
US
and Iran at loggerheads: India’s role in rapprochement
Harsh V. Pant
Iran is once again at the center of the American foreign
policy debate. The final report of the commission investigating
the September 11, 2001 attacks unearthed evidence regarding the
longstanding relationship between Al Qaeda and Iran, especially
the fact that Iran allowed at least eight of the nineteen
hijackers to cross over from Afghanistan the year before 9/11
attacks without putting a stamp on their passports. Though the
CIA has made it clear that there is no conclusive proof of a
connection between Iran and 9/11 attacks, pressure is mounting
on the Bush Administration to clearly enunciate an Iran policy.
Many conservatives are calling for a more aggressive policy of
trying to bring about a regime change in Tehran; a recent report
from the highly influential Council on Foreign Relations argues
that it is in the interest of the US to undertake a “selective
political engagement” with the current regime in Iran rather
than waiting for its downfall.
It is highly unlikely that despite renewed debate on the
America’s Iran policy that the Bush Administration will come
out with a clearly articulated policy because of the impending
Presidential elections. However, this debate can have important
implications for India’s relationship with Iran as the US is a
major factor in bringing the two nations close as well as a
significant constraint in the further strengthening of bilateral
ties between the two.
The absolute US dominance of the post-Cold War
international order has made the major second-tier states like
Russia, China, India and Iran rather uncomfortable. Although
they are in no position to challenge the US predominance in any
significant measure, the countries have upgraded their bilateral
relations. Iran, however, faces a different set of problems as
its relationship with the US remains thorny. While America’s
relations with Russia, China and India have improved
dramatically over time, the US posture towards Iran still
remains overtly hostile. Even recently the US has put Iran on
notice on a host of issues ranging from its nuclear weapons,
missile programs and harboring of Al-Qaeda operatives.
The growth of
Indo-Iranian ties is based on the bedrock of current economic
and political realities. The unipolar
nature of the current international system is among the
significant factors. During
President Khatami’s visit to India in January 2003, both
countries categorically rejected the US stand on Iraq, arguing
that the sovereignty and integrity of a nation should not be
violated. The very fact that Iran’s President was visiting
India a time when the US was positioning for an attack on Iraq,
displayed India’s subtle attempt to distance itself from the
US foreign policy vis-à-vis West Asia.
India’s need to counter Pakistan’s influence,
diversification of partners in the Islamic world and the
engagement of Central Asia are responsible for the growing
convergence in Indo-Iran interests in the post-Cold War period.
Indo-Iran relations based on
mutual and shared interests have reached an advanced state.
There are even reports of an India-Iran strategic accord
allowing India the use of Iranian military bases in the event of
an outbreak of tensions with Pakistan.
After the defeat of Iraq in the
Gulf War of 1991, the focus of the America’s foreign policy in
the Gulf shifted to containing Iran and its Islamic
revolutionary beliefs. Increased
US military presence in the Persian Gulf and the economic
isolation have made matters worse for Iran despite its
capability to pose a significant threat to the American
interests in the region.
Moreover, after September 11, 2001, Iran was designated
as a member of the “axis of evil” that the US considers as a
state supporting and sponsoring Islamic terrorism. As a
consequence, Iran’s international isolation has increased
tremendously in recent years with major states trying to toe the
US line in their dealings with Iran.
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, Iran
feels increasingly hemmed in by the US presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan, with US forces just 300 miles from Tehran on the
Iraqi border and flanking Iran to the east in Afghanistan.
It is interesting, however, to note in this context the
subtle changes in the relationship between the US and Iran in
the immediate aftermath of the swift US conquest of Iraq. Iran
not only cooperated with the US during the war by sealing its
borders and preventing senior Iraqi officials from fleeing, it
also chose to ignore when US munitions accidentally fell on its
soil. In fact, Iran’s former President, Hashemi Rafsanjani,
also suggested holding a referendum on relations with the US,
hinting that the leadership was ready to show some flexibility.
India’s relationship with the
US, on the other hand, has improved dramatically in recent
years. Awareness
in the US about the threat posed by Islamist terrorist
groups and rampant WMD proliferation has grown in the last
decade. This has brought the US and India together on issues of
terrorism and ballistic missile defense.
There are many in India and the US who see both
countries as natural partners because of converging interests
and vibrant democratic institutions. In recent years, the US and
India have engaged in broad based interaction on security and
economic platforms rather than narrow focus on nuclear
proliferation and arms control, the focus of Indo-US
relationship for the last thirty years. There are reports that
the US and India might even be considering a strategic
engagement to curtail China’s presence in South Asia.
Despite noted improvements, India
remains apprehensive about the US foreign policy that it
sometimes views as highly unilateral and insensitive to other
states’ vital concerns. American
policy shores up a regime in Pakistan that continues to actively
support terror within India’s borders, despite protestations
to the contrary. India’s
determination to pursue an independent course in foreign policy
also complicates US foreign policy vis-à-vis South Asia. As a
consequence, Indo – US ties though mutually beneficial and
promising have yet to reach the firm footing that Indo-Iranian
ties have achieved in recent years.
The US relationship with Iran has
deteriorated considerably in the last few months. The US has
accused Iran of giving sanctuaries to top Al-Qaeda leaders and
attempting to destabilize post-war Iraq by trying to position a
pro-Tehran Shia regime in Baghdad. More significantly, the
declaration last year by Iran that it would reprocess spent
nuclear fuel and mine uranium to meet a growing demand for
electricity has further ratcheted up tensions in US-Iran
relationship. The US strongly believes that Iran’s announced
plans are a pretext to develop nuclear weapons as an ambitious
nuclear program for electricity does not make for a country with
huge oil and gas reserves and limited uranium supplies. The US
has consistently pressured Iran about its nuclear program and
has demanded strong action by the international community
against clandestine nuclear activities.
Relenting to strong international
pressure, Iran fully disclosed its nuclear program to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in October 2003 and
also signed the additional protocol to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 2003, opening its
nuclear facilities to surprise United Nations inspections.
However, it was later discovered that Iran’s declaration was
incomplete and it possessed advanced designs of uranium
enriching centrifuges, raising further concerns about Iran’s
nuclear intentions. Meanwhile Iran decided to resume
construction of centrifuges, going back on its promise stating
that it is under no obligation to honor its commitment as the
Europeans had not kept their share of the bargain by ensuring
that the IAEA gives Iran a clean chit on its nuclear activities.
The US wanted this matter to be referred to the United Nations
Security Council.
In a confidential report released
last month, the IAEA had contended that Iran was continuing to
produce large quantities of uranium hexafluoride, the substance
used to make enriched uranium, thereby further stoking concerns
about Iran’s nuclear intentions. The IAEA board has called for
a full accounting of Iran’s nuclear program in its next
meeting in November. Iran, on its part, has threatened to quit
the NPT if its matter is taken to the Security Council. Iran has
also decided to move ahead with the conversion of natural
uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride which many fear can be
used for military purposes. While the Bush Administration
continues to insist that it would not accept a nuclear Iran,
many in the US argue that such an eventuality is inevitable. It
can only be delayed not prevented.
In summary, while India is
selectively converging with the US, Iran is moving further
apart. Ideally
India would like to preserve its healthy relationships with
both, Iran and the US, but such situations are hard to come by
in the topsy-turvy world of international relations. India will
have to do a careful balancing act to make sure that its
mutually beneficial relationship with Iran does not impinge upon
its relationship with the US.
As Washington decides to pursue its containment of Iran
more aggressively and as Iran tries to nullify this strategy by
collaborating with India, both the Indo-US and Indo-Iranian
relations might strain in the coming years. The US has made its
apprehensions about a burgeoning Indo-Iranian relationship clear
to the Indian government. US Under Secretary of Defense Policy,
Douglas Feith, while visiting India for the Indo-US Defense
Policy Group meeting in June 2004, made clear that Iran was a
problem for the US and the world with its nuclear weapons
program and support for various terrorist organizations.
The current US policy options with regards to Iran seem to
be fraught with complications. A
precise debilitating strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities
does not seem very probable within current technological
limitations. Israel’s
planned purchase of 500 “bunker buster” bombs from the US
seems to be aimed at Iran. Additionally, Iran has threatened to
retaliate militarily if Israel attempts an Osiraq-like operation
again. A full scale military option by the US is equally
unlikely as the US is currently bogged down in Iraq and
Afghanistan and military overstretched.
Additionally military action against Iran would drive a
wedge between the US and Britain, which has been actively
working to improve relations with Tehran.
It would also spell further
trouble for the US in Iraq and the larger Middle East as it
could lead to a cooperation between Sunni and Shia extremists
and further the image the US is against all Muslims everywhere.
There are also some suggestions
that the US should act more forcefully from behind-the-scenes to
promote a regime change in Iran.
Despite a fledgling pro-democracy movement in Iran,
political reforms have been painfully slow.
In recent parliamentary elections, conservatives won more
than half of the seats as most of the reformist candidates were
disqualified by the conservative-dominated Guardian Council.
There is a danger that US support for Iranian opposition
groups might make it easier for the conservatives to de-legitimize
them in the eyes of the populace. Also, it is unclear if the
US-favored reformists or other opposition groups would easily
give up Iran’s nuclear program, the main bone of contention
between the US and Iran. In all likelihood, Iran’s nuclear
program will be pursued by the nation’s political elite,
irrespective of its ideological proclivities as it has turned
into a nationalist cause. Additionally,
it would be folly to believe that a regime change could produce
the desired effects in Iran. One needs to only glance at Iraq and Afghanistan to see that
regime changes are tricky at best and often fraught with peril.
A similar situation in Iran would spell disaster for the
entire region with a belt of instability from Middle East –
Persian Gulf to Central Asia and dampening any American
ambitions in the region for the foreseeable future.
Overall, the best way to secure
US interests is by diplomatically engaging Iran so as to have
some leverage on the outcome of issues. Stability in Iraq and
Afghanistan is difficult without Iran’s help and the global
war on terror would not achieve its ends without Iran giving up
on its support of various terrorist organizations.
Iran can also serve as a
counterweight to Pakistan for the US. Improving US Iran relations will end Pakistani monopoly and
influence over America’s Afghanistan policy.
India can play a significant role in bringing US and Iran
together in case the two decide to engage each other. India
enjoys good relations with both and can also sympathize with the
strategic concerns of both. Just as India’s nuclear weapons
capability evolved in response to the South Asian environment,
Iran’s need for nuclear weapons emerges from the highly
volatile strategic environment in the Middle East. On the other
hand, the US concerns with nuclear weapons falling in the hands
of terrorist organizations is also a possibility that India has
to contend with in Pakistan. This makes India ideally suited to
bring about a rapprochement between Iran and the US whose
antagonistic relations span for more than a quarter of a century
now.
The writer is a Research
Fellow at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana (USA).
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