“Catalyst for peace, harmony and tranquility…”
Capt.
(r) Bharat Verma
In an exclusive interview,
the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral
Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM,
ADC, shared his perceptions about the Indian Navy with Bharat Verma,
Editor, Indian Defence Review.
With the global security
environment now focused on Asia-Pacific, the Indian Ocean region
has become critically important to many major powers.
How does the Indian Navy see its future role in
safeguarding India’s security interests from traditional as
well as non-traditional threats?
Containing, as it does, island
nations, island chains, archipelagos, peninsular countries, as
well as those with long coastlines, the destiny of much of the
Asia-Pacific region is inextricably linked with the oceans.
Several of the world’s busiest straits and passages, in this
region, control shipping traffic and thus assume strategic and
economic importance. Coastal and offshore resources, as well as
maritime trade are the principal contributors to the economies
of most countries in the region. Moreover, for most
countries, security threats can only come over the seas, and
thus the littoral has assumed great significance.
Today
Asia-Pacific contains almost 4 billion of the world’s over 6
billion people and accounts for 60% of the world’s GDP. By
2020, seven of the ten largest economies in the world will be in
this region, making the 21st century truly the ‘Asia-Pacific
Century’. While the region holds great economic promise, it
also contains the potential for conflict in several areas, and
has lately become prey to the scourge of terrorism. For India,
the Asia-Pacific region holds immense promise for political,
economic and military cooperation, and the key role that
maritime forces can play, makes the Indian Navy (IN) a key
component of any national strategy towards this region.
As far as
the actual role of the Indian Navy in the region is concerned,
we feel that it can be the catalyst for peace, harmony and
tranquility, in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), across the
spectrum of conflict. This can be achieved through the
imaginative use of the Navy in three classical roles. The first
is maritime diplomacy by which we engage other maritime nations
and extend our hand of friendship and cooperation. The second
pertains to our robust presence in the region, which should
contribute to stability; and the third is a strong deterrent
posture with the ability to firstly, prevent conflict, and then
respond, should it become necessary.
The new security
environment calls for military engagement with regional and
extra-regional countries and India has entered into defence
cooperation agreements with many of them in the last decade.
Since the Navy will have to play the lead role in such
interfaces, how do you as the CNS see them developing and what
sort of capabilities are needed for this proactive peacetime
activity.
India’s growing international
stature gives it strategic relevance in the area ranging from
the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca. The period after the
end of the Cold War has seen a more coordinated use of the
Indian Navy in conformity with some of our foreign policy
objectives – our evolving relationship with the US, France and
the UK, as well as the ‘Look East’ policy are
examples that spring to mind. The initiation of bilateral and
multilateral exercises, most notably the Malabar Exercises
with the US Navy, the Varuna series with France, and the Milan
gatherings in Port Blair were not merely military
interactions but also contained a certain political message.
In the
post 9/11 period, the stabilizing role of the Indian Navy in the
IOR has been acknowledged and recognized by all major and minor
navies in the region. As already stated, we have also recognized
the value of cooperative security and have consequently held
over 24 joint exercises with foreign navies in the past two
years. Defense agreements or MoUs with several countries like
Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam have also been
concluded and some more are in the pipeline.
In my
opinion, our Navy’s international maritime cooperation
initiatives should be tailored to the needs of the individual
country and its strategic alignments, as also the capability of
its navy. For example, a major navy like the US Navy may seek
cooperation only in coalition or alliance building missions.
Smaller navies, which constitute the bulk in Asia-Pacific, on
the other hand, need assistance in a greater variety of
missions, and they are actively seeking our cooperation in
fields such as training, joint exercises, surveillance, etc.
I see this as a tremendous growth area, which will need
sustained efforts and a synergy between the MEA and MoD, in the
coming years. We have also been laggards in rendering material
assistance, which is often sought by our maritime neighbors, and
which has great potential for not only defense export promotion,
but also for building strategic bonds.
The growing dimension of
maritime interests in India’s security concern requires
credible sea power in the northern Indian Ocean at the very
least and even beyond. If
this be so, are you, as the CNS satisfied with existing
capabilities, in particular of C412 and surveillance /
reconnaissance, both from aircraft and from satellites.
I am happy that you have brought up
this issue, because networking of our capabilities, afloat and
ashore, is one of my priority areas. The current IN capability
encompasses weapons, sensors and platforms of formidable range
and capability. This capability will be further bolstered with
the forthcoming induction of platforms such as the aircraft
carrier Admiral Gorshkov with its integral MiG 29K
fighters, and long range weapons like the BrahMos missile. What
we now need to do is to encompass these weapons and sensors into
a long range, cohesive network. Navy-wide Network Centric
Operations, once achieved, would enable the IN to increase the
battle-space awareness of our units, shorten the
“sensor-shooter loop” and thus dictate the tempo of battle
to the adversary. There is ample world-class IT expertise
available indigenously to develop the systems required by us,
and I see this as a good opportunity to harness private industry
for a mutually beneficial relationship. Towards this end, the IN
would need to rely on the space segment to provide the backbone
and bandwidth for connectivity.
Letters of intent for
building an Air Defence Ship (ADS) at the Kochi Shipyard and
Type 75 submarine at Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL) were issued in 1997.
But seven years later, neither project is ready to start
construction. What
will be the impact of this delay on our capabilities?
As far as the ADS is concerned, it
is the most ambitious shipbuilding project undertaken in India
so far, and projects of such complexity do take time to take-off
and fructify. The design, the size, and the overall
configuration of the ADS has gone through several iterations,
because the Navy wanted to be sure that it would take care of
our foreseeable requirements over the next 25-30 years (or make
it “future proof” as the British term it).
One issue that emerged at a late stage was the
requirement for the ADS to be compatible with the LCA (Navy).
Thus we
have made many changes, and the final design has evolved ever
the years. I must
clearly state that the design freezing exercise has been the
major cause for delay, so far.
I am happy to state that all that is behind us, and the
revised sanction was accorded by the CCS in January 2003.
The carrier, with a deep displacement of 37,500 tonnes is
being planned to operate the MiG-29K, and LCA (N) fixed wing
aircraft, as well as the ALH and Ka-31 helicopters. For an
interim period, it may also operate the Sea Harriers and the Sea
Kings.
The basic
design and hydrodynamic tests for the ship’s hull have been
completed, and the design work for internal systems being
undertaken in-house is at an advanced stage. Much of the
infrastructural augmentation at Cochin Shipyard has also been
completed, and construction is expected to commence in early
2005 with an estimated build period of 7 years. But it is a
challenging undertaking, and we will keep our fingers crossed.
With the
coming acquisition of the Admiral Gorshkov, and follow-on
ships of the ADS class, the Indian Navy will be able to
maintain, and in fact enhance, its carrier capability in the
coming years.
As far as
Project-75 is concerned, submarine construction is the one
remaining lacuna in our considerable shipbuilding capability.
We need to re-start the production lines at MDL, which
have been lying idle for over a decade. Moreover, delays in
decision making inevitably lead to cost escalations.
Happily, the new government is seized of the urgency and
we hope to see headway in this aspect quite soon.
However, time is running out and the effects on the force
levels of our submarines will be felt for many years down the
line.
What broadly should be the
force level that the Navy could realistically plan for up to
2020 after taking into account budgetary constraints and
decision-making delays?
Putting an exact number to our
force level is not a very good way to plan.
A better way is to survey the emerging maritime
capabilities in the region, and to ensure that we have the
entire range of forces / capabilities that we need for ensuring
the security of our interests. We have done this exercise, and
have come up with a force structure for the future.
While we
currently have Government approval to maintain certain force
levels, they will steadily keep reducing till 2012, because the
ships being de-commissioned will outnumber new entrants. This
has resulted because of very few new orders placed with our
shipyards in the period, 1985-95. We also have a force
imbalance, because a large proportion of the force level
comprises “brown-water” units or smaller ships of limited
capability. This imbalance needs to be rectified with the
addition of more “blue water” capability.
The good
news is that indigenous ship production has now picked up
momentum, and 19 ships are in various stages of construction at
our shipyards. This includes two new lines of frigates – the
Project 17 (stealth frigates of the Shivalik class) and 15A
(follow-on ships of the Delhi class), and the Air Defence Ship
(ADS). A new line of ASW corvettes is also going to be built. We
trust that our shipyards will be able to keep pace with the
orders placed on them.
As far as
budgetary support is concerned, last year the naval budget
crossed 17 per cent for the first time and this year it is above
16 per cent. I am confident that this trend will continue in the
coming years too as economists, the Parliamentary Committee and
even the 10th Finance
Commission have emphasized the need for adequate funding to
sustain naval growth in view of the long gestation period of
naval platforms.
However,
the dilemma that we face in the area of Force Planning can be
summed up in two brief points. Firstly, no one is willing to
give us a long-term assurance of funds; not even a bottom line
“not exceeding” figure for 3-5 years worth of planning.
Secondly, our budgetary grants have a life of approximately 8-9
months (from June to end-March), whereas the decision making
process never takes less than 18-24 months, and more often runs
into years. Under such a system it is difficult to visualize our
ever spending the annual budget.
Is the Navy satisfied with
its air assets after taking into account the present force
structure and the likely spread of operations?
Is it not desirable to give more attention to naval
aviation in its totality, not just carrier borne elements?
We perceive aviation as a very
potent instrumentality of maritime power, and there is no doubt
that it must be commensurate with our overall responsibilities.
In this context, we do look at air capability requirements,
integral to the Fleets, carrier-borne, as well as shore based,
as part of the Navy’s overall aviation plan.
We have
already formulated a naval aviation plan, which will cater to
our needs for the next two decades and it is awaiting government
approval. Under
this plan, we will induct various aircraft, both from indigenous
sources and from abroad in a phased manner.
This is a particularly exciting area, as several next
generation aircraft like the MiG 29K, the LCA (Navy) and the ALH
will be inducted in the coming years.
The reconnaissance force levels available to us, however,
are not adequate for the vast ocean areas, the dense shipping
traffic and the submarine threats that we need to keep under
surveillance. We are looking at various options in this context.
India is a declared
nuclear weapons power committed to the “No first use
doctrine”. This
implies a retaliatory / second strike capability.
How do you see the Navy’s role in the nuclear triad?
What should be the direction of our thrust for the
acquisition of capability and platforms?
All I wish to say here is that the
draft nuclear doctrine, which was made public by the government,
envisages the deployment of a triad of capabilities.
It is also a well-known fact that an undersea deterrent
capability is the most survivable leg of the triad, and hence
should form the core of a credible second-strike capability.
How do you see force
levels to be maintained/ augmented with state of the art
warships and systems fitted on them?
In this, what do you perceive the role of the industry
especially in the private sector?
The Navy has been ahead of the other two services in the
drive to build indigenous capability in shipbuilding as also of
systems and equipment. So far it has been predominantly limited
to PSUs. Now that the Government has permitted private sector
participation (with 26% FDI) in the defense sector, has the Navy
taken or planned to take measures to optimize the potential due
to this directional shift in the policy?
In principle, we welcome the
jettisoning of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1955, and
entry of the private sector into defense production. Our PSUs
could certainly do with some healthy competition to enhance
their efficiency, productivity, and above all, product support.
Last year we started a 15-year program to undertake
indigenisation in the Navy and this will provide tremendous
opportunities for the private sector to participate in defense
production.
Procurement
procedures have been simplified and made more transparent. The
Navy is also willing to fund R&D projects, which need huge
investments and infrastructural support.
Even for ships being procured from abroad, we are looking
at Indian companies supporting them with indigenous technology.
Standardization of inventories is being ensured and this
will also help address the private sector’s concerns about
volumes. The IT
sector, where we have a known world-class capability is also an
area where the private sector can participate and indeed, is
participating. Moreover,
with the order books of all the major PSU shipyards full, there
are opportunities galore for the private sector to market their
products.
The Navy has made
considerable and substantial progress in the indigenous design
and building of warships. However, the major weapon systems to
be incorporated in the indigenous warships are still to be
acquired from abroad. What steps can be taken to develop this
expertise in the country so as to become self-reliant in the
major weapon systems for warships e.g. SAM Systems, ASW Systems,
CIWSs and associated radars, target designation and fire control
systems etc?
The writing on the wall is clear
for the Armed Forces to read: there is NO FUTURE in importing
weapon systems from abroad. It is a trap, which creates a
vicious circle of dependence on unreliable foreign sources and
spiraling prices. I am afraid that there are no easy answers in this regard.
We will have to keep pegging away with our indigenous
efforts through the DRDO and support them to the maximum extent
possible. I would even go to the extent of accepting slightly
reduced capability for the Navy, provided it emerges from our
own technology and contains the potential for a Mark II
(improved) product.
There are
several success stories from the DRDO, and the development of
world-class indigenous sonars is one of them.
We are also well on our way to designing combat
management systems and work is proceeding well on developing an
indigenous ASW system as well as several types of radars.
The
second approach that we in the Navy have decided upon is to
collaborate with friendly countries in the technology
development and subsequent production of advanced weapon
systems. This is as distinct from the screwdriver, CKD/SKD
approach that has come to be known as “Transfer of
Technology”. There are some such projects, which are currently
in various stages of discussion / negotiation.
This approach has the dual advantage of obtaining access
to advanced technology as well as ensuring that we do not
subsequently remain at the mercy of another country for spares
and servicing support.
Finally,
instead of looking at indigenisation in a generalized sporadic
fashion, and appealing to industry for help, we are seriously
considering the creation of a structure within NHQ to give it
full-time focus and impetus.
But this will require financial empowerment by the
Government.
As the industrial base
(both in the private and public sector), for indigenous
shipbuilding grows and matures and given the concerns of economy
of scales, do you think there is a need to build up strategic
partnership with OEMs to undertake major overhauls of equipment
and platforms? Do
you see any beneficial spin-offs if captive capabilities are
created to meet infrastructure requirements?
We are already doing this and have
several tie-ups with public and private sector players in some
areas like maintenance of COTS equipment and specific systems.
We have also been off-loading the refits of less
weapon-intensive ships like OPVs and Fleet Tankers to trade.
However, at this moment, we simultaneously need captive
capabilities like the Naval Dockyards, as many of our
maintenance needs are unique and require skilled manpower, whose
capabilities are built over years of experience – submarine
repairs, for example, cannot be outsourced, except perhaps, to
the OEM.
Moreover,
in times of emergency or war, we will need to have the
wherewithal to step up the pace of repairs or carry out
emergency repairs, as the case may be. Hence, the spin-off to
the Navy is in terms of the flexibility of operations that a
captive maintenance capability provides.
Having
said that, I must admit that in other countries there is
profound trust between the Government and Industry, and even
strategic systems are entrusted to the private sector for
manufacture / maintenance. We have not reached this happy state
yet.
The MTCR (missile
technology control regime) denies India technologies for
missiles beyond the 300 Km range.
How do we overcome this problem besides stressing on
indigenous R&D, to meet our legitimate security requirement?
Technology denial is a deliberate
strategy to ensure disparity in capabilities.
My view is that we cannot complain too much over this, as
each country will act to protect its national interest.
Hence, we need to firstly identify and deal with
countries willing to share technologies with us. Secondly, and
more importantly, we need to develop our indigenous R&D
capability. As I
said earlier, in the short term we should be ready to accept a
slightly lower capability from our indigenous equipment, so that
our scientists receive encouragement, and we can benefit in the
long run. A typical example is the development of cryogenic engines for
launching our satellites, which was made the subject of
technology denial earlier and which our scientists subsequently
mastered. I am convinced, that a few years down the line,
technology denial regimes are not going to bother us too much.
There are a plethora of
agencies dealing with maritime matters in India. Do you think there is need to set up a Central Maritime Board
or any such organization to postulate policy, coordinate and
manage all maritime activities of this country?
Absolutely; today there are a
plethora of agencies dealing with maritime matters, which
encompass a diverse range of activities like oil and natural
gas, fisheries, excise and customs, immigration, pollution
control, tourism, transport, infrastructure development and
defense. If you notice, defense is just one of the issues in the
maritime arena, albeit the vital one. Hence, there is a need for
a National Maritime Policy to ensure that the management of
India’s ocean and coastal zones is politically correct,
economically sustainable, socially responsible and culturally
sensitive with a view to safeguard our national interest at all
times.
In recent
years, terrorism has acquired a growing maritime dimension as
terrorists find the open highways of the oceans a convenient way
of moving men and materials.
There are also fears expressed of terrorists using
merchant ships for transporting WMD or using them as a WMD. The
only two agencies with the wherewithal and means to actually go
out to sea and do something, are the IN and the Coast Guard.
Therefore synergy of national security resources is now vital.
Hence,
establishment of a National Maritime Commission is
important to protect our maritime interests in an integrated
manner. The commission will comprise representatives from all
organizations connected to the seas and will be a ‘one-stop
shop’ to take decisions on all maritime issues. The issue is
now before the government and we hope a decision on this will be
forthcoming shortly.
India aspires to be a
maritime power and the Indian Navy has to be the flag bearer for
such an endeavor. What is your concept of maritime power in the
present global order? How would you envision India’s growth as
a maritime power?
The 21st century is going to be a maritime
century. The
globalization of the world economy and its impact on global
sea-borne trade, energy imperatives and growing dependence on
sea resources, all point towards the growing importance of the
seas. These developments are extremely important for India due
to our reliance on the sea for trade, energy resources and food
resources. In fact, over a century ago, the famous American
maritime strategist, Admiral Mahan had stated, “Whoever
controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia.” He further went on
to predict “…in the 21st century
the destiny of the world will be decided upon its waters.”
Today that prediction appears to be coming true. While we have
no wish to dominate anything, we need to ensure that nobody else
is in a position to do so, or to dictate terms to us either
A capable
navy is only one element of a maritime power. A large merchant
fleet, modern ports with good infrastructure, a vibrant,
efficient and self-reliant shipbuilding industry along with its
supporting technical infrastructure are some of the other vital
elements of maritime power which we need to concentrate upon.
The key, however, lies in the
populace having a maritime temperament and outlook. Indians in general, need to acknowledge that if not a
“maritime nation” (yet), we certainly are a nation dependant
on the seas, and need to look more seawards than inwards. Such a
realization is especially vital for people at what is called the
decision-making, or “Grand-Strategic Level” of security
planning. Only then can we stake our claim to be a true maritime
power.
This interview first appeared in
the India Defence Review and has been reproduced here with the
permission of the editor.
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