An Exemplary Onslaught

Bibhu Prasad Routray

The December 2003 military offensive by the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA), in which 30 odd camps[i] of the militant outfits such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), operating in Assam and parts of North Bengal, were demolished, and nearly 3000 cadres[ii] were made to abandon their posts, was long due. Beyond doubt, the military operations spanning over three weeks was nothing short of a landmark in the history of counter-insurgency operations in the India’s northeast.   

The article would briefly examine the series of events leading to the military onslaught and would attempt to assess its importance in terms of marginalizing insurgency.

Intrusion of militancy into Bhutan

There are various theories to explain the presence the Indian militants in Bhutan.  It was believed by some that ULFA was a welcome guest in Bhutan since 1991 whose services were thought to be useful in dealing with the people of Nepalese origin in the country. “Bhutan’s tryst with the ULFA and the Bodo terrorists, by the government providing a safe haven to the insurgents, beginning in 1991, in return for their promise to drive out the Nepalese Ngolop refugees from Bhutan, is a story of utility degenerating into a liability.”[iii] The link between the flight of the Nepalese population from Bhutan and the intrusion of the ULFA is unmistakable. “In the early 1990s, about the time when, following Operation Bajrang and Operation Rhino in Assam, ULFA decided to set up camps in Bhutan, nearly 100,000 Bhutanese citizens of Nepali origin in southern Bhutan, a wild belt of territory covering seven districts, fled (or were forced to flee) to Nepal in the course of a few months.”[iv]

The other theory talks of the ULFA and other outfits making their clandestine entry into the region and the Bhutanese authorities dithering in taking actions against them lest its untrained army might be found wanting in military skills while dealing with the battle-hardened militants. This was implied in the statement issued by the Bhutanese Foreign Ministry on the commencement of the military operations. The Statement said: ‘Many are aware that three armed separatist groups from India, namely the ULFA, NDFB, and KLO have clandestinely entered and established camps in the dense forests of southern Bhutan.”[v]  However, not many, except for the Bhutanese, would be willing to adhere to this theory.

Irrespective of the explanations, touching extremities of Bhutanese innocence and strategic planning, the fact remained that “for over 10 years, the separatist militant groups from Assam (and later, from north Bengal) had virtually "invited themselves" into the kingdom, established several bases, including what the militants themselves rather grandiloquently described as their `General Headquarters' and `Command Headquarters', all well supplied and very well armed, from where they ran their operations against their `enemy', meaning India.”[vi]

Bhutan at first denied Indian complains for over a dozen years that these groups had set up bases in Bhutan. However, since mid-1995 it began to admit, sotto voce, that terrorist base camps indeed existed on its soil. By this time Bhutan itself was feeling the pain.[vii]

Impact on Bhutan

The late realisation of Bhutan of the difficulty posed by the militants’ presence was summed up by the country’s prime minister, in his speech at the SAARC summit in Islamabad. He said: “My own country has suffered for some time the presence of three armed extremist groups from the adjoining Indian states of Assam and West Bengal. Having sneaked into Bhutan, they had established as many as 30 camps in the dense jungles along the entire Bhutan-India border. The strategically located camps were used to train insurgents, store arms and ammunitions, and to launch terrorist attacks inside India. Their presence impeded trade; brought about the closure of several large industries as well as educational institutions in the affected areas and inhibited general socio-economic development in southern Bhutan. Innocent people in Assam, West Bengal as well as in Bhutan have been victims of threat, coercion, and extortion. Unprovoked attacks against Bhutanese nationals travelling through Assam and inside our own territory have resulted in the tragic loss of many lives. Furthermore, they threatened to create misunderstandings and undermine our excellent relations with India.”[viii]

As the operations commenced, the media in Bhutan started narrating the negative impact of the presence of the militants on the country. “For the past decade, Bhutan has suffered seriously from the presence of the militants. Every Bhutanese citizen was directly or indirectly affected. The lives of more than 66,000 people in more than 300 villages were completely disrupted. Trade and economic activities and agriculture in a large part of the country were affected. Bhutanese travelling through Assam, a friendly state, have been harassed and even killed in cold blood. Security concerns hampered the development process and, more important, the presence of the militants threatened the security and sovereignty of the country.”[ix] “Development and economic activities in Bhutan have been seriously affected by the presence of the militants. Work at large industries such as the Dungsum Cement Project have been suspended. Educational institutions in vulnerable areas had to be closed down. Trade, agriculture production and other commercial activities in several districts of the country have been disrupted.”[x]

On the other side, there can be no denial of the prosperity the militants brought with them to the people living around the camp area in southern Bhutan. ‘The arrival of the militants from Assam and the construction of the camps and their infrastructure injected a lot of money into an area that even by the standards of Bhutan is economically underdeveloped. The economy certainly benefited.[xi] However, as days progressed, incidents of insurgency, usually reserved for the area beyond the borders, started either being replicated inside Bhutan or targeted Bhutanese civilians in Assam. ‘In 1997, four Bhutan Police personnel were killed in a terrorist attack on a police station in Nganglam. Then in 1998, a senior Army officer and his convoy were ambushed in Patshala, across the border in Assam. Again, in December 2000, 15 people were killed and many more injured in a terrorist attack, and in August 2002, five Bhutanese were killed in an ambush on the highway to Assam.’[xii]

Apart from that, the insurgents’ stay, in spite of claims to the opposite by the outfits[xiii], did have a bearing on the security of the country by giving rise to a potential band of troublemakers who had grown associates of the militant outfits. Following the culmination of the military offensive, the Royal Bhutan Police questioned more than 25 people suspected to have been involved in taking money from the militants over the past few years.[xiv] The discovery of a large quantity of ammunition[xv], the ULFA and its associate outfits had stockpiled over the years, suggests a dangerous liaison between high-ranking Bhutanese officials and the militants. It is highly unlikely that these actions against the sovereignty of India were sustained without the Bhutanese knowledge.

The following narration is an example of nefarious network, the ULFA was successful in crating for furthering its operations. In July 2002, the Bhutan government admitted to the fact that the outfit was successful in using the cover of diplomatic baggage to send money abroad. Police investigations revealed in two installments about $38,000 and Rs 3,00,000 were sent in diplomatic baggage between January and July, 1996. A three- page statement issued by the Royal Government said that ‘While it is true that two junior employees of the Protocol Division were found to have received money and extended some assistance to the militants, this was purely on the individual level and had nothing to do with the Royal Government of Bhutan.’[xvi] 

In another incident, a Guwahati based newspaper, The Sentinel, claimed to have copies of the official letters written by Bhutanese officials to prove the kingdom's role in militancy in Assam. ‘The Sentinel has said the ULFA brought in a consignment of arms from Tibet to its hideouts inside Bhutan with the help of Brig. V Namgyal, security in-charge and Military Advisor to the King of Bhutan, in April 1999. The newspaper said it has evidence to show that Takin Travel Services, the Thimphu-based official travel agency of the Bhutan government, facilitates the travel of Paresh Barua, self-styled commander-in-chief of ULFA. Barua, has a Bangladeshi passport under the name of Kamruzzaman Khan. With it, he can freely hop to places such as Bangkok, Dhaka, Singapore and Thimphu. ULFA leaders are allowed to move freely inside Bhutan with the Department of Immigration and Census, which is under the Bhutan Home Ministry, issuing special permits. The newspaper has said that the Bhutan government has specially assigned Wangchuk Dorji, a senior official in the Foreign Ministry, to help top ULFA leaders on fund collection and foreign travel. Dorji is stated to have received Nu 2,18,000 (Bhutanese currency) in three installments from the ULFA during 1999, with which he even traveled to the United Kingdom.[xvii]

Protracted negotiations

The Royal Government of Bhutan did attempt to find a negotiated way of settlement to the problem. It claimed to have held five rounds of talks with the ULFA leadership since 1998, the last one in October 2003.[xviii] It has been endorsed by a statement of the NDFB. The outfit maintained that “Many rounds of talks were held between the leaders of NDFB, ULFA, and KLO with the Royal Government of Bhutan to resolve the problems peacefully and democratically. The last round of the talk between the representatives of the NDFB and Royal Government of Bhutan was held only on November17, 2003, where an agreement was reached to resolve the problem amicably.”[xix]

However, the result of such negotiation, spanning over six years, was minimal. The militant outfits not only used the duration of talks to prolong their stay in the country, but started fortifying their presence as days progressed. Not a single camp was demolished, not a single cadre left the country, with a promise not to return.

It was evident in the Statement of the Prime Minister, Lyonpo Jigmi Thinley, who said that the royal government had made every effort to avoid taking military action. “It was with deepest regret that I had to acknowledge the failure of the prolonged process to find a peaceful solution. Giving the responsibility of removing the three Indian insurgent groups from Bhutanese soil to the Royal Bhutan Army was indeed painful. Yet, having exhausted all non-military options and endeavours over an extended period of six long years, the implementation of several successive decisions of the National Assembly to exercise the military option could no longer be averted. The ULFA and the NDFB were extremely obstinate and uncompromising. They maintained that they could not leave until they had fulfilled the objective of achieving independence from India. In effect that meant their perpetual presence in Bhutan. The KLO, which also wants to carve an independent state from India, did not even make the effort to come for talks. Quite clearly, the presence of the separatist groups from India was not only harming the interests of Bhutan but those of our friend and neighbour, India. This is something that no Bhutanese is prepared to tolerate under any circumstances.”[xx]

Not the first attack

The recent phase of operations, were the first military operations against the outfits, but in no way was the first attack on the outfit’s interests. On the contrary, the December 2003 military crackdown on the ULFA, NDFB and KLO can be seen as a follow up on the failure of a number of covert raids over the years by the Indian military personnel as well as local mercenaries to frighten the outfits off Bhutan.

• In September 2000, police commandos from the northeastern Indian state of Assam attacked several ULFA bases in Bhutan. Spokespersons for ULFA reported that a number of its fighters were killed.[xxi]

• The NDFB, on January 7, 2003 claimed a prolonged encounter had occurred between its cadres and Indian security forces on Bhutanese territory beginning January 5. According to media sources, the outfit also said it lost seven cadres and claimed 10 Indian troops were killed, too. A statement by NDFB-'western command-commanding officer’ A. Goyari and deputy Mahiraja Basumatary sent to Guwahati based dailies claimed a group of 50 SF personnel from India attacked its Kawapani ‘battalion’, 45km inside Bhutan on January 5-morning. The statement further claimed 15 more SF personnel were injured in the clash and that the outfit seized several weapons from Indian troops.

• Mounting pressure on ULFA emerged from reports regarding the launching of a major military operation against the insurgents' camps in Bhutan. While both Bhutanese and Indian authorities refused to confirm such operations for obvious reasons, the Indian Army reportedly launched a major campaign against ULFA camps across the Bhutan border on June 20, 2003.[xxii]

• According to a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) report of August 4, 2003, unidentified gunmen attacked two hideouts of the ULFA, at Kinzo and Babang in Samdrup Jongkhar district and three ULFA terrorists and four attackers were killed. Samdrup Jongkhar district officials and a member of the ULFA’s ‘publicity department’ Rubi Bhuyan have confirmed these attacks. Meanwhile, Indian authorities maintain that the attacks occurred as a result of the infighting within the group. However, ULFA has alleged that Indian security agencies were behind the attacks.[xxiii]

• Media report of August 13, 2003 indicated that approximately 40 unidentified gunmen attacked a ULFA hideout at Tiluka on August 10 killing four ULFA cadres and injuring five more. The report further indicated that such attacks also occurred earlier and have been continuing on various ULFA camps in the Samdrup Jongkhar district of southern Bhutan and its vicinity for the past two weeks. Indian authorities have also reportedly confirmed that at least three such attacks had occurred over the last fortnight. While the ULFA has accused surrendered ULFA (SULFA) members and Indian security agencies for these attacks, Indian officials claim that such clashes occur due to infighting within the group. Yet another version reportedly believes that the attackers could be part of a special force raised by the Bhutanese army under Indian guidance, the report added.[xxiv]

Following the failure of all such missions to bring about decisive rethinking among the militants about their presence in Bhutan, it was probably time for a full-scale display of military might, which came somewhat unexpectedly after a two-day notice served through the Bhutanese national newspaper. An official statement on the military operations said: “The royal government deeply regrets that the long and arduous process to find a peaceful solution leading to their departure from the country did not yield any fruit after six years of negotiations initiated by the government.” The statement further said: “The government remains confident that the security forces of Bhutan will discharge their responsibility of flushing out the militants from Bhutanese soil which they have forcibly occupied for over 12 years.”[xxv]

Myths exploded

Apart from the success achieved in expelling the militants from the Bhutanese soil, the military operations could also be considered important for exploding myths of various types regarding the ability of the outfits and their popular base, particularly in Assam.

There are quite a few myths, which went around in the regional media, months before the launch of the military operations, regarding the lack of basic facilities in the militant camps in Bhutan. Many newspapers in the region bought such stories, apparently circulated by the security forces, that there is a critical shortage of ration in the camps in Bhutan and the cadres are suffering from malaria and starvation and are therefore, most likely to surrender, even in the non-event of an army raid. However, except for the regular numbers of cadres who surrender every year, such shortage did not really pave way for any such surrender. On the contrary, now it appears from the details provided by the RBA that the ULFA cadres did not really face any food shortage. None of the cadres did really complain of lack of medical attention. Goburkonda ULFA camp, in lower Zhemgang, was among the last camps to have been destroyed by the RBA. On January 2, among other items, the RBA recovered three television sets, a generator, and 20 metric tonnes of rice from the camp.[xxvi]  

Doubts were also expressed regarding the Bhutanese forces ability to deal with the battle-hardened outfits. Especially a force, which had never fought a war throughout its existence, had serious doubts on its ability. A government press release in the national newspaper said: “Military planners estimate that it takes up to 10 soldiers against each militant when facing guerrilla fighters in the forests. We were painfully aware of the perils of facing more than 3,000 armed militants with a fledging army. We wondered whether, in the absence of experience, numbers, and heavy-duty fire power, we had the extraordinary courage, the skill, and the commitment that would be required.”[xxvii] There were even reports that a Bhutanese prince put a stop to his education abroad and came back to Bhutan to take charge of the military operations.[xxviii] 

In spite of the predictions of the military might of the terrorists and under-preparedness or the lack of ability among the Bhutanese soldiers to take on the militants, the operation was not really a blitzkrieg of any kind. In spite of Paresh Baruah’s statement that his cadres ‘are giving the Bhutanese a tough fight and the ULFA general headquarters is safe’ [xxix], it was never a case of heavily armed RBA personnel smashing the resistance of the terrorists. It was mostly a case of un-anticipating terrorists being attacked and made to abandon their bases by the evidently better prepared RBA. By the end of the first day of operations, ULFA was pleading for a ceasefire. In a letter addressed to King Jigme Singye Wangchuk, the government and the people of Bhutan, ULFA chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa said ‘the kingdom should not allow itself to be used by the Indian army as a tool to snuff out innocent lives — non-combatant women, children and elders.” He appealed ‘to cease all those activities that might get in the way of our legitimate struggle, our fraternity, and historical bondage.’[xxx] The NDFB too was asking for a halt to the operations. In a letter addressed to the Bhutanese authorities, the Chief of Staff of the Bodoland Army, the armed wing of NDFB said: ‘On behalf of the NDFB and Boro people I would like to request the Royal Government of Bhutan and His Royal Highness to stop such activities that may create enmity and problems in maintaining our age-old friendly relationship.’[xxxi] The response of the Bhutan government was dismissive.

Going by the statements of the arrested and surrendered ULFA cadres, they were taken by surprise by the RBA attack. Most of them fled and those who could not, either got killed in the fighting or came out with white flags and surrendered, as did the ULFA founder, Bhimakanta Buragohain. On the RBA side too, although the casualty was never reported, the losses of trained personnel remained high. It is believed that the RBA too lost 100-150 of its men.[xxxii]

The Bhutanese operations provided a unique opportunity to Assam to judge the popularity level of the ULFA among the common people. Even though a lot had been written on the declining support base of the outfit, especially after the killing of the NGO activist Sanjoy Ghose in 1997, there was hardly an occasion to put such analysis on a scanner. In spite of the reasonable success of the call for general strike by the outfit after the launch of offensive in Bhutan, only because the call for strike was made on December 20 and 21, 2003 (falling on a Saturday and a Sunday, when most of the official and private establishments are normally shut), the angst among common people for the ‘terrorists under attack’ remained minimal. Some organisations did come out with statements asking for a halt to the operations. However, they either were front organisations of the outfits such as the Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti (MASS) or were organisations who tried to hog the limelight in order to come out of political marginalisation, like the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and the Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuba Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP).

At the same time, the post-operations development also put to rest, speculations about the spread of ULFA’s operational mechanism beyond Bhutan. The outfit has been able to continue with its no negotiation policy with the government and has carried out a number of attacks on oil and gas pipelines in Assam. The annihilation it faced in Bhutan is till not enough to force the outfit to opt for a negotiated way of settlement of the dispute. In fact, as the surrendered and arrested cadres alleged, the senior ULFA leadership, based primarily in Bangladesh and leading a luxurious life, will continue to remain opposed to the talks unless their source of existence is put to considerable distress. 

Impact of the Ops  

After the second day of operations, the Kolkata based Statesman, in its editorial, wrote: “The Ulfa must renounce violence or perish. Its battlecry for “swadhin Asom” has long fallen on deaf ears and time is ticking away.”[xxxiii] The statement could be partly true. For the time being, the impact of the operations has been decisive. Apart from the number of terrorists neutralised in Bhutan, the details of whom are still shrouded in mystery, the number of terrorists who have been killed, arrested and surrendered in Assam has been substantial. For example, the military operations in Bhutan had a significant impact on a district like Jorhat in Assam, which once upon a time was a hotbed of ULFA insurgency. “As many as 10 of the 20 ULFA hit men on Jorhat police’s most wanted list have been captured or forced to surrender since the crackdown on Bhutan.”[xxxiv] Similarly in North Bengal, at least 50 KLO terrorists were neutralised during the operation.[xxxv] The NDFB, too, has been affected to a significant extent. A number of its top leaders including its publicity secretary B Irakdao have been arrested. A significant number of its cadres have started surrendering.

The moot question is, however, does it mean an end to insurgency? At the moment it does not appear to be so. Outfits like the NDFB and the KLO might not be able to resurrect themselves quickly from the state they find themselves now. The NDFB chief Ranjan Daimary, in a media interview, subsequent to the operations, did suggest that his outfit would have to start from the scratch in order to reach a position of consequence. The KLO too would find it extremely difficult to activate itself.

However, there are still a large number of cadres who simply have melted into thin air. The North Bengal police still have a list of 35 other KLO militants who were in the Bhutan camps, but could not be traced after the military operation.[xxxvi] There are no easy explanations regarding the current location of cadres who were not neutralized (an ambiguous term which has started being used for killed/surrendered/arrested militants) out of the 3000 cadres who were said to have been living in the 30 odd camps in Bhutan. It thus means that the war on terror is still not over. Till the time each and every refuge inside the country and outside is targeted and the militants are made to see reason in a peaceful dialogue process, the game would go on.

Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray works as the Acting Director of the Guwahati based Database & Documentation Centre of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi.

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