Book Review

Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: South Asia ,  Dr. Amit Gupta, March 2003, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

The reviewed article was written before the onset of hostilities in Iraq. Thus this reviewer has the advantage of 20-20 hindsight. The article would be reviewed keeping in mind the information that was available to the author at the time of publication.

The article’s title “Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: South Asia” is somewhat of a misnomer. The study limits itself to India and Pakistan and concentrates on the reaction of these two countries to the war, the war’s effect on bilateral relations between the US and each of the two countries, and the possible ways in which the two countries could assist or detract from US goals in the region. The medium and long-term strategic implications of the war in the Indian subcontinent are also discussed.

The article begins with restating the facts, i.e., both India and Pakistan refused to support military intervention in Iraq. This was driven in both cases partly due to domestic political compulsions. The war against Iraq was seen as an unprovoked attack on Muslims by large sections of the populace in Pakistan. Any move by Pakistan to support the war would have been extremely unpopular, and it would have fortified Musharraf’s image as an American stooge. India’s traditional aversion to unilateral action and the historically close relations with Saddam’s Baathist government were also an important factor in India’s reluctance to support the war. The author however omits to mention that Saddam’s government was the only one in the Middle East to support India’s stand on Kashmir for many decades. Indeed such unequivocal support has not been forthcoming even from the US till date. The author mentions opposition from Indian Muslim community to the war due to religious affinity with the Iraqis. It would have been pertinent to note that there was a large groundswell of sympathy for Saddam’s regime exists even in the majority Hindu community. Saddam’s staunch secularism and his brutal crackdown on fundamentalist Muslim groups within Iraq had rendered him superior anti terrorism credentials than the US, at least in Indian minds.

Both India and Pakistan were also concerned about the economic fallout, since both countries have millions of diasporas in the Middle East. The remittances of these overseas residents are important to both economies, esp. Pakistan.

Moreover, since both countries are energy importers, according to the author a spurt in oil prices also was a significant concern. However most energy analysts had predicted a moderation in oil prices in the medium and long term due to development of oil fields in Iraq. The fear of higher oil prices might have been a public concern rather than of the governments involved.

The author correctly asserts that both India and Pakistan would prefer a short and swift war to minimize economic and political disruption. This was of course true for all state actors around the world and is not unique to the 2 countries.

The author then lists the importance of Pakistan and India in counter terrorism activities. He surmises correctly that the cooperation of both countries especially Pakistan is very important for counter terrorism activities in the region, particularly against Al Qaeda and Taliban forces. The Iraq war was unlikely to cause significant disruptions in the counter terrorism activities from India or Pakistan. The greater concern was that the US would divert its attention away from counter terrorism to Iraq.

The author mentions the danger of increased terrorist incidents in Kashmir as retaliation for the perceived attack on Muslims in Iraq. However here again the author ignores the other possibility that terrorists may divert attention to American targets instead of Indian in retaliation for the Iraq war.

It is also suggests that US planners should consider the possibility that India might use the Iraq war as a useful diversion to launch an attack on Pakistan. He negates this possibility saying that India would not be in a position to defy US will on this issue.

The author then discusses the possible deployment of Indian and Pakistani forces in the war against Iraq. He cites logistical and military limitations of Indian defense forces to divert forces to the Iraq theatre.

The article goes on to discuss the possible role of both countries in post war reconstruction of Iraq. He is accurate in his assessment that India particularly can play a role in providing military services and training of administration.

The author then discusses the long-term effects of the war and concludes that the war would only have peripheral effects on US relations with India and Pakistan.

The author is by and large correct in his assessment that the Iraq war would not cause major changes in US relations with India or Pakistan. However, the article overall takes a very superficial view of the effects of the war. A serious analysis would not have papered over facts that might be unpalatable to US planners. The author completely ignores the fact that the US and Britain were, rightly or wrongly, internationally isolated in their move to attack Iraq. Even traditional allies were lukewarm or downright hostile to US moves. In this situation, any overt support to the war by India or Pakistan would have been fraught with political and diplomatic risks. The US cannot afford to punish or disrupt relations with all the countries that have opposed the war on Iraq; they are too many and too important. So the cost of neutrality was not high. Support to the war, in contrast posed dangers in relations with important countries in the Middle East and elsewhere, and especially in long-term relations with Iraq itself. Joining forces with the US was unlikely to cause any major realignment in relations with US, since US is unlikely to compromise its position on important Subcontinental issues as a reward for cooperation in the war. Moreover, support to the US in defiance of domestic and international public opinion would cause either country to appear as US lackeys both domestically and internationally. Therefore, it is logical that both governments choose the low risk option of neutrality.

The article also makes statements are considered inaccurate in every place apart from Washington. “ The Bush administration, in May-June 2002, successfully (underlining mine) pressured the Pakistani government to halt cross-border infiltration of militants into Indian Kashmir.” While it is understandable that governments have to veer away from the absolute truth in the national interest, it does not justify policy researchers living in cuckoo land.

Atish B.