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Pakistani
Deobandis Challenge Musharraf
M.
S. Iyengar
The
past two months have seen a rapid escalation in
sectarian violence and general lawlessness in
Pakistan. Incidents that merited special attention
were the assassination of Maulana Nizamuddin
Shamzai in Karachi and the series of bombings that
targeted Shiites. Pakistan watchers may recall
that these incidents have usually followed
participation of the Pakistan Army in US led
counter-terrorist actions. The most recent case is
the Pakistani operation against suspected
terrorists in Waziristan. General Musharraf
himself has spoken at great length about the
threat to his life from Jihadi groups. Most
Pakistani sources, including Gen. Musharraf
himself, blame three groups; Jaish-e-Mohammed,
Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin-al-Aalmi, and the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi for all acts of terrorism in
Pakistan. These three groups have been accused of
collaborating with Al Qaida by the Pakistani
government.
The
Jaish-e-Mohammed is led by Maulana Masood Azhar.
He is an influential Pakistani Deobandi preacher
in the Jihad community. The Jaish-e-Mohammed is a
partner of the Pakistan Army’s intelligence
service, the ISI, in its covert war in Kashmir.
The Jaish-e-Mohammed came into existence after
Maulana Azhar was released from an Indian jail in
exchange for the hostages of Indian Airlines
flight IC-814 in 1999. The Jaish-e-Mohammed was
founded in Karachi at the Jamia-ul-Uloom-Islamia
– Banuri with the support of the highest ranking
Deobandi clerics in Pakistan, including Maulana
Nizamuddin Shamzai. A large portion of its initial
asset base came from an older Jihadi group called
the Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin (HuM). After its
formation, the Jaish went on to mount a brutal
campaign of terror in Jammu and Kashmir. Its
penchant for suicide attacks made it a poster boy
for the Islamist struggle in Kashmir and attracted
it several influential backers including Osama Bin
Laden himself.
The
Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin-al-Aalmi is allegedly an
offshoot of the Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin.
The Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin was a partner of
the ISI in the covert war in Afghanistan. HuM
cadre were also involved in terrorism in Kashmir
and other parts of India. In the events that
preceded the fall of the Taliban government, HuM
cadre went to Afghanistan in large numbers to
fight against American forces attempting to
capture Bin Laden after Sept. 11, 2001. As readers may recall Gen. Musharraf had committed Pakistan to
assisting the US in its war against the Al Qaida
after Sept 11, 2001 and a lot of HuM cadre were
killed in US offensives against the Taliban. The
Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin-al-Aalmi is allegedly made up
of elements of the HuM that seek to avenge this.
The
Laskar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is an offshoot of the
Anjuman Sipaha Saheba Pakistan organization, which
was started by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in the
Jhang district of Punjab. Maulana Haq Nawaz was a
Deobandi preacher who urged poor Sunni farmers to
take up arms against Shia landlords in the Jhang.
This appeal resonated among the poor in the
eighties and soon a number of people joined the
Sipaha Saheba Pakistan (SSP). The SSP eventually
split up and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) was
formed under the leadership of Riaz Basra. Elements of the LeJ participated in the Afghan Jihad, and
also fought alongside the Taliban. Domestically in
Pakistan the LeJ is believed to have been involved
in a vast number of sectarian killings. The LeJ
leader Riaz Basra was also involved in an attempt
to kill Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with an
improvised explosive device outside his hometown
of Raiwind. LeJ cadres are generally close to the
Deobandi church but they retain a uniquely strong
sense of anti-Shia feeling.
There
have also been reports emanating from the Wana
area that a group of Pakistani Army officers
have defected to side of the terrorists holed up
alongside the late Nek Mohammed’s lashkar in
Waziristan. There are also reports of writ
petitions being filed against the Pakistan Army
leadership on behalf of another group of Pakistani
army officers up to the rank of colonel. In these
petitions it is alleged that the aforementioned
Pakistani officers are being secretly held under
arrest, in contravention of Pakistan Army rules,
on the orders of General Musharraf. Per ISPR
spokesman Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan, these officers
are under investigation for involvement in an
attempt to kill Gen. Musharraf. Both these
incidents of serious indiscipline highlight that
there is considerable opposition to Gen. Musharraf
in the officer corps of the Pakistan Army.
When
the convoy of Lt. Gen. Ahsan Saleem Hayat was
challenged in the early hours of the morning in
Clifton, it brought considerable public scrutiny
on the Corps Commanders committee of the Pakistan
Army. As a result of this scrutiny, opinion
editorials in newspapers are now openly talking
about the cavalier manner in which Gen. Musharraf
has filled the Corps Commanders with his
relatives. For example, Gen. Shahid Aziz Siddiqui,
the Corps Commander of Lahore, is a direct cousin
of Gen. Musharraf. Similarly Gen. Hayat is
allegedly related to Gen. Musharraf through his
wife’s side. This allegation of nepotism could
simply have its roots in the minds of disgruntled
Pakistani Army senior staff that may have been
sidelined in the promotion process. One finds this
explanation debatable if one goes through the
service records of the people that Musharraf has
promoted. What is however beyond debate is that
Musharraf needs to surround himself with people
whose loyalty is beyond doubt. While this is true
for all leaders, in the case of Musharraf and the
Pakistan Army Corps Commanders, this takes on a
very ominous significance.
Before
one begins to put all the pieces laid out here
together one must recall some key facts about
Pakistani Islam. A majority of Pakistan’s
population are from the Sunni sect. The Sunnis of
Pakistan fall roughly under three sub-sects, the
Barelvis, the Deobandis, and the Alhe Hadithis.
The Barelvis are a majority of the population.
They comprise most of the lower socio-economic
sections of Pakistan. The Alhe Hadithis are a
minority, but there are very close to Wahhabi
groups in Saudi Arabia, and hence their leaders
are among the richer people in Pakistan. The
Deobandis of Pakistan are somewhere in the middle.
It
is important to understand where the Deobandis of
Pakistan came from. Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband in India
is the Islamic equivalent of Harvard or Oxford in
the West. Indian Deobandis were a major influence
on educated Indian Muslims in British India. The
positive effect of their scholarship was felt in
better part of the Islamic world. Many social and
legal codes throughout the Islamic world were
shaped by the thinking of Indian Deobandis.
In British India, the Deobandis formed a
political group, the
Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Islami-e-Hind (JUI-H) to protect
their political interests. After partition this
organization split up and the Pakistan branch
broke away after the Indian branch of the JUI-H
opposed partition. After the partition a number of
educated Indian Muslims left for Pakistan, and
took up very influential positions in government
there. The result is that the bulk of the
administration, army and judiciary in Pakistan are
dominated by Deobandis. Deobandi thinking
continues to be a major influence on Pakistani
government policy. During the period of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the rule of the
Pakistani Army dictator Gen. Zia ul Haq, the power
of Pakistani Deobandis grew enormously. Several
major Deobandi learning centers, such as the
Jamia-ul-Uloom Banuri and the Dar-ul-Uloom
Haqqania at Akora Khattak, became centers for the
promotion of a new brand of militant Islam.
Influential preachers from these institutions
became respected voices in Pakistan and were given
powerful positions on the Council of Islamic
Ideology, a body setup by Gen. Zia to shape
Pakistani national policy. An infusion of funds
and arms from Saudi Arabia and western
intelligence agencies, created huge standing
armies of radical Deobandis in Pakistan. The role
of leading Pakistani Deobandi Ulema in creating
the Taliban has been well documented now, and the
links between these Ulema and Osama Bin Laden are
public knowledge. Major Deobandi organizations in
Pakistan like the Harkat-ul-Mujaheedin, dominate
the nodal body for the Kashmiri Jihad, the
Muttahida Jihad Council. Pakistani elements of a
Deobandi religious order, the Tablighi Jamaat
which had a great following among some sections of
the Pakistani Army was also found to be involved
in an attempt to depose the elected Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto and to impose Islamic rule in
Pakistan. The leader of this coup attempt Maj.
Gen. Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi, once the ISI head of
station in New Delhi, was jailed for treason in
1995. Gen. Abbasi was released after Gen.
Musharraf ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in
1999. Gen. Abbasi immediately went on to establish
a new organization, the Hizb-allah, comprising
former military officers that would aim to
establish Islamic rule in Pakistan. To summarize
in all the Jihads run by the Pakistan Army’s
Inter-Services Intelligence agency, the Pakistani
Deobandis had a major role.
After
Sept 11, 2001, the US invaded Afghanistan to
remove the Taliban from power, and to capture
Osama Bin Laden. At this time, all Pakistani
Deobandi Ulema vociferously opposed the US and
condemned Gen. Musharraf’s cooperation with the
US forces. Huge rallies were organized and the
public sympathy generated in this process for the
Islamist cause, brought the Pakistani Deobandi led
Islamist political alliance, the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal to power in the recent parliamentary
elections. Since then almost every single day in
the Pakistani National Assembly, MMA legislators
have called for the ouster of Gen. Musharraf. Most
MMA office bearers publicly challenge the fairness
of the referendum that Gen. Musharraf claims to
have won. High ranking Pakistani Deobandi Ulema like Maulana Shamzai
had strongly opposed any move by the Pakistan
Govt. to participate in the US counter terrorist
activity. In the aftermath of the A. Q. Khan
nuclear smuggling scandal, the Pakistani Deobandi
Ulema once again led the charge against the Govt.
of Pakistan for having sold out the Pakistani
Nuclear Program. The year 2002 saw the most
intense Indo-Pak standoff to date. During this
period the Govt. of India succeed in forcing Gen.
Musharraf to act against major anti-India
terrorist groups in Pakistan. The leaders of
several groups were placed under house arrest, and
their groups declared terrorist organizations in
Pakistan. The ISI unit responsible for
coordinating these groups was also asked to
curtail its activities. Most of the groups shut
down were Pakistani Deobandi outfits. By contrast
the Alhe Hadithi outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba, headed by
Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, was spared the axe and
continues to operate with impunity in Pakistan
today.
From
the perspective of people in the Pakistani Army
intelligence community, the Ahle Hadithis are a
very useful group. Being a minority in Pakistan,
they are constantly under the threat of
assimilation from the other Sunni sub-sects. As
their brand of Islam is very close to the Wahhabi
church of Saudi Arabia, these groups usually
attract a lot of funding from Saudi sources. In
addition to this there are numerous internal
fractures, mostly along caste lines within the
Ahle Hadith groups in Pakistan, so this makes it
easy for the Pakistani intelligence community to
leverage groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
Before Sept. 11 2001, most Pakistan watchers noted
that all the international Jihad operations run
out of Pakistan, i.e. support to Arab, Chechen,
Bosnian, Myanmarese, Malaysian and Indonesian
groups was coordinated by Pakistani Deobandi
leaders and groups like the Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin,
and the Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami. At one point of
time the ties between the HuM and the Al Qaida
were so close that one Indian analyst suggested
that the Al Qaida’s Makhtab-al-Khidmat and the
HuM were practically indistinguishable entities.
After Sept. 11, 2001, one no longer sees this
connection. The Lashkar-e-Taiba however seems to
be growing in profile and spread. On a daily basis
we are treated to reports about American, British,
French and Australian Muslims getting trained at
LeT camps in Pakistan to commit terrorist acts in
western countries. Another interesting fact that
came to light recently was that a Pakistani
national had been trained at a LeT facility and
asked by Al Qaida operatives to participate in
Sept 11, but the Pakistani defected and informed
the FBI. Tragically this intelligence input did
not receive the attention it merited. The LeT has
also been involved in promoting terrorism against
US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The LeT leader,
Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, has been making statements
about the possession of nuclear weapons and other
WMD. A number of analysts privately admit that the
LeT may already have the know-how to make chemical
and biological weapons. The involvement of A. Q.
Khan with the LeT has been subject to some
speculation also. The sudden rise in profile of
the LeT in the last three years, led one Indian
analyst, Shri. B. Raman to characterize the LeT as
the “new standard bearer of the Al Qaida and the
International Islamic Front”.
This
rise in profile of the LeT appears to have come at
the expense of the Pakistani Deobandi groups. It
is not uncommon for the Pakistani intelligence
community to play off one group against another to
ensure that a control is maintained on things.
While this sort of `friendly football’ would be
fine under ordinary circumstances, in the current
atmosphere in Pakistan, this is a very bad idea.
The Musharraf government is increasingly being
perceived as being anti-Muslim. That label
attracts all sorts of bad vibes, and it drives the
Islamic religious fanatics into a homicidal
frenzy. The Indian Deobandis were extremely
consistent in their opposition to British colonial
rule. Conditions in Pakistan today, are
reminiscent of the worst days of colonial power.
Pakistani Deobandis must feel a deeply ingrained
sense of anger over the perceived failure of the
Pakistani Army to protect Pakistan, and Islam from
the Americans. Given the extent to which the
Pakistani Deobandis penetrate the bureaucracy, the
Army and the judiciary, this anger must be quite
palpable to Gen. Musharraf.
All this brings us to the events of the last
three weeks, namely the assassination of Maulana
Nizamuddin Shamzai, the most respected Deobandi
cleric in Pakistan, and the attack on Lt. Gen.
Ahsan Saleem Hayat’s convoy. Given the sheer
spread of Islamist influence and power in Karachi,
it is difficult to imagine that the Pakistani
Deobandi leadership in Karachi did not know of the
attack on Gen. Hayat’s convoy. Given the
suspicious circumstances of Maulana Shamzai’s
murder, perhaps the Deobandi leadership in Karachi
had their reasons for looking the other way? It
comes as no surprise to Pakistan watchers that the
Pakistani Army has been very circumspect in their
investigation. Of the eighty suspects arrested in
connection with the attack not one has been
identified by group affiliation. The Pakistani
Army appears very keen to avoid a confrontation of
any sort in Karachi. All of these could make a
reasonable person conclude that the attack on the
Corps Commander’s convoy in the heart of Karachi
is the public expression of a direct challenge
from the Deobandi Ulema of Karachi to the
leadership of General Pervez Musharraf. Gen.
Musharraf can only ignore the implications of such
a challenge at his own peril.
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