11.62 MAF; Live storage 9.7 MAF;
Generates 3478 MW power
|
Table 4 :Engineering
Construction Work in
Pakistan
as part of IWT -
Barrages & Syphons
|
Barrages
Constructed in
Pakistan
under IWT
|
|
Marala
|
On
Chenab
; completed in
1968; Max. discharge 1.1 Million cusecs
|
|
Qadirabad
|
On
Chenab
; completed in
1967; Max. discharge 900,000 cusecs
|
|
Sidhnai
|
On
Ravi
; completed in
1965; Max. discharge 167,000 cusecs
|
|
Rasul
|
On
Jhelum
; completed in
1967; Max. discharge 876,000 cusecs
|
|
Chashma
|
On
Indus
; completed in
1971; also has a reservoir of 0.75 MAF; Max. discharge
1,176,000 cusecs
|
|
Mailsi
|
On
Sutlej
; a gated siphon;
Max. discharge 429,000 cusecs
|
Table 5 :Other Engineering
Constructions on the
Indus
River
System
|
Other
Important Engineering Structures
|
|
Jinnah
Barrage
|
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