The reign of the Non-proliferation Ayatollahs

Kaushik Kapistalam

Once the US successfully built and used nuclear weapons to devastating effect to end the Second World War, other great powers of the time realized that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was essential to maintain their status. In 1970, after three decades of hectic developments, America, along with other big powers at that time then formulated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. The NPT divided countries into two groups: those that tested nuclear weapons before 1968, and those that did not. The "nuclear-weapon states" comprised of the US, China, France, Russia (then the Soviet Union) and the United Kingdom. These states were allowed, temporarily, to maintain their nuclear status. Other countries joined the NPT as "non-nuclear-weapon states". In return for committing never to develop or receive nuclear weapons, these countries were given two promises, which included a commitment from the nuclear-weapon states to nuclear disarmament and access to the peaceful nuclear technology.

To enforce this treaty, American and Western European governments set up entire bureaucracies staffed with international lawyers, career diplomats and arms control specialists. The era of the non-proliferation ayatollah had begun.

So who exactly is a non-proliferation ayatollah? An NPA is a person, usually in a Western government bureaucracy, who advocates the advancement of American or Western geo-political goals through the prevention of spread of nuclear, missile, space and “dual use” technologies to countries identified as inimical to Western dominance in the aforementioned areas. It is critical to distinguish the non-proliferation ayatollah from a non-proliferation doctrinaire. A non-proliferation doctrinaire is someone who truly believes that nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction are a serious threat to all of mankind and seeks to rid all countries of such dangerous technology, including Western nations.

NPAs and South Asia

Despite attempts at persuasion, India, Pakistan and Israel refused to be parties to the NPT. India came to the conclusion when it became clear that, instead of addressing the central objective of universal and comprehensive non-proliferation, the NPT only legitimized the continuing possession and multiplication of nuclear stockpiles by the nuclear-weapon states. Indian policymakers saw this as a discriminatory system that is highly prejudicial to India’s strategic interests.

The NPAs saw India’s refusal to accede to the NPT and its “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 as dangerous and obstructionist. While they accepted China as a legitimate great power, they did not see any need for India to develop nuclear weapons. The NPAs saw Israel as a special case and were quite sympathetic to Pakistani pleas that it cannot sign the NPT without India doing so as well. In the South Asian context therefore, the NPAs policy had two cornerstones – preservation of the nuclear status quo and a hyphenation of India and Pakistan. The latter soon developed into a mantra for the NPAs. The zero sum game between India and Pakistan also became a useful tool for the NPAs to prod India into submission.

During the Cold War years, India’s ties with the Soviet Union reduced NPAs’ direct leverage on India. Therefore, the NPAs saw Pakistan’s attempts to acquire nuclear weapons as the only means to convince India not to build nuclear weapons. Even though they prevented Pakistan from acquiring plutonium-reprocessing technology, Western governments glossed over Pakistan’s clandestine procurement of Uranium enrichment technology from right under their noses. Despite denials from both parties, Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s enrichment and nuclear warhead building projects was also an open secret. It was also well known that many rich Muslim nations like Saudi Arabia and Libya had contributed financially to Pakistan’s bomb efforts during that time.

While it is true that non-proliferation was perhaps forced to play second fiddle to other geo-strategic concerns during the Cold War years, it was hard to avoid noticing the emergence of a clear pattern of the NPAs’ cover up of Pakistan’s proliferation. Another facet of this era was that the NPAs placed India and Pakistan on the same moral plane. In fact, many accounts indicate that the NPAs were quite sympathetic to Pakistan’s position that it was only responding to India’s “aggressive” development of nuclear weapons. Even though Pakistan was using extra legal means to acquire technology for its nuclear program in contrast to India’s essentially indigenous program, the NPAs still blamed India for “the original sin” of introducing weapons to South Asia. From later accounts, it is discernible that the NPAs might have made a calculation that until they actually tested the devices; it was always possible for them to cap and roll back the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs. But whatever their motivation, the die had been cast in the 1980s and 1990s.

NPAs and Pokhran-II

After the end of the Cold War, Western non-proliferation policy, especially that of the US NPAs proceeded on autopilot. If anything, the NPAs found more reasons to continue a policy of engagement with Pakistan and more importantly China, which was becoming a global economic force. Even though US-Indian relations started to thaw during this period, the NPAs attached less importance to engaging India, which they still considered as an obstructionist force, than they did to China and Pakistan.

But the late eighties to mid nineties also saw an order of magnitude change in proliferation. There was clear evidence of Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs. In 1992, US slapped sanctions on Chinese firms for delivering M-11 ballistic missile components to Pakistan. After a written assurance from China to stick to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, the sanctions were lifted. Nine months after the waiver, the Los Angeles Times reported China's violation of the commitment. The Times’ December 4, 1992 article quoted U.S. intelligence officials as stating that China had recently delivered about around 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan through the port of Karachi. The former Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, also admitted to Pakistan's purchase of M-11's from China, but said the missiles were not nuclear capable.

Shortly after the imposition of sanctions, some NPAs were quoted as saying that despite "...overwhelming intelligence evidence that China in November of 1992 shipped Pakistan key components of its M-11 missile" -- an MTCR Category 1 violation - - Secretary of State Warren Christopher decided China had only committed a Category 2 violation and imposed the mildest form of sanctions possible. Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis defended the decision, saying the U.S. did not have conclusive evidence Pakistan had received complete M-11's. The NPAs also made it clear that the sanctions could be lifted if China signed the MTCR. Eventually, the sanctions were lifted in 1995 after merely another Chinese pledge to stick to MTCR guidelines, despite Chinese refusal to formally sign on to the regime.

Amidst all this, American NPAs saw no problem with the sale of a Cray supercomputer and advanced American Space Research technology to China. In 1996, after obtaining clear evidence of the sale of 5,000 ring magnets, critical Uranium enrichment components, to Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC), American NPAs refused to make a “determination” whether China violated its NPT commitments. Prior to this, the NPAs also ignored evidence that China gave Pakistan the design for a 25-kiloton implosion type A-bomb plus enriched uranium for two nuclear weapons. In addition, just before formally acceding to the in 1992, China signed a $500 million deal to construct a 300 MW nuclear reactor in Chashma, Pakistan. The fact that the NPT forbade its signatories from exporting such technologies to non-NPT signatories made it clear that China was thumbing its nose and the NPAs. Former Pentagon non-proliferation expert Henry Sokolski succinctly captured the NPAs’ actions in this timeframe as thus:

…U.S. officials have taken a more cowardly course, downplaying initial proliferation reports, especially when they involved nations Washington wanted to engage.

While the NPAs pursued a “see no evil, hear no evil” policy with China, Pakistan also benefited from this kid glove treatment, despite being sanctioned for building nuclear weapons. In 1998, the situation took a turn for the worse when Pakistan “tested” a long-range ballistic missile, which was identical to the North Korean NoDong missile. Titled “Ghauri”, this new missile gave Pakistan the means to deliver a nuclear warhead to all corners of India. Apparently, because the US was engaging Pakistan at that time for its role in Afghanistan, the US NPAs were muted again in their criticism of the Pakistani-North Korean proliferation link. Let it not be forgotten that it was this background, when the NPAs were totally blind to the alarming increase in Sino-Pakistani proliferation that the Indian policy makers decided to test its nuclear weapons in 1998.

The A Q Khan Nuclear Black Market

Various acts of omission and commission by the non-proliferation ayatollahs led to the 1998 nuclear weapons testing of India, followed by Pakistan. However, the stark reality of the consequences of the dubious policies adopted by the NPAs towards Pakistani and Chinese proliferation came to light recently in the exposé of the Pakistan’s “nuclear father” Dr.A.Q.Khan and his nuclear smuggling ring.

Khan and his cohorts stood accused of transferring Uranium enrichment technology, designs for an implosion device and even some enriched Uranium to Libya, Iran and North Korea. With Libya virtually handing over its nuclear program to the US and the UK, the evidence of Pakistani involvement was irrefutable. Iran also admitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it obtained its nuclear wares from Pakistan. In early February, Khan made a televised confession in English taking full responsibility for the nuclear sales and absolved the Pakistani government. After Khan’s plea for mercy, Pakistani leader Gen.Musharraf promptly pardoned him. There was only a muted response to this high farce from Washington and other Western capitals.

Firstly, the idea that the Pakistani government was not involved in the proliferation acts of A.Q.Khan must be debunked. Former Pakistan army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg openly called for nuclear ties with Iran in the early 1990s when the nuclear transfers supposedly began. Libya has had long standing ties with the Pakistani nuclear program starting with the funding of the then nascent Pakistani nuclear program by Col. Gaddafi when Z.A.Bhutto was the Pakistani leader in the 1970s. Surely the wily Libyan leader was not doing this out of the solidarity with a fellow Islamic nation. The Pakistan-North Korea nuclear relationship was a simple nukes for missiles barter deal by which Pakistan was able to acquire North Korean NoDong ballistic missile by paying for it with nuclear technology, at a time when Pakistan was facing a financial crisis. The fact that Pakistan Air Force planes were involved in transferring this technology clearly shows state involvement in nuclear proliferation.

NPAs after the A.Q.Khan scandal

In this context, the reactions of the NPAs to the Khan saga are both predictable and alarming. The official NPA view of how to pursue the Pakistan led nuclear ring and shut it down is best illustrated by a recent speech by Robert Einhorn, the non-proliferation Czar in the second Clinton administration. After shocking the audience with his admission that successive US administrations have had "a very tough time facing up to Pakistan’s proliferation problem," Mr. Einhorn proceeded to blame India for its “original sin” in introducing nukes to South Asia. Never mind that South Asia was immediately bordered by a freely proliferating nuclear power, China. The best course with Pakistan, opined Mr. Einhorn, was to "forget the past and look to the future". Really?

The sheer logical fallacy of this opinion is staggering. Firstly, despite the behind the scenes pressure on it, Pakistan has compelling reasons to keep the nuclear underworld alive, albeit more discreet. Because of its weak indigenous scientific capacity, Pakistan has long relied on Western sources for sophisticated nuclear components. Even as the A.Q.Khan saga was unfolding, US Federal prosecutors were looking at the case of a South Africa based middleman who was caught in a sting operation sending nuclear bomb triggers to a man a person with ties to Pakistani intelligence. Clearly, for Gen.Musharraf to cooperate in dismantling the nuclear network would see Pakistan lose is nuclear component supply chain, bringing its nuclear weapons program to a grinding halt. Now why would Gen. Musharraf or any other Pakistani leader do that? Alternatively, if the NPAs believe that they can convince Pakistan to take actions that could not but shut its nuclear program down, then why not apply multilateral pressure to open up Pakistan’s nuclear program directly?

The other “brilliant” argument used by the NPAs is to point out that the Pakistani army is the best keeper of Pakistan’s bomb and therefore must be engaged and not isolated. Now, this one is a hoot. Firstly, it is the Pakistani army that has so recklessly indulged in nuclear profligacy for all these years. Should the US rely on the very same institution again by forgiving past sins, the most logical consequence would be the emboldening of future Generals to keep the nuclear sales option open because they now know they have been able to get away with it before. The “nightmare scenario” of Islamic Radicals taking over Pakistan should Gen.Musharraf fall is simply not likely. America has been constantly cultivating the Generals immediately junior to Gen.Musharraf and should Musharraf be deposed, it is extremely likely that another pro-Western General would replace him.

China and India – Double Standards?

If the NPAs’ reaction to Pakistan’s role in proliferation is predictably absurd, their reaction to the role of China can be described as shamelessly craven. The Washington Post reported that the items surrendered by Libya included “step-by-step instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb” and “technical instructions for manufacturing components for the device.” The source of all this material was China, even though the Khan network distributed it. This revelation was unimpeachable evidence of Chinese role in nuclear proliferation. This was also the worst kind of nuclear proliferation, because should a terrorist group get access to nuclear fuel, this design gives them the ability to build a nuclear bomb that could fit on the rear of a pick up truck and therefore giving them the ability to inflict a carnage immensely worse than the 9/11 atrocities.

But the NPA circles did not waste time after this news to come to China’s defense. Former Clinton Administration special policy advisor on non-proliferation at the Department of Energy, Jon Wolfsthal, said that Chinese views on proliferation has changed “dramatically since the 1980s” and that of late the Chinese “generally cooperate” with the US in preventing nuclear technology leakage. This claim flies in the face of the facts that came to light when Mr. Wolfsthal was in the government, such as the Chinese sale of ring magnets to Pakistan and continuing missile technology assistance to Pakistan and Iran. The NPAs also conveniently ignore the otherwise inescapable conclusion that Pakistan could not have used C-130 cargo planes to ferry nuclear technology and missiles to and from North Korea without refueling in Chinese territory.

While the NPAs see no problem with continuing US hi-tech co-operation with China despite its apparent desire to proliferate to anti-American regimes, the NPA reaction to similar co-operation with India, even at a lower level, has been downright hostile. On January 12, President Bush released a statement outlining American desire to pursue the “Glide Path” or hi-tech co-operation with India, including in the areas of Space and civilian nuclear arenas. But within hours of the announcement, a State Department NPA hurriedly convened a briefing and poured cold water over the announcement. The official, who spoke “on the background”, made it clear that this co-operation would take years and is contingent on India “tightening its export laws” amongst other things. Never mind that unlike China or even the Western European nations, which allowed private companies to supply Khan with nuclear components for decades while sitting comfortably under a NATO nuclear umbrella, India has never even come close to transferring dangerous technology to other states. As if this was not enough, the official went out of the way to make it clear that the US would like to offer the same deal to Pakistan - at the time of the A.Q.Khan scandal!

Dangers of Groupthink

A previous article by this author pointed out the prevalence of Groupthink in US strategic circles when it comes to South Asia. As one can see, nowhere is Groupthink more prevalent than in the non-proliferation bureaucracy. The NPAs dislike democratic India because the Indian leadership wouldn’t “play ball” with them while they find it easy to deal with the authoritarian Pakistani and Chinese ruling elites who show a ready acceptance of Western norms. What they don’t realize is that while Pakistani Generals and Chinese Communist leaders may display a liking to Western diplomacy, it only serves as a veneer to mask their deep rooted contempt for core Western values like democracy, individual liberties and transparent rule of law. Indeed the Chinese and Pakistani rulers see the NPAs as weak-kneed when they forgive any number of broken promises made by them in bad faith on the basis of proclaimed strategic or economic interests and yet feel humiliated and swear revenge in the rare occasions the West manages to draw the line.

The NPAs’ Groupthink also makes them oblivious to the pattern of Pakistani and Chinese proliferation, which clearly belies their desire to keep challenging the status quo - not just of geopolitics, but also of values. In some aspects they're out to prove not just that West has no values when it comes to foreign policy and that liberal values are unnecessary for a nation to become a great power. Indeed they seek to demonstrate to the West that “freedom and democracy” are one great lie conjured up and promoted by the West to maintain its hegemony over the rest of the world. Therefore, for the NPAs to continue to push for proliferation policy with China and Pakistan that has long moved well South of the line separating engagement and appeasement is downright reckless and irresponsible.

A clear example of the emboldening of Chinese and Pakistani nuclear goals by the free pass that they received from the US came in the form of this month’s revelation that Pakistani nuclear officials secretly visited Beijing recently to conclude the technical agreement for the second 300 MW Chinese reactor to be built at Chashma, Pakistan. In addition, reports say that Pakistan and China are already talking about a huge 600 MW Chinese reactor in Karachi. Yet there’s not even a whimper of protest from the American NPAs to these acts of chutzpah.

In the ultimate analysis, the policy decisions formulated by the American non-proliferation ayatollahs over the years have clearly failed to achieve their stated goals of preventing dangerous mass destruction weapons from being acquired by states with dubious records. Even granting that many of non-proliferation goals had to play second fiddle to other pressing geo-strategic concerns, the NPAs’ various acts of selectively targeting acts of proliferation has reduced their credibility to a state beyond repair. More than that, by their serial acts of cover-up of proliferation, especially by China and Pakistan, the NPAs have perhaps provided fillip to some in the latter state especially, to continue their dangerous trade to rogue nations and more dangerously to terrorist groups. While the NPAs have perhaps failed to prevent nuclear proliferation, they did succeed in preventing the proliferation of one thing – new ideas. That may turn out to be their most deleterious contribution in the long run.

This piece first appeared on the website of the Observer Research Foundation, www.orfonline.org and has been reproduced here with their permission.