Was
late medieval India ready for a Revolution in Military Affairs?
Airavat
Singh
Executive
Summary
In
1683 the Ottoman Turks laid siege to the European city of
Vienna. Their defeat there began a process that finally
unraveled the massive empire straddling West Asia and South-East
Europe. While the European powers had completely overhauled
their military formations over the past century, the Ottomans
still relied on cavalry and imported their advanced weaponry
from Europe. The steady improvements in infantry were showcased
later on by the terrible line-attack of Frederick of Prussia,
and still later by the invincible infantry columns of Napoleon.
Why
didn’t things change in the Indian sub-continent in this same
period? After all, firearms had been known to Indians right
about the same time as they were to the rest of the civilized
world. Moreover large parts of India were not breeding grounds
for horses; it is reasonable to assume that people inhabiting
those regions would be proficient in infantry warfare. The
regions east of the River Ganga and south of the River Krishna
are marked by excessive humidity and thick growth of
forests—they lack the vast open grasslands that sustained
horse-breeding in the medieval era.
The
inhabitants of these lands—whether Telegus, Berads, or Purbias—did
impact the evolution of infantry warfare; but only as willing
recruits to battalions organized and led by European officers.
Why was it so? Did the superiority of organized infantry over
cavalry only become apparent when Europeans were at the head?
Were there no occasions in the past when indigenous bodies of
infantry had fought off or even defeated superior cavalry
forces?
Yes
there were—a handful of occasions only but they should suffice
for this series of articles that I intend to write. None of
these battles were momentous or epoch-marking. They did not
change the course of history and for this reason will not be
found in conventional history books. These battles were mere
episodes in an often chaotic saga of history. None of these
involved an Emperor or a King; the leaders on either side were
mostly regional landowners and military commanders.
For
those knowledgeable in warfare, these battles and skirmishes
will prove to be case-studies that will hopefully help solve one
of the many dilemmas of Indian History. The first such battle
took place in 1680—curiously three years before the siege of
Vienna.
Contents
The
Berads of Sagar
Geo-Political
Background
The
Battle of Sagar 1680
Epilogue
up to the Battle of Wagingera, 1705
Conclusions
References
and Footnotes
The
Berads of Sagar
The modern town of Sagar is situated in the Shimoga district of Karnataka, between the Krishna and Bhima Rivers. The region between these rivers is hilly and forested and is called Malnad on account of the heavy rainfall it receives. In the middle ages there was no town, the forests were thicker, and the wildlife
profuse.
From Mysore north through the Malnad region and all the way to Bijapur were lands colonized by the Berads—a race of aboriginal Kanarese belonging to the lowest Dhed caste on account of their life style. Although many of them were Lingayets or Vaishnavs they had no dietary restrictions and ate mutton, beef, pork, and fowl with gusto and drank to excess. Their race name means “hunter” in Kanarese and they also indulged in cattle-lifting and other crimes. Alternatively called Bedars/Beydurs these people were dark, muscular, and of middle height; with round faces, thin lips, and frizzled hair. A popular story ran that the Mughal historians were so impressed by their fighting qualities that they changed the name Berad to Be-dar, meaning fearless.
It is these fighting qualities that are of importance to our study. For the purpose of hunting and war the Berads had adopted the matchlock and had become adept in the use of this firearm [1]. Their tribal organization—where headmen controlled different bands of younger fighters—ensured discipline and unity in their ranks. Not surprisingly they had become the steadiest and most accurate musketeers in 17th century South India. Another singular name used for them was kala-piadas or black foot-musketeers. Later on these same Berads formed the bulk of Tipu Sultan’s French-led infantry.
We are not concerned here with the history of the entire tribe; our focus is on their one large kingdom based in Sagar. The Berad King of Sagar used the title Nayak and is known in Persian histories as Pam
Nayak.
Geo-Political
Background
His opponent in 1680 was the Mughal commander, Dilir Khan, a Ruhela Afghan. These Ruhelas will be covered in detail in future articles; for they also provided examples of the superiority of infantry formations. Here it will suffice to say that Dilir Khan’s tribesmen had colonized the district of Shajahanpur in modern Uttar Pradesh, and Dilir Khan had won the position of a Mughal Mansabdar (Commander) under Shah
Jahan.
In the 17th Century the North Indian Mughal Empire had planted its feet firmly into the southern peninsula. The outstanding historical fact of the Indian sub-continent has been its geographical unity—any empire; whether based in the northern plains, the eastern jungles, or the southern plateau; will attempt to bring the other regions under its control. The Mughals were living up to this idea of India’s unity [2].
Dilir Khan had served in this region first under Prince Aurangzeb and later under Mirza Raja Jai Singh, playing an important part in the latter’s famous victory over Shivaji, the founder of the Maratha Kingdom. He thus had a good knowledge of the terrain, the forts, and the military forces in the peninsula. Apart from the young Maratha Kingdom these forces were; the two decaying Shia Sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda, and the numerous remnants of the Vijaynagar Empire further south [3].
The Berads of Sagar had been tributaries to the Bijapur Sultans, but now that the Sultan was a mere figurehead and the various Bijapuri officers were carving out their own personal estates, Pam Nayak lived and functioned as an independent king.
The Mughal General had two duties to perform—protect Mughal territory from Shivaji’s raids and annex Bijapur—the Sultanate of Golconda was expected to simply fall into the lap of the Mughal Empire because of its weak condition. In 1679-80 Dilir Khan set his eyes on Bijapur. He hoped to gain allies among its nobles and use the resources of this kingdom to crush Shivaji. Unfortunately these negotiations did not mature and the angry and stubborn Afghan went ahead and laid siege to the city of
Bijapur.
In the meantime Shivaji sent his cavalry to raid and plunder the Mughal dominion to his heart’s content. Aurangzeb sent an angry letter to Dilir Khan ordering him to withdraw from Bijapur [4]. The disgraced general, foiled in his purpose and with nothing to show for his expenditure of men and money, decided to wreak vengeance on Bijapuri territory. He roamed about like a mad dog, slaying and looting with fiendish cruelty, and in his crazed, bloody wanderings came upon the fort of
Sagar.
The
Battle of Sagar, 1680
To save his people from needless slaughter, Pam Nayak offered to pay 1.5 Lakh Rupees as ransom for his capital but Dilir Khan demanded no less than ten times that amount! The Mughals pitched their camp at Gogi, five kilometers north of Sagar, and laid siege to that fort.
On the first day (20th February) Dilir Khan decided to storm the village at the base of the fort. The village was manned by a force of Berad infantry and in addition was protected by a wall skirting its homes and fields, so Dilir’s initial plan was thwarted by the firing from the Berad matchlocks. The Mughals then laid siege and began firing their own matchlocks and swivel guns. The exchange of fire continued all day long—towards sunset when the firing on both sides began dying down the Berad infantry delivered a sudden charge and drove the Mughals back with loss. Dilir Khan retired back to Gogi.
The next day he returned with his entire muster of artillery and cavalry [5]. The Berads took shelter behind rocks, in the nearby jungles, on the fort parapet, inside huts—and manfully faced the reckless firing. At last the gate of the village was breached. The Afghan stood near the broken gate on his elephant while his men poured into the village and began looting the houses. But the fighting wasn’t over just yet.
Dilir Khan imagined that the Berads had either been cowed or had made their escape from the pressure of the Mughal artillery—no such luck. From the fort walls, from the nearby hillocks, and from the surrounding jungle, a blaze of fire descended on the crowd of Mughals, Sayyids, Rajputs, and Afghans [6]. As his soldiers began dropping like flies, Dilir ordered a retreat; soldiers around him and with his son in the nearby fields were still maintaining their order.
All of a sudden the firing ceased and through the smoke and the haze the Berad infantrymen tumbled down, sword in hand, to complete the rout. Attacked on all sides the two remaining Mughal wings gave up their order and bolted; the Berads bringing down the Afghan cavalrymen in their expensive armor and costly dresses. Dilir Khan’s son escaped with his bare life—the total Mughal casualties on that day mounted up to 1700 men.
The battle was decisive. For some time Dilir Khan plotted revenge on the Berads but the spirit of his soldiers was utterly broken and they threatened to abandon him if he did not withdraw from this foreign land. The Afghan’s military reputation and finances alike were utterly ruined—his troubles ended with his death only three years later in 1683.
Pam Nayak was feted and highly rewarded by the court of Bijapur for this splendid victory. His tribesmen were rightly exultant—they had added to their reputation of being the steadiest musketeers of South India by defeating a leading Mughal general in a pitched battle. Pam Nayak’s services were now eagerly sought by both Bijapur and Golconda. But what next? What lessons were learned from this victory? And how did Pam Nayak utilize the profuse finances and his men’s high spirits?
Epilogue
up to the Battle of Wagingera, 1705
The very next year Aurangzeb crossed over the River Narmada to begin the Deccan Wars—which were to last for a quarter century and would end with the Marathas completely dominant over the peninsula. After some initial operations against the Marathas, Aurangzeb turned his attention to Bijapur, assaulting the city with an enormous park of artillery [7]. Pam Nayak sent 6000 infantry to help his overlord, but these men were waylaid by a Mughal trap while carrying their provisions on their heads and with their matchlocks tied to their backs.
Undaunted, Pam Nayak sent help next to the Sultanate of Golconda, which place was also won by the Mughals—but this time with treachery. It was now 1687 and as Aurangzeb turned his eye from the city of Golconda to the city of Bijapur, the eyesore of proud and independent Sagar interrupted to disturb the view. To punish the Berad chief and also to secure his line of communication, Aurangzeb dispatched an army towards Sagar.
The invading Mughal General, Khanazad Khan, was told to avoid a conflict and simply induce the Berad chief to enter Mughal service. The Berad national levy was rumored to be 100,000 infantrymen, along with 12,000 hired cavalry [8]! Pam Nayak accepted the Mughal terms and paid a visit to Aurangzeb but died only five days later—his sons and nephews were now enrolled into the Mughal service. The remaining Berad families were ejected from Sagar—where a mosque was built and the Muslim creed chanted for the first time.
They shifted base to the village of Wagingera only eight kilometers west of Sagar. The most enterprising successor of Pam Nayak was his nephew Pidia; he helped the Mughals in the siege of Raichur and then took leave to ostensibly replenish his troops and equipment. Arrived at Wagingera Pidia fortified the hill where his uncle’s leading associates had built their homes. He improved cultivation and furiously collected money and materials—all the time pretending to be a loyal servant of the Mughal Emperor.
By this time the Maratha King Shambhuji had fallen and his court and army had dispersed in all directions. The numerous Maratha armies took to plundering the Mughal dominions for their bread and butter. In imitation of the Marathas, and sometimes in concert with them, Pidia Nayak plundered the Mughal territory in Gulbarga. At last in 1691, Aurangzeb began sending army after army, sometimes under his sons and sometimes under his generals, to cow the irrepressible Berads.
Each time these armies would lay siege and dig trenches; and each time the Berad infantry would storm these trenches and slaughter the Mughals. And each time the wise Pidia Nayak would make peace by paying, or promising to pay, some money. At last these “jackal like tricks” exasperated Aurangzeb and he arrived to lead the siege in person. It was 1705.
Aurangzeb threw his best mansabdars against the fort—Chin Qalich Khan Subahdar of Bijapur, Tarbiyat Khan Chief of Artillery, Hamid-ud-din Khan, Daud Khan Pani, Nusrat Jang, and so many others. The siege lasted three months and displayed graphically the utter decline and military weakness of the Mughal Empire. All attempts to capture the hillocks around Wagingera failed because each time the Berad infantry would sprint up those hills and rout the Mughals with their murderous firing. Attempts to storm the villages at the base of the fort met a similar fate.
Indeed it was not the strength of the fort—which was nothing spectacular—but the courage and accuracy of the Berad musketeers that held off the Mughals. It was for this reason that many Maratha Generals had deposited their families in the care of Pidia Nayak while their own homeland was under attack. These Marathas now arrived on the scene to protect their families—together the Marathas and Berads harassed the Mughal camp which now had to be protected by a wall of its own!
At long last the Berads decided further resistance useless and they evacuated the fort at night and made away with their Maratha allies. In the morning the Mughals entered the fort and in their usual careless manner began looting and destroying the property. The houses they set fire to still contained large amounts of powder and powerful explosions killed off numbers of their soldiers—bodies were blown up into the air and could not be found for burial!
So Wagingera was captured—but its chief and his army escaped and lived to give great trouble to the Mughals. Wagingera was the last battle for Aurangzeb, who died two years later—but not for the Berads. They captured the fort of Penukonda the very next year and later built a new fort of Shorapur, barely two kilometers east of
Wagingera.
Conclusions
To answer the question “What were the lessons learned by the Berads from the Battle of Sagar?” we only have to look at the sequence of events. Pam Nayak used his monetary rewards to organize more infantry units, till he had armed almost a hundred thousand kala-piadas. He also hired twelve thousand cavalry (see footnote 8).
For centuries India had been dominated by tribes/races proficient in horsemanship—the Turks, Rajputs, Afghans, and Marathas. It was believed that without cavalry an empire could not be formed and a kingdom could not be defended. This was the historical experience of the past few centuries—and centuries of historical memory cannot be set against the haze of a one-off battle.
Little good came from this hiring of cavalry. Since the cavalry and infantry belonged invariably to different races [8] a disciplined union between them was impossible. The cavalry groups only came into play if they were paid regularly—and they could quite simply abandon their employer for someone else who offered better pay. At Wagingera the Marathas and Berads did unite for some time—but it was a practical and not a professional arrangement. When their interests were not served in this unprofitable battle, the Marathas advised the Berad Nayak to make peace with Aurangzeb [9].
The union of cavalry and infantry in India—preferably with the cavalry under orders of the infantry commander—became possible only with the establishment of British rule.
References
and Footnotes
[1]
http://www.silcom.com/~vikman/isles/scriptorium/firearm/match.html
[2]
Northern Empires – Bharats, Kannauj, Pratiharas, Turks.
Eastern
Empires – Mauryas, Guptas, Palas, British.
Southern
Empires – Satavahanas, Chaulukyas, Rashtrakutas, Marathas.
[3]
In Mughal geography the Marathas, Bijapur, and Golconda together
denoted the Deccan Plateau. The region of the Vijaynagar Empire
was called the Carnatic.
[4]
“Your first duty was to guard the imperial dominions. What
folly is this that you have practiced? You have neither
protected my dominions, nor gained your objective. Withdraw
quickly from the siege of Bijapur to the defence of the
empire.”
[5]
Cavalry was the most important fighting arm of the Mughal
Empire; artillery came second; but infantry was not separately
organized. Infantrymen were termed Bandukchis, Barqandazes,
Ahsham etc. and were set to protect the guns (just standing
alongside them without order) and the main camp.
[6]
A Mughal Mansabdar was always given a mixed contingent of
soldiers—with other races outnumbering his own tribe/clan.
This was done to ensure that such individuals when campaigning
in distant lands would not set up their own kingdoms.
[7]
It included 2900 barqandazes, 23,027 ahsham, 110 pieces of
artillery, 40 gajnal, 154 shutarnal, 404 banduq, and 7561 maunds
of powder.
[8]
Pam Nayak hired Hindu and Muhammadan cavalry—including many
Sayyids of the Deccan—to the intense abhorrence of the pious
Muslim Aurangzeb!
[9]
They continued their stay however when the Berad chief paid them
a daily subsidy of several thousand rupees. The Marathas hovered
in the neighborhood and made frequent attacks on the Mughals—no
decisive action but enough to inspire fear among the invaders.
History
of Aurangzeb (Vol 4 and 5) by Jadunath Sarkar.
http://www.hvk.org/articles/0203/233.html
http://www.bibliomania.com/2/3/260/1269/19901/1/frameset.html
“Kirkpatrick
supposed the word Bede meant infantry, which, I believe, it does
not’ (p. 36). The quotation from the Life of Tippoo seems to
indicate that it was the name of a caste. And we find in
Sherring’s Indian Tribes and Castes, among those of Mysore,
mention of the Bedar as a tribe, probably of huntsmen, dark,
tall, and warlike. Formerly many were employed as soldiers, and
served in Hyder’s wars.
http://www.macalester.edu/~icm9/Bhosale.html
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