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Dispatch
from Afghanistan
Laxman
Bahroo
Executive
Summary
The Loya Jirga and the subsequent ratification of the
Afghan constitution heralded the promise of nationhood.
However, the events of the past year have changed the
glimmer of hope to despair.
The political, regional and ethnic divide has widened due
to the actions of the Taliban and the government.
Violence has made further inroads into Pashtun areas and
the Northern regions of the country.
Afghanistan lurches from one violent event to another.
Newspaper articles are replete with talks of broken
promises, betrayal and helplessness.
Elections initially thought to bring about reconciliation
for a troubled nation may have the opposite effect.
Instead it may provoke violence, retribution, generate
animosity between ethnic groups, and government at various
levels. The paper
will examine and analyze the major events since the Loya Jirga
and how they have contributed to the current situation in
Afghanistan.
Contents
Recent
Events
Analysis
Conclusions
and the Future
References
and Footnotes
Recent
Events
On December 14, 2003, 502
delegates gathered at Kabul’s Polytechnic Institute amid tight
security to deliberate over the draft constitution.
The delayed release of draft version of the constitution,
only a month before the convention, resulted in decreased public
awareness. The
constitution convention tackled issues of women’s rights,
civil rights, and a political system was marred by bombings in
Kabul.[i]
[ii]
The jirga extended eleven days longer than scheduled largely due
to sharp disagreements over the type of leadership.[iii]
The Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks and ethnic minorities favored
a Parliamentary system while the Pashtuns largely backed a
strong Presidential system.[iv]
The heated debate was amusingly dubbed by some as
the loya jagra (grand fight).[v]
Last minute deal making resulted in ratification on
January 4, 2004. [vi] [vii]
The final version of the constitution contained a
compromise. It
endorsed the Presidential system with diluted powers, Parliament
was strengthened and minority languages were given special
status.[viii]
[ix]
The constitutional Loya Jirga set the stage for the
Presidential election but also uncovered the existing divisions
in Afghanistan.
Since March 2004, the prosperous city of Herat has been the
site of clashes between the Afghan central government and
provincial government. Speculation
stated that a failed assassination attempt on Ismail Khan lead
Mirwaiz Sadiq (Khan’s son) to exchange words with the local
Afghan National Army (ANA) commander.
The murder of Mirwaiz Sadiq, Minister of Aviation, after
the heated argument led to the clash between Herat’s troops
and ANA resulting in the death of 100 people.
The small ANA force was quickly outgunned by the better
armed local force. The
central government appealed for calm and pressed reinforcements
into the city. Unfortunately, the presence of the ANA did not stabilize the
situation, regular clashes between Ismail Khan and Amanullah
Khan, a neighboring rival Pashtun warlord, increased in
intensity. In early
August, Amanullah Khan’s troops over ran Ismail Khan’s
forces in Shindand under the pretense that Pashtuns in those
areas were not being treated fairly.[x]
Once again the central government rushed troops and
forced a truce.[xi]
Ismail Khan alluded to a conspiracy to undermine Herat
hatched by Amanullah Khan and certain government officials.[xii]
Shortly after, in a
coordinated move at the start of the election campaign,
President Karzai removed Ismail Khan as governor of Herat.[xiii]
The dismissal sparked violence in the city, protestors
attacked the UN compound and a night curfew was imposed on the
city.[xiv]
Besides the increasing violence in Western Afghanistan,
violent events in the Northern region made national and
international headlines. In
April 2004, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek warlord,
launched an attack on neighboring Faryab Province and overran
the capital Maimana.[xv]
The governor of Faryab fled and ANA was rushed into
stabilize the situation. The
motive of the attack, as stated by Dostum, was election fraud
and bribery by government officials. However others have stated
that Dostum was angered by the closeness between Kabul and the
governor of Faryab.[xvi]
The most notable
violent act was the massacre of eleven Chinese construction
workers in Kunduz in June 2004.
The event was surprising for several reasons. The killing
sent shockwaves thru Afghanistan and led many to immediately
blame the resurgent Taliban and associated Hezb e Islami for the
attack. This
increased the fear that the Taliban insurgency was spreading
rapidly into the north.[xvii]
The Taliban swiftly denied responsibility for the attack
and Xinhua, the Chinese news agency, stated that it did not
believe that the Taliban were behind the attack.[xviii]
However, the inquiry did not consider the possibility of other
assailants. Another
curious point was that the targets were construction workers,
employees of China Railway Shisiju Group Corporation, who had
just arrived in Kunduz the day before to build a road link from
Kunduz to nearby Baghlan province and repair irrigation canals.[xix]
[xx]
In 3 short years after the rollback of the Taliban regime,
the resurgent Taliban have become a force in the southern
Afghanistan. The
movement started insidiously about a year after the defeat of
the Taliban regime. Initially,
the resurgence was seen in the furthest reaches of the Pashtun
provinces. Over the next eighteen months it came to dominate the
provinces of Zabul, Khowst, Paktika, and Paktia. Additionally it became a force in Kandahar, Helmand and
Nangarhar provinces and a regular presence in Kabul by way of
frequent bombings. The
resurgent Taliban are a conglomerate of old Taliban cadre,
warlords looking to return to power, and economically
dispossessed youth. The
movement has been propelled by a multitude of factors among them
Pashtun anger over the influence of Tajiks, mistreatment of
Pashtuns in the northern regions, and by U.S search operations.
The movement is supported by the blossoming opium
cultivation. Pakistani support is essential for the survival of
the Taliban problem from recruitment of cadre, sheltering of
leaders and training foot soldiers.[xxi]
In the last eight months, several large clashes between the
resurgent Taliban and coalition forces have occurred in Khowst,
Daycophan district of Zabul, Ghazni and Uruzgan.
Coalition forces have used helicopters, aircraft and
superior numbers forcing the resurgent Taliban into successive
retreats. However,
the attacks have continued to occur despite the losses.[xxii]
[xxiii]
The governor of Helmand noted that the Taliban recruited young
people from the province and gained strength in the past year.
Additionally, the government stated that the Taliban had
killed a larger number of Afghans in the first six months of
2004 than in the comparable period in the past year.[xxiv] Humanitarian agencies
bear the wrath of Taliban, elections workers beheaded, offices
of international agencies bombed, and schools burned.[xxv]
As a result frustrated organizations such as Doctors
without Borders have withdrawn workers despite a legacy of
working in the country during the Soviet occupation.[xxvi]
On July 26th 2004, President Karzai announced
Ahmed Zia Masood as his running mate instead of the expected
Marshal Qasim Fahim, Minister of Defense.
The move was hailed by the world community as brave and
sidelining the warlords. President
Karzai told western media that by not picking Fahim he was
resisting the “strongest warlord”.[xxvii]
The decision
to not pick Marshall Fahim was quickly followed by several
resignations and the announcement of Minister Yunus Qanooni’s
candidacy for President. Troops
were deployed in Kabul to prevent any reprisals from Fahim
supporters.[xxviii]
There were strong fears that the vote would further
divide Afghanistan.[xxix]
Ahmed Zia Masood, the youngest brother of the Late Ahmed
Shah Masood, was until recently Afghanistan’s Ambassador to
Russia. During the
Afghan Jihad, he manned a compound in Peshawar, Pakistan to
contact his brother in the Panjshir valley.[xxx]
The choice of Ahmed
Zia Masood is interesting in light of his membership to his
brother’s (Ahmed Wali Masood) National Resistance Party based
on Ahmed Shah Masood’s vision of Afghanistan.[xxxi]
Additionally, he has been on record to state that he will
not support President Karzai in the 2004 elections. “December
2003 meeting of the Northern Alliance against Karzai, Ahmed Zia
told a Moscow based newspaper that they would not support Hamid
Karzai in 2004 presidential elections. According to him, their
candidate would be the former President, Rabbani.” [xxxii]
Former President
Rabbani is the father in law of candidate Ahmed Zia Masood and
interestingly announced on October 3, 2004 that he will support
President Karzai’s bid for Presidency. [xxxiii]
[xxxiv]
Analysis
A glance at the preceding year indicates that Afghanistan
has started its long slow descent into an abyss. Numerous factors have aided the current situation, the
unabated resurgent Taliban violence, fractious nature of Afghan
politics, ethnic divisions, and government actions in the
provinces. In the following paragraphs, each of the factors will
be reviewed and its contribution to the downslide of
Afghanistan. The
overwhelming trend in Afghanistan for the past year and a half
has been the exacerbation of centrifugal tendencies.
This trend has been demonstrated across ethnic and
political divisions. The
policies and handling of the crisis events by the government
have further exacerbated these tendencies.
Over the past 2 years, the resurgent Taliban challenged
local authorities, engaged coalition forces in hit and run
attacks and created a power vacuum.
The failure of the coalition shakes the confidence of the
local people in the government creating further discontent on
which the resurgent Taliban can capitalize.
Specifically over the last year, the resurgent Taliban
have advanced from the edge of the Pashtun belt to interior
provinces such as Uruzgan, and there are further reports of
attacks in Nuristan in Eastern Afghanistan.[xxxv]
The resurgent Taliban have established themselves as a
major force in Afghan politics by intimidation.
In far flung provinces of Zabul and Uruzgan, they act
thru night letters and notices on mosque doors to intimidate the
local population from registering and voting.[xxxvi]
Furthermore, the Taliban have forced Pashtun politicians
into a competition by dividing the people along ideological and
religious lines. In
a bid to recapture attention, the politicians have chosen to
voice issues that unify Pashtuns such as mistreatment of Pashtun
issues and forcing interethnic conflicts to the forefront.
Pakistani involvement is the power behind the resurgent
Taliban. The
Pakistanis have longstanding compulsions to interfere in Afghan
politics for ethnic and political reasons.
After the roll back of the Taliban regime, the fleeing
soldiers flooded into bordering villages.
The reentry of Islamic fighters resulted in increased
violence in Pakistan. The
resurgent Taliban was borne of many of the longstanding
compulsions that created the original Taliban.
Pakistan is driven by compulsions to gain influence over
Afghanistan’s new government and thereby displace Islamic
pressure instead of resolving it.
The Pakistanis have continued to play a double game of
allowing American troops to carry out security operations while
abetting the resurgent Taliban.
The involvement can best be seen by the difficulty of
eradicating the insurgency despite numerous victories and heavy
casualties. For lasting victory, the allied forces will have to
systematically undermine the contributing factors, most
important being the ongoing Pakistani support.
The purpose of the Loya Jirga was to unite Afghanistan’s
disparate populations under the banner of a national government,
a task made more difficult with armed ethnic groups.
The Loya Jirga forced divisions to the forefront between
the former mujaheddin, subjugate population, non Pashtuns,
Pashtuns, supporters of the Presidential system and the
Parliamentary system. Ultimately, last minute deal-making amply demonstrated that
neither group was strong enough to force their point. While
concessions secured the successful ratification of the
Constitution, it also showed underlying fissures.
Pashtuns were angered at the granting of special status
to Tajik and Uzbek languages.
The Loya Jirga demonstrated the force of Pashtuns,
generally a disparate group, united by ethnic issues, anger at
the prominent involvement of non-Pashtuns in government and
preference for a strong Presidential system lead by a Pashtun.
The events of the Loya Jirga revived memories of a
Pashtun dominated repressive state among the ethnic minorities. The
minority groups of Afghanistan were able to gain concessions but
unable to supplant the Presidential system with a Parliamentary
system that promised more regional anatomy.
The exposure of these fault lines is not new, they have
existed for centuries. In the current situation, the clash of various interested
parties will involve political arena and the battle field. Interestingly, the Loya Jirga dampened the immediate
repercussions; instead it postponed the battle for the elections
and beyond.
The surprise announcement choosing Ahmed Zia Masood
(brother of Ahmed Shah Masood and Ahmed Wali Masood) as the
running mate over Marshall Fahim sent shock waves thru
Afghanistan and the world. The astute choice was expected to
reap dividends. First,
by picking a Tajik with a prominent last name Karzai hoped to
decrease the monopoly of the former Northern Alliance on non-Pashtun
votes. Second, it
circumvented nascent political organizations such as National
Resistance Party before it became a political threat; Ahmed Wali
Masood extended conditional support to Karzai on the eve of the
elections. Third,
it neutralized some of Karzai’s potential opponents such as
the Jamaat-e-Islami. Former
President Burhanuddin Rabbani (father in law of Ahmed Zia Masood)
supported Karzai while other members of the Jamaat-e-Islami
backed Younus Qanooni. Fourth,
the change resonated with Pashtuns, Karzai’s powerbase, angry
at the Northern Alliance influence in the cabinet and blame
Marshall Fahim for the government’s lack of response to the
abuse of Pashtuns in the Northern areas.
It displayed Karzai as a statesman who is trying to fight
“warlords” in Afghanistan both inside and outside the
government. Lastly, it diluted the anti- Pakistan stance of the
current Karzai government, the timing of the announcement prior
to President Karzai’s state visit to Pakistan is most curious.
However, Karzai’s choice is not without dangers, it may
severely backfire and resulted in fragmented polity unable to
reconcile its differences within the frame work of the Afghan
constitution thereby undoing the accomplishments of the past few
years. The pre
election attack on Ahmed Zia Masood in Badakshan province
indicated underlying Tajik anger at President Karzai and his
running mate.
Herat has become a mirror for the conflict enveloping
Afghanistan. Over
the past few months the city has witnessed friction between
civilians, militia, central government forces, and Pashtun - non
Pashtun issues. The
mysterious attempted assassination of Ismail Khan, the
suspicious death of his son Mirwaiz Sadiq shook the city and set
the stage for the current situation.
The Afghan National Army deployment in March 2004
curtailed Ismail Khan’s power and invited an opportunistic
attack by Amanullah Khan. Ethnic
overtones colored Amanullah Khan’s attack on Shindand
province, a prominently Pashtun area under the control of Herat. The violence resulted in more deployment and furthered the
central government’s commitments in the area.
Simultaneously in Herat it deepened discontent and
suspicion of the Kabul’s motives.
Anger reached a boiling point over the sudden dismissal
of Ismail Khan. The
ensuing riots demonstrated Ismail Khan’s popularity and anger
at Kabul’s decision. The
dismissal on the opening day of the Presidential campaign was
not a coincidence, it may impact the elections and beyond.
Conclusions
and the Future
The centrifugal tendencies of Afghanistan have once again
been exacerbated by a combination of government action and
reaction to events in the remote provinces.
Once exacerbated these feelings tend to nursed by local
warlords, ethnic pride and result in sharply divided polity.
One can already see the warning signs in the multitude of
presidential candidates. President
Karzai in a bid to consolidate his base in the Pashtun
population and reduce the popularity of local Pashtun warlords
and the resurgent Taliban acted on Pashtun concerns against the
governor of Herat, the role of Tajiks in the cabinet to the
detriment of the national unity.
Ironically, the year began with an event considered to be
the hallmark of national unity and may end on a note of national
discord with the election results and widening regionalism.
The United States has vested strategic and economic
interests in a stable Afghanistan.
The strategic goals go beyond the war on terror, the
upcoming American Presidential elections and dovetail on
economic interests of making Afghanistan a transit corridor.
Therefore, American policy in the region cannot be solely
based on the backing of President Karzai.
Even before the elections, charges of improper conduct
abound about America’s role in pressuring competing candidates
and tribal elders coercing voters for President Karzai.[xxxvii]
[xxxviii]
In order to create a stable Afghanistan, American policy must be
a broad based initiative working with diverse and often divided
ethnic groups. The current narrow focused policy based on supporting Karzai
at the expense of the Tajiks will alienate potential political
allies. Similarly,
Afghan policy excessively influenced by Pakistan may anger
regional powers and create long term problems.
America must engage prominent regional politicians and
warlords rather than back Kabul’s self serving policy of
intervention. The
current policy will create ill will against not only the central
government but against the U.S.
A victory by President Karzai’s will not automatically
grant him a mandate to rule.
The divisive events of the past year will make it
difficult to run the country regardless of the results of the
election. He
will still need to form an Afghan unity cabinet by bringing in
prominent politicians from marginalized regions.
This will pose several problems.
One is the pre election bravado about not sharing power
and open rejection of possible backroom deals.
Another is the anger in Pashtun community over the
sharing of power. The
Pashtun anger at the betrayal may translate into greater support
for the resurgent Taliban and result in more violence. An overwhelming victory will not resolve the issue, charges of
coercion, election irregularities and fraud will continue to
abound backed by rival candidates, already seen at the end of
voting. The elections need not be fair or free, but the outcome has
to be accepted by the ruled population. In short, President
Karzai cannot rule a united Afghanistan without support from
Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.
If he attempts so, he will raise the dual spectre of
Pashtun overbearance and central government meddling.
Afghanistan’s regions have a history of challenging
central authority. After
all one must recall that Herat was the site of the Sauer
Rebellion, a reaction to the invasive policies of leftist
governments, led by a young captain Ismail Khan that eventually
sparked a country wide revolt against Kabul’s authority.
References
and Footnotes
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