Buying
an Interim Fighter
Rupak
Chattopadyay
The
Indian Air Force (IAF) is in the market for an interim fighter
that doesn’t break the budget. Interim fighter purchases are
always tricky. If one is not careful, one is likely to end up
with unsuitable aircraft, in limited quantities, that needlessly
complicate logistics. The paradox of limited budgets and ever
increasing responsibilities haunts the IAF. This piece considers
the challenges before the IAF and discusses some procurement
options.
What’s the problem?
Of great concern is the fact
that the IAF’s fighter fleet is in danger of block obsolesce
in the absence of quick procurement decisions. Of even greater
concern are rapidly declining force levels. In the medium and
long term, there will be LCAs and Su-30s to plug any
deficiencies in the IAF’s force structure. The problem is that
in the immediate future large numbers of aircraft are due for
retirement. The Type 66, Type 77 and Type 96 MiG-21s are now
well past their prime. Indeed these types were due to be
withdrawn over a decade ago. The MiG-23s too are beginning to
get long in the tooth.
Over the next five years the
IAF will have to replace about six to eight squadron equivalents
of MiG-21s. There are no easy solutions, but this provides an
opportunity for some creativity and more importantly it provides
an opportunity for a comprehensive review of ones force
structures and doctrine. In the last five years the combat
strength of the IAF has declined from thirty-nine and a half
squadrons to thirty-seven and a half squadrons without any
appreciable decline in threats. If anything there are glaring
holes in the air defense umbrella.
For the preceding thirty years,
the IAF’s qualitative and quantitative superiority provided
the bedrock on which
India
’s conventional posture rested. The
IAF fielded enough fighters, of the right vintage, to properly
defend both the eastern and western sectors. Over the last
decade a proliferation of fourth generation fighter types in the
east have rendered the resident Type-77 squadrons obsolete and
the MiG-27’s specialized role is certainly a handicap. One
isn’t suggesting that the
Bangladesh
or Myanmar Air Forces are necessarily
hostile, but one must take cognizance of their enhanced
capabilities. Nor is one suggesting that conflict with
China
is imminent. But the PLAAF’s
changing profile is shifting the balance (if it hasn’t
already).
What solution?
Once the Type-96s and Type-77s
retire there will be a huge gap in the IAF’s force structure.
Any replacement should be capable of filling both the
quantitative gap and bringing IAF capabilities at par with those
of potential adversaries. Keeping in mind that the IAF force
structure in the long term is likely to see a high-low mix of
multi-role Su-30MKIs and LCAs, what the IAF needs in the interim
is a fighter that can be bought in large numbers, is versatile
and can be integrated into the service at minimal cost.
There are several ways in which
one can address this, given budgetary constraints. One of course
is to purchase second hand aircraft of a type already in
service. The Pakistan Air Force has done this with some degree
of success with respect to their Mirage III/5 fleet. The capital
outlay for such purchases is relatively modest. However, there
are issues of relatively higher life cycle costs and safety, as
the PAF itself is finding out. Another option is to replace
manned aircraft with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in some
roles. This is certainly a more cost effective option in terms
of both capital and life cycle costs. However, UAV and UCAV
technologies are not mature enough yet to dispense completely
with manned fighters - particularly where air defense duties are
concerned. Over time it is indeed conceivable that the IAF will
replace single-role (strike) fighters with UCAVs. The third
option is to buy new build aircraft of a type that is already in
service. The IAF has already exercised this option in purchasing
additional Jaguars from HAL. However, the Jaguar despite its
excellent abilities is a bomber and ill suited for other tasks.
The IAF could also choose to purchase additional Su-30MKIs.
Being a twin-engine fighter, with a complex thrust vectoring
mechanism, it is likely to have higher operating costs and is to
an extent still work in progress.
What aircraft?
The Ministry of Defence has
invited bids from four vendors for 126 aircraft of an interim
type. These include Bae/SAAB (Gripen), EADS (Eurofighter),
Dassualt (Mirage 2000) and RSK-MiG (MiG-29). All these are
contemporary aircraft and multi-role. Even though the Mirage and
MiG airframes designs are a generation older, as far as systems
are concerned the aircraft are roughly equivalent. From an
Indian perspective the following are likely to constitute some
important criteria for arriving at a final decision:
- Fly-away price
- Operating costs
- Logistical compatibility
- Offsets and transfer of technology
Let
us consider these in more detail (in reverse order). In each
case where these aircraft have been offered for sale the vendor
was willing to consider offsets and transfers of technology,
where requested. Most recently, MiG and Bae/SAAB offered to
supply fighters to
Thailand
in return for the supply of chicken.
Similarly,
Austria
considered joining the Eurofighter
program in return for industrial offsets and technology
transfers. In this respect all the bids might be considered
equally competitive.
The Eurofighter and the Gripen
are two completely new types and have no commonality with any
other type of aircraft already in
India
service. Although one should note
that the Gripen GE F-404 engine is similar to that used in the
LCA. In terms of logistics, it is quite clear that both the
MiG-29 and the Mirage 2000 can be rapidly integrated into the
IAF. They will require minimal investment in maintenance
infrastructure and retraining of personnel.
While the cost of flying a
single-engine Gripen is likely to be less than that of the
twin-engine Eurofighter, it’s actual life cycle costs
(especially in Indian conditions) are an unknown. Some
information might be inferred from the Swedish Air Force’s
experience about the Gripen. The IAF has operated MiG-29s and
Mirage 2000s for almost 20 years now. Consequently, there is a
sound basis for making a judgment about the operating costs for
these types.
The final issue is that of
flyway price. Based on cost of aircraft being sold to
Germany
and
Greece
(since cancelled), the flyaway cost
of a Eurofighter is around Euro 70 million (Rs 400-450 crore
each). The remaining three types of aircraft are available for
between Rs 150-200 crore, depending degree of customization.
Clearly, then, the Eurofighter is not competitive.
We can draw the following
conclusions from the above discussion. First, that the
Eurofighter is the least competitive of all the types. Second,
since the other three types fall in the same price category, any
final selection is likely to (or should) be based on operating
costs and ease of integration. Introducing the Gripen will
require the creation of a support infrastructure that is likely
to take funds away from other pressing needs. In purely
objective terms, this leaves the MiG-29 and Mirage 2000 as the
only credible choices.
MiG or Mirage?
The IAF has a clear preference
for the Mirage 2000 for good reasons. The aircraft has been
unparalleled in its reliability, cost-effectiveness, versatility
and safety. However, the MiG-29 too could be competitive, the
added costs of operating the twin-engine type fighters
notwithstanding. First, the upgraded versions of the MiG-29 are
less maintenance intensive, less fuel hungry and considerably
more versatile than the models currently in IAF service. Second,
since the Navy too is purchasing MiG-29s, buying a common type
could potentially lower procurement, maintenance and operating
costs across the services.
But how do the two aircraft
stack up against each other? In purely technical terms the
Mirage 2000-5 offers some advantages over the Mig-29K (actually
a navalized ‘M’ version being built for the Indian Navy). In
particular, the Mirage and its systems are less maintenance
intensive, implying greater up time and aircraft availability.
First, the Mirage has much greater airframe life: 7500 hrs vs.
6000 hrs for the MiG-29K. Second, the RD-33K engine for the
MiG-29K is advertised as offering 1,200 hr MTBO (mean time
between overhauls). However, based on IAF and Luftwaffe
experiences with earlier models of the engine found that most
engines require overhaul after 300-700 hours. The Snecma M53
powering the Mirage is of modular construction. This eliminates
the need for complete overhaul at specified periods. The twelve
modules that make up the engine can be exchanged or replaced
during regular engine inspections. Third, the while RD-33
derivative powering the MiG-29 has lower specific fuel
consumption (0.77) than the M53 on the Mirage (0.9) in dry mode,
two engines on the MiG-29 make it more expensive to fly. Fourth,
the Mirage 2000-5 can carry 6,300kg of ordnance compared to
5,500 kg for the MiG-29K. The two aircraft have roughly
equivalent performance with respect to range and endurance, but
the Mirage is more efficient. Last, and by no means the least,
the Mirage 2000 has had a better safety record in Indian
service.
Just as in the 1980s, the IAF
could choose to split the buy between the two types, but MiG’s
financial troubles might yet prove a deterrent. There is of
course the important issue of sticking to delivery schedules,
but as with manufacturing any complex equipment, delays should
be expected – more so since neither the MiG-29s nor Mirage
2000s have been built in quantity in recent times.
Ultimately it is for the IAF
and Ministry of Defence to choose which aircraft to buy. There
is often a tendency in any competitive bidding processes to
over-emphasize the issue of unit cost. One hopes that in
procuring an interim fighter, both the IAF and the Ministry will
take a more holistic view. Interim solutions should be optimal
in both financial and operational terms.
(Rupak
Chattopadyay is associated with ORF,
New Delhi
)
Reprint
from ORF Strategic Trends Volume II Issue 48
December 6,
2004
http://www.observerindia.com/strategic/st041206.htm#2
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