Towards
Modern Ship Design and Shipbuilding in India
Vice
Admiral Rajeshwer Nath, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd)
Introduction
The
commencement of construction of the Air Defence Ship on
11 April 2005
at
the Cochin Shipyard Limited,
Kochi
marks
the beginning of a new era of ship design and shipbuilding
technology in
India
.
We had to our credit the successful design and building of
destroyers, frigates, corvettes, fast attack crafts and
auxiliary vessels e.g. LST(L)s, survey vessels, fleet tankers
etc. The building of an air defence ship brings
India
into
the elite club of those very few nations in the world that can
design and build all types of warships up to aircraft carriers.
This paper reviews the developments in this field of ship design
and shipbuilding and the future prospects in
India
.
Abstract
Ship design and shipbuilding
in
India
mainly pertains to warships.
We are one of the very few proud nations in the world who
design and build warships for their Navies.
The Navy’s in-house design organisation has gradually
grown into a fully computerised unit having the necessary
special techniques for stealth, hydrodynamic, ship motion,
structural and dynamic predictions.
We need to continue to move forward and update the design
tools e.g. modern 3D computer software with allied application
software to automate the design process with necessary checks
and balances and transfer data and drawings securely to
shipyards not only on magnetic media but also on-line without
the need for duplication effort by the shipyard.
The infrastructure available in our shipyards is
ancient and not suited to modern shipbuilding at optimum cost,
quality and time frames. Nevertheless,
we have built warships at defence shipyards.
These shipyards have delivered warships to the design
specifications given by the Navy and met their specifications.
However, we are not happy because the manhours taken by
our shipyards to build a frigate / destroyer is more than 10
times that taken by modern shipyards abroad.
Also, the calendar months taken by our shipyards to build
a frigate / destroyer have been three times those taken by
foreign / modern shipyards.
The excess calendar months can to some extent be
attributed to delays in decision-making, indigenisation and
delays in the availability of payload and other nominated
equipment, which are beyond the shipyard’s control.
However the very excess manhours taken do account for the
lack of productivity, which can be attributed to not so modern
facilities available in our shipyards and also to room for
improvement in ship production, management, working environment
of Indian worker and lack of multi skilled work force concept.
In spite of this not so encouraging scenario, we still
produce warships that are cheaper than those manufactured
anywhere else in the world.
This is because of the relatively lower labour rates and
also due to prices of equipment purchased from the former
Soviet Union
and
Russia
have been highly competitive
and economical to us. On
an average, the shipyard effort in a shipbuilding programme is
about 40 per cent of the total cost. If this 40 per cent
component (having taken 10 times more man-hours) is still
cheaper in
India
, we can foresee the
enormous advantage in improving productivity to match the
man-hours to international standards. We can then produce
warships at costs that are most economical and even foreign
shipyards will not be able to compete. This is possible because
the shipbuilding labour rates in
India
are about one fifteenth of
those in
Europe
, one tenth of those in
Japan
/
USA
and one fifth of those in
Korea
.
Therefore, what are we to do? Firstly, within the
existing infrastructure, improve management of shipbuilding,
provide the right environment, introduce multi skilled trade and
improve worker productivity as defined in section 15 to 26
of this paper. These
suggestions, when implemented, will improve efficiency by at
least 20 per cent and even with existing facilities, the
man-hours taken will be 80 per cent of those taken now.
Secondly, provide
incremental modernisation of existing shipyards to enable high
crane capacities, larger block construction, module workshops
for advanced fitting out, wet basins and dry docks independent
of too much dependence on dredging.
This modernisation
of infrastructure will of course have to be supplemented by
modern concepts of lean manufacturing and total CAD/CAM.
These will improve productivity by another 30 per cent.
With modernised facilities and modern ways of working,
the man-hours taken will be 50 per cent of those taken now with
existing facilities. Thirdly,
in the long run setting up new modern shipyards with latest up
to date facilities and layout will reduce man-hours by 70 to 80
per cent and will eventually catch up with man-hours as per
international practice. The
capital expenditure involved in these recommendations will be
more than outweighed by the reduction in the cost of the
warships. Therefore,
we must continue to improve warship building and achieve
self-reliance. Moreover,
our shipyards and the industry are urged to develop competence
to provide comprehensive Integrated Logistic Support and
performance warranty for warships as brought out in para 5 of
the paper.
We
are also among the very few nations in the world which could
design and build submarines. We built two submarines during the
1980s and suddenly the programme has halted for the last 15
years for reasons, which are not technical.
We need to revive submarine building at the earliest and
also open a second line of submarine construction to catch up on
lost time. The
special features of submarine building are briefly covered in section
6 of this paper. The
capability to design and build submarines indigenously exists in
the country and needs to be utilised and nurtured.
As far as merchant ships are concerned, our country has
lagged behind. A few
nations like
Japan
and
Korea
have virtually captured the
entire market because of the excellence achieved by them in
designing and building of ships (e.g. bulk carriers in 6 months
and containerships in 12 months).
We have to seriously work hard to aim for achieving such
standards. The Indian merchant fleet consists of about 200 ships
(overseas going). Taking
a 20-year perspective, we shall need 10 ships every year for our
own market. In
addition, we have 425 coastal ships and about 21 of these need
replacement every year. Therefore,
there is a good case for reviving merchant shipbuilding within
the country.
Our commercial shipyards
have not kept pace with the technological developments in
optimum production of ships.
We need to provide incremental
modernisation to these shipyards to make new merchant
ship building economically viable in the country.
The remarks made for improving warship building in
previous paragraphs are also applicable here.
The internal market need for producing 10 ships
(seagoing) and 21 coastal ships every year should provide the
necessary incentives. Government
can assist in providing income tax incentives, export incentive
credits, tax incentives for money spent on training and facility
improvement and free export or trade zone incentives (shipyards
could import supplies free of duty for ships). The assured
internal market, cheaper labour rates and Government incentives
or support and prospects of producing ships cheaper than
anywhere else in the world should encourage private industries
to get collaboration or joint ventures with leading shipbuilders
in the world and start a new shipbuilding wave in our country.
The quest and zest for increasing productivity,
reducing cost and improving quality in shipbuilding, warship
building and submarine building continues in the world.
The latest trends are digital shipbuilding innovation
brought about by software solutions for Product Life Cycle
Management (PLM). IBM
and Dassault Systems are offering such solutions using software
Catia, Enovia and Delmia. This
will improve collaboration / integration between design and
manufacturing. The
next generation digital shipbuilding system will simulate and
optimise the entire shipbuilding life cycle process in a virtual
environment from the initial development stage to launch. The US
Navy Office of Naval Research and Samsung Heavy Industries Co
Ltd (SHI) are very actively pursuing the digital shipyard
concept with virtual reality.
LPD 17 USS San Antonio is the first surface ship
ever designed in virtual reality.
It is reasonable to expect substantial quantitative and
qualitative benefits from investment in digital manufacturing.
Returns in the range of 10 to 1 are realistic with
digital mock up, process re-engineering and as a component of an
integrated Product Life Management (PLM) solution.
We must take cognisance of these futuristic developments
and take them into account in our modernisation plans for ship
design and shipbuilding both in military and commercial sectors
as discussed earlier. Joint
ventures with sharing of initial investment, workload, and
profits to mutual benefit of both sides will yield quicker
results.
Warship Design & Building
We are one of the few proud nations
in the world, which designs and builds warships for tits Navy.
Credit goes to the Indian Navy who nurtured its in-house
design organisation and credit also goes to the Ministry of
Defence which motivated and encouraged our defence shipyards to
take on the challenge of warship building.
The Indian Navy provided the trained specialist officers
to manage these shipyards. The
indigenisation organisations set up by the Ministry of Defence
provided the opportunities for indigenous development of
equipment, which is fitted in warships.
Thus Indian industry participated in the Defence Sector
by helping the Navy to gradually move from a buyer’s Navy to a
builder’s Navy. This paper reviews the gradual evolution of
this capability for the indigenous design and building of
warships. Although
total self-reliance exists in design and building of warships,
we are yet to become self reliant on weapon systems, gas turbine
generators, control systems and allied special machinery and
equipment. The
in-house design organisation of the Navy has been updating its
resources and these are now almost fully computerised.
The shipyards need urgent modernisation to apply the
latest techniques of large pre-outfitting and block
construction. Our
existing shipyards can be modernised only within constraints of
geographical locations and space limitations and water depths
available. In the
long run, we do need to have a new modern shipyard to build
warships in cost, time and quality competitive with
international practice. Indeed,
in the meantime, we can analyse and focus on areas, which can
improve our ship design, and shipbuilding practices in a most
cost effective manner. This
will depend upon disciplined decision making at all levels and
strict adherence to time schedules.
The reasons as to why we have not been able to adhere to
such disciplined action also need to be analysed.
Our dependence upon foreign
sources for major weapon systems, our ambition to have the
latest and up-to-date equipment, and our policy of complex
multi-agency (directly and indirectly involved) participative
management have prevented us from having clear-cut and firm cost
and time programmes for shipbuilding.
But on the other hand, this has helped us to keep an edge
in the overall performance and operational capabilities of our
warships.
Warship
Design: Warship designs are
specific to the Navy and this fact was realised by the leaders
in the Indian Navy in the 1950s and progressive steps were
initiated to have the capability of warship design within the
Navy. In 1957, the
Corps of Naval Constructors was set up to have specialisation in
Naval Design and Construction.
The officers were trained in
UK
,
USA
,
USSR
and also the training programmes that had been
established in
India
at IIT Delhi and with Naval training
establishments. Concurrently,
postgraduate dagger courses
were introduced for the marine engineering and electrical
engineering branches. The
idea was to have a composite design organisation with all
disciplines i.e. Naval Constructors, Marine Engineers, and
Electrical / Weapon Engineers qualified for the design of state
of the art warships.
The Navy’s design organisation has to its
credit the design of many types and classes of warships.
These include the
Delhi
class destroyers,
Brahmaputra
class frigates, Kora class Corvettes,
Godavari
class frigates, Khukri class corvettes, Magar class
LSTLs, Sandhayak class survey vessels and seaward defence boats
etc. The capability
to design warships came about not only through trained manpower
but also through collaboration with
UK
for building Leander class frigates during the
1960s and 1970s. Subsequently,
the design interface of FSU and Russian weapon systems on
indigenous designs strengthened our capabilities.
The Navy’s design organisation is fully
computerised and has the necessary techniques for stealth (RCS,
IR, noise) prediction, hydrodynamics, ship motion, structural,
powerful and dynamic predictions.
We need to move forward and continuously update the
design tools of 3-D type comprehensive computer software with
allied application software to automate the design process with
necessary checks and balances and transfer data and drawings
securely to shipyards on both magnetic medium and online without
any need for duplication of effort by the shipyard.
Of course, if we have to have complete self-reliance,
then Indian industry must come forth to design and manufacture
state-of-the-art weapon systems, gas turbines generators,
control systems and other allied special systems for warships.
Warship building: The infrastructure
available in our shipyards is ancient and not suited to modern
shipbuilding within optimum cost, quality and time frames.
Geographical location of shipyards poses problems of
dependence on tide and heavy dredging before movement of ships
in and out of the shipyards.
The modernisation of shipyards with better and augmented
facilities will be limited to availability of space and other
constraints. Nevertheless,
we have built warships at defence shipyards.
These shipyards have delivered warships to the design
specifications given by the Navy.
Within the constraints of existing facilities, are our
shipyards efficient? The
answer is no. We are
unable to produce ships in quality and quantity in time even
commensurate with existing facilities.
This, not so happy state of affairs is the cumulative
effect of factors such as:
-
Order for series production of ships is not given and as
such production lines are seldom fully loaded.
-
Administrative
and bureaucratic hurdles and delays in sanctions for the ships,
delays in sanction for model testing and delays in sanction for
special design inputs.
-
Telescopic concept for design and production hampered by
delays in decision-making.
-
Too many
workers and too many trades in shipyards. Lack of multi skilled
tradesman. Worker environment leaves much room for improvement.
-
Shipyards
have to depend on other organisations for dry-docking. Too much
dependence on tide and dredging for moving ships in and out from
shipyard basins.
-
Crane
capacities are small and no arrangements for advance
fitting-out. Too much dependence on measurements at site to
manufacture items. Less use of composite drawings for piping
services. No facility for shot blasting and primer coating of
weldment blocks.
-
Berths,
jetties, dry docks not equipped with adequate and systematic
services and welding points, gas outlets, power points etc.
This results in long cables, hoses etc all over the place
leading to unhygienic shipbuilding conditions.
-
Room for
improving co-ordination in design, planning, materials, and
production management in the shipyard.
-
Delays
in availability of systems and need for accelerating
indigenisation process.
We
need to improve warship building systems and processes in
India
.
The time taken by our shipyards to build warships should
have been commensurate with the infrastructure and facilities
available in the shipyards.
The delays have also been due to delays in
decision-making, delays in finalisation of contracts with other
countries for supply of weapon systems.
Improving infrastructure to enable pre outfitting and
manufacture of larger blocks and larger cranes to shift them to
the slipway can of course, reduce shipbuilding time.
Decision-making can be improved by having more indigenous
systems and having disciplined action plans with suppliers that
match the construction schedule.
Ship construction should only start when all inputs are
nearly complete i.e. design is complete, systems have been
selected. Since
shipyard slipways are free and workshops are idle, shipyards
commence work without waiting for all inputs to come.
The shipyards should take on the responsibilities for
detailed design and marry CAD/CAM fully in their shipbuilding
process. The introduction of multiple trade system will reduce
man-hours and save time by reducing man-days.
We should continue to seek means for productivity
improvement.
Unique Nature of Global
Warship
Building
All nations in the
world have endeavoured that their Navies have a technological
edge to face any threat. As
such, performance factors have hitherto always had precedence
over cost factors. However,
in recent years, cost has become increasingly important. Rather
than reducing the performance capabilities of their ships, the
Navies are interested in reducing costs by adopting more
efficient practices in the acquisition, design and construction
processes. The design cost of US warships have been reported to
be as below:
DD651 in
US
6,000,000 man-hours
DD173
in
Japan
1,200,000
man-hours
DD963
in US
5,000,000
man-hours
D647
in US
3,000,000
man-hours
Such figures for
Indian design costs are not readily available.
However, there is always room for reducing design costs
by adopting integrated CAD/CAM solutions.
The
construction hours of some warships have been reported as
follows:
|
Country
|
Ship
type keel
|
Displacement Tonnes
|
Time
|
Man-hours to
Commissioning
|
|
US
|
DD651
|
8315
|
30
|
5,000,000
|
|
US
|
FFG-7
|
3500
|
30
|
2,500,000
|
|
Japan
|
DD173
|
9485
|
34
|
2,036,000
|
|
Japan
|
DD158
|
4500
|
29
|
1,000,000
|
|
Italy
|
D-560
|
5400
|
42
|
-
|
|
Germany
|
F-215
|
4490
|
38
|
-
|
|
Canada
|
FFH300
|
5235
|
51
|
2,100,000
|
|
Canada
|
DD6280
|
5100
|
42
|
2,300,000
|
|
UK
|
F230
|
4200
|
54
|
-
|
|
India
|
Godavari
Class
|
3600
|
72
|
10,800,000
|
|
India
|
Delhi
class
|
6500
|
100
|
18,200,000
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
The Indian shipyards take about 10 times the
man-hours taken by Japanese shipyards and 3 times the calendar
months. There is a
lot of room for improvement in modernising Indian shipyards and
reducing build periods.
Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) and performance
warranty for warship
The prime contracts
for the recent warships in the world include a comprehensive
requirement for ILS, necessary to ensure that the ships are
effectively operated, maintained and supported throughout the
life of the warship. The
elements of the ILS package include maintenance planning, supply
support documentation, manpower, training, technical
documentation, facilities, storage and transportation of support
and test equipment and computing support.
The recent contracts for warships, which include ILS
performance warranty, the prime contractor has guaranteed an
operational availability of 80 per cent for a period of 10 ship
years. These new
contracts also include setting up of ship support centre to
support the development and integration testing of both the
platform control and monitoring system and the combat systems
and to train the Navy personnel.
Our shipyards and industry should develop such competence
and provide such services to the Navy.
This will be more economical and efficient and will
increase teeth to tail ratio and enable the emerging lean Navy
to perform better and achieve excellence in mission operations.
Submarine
Design and Building
Although
the Indian Navy has been operating submarines since 1960s, the
indigenous design and building of submarines was realised with
the designing and building of SSK submarines of Type 1500 in
collaboration with
Germany
.
MDL Mumbai, the premier shipyard in the country, built
two SSK submarines in the late 1980s.
We were among the very few nations in the world who could
build submarines. The programme for continuation of submarine
building in
India
came to a sudden halt due to
non-technical reasons and the infrastructure developed at MDL
Mumbai has been idle and unutilised for the last almost 12
years. Efforts have
been made to revive submarine building with more emphasis on
indigenous development of systems in the Indian industry.
Such efforts are continuing for the last 12 years and
persistence will bring success one day.
This will open up new avenues of co-operation and work
for the Indian industry. The
design organisation is well equipped to undertake design and
design-production interaction for submarines.
Special
features of submarine building
There are many
changes necessary to adopt traditional shipbuilding methods to
modern submarine construction technology. The complexity of
modern submarines requires a high level of discipline from the
submarine designer, submarine builder as well as those
responsible for the design of machinery and equipment and the
selection of materials. The strong links forged between the
designer, shipbuilder and supplier of specialised equipment and
materials are key factors in the technical success of a
submarine programme. The total effort involved in modern
submarine design, from concept, development and up to generation
of working drawings is approximately 1,000 man-years over a
7-year period. The
cost of a full range of design and support to build tasks is
equal to about one third of the construction costs of the first
of the class. Submarine
design and building requires special efforts in weight control,
ventilation and air-conditioning, mock up, modelling etc.
The steel for building submarines is to be high yield,
low alloy, fine grain, fully killed, quenched and tempered.
Thicker and heavier plates are needed for the pressure
hull requiring special fabrication and welding techniques.
The hull outfit in a submarine requires stricter
standards. The
ability of the shipbuilder to produce pipe works to exacting
service standards, configured within very restrictive space
envelopes and in the quantities necessary, is one of the
demanding parameters of a submarine programme.
1/5th scale three-dimensional models of each
compartment are made with all relevant structure, equipment,
piping and cabling represented.
Production information is also obtained from computer
models. The
electrical outfit for an advanced submarine has to service the
complexities of the propulsion systems, as well as, greatly
increased electrical demand for DC and AC systems in a variety
of voltages and frequencies to suit control, instrumentation,
communication, navigation, weapon and life support systems.
The modern trend is to complete more outfitting in
workshop rather than in the cramped confine of the submarines.
Nearly 80 per cent outfitting is completed prior to the
launch of the submarine.
ARM
Technique
Availability,
reliability and maintainability are essential factors in the
design of any modern warship and more so for submarines.
These must be considered at the earliest possible stage
of design and modelling to assure optimum safety and service
performance. The
ship availability modelling is a powerful tool used to assess
the probability of a warship / submarine achieving given mission
profile. The
assessment begins by producing a ship dependency diagram showing
the relationship between the operational characteristics and the
systems / equipment, which support them.
Each element is then examined to determine its likely
failure rate, causes, and consequences (Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis). The
results are applied to ship availability date for various
mission profiles. This
approach is most useful in comparing the reliability of varying
system proposals in the design stage.
By the use of models and mock-ups, equipment maintenance
envelopes and removal routes are carefully designed, checked and
then verified finally at ship.
Design decisions affect through-life cost and ARM
techniques coupled with systematic design reviews offer a means
of achieving an acceptable balance between procurement and
upkeep costs and operational targets.
Merchant
Ship Design and Building
The Indian Scenario: The majority of the
merchant ships owned by Indian companies have been designed and
built abroad. A few
countries like
Japan
and
Korea
have virtually captured the
world merchant ship market.
This is due to their excellence in design, quality and
minimal shipbuilding times for delivery e.g. 6 months for bulk
carriers and 12 months for containerships.
Indian shipyards have not been able to compete in the
design and building of merchant ships.
The Indian merchant ship fleet consists of about 200
ships (overseas going). Taking
into account 20 years life, we shall need 10 ships every year
for our own market. There
are, in addition, 425 coastal ships i.e. we need 20 such ships
every year. There is
a strong case for reviving shipbuilding within the country.
The Indian shipyards have not kept pace with the
technological developments in optimum production of ships.
We need to provide incremental modernisation to these
shipyards to make new merchant shipbuilding economically viable
in the country. The
internal market of 10 seagoing ships and 20 coastal ships every
year should provide the necessary incentive.
We need to take major initiatives to improve productivity
through technological automation, standardisation and
rationalisation of design, engineering and production activities
and reduction in work force.
Government can encourage, support and assist in providing
income tax incentives, export incentive credit, tax incentives
for money spent on training and facility improvement and free
export on trade zone incentives and shipyards could be allowed
to import supplies free of duty. The prospects of producing
ships cheaper than anywhere else in the world should encourage
private industry to get into collaborations with leading
shipbuilders in the world and create a new wave of ship building
in
India
.
Worldwide Shipbuilding Industry
The market for ships
is a global market. Ship
operations, ship owners and shipbuilders freely cross national
borders to obtain a price, time and technological advantage.
The shipbuilding industries of nations with comparative
advantage, based on responsive markets, cheap labour, or
superior technology would be expected to prosper.
The economics of nations that lack such an advantage
would be expected to allocate resources to other activities.
This simple logic / model does not fit the realities of
world shipbuilding. This
is so because most trading nations perceive the shipbuilding
industrial base to be a vital national resource on other than
strictly economic grounds. The
national policy of most trading nations reflects the primary
requirement to maintain some degree of control over the
resources needed to move their products to foreign markets.
They have, therefore, industrial policies aimed at
assuring the existence of a nationally controlled fleet.
Some of these nations have supported their shipbuilding
industries in order to provide the means of replacing the
national fleet should it be threatened militarily or
economically. Other
nations have supported the shipbuilding industry as a ‘hub’
industry for economic development.
Many nations also view their national shipbuilding
industry as essential for defence purposes.
The
World Shipbuilding Market
The
international market for merchant ships has historically been
cyclical with nine major cycles.
With the closing of the
Suez
Canal
in
1959 and the oil embargo in 1973, the cyclical curve had peaks
and troughs with new extremes.
The first half of the 1970s was a boom period for the
world’s shipbuilders. Between
1970 and 1975, the world fleet deadweight tonnage increased by
70 per cent. Much of
this tonnage comprised supertankers built to carry crude oil
from the
Middle
East
to
Europe
and
Japan
.
In 1973, the world order book was equivalent in
deadweight tonnage to 50 per cent of the world fleet.
After the Arab oil embargo in 1973, the entire world
shipbuilding market contracted dramatically.
The worldwide order book declined from a peak of 242.3 m
deadweight tonnage (dwt) in 1979 to 32.0 m in 1979.
Many of the marginal shipbuilders who were able to
penetrate the market during the boom years went bankrupt or were
nationalised. The
highly automated yards in
Europe
were either nationalised or
restructured. Even
Japan
suffered many bankruptcies
and a reduction in shipbuilding capacity of 35 per cent.
Although some recovery occurred in the world shipbuilding
market, its condition throughout the 1980s can be described as
depressed. However,
there were modest increases in the 1990s.
The estimated installed yard capacity for shipbuilding
worldwide is about 18 million compensated gross tonne (27
million dwt) of new tonnage per year.
The new shipbuilding requirements for the current period
1975-2010 have been projected to be of the order of 50 million
dwt per year. As
such, the demand is almost twice the installed capacity.
Therefore, there will be pressure to expand world
shipbuilding capacity during the early 21st century.
Japan
became the world leader in
commercial shipbuilding in 1956 and has continued to maintain
that position.  |