Siachen:
A Viewpoint
Brig. (r) S. K. Raychaudhuri VSM
The Siachen area is awe inspiring and beautiful…..till the
first few steps are taken! The challenges to human
endurance that this beautiful and inspiring
scenario imposes adequately negate the initial
impression caused by its stark beauty.
The Siachen Glacier is awesome and it embodies one of the most
inhospitable and glaciated environs in the world.
The glacier runs down the valley in the Karakoram
Range and is 76 kilometers long and varies in
width between 2 to 8 kilometers. The mountains
alongside the Siachen, range between 15,000 to
25,000 feet. The ridges are sharp, rugged and
barren. Local resources are absent. The gradients
are steep and precludes cross country movement and
the glacier is highly crevassed.
Compounding the arduousness are the snow and blizzards. It
receives 6 to 7 meters of the annual total of 10
meters of snow in winter alone. Blizzards can
reach speeds up to 150 knots (nearly 300 kilometers
per hour). The temperature drops routinely to 45
degrees C below zero, and the wind chill factor
makes the temperature dip further with increase in
wind velocity. The weather is fickle and can
change without notice. It does not require
imagination to realize the isolation and
forbiddances of this place.
Such an environment makes conducting a war in this area an
expensive proposition. An unending, undeclared war
is worse still. Siachen, thus, is mind boggling,
not only in since a solution is elusive, but also
in financial terms and in human lives.
The origin of the Siachen imbroglio can be traced to Karachi
Agreement (27 July 1949) consequent to the first
war over Kashmir after Partition.
The terminology in the delineation beyond
NJ 9842 was couched in the vague phrase ‘thence moving
northwards’. This ‘northward moving line’
was never physically demarcated or verified on
ground. The Pakistani contention that Siachen is a
part of Baltistan in the Northern Areas of
Pakistan is faulty if viewed in the light of the
Karachi Agreement. Every area would then be a part
of the Northern Area of Pakistan so to say given
this astounding logic. Therefore, the ground
reality and the geopolitical situation demanded
physical occupation and administrative control
which India undertook in 1984. This gave
concrete body to the vagueness of the delineation
terminology of the Karachi Agreement and its
successor Agreement at Suchetgarh (11 December
1972). The question of interpretation and
exercising of this prerogative physically and
administratively was thus resolved.
The question of the line ‘thence moving northward’ going
North West or North East is of pertinence.
Currently, the line moves from NJ 9842 through
Bilafond, Saltoro Kangri, Sia La, Baltoro. It thus
joins at the central segment of the Shaksgam area
of Jammu-Kashmir which Pakistan illegally ceded to
China.
A North Eastern demarcation of the line would join it to the
Sino – Indian boundary between the eastern
corner of Pakistani-ceded Shaksgam and the western
corner of Chinese-occupied Aksai China. This is
where the strategic Karakoram Pass is situated (a
distance of 91.3 kilometres). The occupation of
Siachen effectively separates Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir (POK) from Aksai Chin, the part of Kashmir
claimed and Occupied by China and hence precludes
any outflanking moves to isolate Leh or even
Kargil sectors. It also empowers India to keep a
check on the Khunjarab Pass; as also is a positive
factor to any negotiation with China on the border
question.
Thus, the view that Siachen is an exercise in futility and too
expensive an all encompassing burden is not valid
given the geopolitical realities then and even
now.
There is a view that India could withdraw from the Glacier.
Unless there is an international assurance, which
in any case, is not the worth in paper it is
written on, there is no guarantee that Pakistan
would not occupy the Glacier. In such a case advantages
that India currently has would be negated. To imagine that
holding a few major passes would suffice would
also not be valid since moving troops in a High Altitude
Area to an impending threat
is laborious, time consuming, physically
impossible given human adaptability limits and
thus merely theoretical.
Pakistan occupies the southern slopes of the Saltoro
Watershed, most of which is between 9000 to 10,000
feet at most places, whereas India occupies the
northern slopes which are higher and reach 25000
feet. This makes operating in high altitudes
compared to Pakistan more complex and difficult.
It is in Pakistan’s advantage that lower heights given them
a positive inherent logistic supply continuum and
less dependant on air supply. As Pakistan occupies
lower heights there logistic can be land based
routes while the same is not the case with India.
This also ensures that the cost of operations is
much lower for Pakistan, especially in financial
terms.
Occupation of commanding heights and passes is the crux to the
defense of Siachen. Therefore, the flip side of
the altitudinal disadvantage is that it provides
tactical advantage. Given the altitude and the
steep terrain it is immensely difficult to
dislodge the defender as Pakistan has learnt at a
high cost.
Pakistan however occupies certain areas which give them the
advantage over the logistic routes.
The Base Camp for Indian forces is 12,000 feet above sea
level. The altitude of some Indian forward bases
on the Saltoro Ridge ranges from Kumar (16,000
feet) and Bila Top (18,600 feet) to Pahalwan
(20,000 feet) and Indira Col (22,000 feet).
Because of the steep gradient of the Saltoro
Range, the area is also prone to avalanches. It is
may be pertinent to mention that only 3 per cent
of the Indian casualties were caused by hostile
firing. The remaining 97 per cent have fallen prey
to the altitude, weather, and terrain.
The greatest challenge is logistics. The maintenance chain is
by fixed wing air drops, helicopters, porters,
army mules or small donkeys. This is
not only financially costly but also costly in
terms of effort. As
per an estimate, it costs between Rs 1,00,000 to
Rs 1,50,000 per ton depending upon the aircraft/
helicopter employed.
The interesting fact is that Kerosene Oil required for heating
and drying purpose constitutes about 40% of the
tonnage lifted. As Kerosene freezes at -50 C, it
is possible to use a pipeline to pump Kerosene.
Much that it may astound those who have not
operated at such attitudes and adverse weather
conditions that Kerosene oil is more welcomed than
foodstuff.
As is well known, food is not a problem since these altitudes
influence an aversion to food. The appetite is
reduced. Tinned stuff is most unpalatable and
this low intake in food seriously affects the
operational efficiency, even though it is not
apparent if one goes by the enthusiasm of all
ranks in executing their tasks. 6000 calories are
essential at these altitudes compared to 3000 to
4000 calories at lower heights.
There is a continuous effort to reduce costs. To offset the
cost in the supply chain, which is airlifted from
Chandigarh or brought from Srinagar since the food
habits are different from the locals, the DRDO has
done commendable work. They are greening Partapur,
the Siachen brigade headquarters at an altitude of
around 11,000 feet. A serious attempt is to grow
fresh vegetables for troops stationed at an
altitude of 12,000 feet and above (up to 20,000
feet) on the glacier and beyond on the Soltoro
ridge. A pilot project is already underway to grow
cabbage, capsicum, onions, tomatoes, cauliflower
and brinjals. It is to their credit that when the
temperatures are minus 25 degrees Celsius and snow
omnipresent they succeeded in harvesting crop
through solar green house cultivation. It is of
interest to note that not only they are army
specific, they are actively assisting the local
populace. However, the sizes of the vegetable are
so large that they defy imagination!
My unit in Kargil, though not in the glacier, had a full
fledged poultry organized in a shed with bukharis
so that my men had fresh chicken when they so
desired.
There is a dairy is already functioning in Partapur on an
experimental basis and approximately 200 liters of
milk are sent up to different posts on the glacier
every day.
Health remains a problem. Pulmonary edema is a killer. Acclimatization
is the only way to ensure unnecessary deaths. At
times, owing to operational imperatives, this is
forgotten, but then the costs are high.
The challenges to human endurance make the conduct of operations
as challenge not only in military terms but also in
human ingenuity. This is the sole factor that makes
Siachen Glacier operations a keynote issue in the
art or science of conducting warfare and
thereby keeping it at the center of everyone's
attention.
The
author is a retired Infantry officer of the Indian
Army