BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR - Volume 6(4) January February 2004

Thinking Outside the Box!

Capt. (r) Bharat Verma

As per Western estimates, by 2025, India is likely to emerge as the third largest economy in the world. These predictions require an upward revision, as there exists a parallel black economy that runs in tandem. However, every time the Indian subcontinent generated wealth, foreign invaders in one fashion or the other managed to plunder it, either due to lack of military muscle or the inability of its rulers to employ military power profitably to defend it.

The reasons are not difficult to fathom as they lie broadly in two inherent failings. First, to secure the physical boundaries of India, we need to influence our strategic frontiers to act as the first line of defense. Irrespective of how much military power we generate, mere deployment of the military instrument on the borders by itself is inadequate, as this tends to get grounded, without lucrative spin-offs. The military surplus lost over the last five decades in Kashmir and the Northeast is stupendous. Due to this myopic bogging down on land frontiers, we overlooked a simple fact that India is geographically placed to be a maritime as well as a continental power. Unless and until, we endeavor to lend stability, within a cooperative framework, to our strategic frontiers in East, West and Central Asia, peace dividends will not accrue. Therefore, benevolent India should position itself as the natural economic hub in Asia. Efficiently backed by powerful integrated military wherewithal to safeguard its areas of influence.

Second, after Independence, out of fear, we were neither ambitious enough to wrest strategic space from others attempting to encircle us, nor did we evolve strategies to force them to contend for political space in our vicinity. For example, our fears began to show after the Pakistani nuclear tests at Chagai. Since then the fear of a nuclear strike by Pakistan and its potential for destruction has become manifest in all our planning for war and peace. The policy of No First Use itself reflects our fears. Pakistan stands assured that it need not fear a pre-emptive nuclear attack from India. This whittles away the deterrence value. Another evident fear has been the reluctance to take offensive action against terrorist bases in PoK, despite an edge in conventional forces. The sum total of these fears was obvious when the leadership hesitated to take Operation Parakaram to its logical conclusion. They were ready to go up to the edge but no further.

Primarily, the lack of national ambition to secure our areas of influence, and the inability to expand strategic space were born out of slavish attachment to Anglo-Saxon perceptions that subtly wanted us boxed within the subcontinent. Our intellectuals, by and large were wedded to promoting the Anglo-Saxon and Western analyses, which are usually detrimental to our interests. For example, the latest theory being advocated by American surrogates in India, is that Beijing will throw us out after taking the advantage, like an used condom, if we join the China-India-Russia trilateral. Subsequently, it would be too late to participate in the America-Israel-India trilateral. Therefore, we will be left standing in the cold! This kind of strategic folklore, planted through instruments of soft psychological warfare has kept Indians restricted to the subcontinent. Despite our territorial independence, mentally our elders were boxed-in by Anglo-Saxon security prescriptions and paradigms. They have been handicapped in visionary thinking and decisive military action, in pursuit of our national interests.

Therefore, it is to the credit of the Vajpayee government that in 2003, New Delhi finally started thinking outside the box. First, India’s increasing military muscle is quietly backing its economic diplomacy in East, West and Central Asia. In Look-East, the Indian Navy is implementing a cooperative framework of security with ASEAN navies as well as with out-of-the-region naval powers to secure the sea-line of communication in the Indian Ocean. While Looking-East, the Indian Navy should do contingency planning for an integrated force to be to able get in, restore stability, and exit quickly, should the Malacca Strait or any other sea-lanes be threatened. More significantly, for the first time, New Delhi is vigorously shaping a Look-North policy – the direction from which India was regularly invaded in the past. Afghanistan and the various Central Asian Republics, and enhanced cooperation with Iran and Russia are now the focus of India’s strategic attention. Shaping of a Look-North policy is crucial for our energy security in the future. Hence, if Indian troops need to be deployed on the request of a legitimate local government, they should be in Afghanistan to act as a force-multiplier for Kabul and not Baghdad. It would be suicidal to hand over Kabul once again to a Pakistan backed Taliban.

Though one last effort is worthwhile, the successful outcome of our peace initiative with Pakistan is doubtful. However, irrespective of the outcome, it is imperative that India permanently disables Pakistan’s capability to export terrorism by firmly entrenching itself to the West of Islamabad. In West Asia, our intelligence agencies are interacting with Gulf countries and the Western outfits to nip terrorist as well as criminal activities in the bud. India needs to enhance its military cooperation through a program of exchange of officers and by support training of such countries’ military for optimum results.

Second, instead of walking into the Anglo-Saxon trap of America-Israel-India or China-Russia-India trilateral, New Delhi has wisely decided to extract the best political mileage from China as well as America. With China, inter-connectivity of economy and discussions on border disputes became a possibility in the year 2003. Similarly, enhanced military to military cooperation with America on areas of mutual interests was kicked off with a measured approach. However Indo-US Strategic partnership remains hostage due to American support to a terrorist state of Pakistan and has run into difficulties with these double standards. At the same time, it is vital for India to ensure that American agencies do not infiltrate our establishments and attempt to take control of our strategic autonomy. This remains their key objective in the countries they operate in, under the disguise of partnership.

Third, in the “near abroad”, New Delhi is actively supporting the Royal Nepalese Army with training and weapons against the Maoist insurgency. Indian intelligence agencies are coordinating with Nepalese and US agencies to track down ISI and other foreign outfits helping the Jehadi activities inimical to India. At the same time, New Delhi must advise Kathmandu to ensure rapid economic development, as military solutions at best can provide temporary respite. Active military support by way of training, techniques and logistics is also being rendered to Bhutan, which has decided to kick out anti-India forces like ULFA from its soil. Similarly, with Myanmar, our economic diplomacy has started paying dividends and the military junta will conduct operations to expel anti-India insurgents from their soil. Deft handling by New Delhi to deny space to anti-India forces in its vicinity is a major policy shift. Though we have yet to find common ground with Bangladesh, where almost 300 anti-India terrorist training camps are being run. In Sri Lanka, our support to the peace process continues to disallow derailment of the talks.

Last but not the least. The pace of modernization of the Indian Armed Forces has quickened with big-ticket acquisitions. The Advanced Jet Trainer is in after 17 years of dilly-dallying. The Gorshkov aircraft carrier deal more or less, stands wrapped-up. INS Talwar and Trishul start the process of induction of stealth technology from Russia into the Indian Navy. Su 30 MKI, the fourth generation-plus aircraft guard the Indian airspace. Early warning systems like Phalcon from Israel have been finalized and Arrow-2 missile and Antey 2500 anti missile shields are being assessed. Leasing of two nuclear powered submarines and Tupov-22 Long Range Bombers are under finalization to complete India’s nuclear triad. The IAF is determined to have 60 squadrons by 2010 and the Navy 200 ships in the long run to convert it into a truly blue water force.

Similarly, “leave alone” sensors and thermal imagers have started paying dividends in locating infiltration along the LoC in J&K. Thirty-six Russian multi-barrel-rocket-launchers are under purchase to boost firepower. Deployed on the LoC, they can flatten enemy infrastructure ninety kilometers away. However, New Delhi needs to develop military power in a holistic manner with 3.5 per cent of the GDP set aside for the next fifteen years as a defense budget. Since the process of modernization of the military is time consuming, moneys not consumed in the financial year should be put into the pool for the following year as evaluation of weapon systems and negotiating their price takes a long time. Similarly, the political leadership should pay attention to the ageing profile of the Defense Forces and work out an attractive exit policy. With strategic frontiers officially defined by the Prime Minister, Generals and their equivalent are definitely required to rework their operational contingency planning. For example, if India’s Parliament or such symbols of democracy are attacked again, we will need a tri-service rapid action force to enter enemy territory, cause destruction and de-induct quickly.  Conventional forces the world over take time to react but a designated division level integrated force in a perpetual state of readiness, can meet such short-term challenges effectively.

At the end of the year, New Delhi’s economic balance sheet is looking prosperous once again. Lest outside forces are tempted to impose a surrogate status on India, expanding the military wherewithal to defend the wealth of the nation is imperative.

The writer is the Editor of the Indian Defence Review and this piece has been reproduced here from the latest issue of the India Defence Review with his permission.

 

Copyright © Bharat Rakshak 2004