Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Implications for India

Ashok K Mehta

"Our basic agenda is to form a republican state. If the King abdicates voluntarily, we will offer him some position. It will be good if he agrees to play the role of Norodom Sihanouk"

Baburam Bhattarai,

11 April 2003

Introduction

A former Indian Ambassador to Nepal recently asked why India was caught unawares by the scale and intensity of the Maoist insurgency. He, like others before and after him, is equally culpable for being surprised by its occurrence. It was by no means a sudden upheaval but a revolution that was in the making since the earlier 1990s but was not recognized. India, which is terribly sensitive about its northern security arc astride the Nepal Himalayas, was certainly caught off guard. The writing was on the wall but South Block refused to read it.

The revolt in fact, started on September 10, 1995 when people's power flowed out of a country gun surprising the administration in Rolpa. The next big salvo was timed with Democracy Day on February 19, 1996 culminating in the biggest guerrilla-police clash on February 27.

The Government of India's lack of sensitivity to the Maoist insurgency can be judged from the fact that for nearly six months, June to November 2002, it had no Ambassador in Kathmandu.

For Nepal it is a classic case of too little too late. Despite the graffiti on the wall, Nepal failed to mobilise and prepare the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) in containing the Maoist threat. Instead, an ill trained and poorly equipped police was employed to combat
what was misinterpreted as a law and order problem. Successive governments could not create a national consensus on dealing with the Maoists and also obtain from the King, the Royal assent to employ the RNA. This failure to mobilise the sword arm allowed the Maoists to develop the capability and clout that has spread throughout the country, in a plan that was brilliantly conceived but less effectively executed. Their strength was checked only after Indian military assistance and guidance was provided and the world took notice.  

A failing state  

Other than Bhutan, the RNA is the only army in the world not under civilian control (despite the constitution providing for it. It was mobilized only when the Maoists attacked the RNA garrison in November 2001 at Dang. Since then, and up to the ceasefire in January 2003, nearly 2,000 Maoists, 1,200 security forces and up to 3,000 civilians had been killed. As per the RNA, 4,648 Maoists against 245 RNA and 544 police had been killed. Another 600 persons including civilians were killed till 15 October 2003. The official figures are invariably higher for Maoists and lower for their own casualties.

After the big attack against the RNA on 27 May 2002 at Khara there was a three-month lull in the fighting. Parliament was dissolved and an election was ordered for 13 November 2002. The Maoists had dramatically announced their intention to blast the elections. When the Emergency lapsed on 28 August, and the government expressed its inability to hold the elections on time, the King dismissed the caretaker government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in 2002. This put the 1990 constitution in a limbo and placed all the power in the hands of the King. Since June 2003, there has been a second new interim government under the Royalist Prime Minister, Surya Bahadur Thapa (the first under LB Chand lasted eight months). The King was in touch with the Maoists, a fact never acknowledged by the Palace and succeeded in bringing them to the negotiating table. A ceasefire was in place since 29 January 2003 - there had been one other ceasefire in 2001, followed by unsuccessful talks - and a code of conduct was agreed upon before the formal commencement of peace talks. Four rounds of peace talks were held before the Maoists withdrew unilaterally from the talks on 27 August after a seven-month long ceasefire. This was Nepal's third attempt since the year 2000 to negotiate with the Maoists. A number of foreign countries, notably USA and UK, have become proactive, ostensibly to prevent Nepal from becoming a failed state. The challenge for India is to ensure that democracy is not marginalized altogether in the name of stability for Nepal. Equally, India with its legitimate security concerns, is not upstaged by these powers. India has been calling for greater transparency on the part of Nepal and the foreign mentors assisting it. 

India's Security Concerns and Military Assistance to Nepal

In 1919, a British Foreign Office document noted: "Nepal is in a position to exercise powerful influence on India's internal stability and if it were disaffected, the anarchy would spill over." In spite of this, the 1923 security treaty between Nepal and British India and its successor Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1950 did not refer to risks of internal threat, but only to a 'foreign aggressor'. The two sides were required to consult each other in order to devise countermeasures. Even the provision in the 1923 Treaty
for the prevention of each others’ territory being used for purposes inimical to the security of the other was done away with. Despite this, security consultations had not been held till as late as April 2002 between the two countries to combat the Maoist
threat.

The Indian Military Mission in Nepal was set up in 1952 at Kathmandu at the request of King Tribhuvan for reorganizing and modernizing the RNA. The task was carried out over the following ten years with the nomenclature of the assistance changing to Military
Training and Advisory Group in 1958, and thereafter, Military Liaison Group in 1963. In 1959, Indian Army signalers helped Nepal in its first multi-party elections. From 1963 onwards, the RNA started looking at other countries for training and modernization. China, UK, USA and Israel were the countries whose help was sought.  However, the bulk of RNA needs were met by the Indian Army.

The reorganization of the RNA into Army Headquarters and three infantry brigades, as also the setting up of training institutions and logistics installations was done by the Indian military. At one time, India had even established 21 border check posts. However, the Military Liaison group was withdrawn in August 1970 after a formal request by Nepal prompted by the Communists. Ironically it is now after the Maoist insurgency that there is a revival of training teams visiting, advising and being deployed inside and close to the border with Nepal. The new Army Chief, General NC Vij visited Nepal in May 2003 precisely one year after his predecessor had initiated the refurbishment of the RNA. This reflects both the symbolic and substantive importance attached to the enhancement of military ties between the two countries.

Background to the Maoist Movement

The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was formed in 1949 after the success of the Communist Revolution in China. The CPN was also inspired by the Naxalite movement especially in Jhapa, East Nepal, which became the hotbed of the Communist movement. Nepal was regarded "suitable for revolution due to centralized reactionary rule for close to 200 years in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial small mountainous country favorable for guerrilla warfare" (Prachanda, aka Pushpa Kamal Dahal who is the supreme leader of the Maoists). He was convinced that both the subjective and objective conditions for revolution existed in Nepal. Underdevelopment, poverty and neglect by Kathmandu made the West historically, geographically and culturally the basin of revolt and the epicenter of the People's War. It is also the case that parts of the West were never under effective central control and always enjoyed some autonomy. The revolution, however, was not confined to the West as the Maoists realized it would be contained and quelled by centralizing effort. So it was a broad-spread movement. The rank and file Maoists are mainly of Mongolian ethnicity - like Magars Gurungs, Rais, Limbus and Tamangs. The majority of Maoist cadres are Dalits (untouchables) and Tharus. Magars are more dominant in the Mid-West hill region, Rais in Eastern hill regions, Gurungs and Limbus are a relatively smaller percentage of the Maoist cadres.  Brahmins and Chhetris who dominate the political and military leadership along with Tharus, Dalits and women are also among the fighters. These cadres represent nearly 37 per cent of Nepal's ethnic groups. In many ways this is a caste and class war of the oppressed against the elite with similarities in People's War and Maoist Coordination Center in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh. 

  The Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (MLM) ideology was adopted by CPN (Maoist) in 1986. In 1991, the Samyukt Jana Morcha (United People's Front) had won nine seats in Parliament. But it boycotted the 1994 elections saying it had demonstrated it could win elections but was abandoning the democratic path as it knew it would yield nothing. Former Foreign and Finance Minister, Ram Saran Mahat, during a presentation on September 24, 03, said that the CPN M had realized that they could not come to power through the electoral process and so it was necessary to start the  revolution.  It is also relevant that both Dahal (then with CPN Maoist) and his deputy, Baburam Bhattarai (then with Samyukta Jan Morcha) were both of the view in 1990 that a constituent assembly was necessary for framing a new constitution. They still hold that view.

The UPF split between the Baida group led by Lilamani Pokhrail and Maoists under Bhattarai. After the "two-line struggle" CPN (Maoist) was formalised abandoning MLM ideology. The brains behind the revolution are two firebrand Marxist ideologues -  Dahal (Prachanda) and Bhattarai (Jit Bahadur). While the Prachanda Path outlines the operational strategy of the People's War, Bhattarai has provided the "politico-economic" rationale of the movement. A great deal of homework was done by the two. It seems the preliminaries started in the early 1990s with a full range of political discussions and interactions with RIM, PWG and MCC in India and several like-minded people in south Asia. Bhattarai, like the legendary guerrilla leader, Orde Wingate, is known to quote from the Bible. The spark of the revolution was lit on February 13, 1996 with the launch of three raids on banks and police posts simultaneously across the country stretching from Gam in the West to Gorkha in the center and Sindhulgarhi in the East. It later spread to all the 75 districts of Nepal. The decision to put a broad spread on the revolt was made so that the government would not be able to centralize its efforts to contain and localize the movement. However, cadres were told that cities were not for armed clashes but to fight a propaganda war.

The Maoist revolution is a thoroughbred homegrown insurgency and unlike other movements, not geographically limited to one region. Previously, it was the East of Nepal that was considered the stronghold of Leftists and Dharan was called the Red Fort. The Indian Naxalite movement of the later 1960s in neighboring West Bengal contributed to the Communist movement and was called the Jhapa Uprising. The current Maoist movement looks down at the Jhapa Communists for launching a movement without proper preparation. It is reported that the only time King Birendra was shown black flags was by the Communists in Dharan. But this time around, the stronghold of the Maoists People's War was the Mid-West, cantered around Rolpa including the Rapti, Bheri and Karnali zones and further west in Seti and Karnali. The current movement has external ideological linkages though material support is wholly indigenous. In 1995, Bhattarai and Dahal made the plan called "Taking the revolution to the people." It was conceived in four parts (for details see Prachanda's interview in Revolutionary Worker, February 2000 contained in The Maoist Movement in Nepal by Anand Swaroop Verma):

• Ideological preparation
• Transition from peaceful to armed struggle
• Military action
• Developing strategic base areas by encircling cities from villages and converting unarmed masses into armed fighters

The heart or base of the revolution was in Rolpa, Rukum, Gorkha, Sindhuli and Kabhre districts of Nepal, with the first two being the citadels. Gorkha is the home of deputy leader, Bhattarai. It gradually spread throughout the country from the West to the middle
(which is economically better off) and eastern region. As an insurgency, it is unique compared to others on the Indian subcontinent which are geographically localized. It is also unique in being the only insurgent group, which has shown no signs of splitting
or for that matter, any serious internal discord. At the same time, it has shown considerable flexibility in projecting its demands.

By 2001, the revolution had completed its third stage of conducting coordinated military action throughout the country with a guerrilla army. They had developed the capacity to launch simultaneously, military attacks against at least two RNA posts, 2 to 300 miles
apart with up to 1,000 to 2,000 rebels. The renewed guerrilla attacks against Kathmandu and other urban centers beginning August 2003, marked the start of possibly the fourth and final stage of the revolution, i.e. encircling cities from villages. The main reasons why the revolution paralyzed the state was because of its broad spread, favorable terrain, 100 per cent indigenous participation and avoiding the better-trained and equipped RNA till they were ready to take it on. All this despite their not having any external support - certainly not from China or India - and sanctuaries outside Nepal. It is extremely difficult for any revolution to succeed without outside assistance, though the open border with India has helped.

In April 2003, the Maoists presented to the government their most comprehensive summary of proposals for facilitating peace talks, formulating the new constitution and introducing national and socio economic reforms. The proposal emphasizes the need to build a democratic and developed Nepal. It also advocates the creation of a conducive environment for talks by implementing in full the 22-point code of conduct, release of prisoners of war, withdrawal of Tada Act (Terrorism and Destructive Activities Act, 2001) and return to barracks of the RNA. The creation of a new constitution is the minimum requirement. For this there should be a roundtable conference, the formation of an interim government and an interim constitution based on the existing one under the leadership of the rebels. Elections to a constituent assembly should be completed within six months. A unified national Army should be formed merging RNA with the People's Army and be controlled by Parliament. Further Nepal should be made a secular state, unequal treaties like the India-Nepal Treaty 1950 should be repealed, foreign recruitment of Nepalese stopped and foreign troops present on Nepalese soil in the guise of fighting terrorism be removed. Uncertain of the future of political formations of Nepal and its experience in the talks with the government till June 2003, the Maoists wanted to talk directly with the King rather than the King-installed government representatives nominated by what some Maoists call “puppet Prime Ministers.” But in the end, they had to negotiate with the new governments.

The Maoist Military Capacity

Maoists' strength of trained fighters is estimated from anywhere around 5,000 to 8,000 (even 12,000) with a People's Militia of 25,000. The main force is augmented by a semi-trained support force of 5,000. Maoist Lal Sena (Red Army) is now believed to be organised into around 6 to 8 battalions each of 400 active cadres. There are 3 to 4 battalions located in the western region in Aacham, Rolpa and Dhor-Patan and 2 to 3 in the East. One of these is where the three districts of Solukhumbu, Ramechhap and Okhaldhunga meet. Their main fighting and support forces consist of Magars, Tharus, Janjatis, Gurungs, Rais, Limbus, Tamangs, Dalits, Brahmins and Chhetries, the last two also providing the political and military leadership. Nearly 30 per cent are females. Not more than ten Indian Army ex-servicemen are actively involved with the Maoists and most were part of previous ethnic movements which were subsumed into the Maoists. Some Indian Army deserters and discharged personnel are involved but have joined more as a means of livelihood. British ex servicemen are conspicuously not involved. Serving soldiers from the Indian Army on leave, either pay a donation or run a 3 to 4 day training capsule for Maoist recruits. Their main weapons are about 50 AK 47 rifles, 500 SLRs; a thousand .303 rifles, 1,500 and more country guns, a few hand grenades, explosives, detonators, three to four 2 inch mortars, nine LMGs, one RCL, and an unassembled 81 mm mortar. Nearly 85 per cent of these weapons are looted from police and RNA. There is no difficulty in acquiring rifles from MCC / PWG and even from rebel groups like ULFA and LTTE. According to some reports, Maoists are short in weapons but their most serious deficiency is in ammunition. Training expertise is also available. There are reports that six-feet tall Muslim looking people (presumably Kashmiri and Taliban) have been seen in villages in the west and some among the Maoist  dead.

Changes In Maoist Military Strategy

Three clear stages in military strategy are discernable. The first was between 1996 and 2001. It relied entirely on guerrilla tactics. focused on the police and scrupulously avoided the RNA. The hit and run tactics also included raiding police posts, looting banks and extortion. It was at this stage that Nepal raised the armed police as an interim paramilitary force between the RNA and the civil police.

The second stage of the strategy was the dramatic shift to direct confrontation of the RNA which commenced with the breakdown of the peace talks and simultaneous attacks on RNA posts in Dang on November 23, 2001. This led to the imposition of emergency, the formation of composite posts (RNA, civil police and armed police) and the modernization of the RNA. It also resulted in a political crisis - dissolution of Parliament.

The third stage of the Maoist strategy became visible on August 27, 03. It followed the same pattern as during the second stage of targeting the RNA immediately following the breakdown of negotiations. But there was a difference. The Maoists were no longer
capable of attacking RNA posts and, therefore, resorted to guerrilla tactics once again, focusing once again on urban areas. The Maoists complained bitterly that the government had reneged on its pledge to restrict the movement of the RNA to five km of its barracks. The reason given for walking out of the talks was the cold-blooded murder of 19 Maoists by the RNA at Ramechhap even while the ceasefire was on. Their main grouse, however, was the refusal of the government to accept their demands for a Constituent Assembly.

RNA

The RNA is controlled directly by the King. It is called the King's Army. It was not employed against the Maoists till it had been attacked on November 23, 2001 and an Emergency imposed. For almost 6 years since the start of the insurgency, the RNA was not mobilized as the King felt it ought not to be used against its own people. Consequently, the RNA was totally unprepared for the task as it had little or no operational experience, being purely a UN Peacekeeping outfit. It was brought on par only after military assistance from India and suffering military debacles at the hands of the Maoists.

Location of Power:

Civilian control of the RNA is the key demand of the Maoists. Despite the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 and Electoral Laws clearly stipulating that the RNA will be guided by the National Defence Council (NDC) headed by the Prime Minister, it is the King who exercises de facto if not de jure control over it. His is, as I have understood, the last word on the RNA. While Article 119(1) confers on the King, the appointment of the Supreme Commander of the RNA, Article 118 (2) says "His Majesty shall perform the operation and deployment of the RNA on the recommendation of the NDC." The word  "shall" not "may" has been used. Until two years ago, the NDC consisted of the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and the Army Chief. Since the Prime Minister was also his own Defence Minister, there was normally a tie between the civil executive and the Army Chief. In order to overcome this, a separate Defence Minister was appointed to increase the quorum of the NDC from two to three and thereby avoid any impasse. Because of the perceived ambiguity in the chain of command, the Palace continues to control important promotions and postings. For example, article 119 (2) says that His Majesty "shall appoint the Chief of Army Staff on the recommendation of the Prime Minister." According to former Army Chief, Gen Dharam Pal Thapa, no Prime Minister has exercised his prerogative either under Article 118 (2) or 119 (2). For the officers in RNA the King is 'Sarkar' (government).

The Military Situation as it Developed

Following the Maoist debacle against the combined RNA / police post at Khara on May 27, 2002, an operational stalemate existed due to two reasons: the onset of the monsoons and the hazy political picture. The Emergency lapsed on August 28, 2002. The Maoists had brought their war to Kathmandu by attacking soft targets including political assassinations in the run-up to elections, which they had vowed to block and in which objective they succeeded. The string of deadly attacks in September, October and November 2002 against security forces reflected this determination not to be marginalized militarily. But as the RNA grew in strength and military acumen, the Maoists took heavier casualties. 

At the time of the ceasefire in January 2003, security forces controlled the capital Kathmandu, major towns like Surkhet, Baglung, Pokhara, Dharan, most of the Terai and the 75 district headquarters. In terms of territory, the Maoist writ ran over a much larger area than that of the government. They ran a parallel government in areas controlled by them. But the politically more important urban areas are still with the government. In a secret despatch in 2001 the Maoists had described the military balance as follows:

·         East - the government is effective and functioning up to district headquarters. Maoist influence is palpable but no major attacks or clashes have taken place. The Maoists claimed "balance has been achieved."

·         Central and Western - Security forces dominating with Maoists having pockets of influence. Maoists called this "situation confused and our movement sabotaged."

·         Mid-West and Far West - Maoists are dominating. They categorized the situation as gains for the movement.

The recent attacks in Sindhulgarhi, Arghakhanchi, Rumjatar, Jumla and Gorkha - between September and November 2002, showed that  the Maoists had demonstrated they held the initiative but realised it could slip out of their hands any time. The RNA
expansion plan, new military equipment and on the job training had convinced the Maoists that they were facing a more robust and determined RNA.

Deployment of RNA

Against an authorized strength of 74,000, RNA is posted with 68,000 combatants. Another 5,000 recruits are under training at any time. The US specialist team, which visited Nepal earlier in the year, has suggested an augmentation of 150,000 to take the overall strength to 200,000, which is probably what the RNA desires - an Army of three Corps, six Mountain Divisions and four Plains Divisions. The police are 45,000, which is to increase by 10,000. The armed police sanctioned for 25,000 have only 12,000 but are still not fully operational. Both police forces are under operational command of RNA in the rural areas. The relations between the RNA and police were soured in the pre emergency period when the RNA refused to bail out the police even at Holleri which marks the lowest point in civil-military and RNA-police relations. Prime Minister GP Koirala had to resign after this incident.

As in August 2003, the new RNA consisted of 18 brigades numbered from 1 to 19 including the Palace Brigade, which is without a number. 8 and 12 Brigades do not exist. The operational deployment casts the force into three Infantry divisions: the Western Division located at Nepalganj with 4, 5, and 18 Brigades; the Central Division in Pokhara with 3, 6 and 7 Brigades; and the Eastern Division at Itahari with 2, 9 and 19 Brigades. In addition there is 1 Infantry Brigade located in Kathmandu besides the Palace Brigade deployed in the Narayanhity Palace. The other Brigades are Special Forces (10) Air Assault (11) Artillery (13), Engineers (14), Signals (15), Logistics (16) and Electric and Mechanical Engineers          (17).

There are 11 Infantry Brigades including the Palace Brigade and 7 specialist Brigades in RNA. Most of the fighting force is deployed in Kathmandu or committed to holding city centre, district headquarters and key installations and facilities. A very small force is,
therefore, available for offensive seek and destroy missions. For example, in the west, before the new raisings in 2002, RNA had just the equivalent of 30 rifle companies for the impossible task of managing one third of the country in which lay the heart of
the revolution. The new deployment has changed the balance of forces to some extent in the favour of the RNA. 

Military Equipment

The RNA requirement to fight the Maoists includes a light and accurate rifle, handy radio sets, light bullet-proof jacket and personal equipment and a good supply of hand grenades, rocket launchers, LMGs, surveillance and night vision devices, direction finders and sensors. It has very little of most of this equipment. It also needs good intelligence, effective communication network, sound logistics and mobility. Of all these it has even less. It acquired 3,000 US M16 rifles specifically for UN forces. It had recently been sold another 5,000 M16 rifles by the US under its latest assistance plan. An additional 15,000 M16 rifles are being provided as a grant. The Germans were unable to provide the rifle the RNA was seeking. However, the shortfall has been made up by the Belgians who are to supply 5,500 x 5.56mm mini machineguns by the end of this year. The Indian Army has given 5,000 SLR and 13,000 INSAS rifles. Another 10,000 INSAS rifles, two helicopters and defense stores have been sought by the RNA. Besides this, sizeable quantities of defence stores like mines, wire and other protective gear have already been supplied. The RNA has not been very happy with some of the SLR rifles. For the first time since 1970, Indian military teams have been located inside Nepal to train the RNA in interrogation, anti-IED and other counter insurgency techniques. This is in addition to an elaborate training program for the RNA and the police in Indian military and police establishments. Pakistan and China are also playing a minor part in RNA upgradation. RNA has 105 mm light guns and 120 mm mortars. It has been seeking the Indian 105 mm gun. The modernization of RNA begun by India in 1990 as part of its Treaty commitment to bolster its capacity to deal with the Maoists.

RNA Air Wing

The air assets in the RNA consist of:

Avro - 1
Skyvan - 1
Skytruck - 1
Mi-17 Heptrs - 4
Puma Heptrs - 1
Ecuriel Heptrs - 2
Chetak (Alouettes) - 5
Cheetah (MMG fitted) - 2
Lancer (weapon pod fitted) - 2

In addition, there is a VVIP flight comprising two Bell and two Superpuma helicopters. The RNA considers the helicopter a panacea to the war and employs it boldly. It is known to be using two pilots on board to ensure the helicopter is brought down safely even after one of the pilots is hit.

Operational Strategy

The RNA is holding key towns, communication centers as well as district headquarters and keeping lines of communication open by mounting limited seek and destroy missions as there are hardly any posts anywhere outside district headquarters. With the onset of monsoons, government forces withdraw to road heads and adopt a defensive posture.  The government has established composite posts of RNA, police and armed police. The center of gravity of the People's War is around Rolpa and Rukum. Senior commanders in Nepal like former COAS, Gen Dharam Pal Thapa, believe that Maoists have to be brought to their knees. Obviously, this has not happened and is certainly beyond the present and future capability of the RNA.  Following the ceasefire in January 2003, the RNA became proactive, rebuilding intelligence on the Maoists like the latter had done on them. The RNA had complained to the government that the Maoists used the ceasefire to rebuild their forces. Therefore, they had reportedly carried out clandestine operations to bottle up the Maoists in some sectors during the ceasefire. In the period before the breakdown of the ceasefire in August 2003, and even while peace talks were being conducted, the RNA killed and captured several senior Maoist leaders and their cadres. The ambush and slaughter of 19 Maoists in Doramba in Ramechhap on 17 August was the main reason for the collapse of the talks. Human rights organizations in Nepal have declared Doramba a serious violation of the ceasefire and of human rights.

The RNA carried out a major offensive in Rolpa in September 2003, for the first time employing one battalion and using the dreaded Tora Bora tactics. Many innocent civilians and up to 100 suspected Maoists were killed in this operation in which they recovered 10 weapons. The RNA operational capacity has increased manifold due to the induction of M16 rifles and Belgian Mini-Mi rifles. Since the RNA had the upper hand, they were unlikely to suspend operations even if and when a new round of negotiations was organized.

Implications For India

Nepal was heading towards a perfect stalemate by the end of 2003. The balance of the military advantage was shifting in favor of the RNA but only just. The political crisis was worsening. The future of the constitution was under a cloud. The King's motives and sincerity were under question, even though he had handed over executive powers under Article 35 to the Prime Minister he had appointed.  The economy was in a downward spiral. The peace dividend following the seven-month long ceasefire was short-lived. But there was a good chance the Maoists would return to the negotiating table either under pressure or inducement.

Ever since the declaration of Emergency in November 2001, US and UK had assumed a proactive role. Although neither had declared the Maoists as a terrorist organization, they pledged to help Nepal to combat the menace with economic and military assistance. The UK has always nursed a Gorkha hangover and a monarchical affinity for the Himalayan kingdom. India was visibly upstaged by the first ever US military presence in Nepal and the visit by Secretary of State, Colin Powell, the first ever by any US Secretary of State, to Kathmandu. Before 2002, there was no military office in the US Embassy in Kathmandu. Since then, a military training and assistance program is being overseen by a defense advisor. Throughout the year 2003, there were up to 25 American military trainers periodically present in Nepal as part of Exercise Balanced Nail.

Nepal has usually thrived on finding its sovereign space to distance itself from India - first with China, later Pakistan and now with its new-found western allies. Both the US and the UK were giving preference to the return of stability and not on the restoration of democracy. The British even appointed a Special Envoy on Nepal, Sir Jeffrey James, whose job was ostensibly to coordinate aid assistance to Nepal.

India's position is that the stability of Nepal rests on the twin pillars of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy and it does not want democracy to be undermined. On his part, the King is very happy with the Western position, which ensures that he can remain in total command and control of Nepal. India would like the foreign powers and the Nepalese establishment to keep it informed about their activities. India has been asking for greater transparency and consultations at the highest level as well as at appropriate levels of bureaucracy. India would also like all assistance to be linked with certain benchmarks that will ensure that the political formations are not sidelined and the gains of democracy preserved. At one stage it had been agreed that all activity in Nepal by the US and UK especially, would be coordinated by India. That has not happened and India is upset about it. The implications of these developments are political, economic and security-related.

India can ill-afford another full-blown insurgency in the north leading directly into the strategic Indo-Gangetic plains. There are no political institutions left in Nepal. Democracy has been derailed and is literally on the streets. The King has regained both power and the aura that monarchy commanded during the partyless Panchayat system. The Royal Nepal Army is now more firmly under Palace control. The Maoists are in direct confrontation with monarchy. The political formations of the dissolved Parliament are agitating from the streets. All this makes political instability into a crisis. No elections can be held nor can any development be undertaken till the security situation stabilizes. The future of monarchy and the constitution is wide open.  On the economic front, there has been a spurt of movement from the hills and the Terai in Nepal into India. The movement of young, recruit-able males and females is a matter of concern for both Nepal and India. In the long term this could lead to more smuggling and economic disorder.

But it is India's security concerns that are most seriously affected by the Maoist insurgency. The open border allows Maoists almost unhindered access to anywhere in India. There is the fear that this could open an insurgency corridor to the MCC, PWG in UP, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh. The cross border movement of Maoist cadres and weapons is another threatening development despite the deployment of three SSB battalions on the India-Nepal border. It is virtually impossible to seal off the border especially in the areas adjoining Uttaranchal and Sikkim and West Bengal in the west and east. The presence of 8 million Nepalese in India (most of whom are part of the Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES) and their support to the Maoists is worrying. The government of India has banned ABNES and deported several active and suspected Maoist cadres to Nepal.

The threat posed to Nepali ex-servicemen living in India and Nepal and to serving Gorkha soldiers in the Army as well as paramilitary forces is a longer-term threat. India, which is usually slow to react, requires galvanizing both the preventive and consequence management measures of the Maoist insurgency. These should include: 

• Ensuring that the Maoists are unable to establish an insurgency corridor to the MCC and the PWG in UP and Bihar.
• More effective border management especially preventing smuggling of explosives, detonators and other subversive material.
• Monitoring, locating and disrupting Maoist presence on Indian soil and being seen to be doing so.
• Launching a PR and media offensive to dispel the illusion that India is supporting and nurturing Maoists.
• Providing Nepal with the wherewithal required to combat the Maoist menace but within certain mutually agreed parameters.
• Keeping foreign players out of the domestic politics of Nepal and ensuring democracy is not sidelined.
• India playing the dominant role in coordinating the development and security assistance activities by foreign powers and relating these to certain political benchmarks in the resolution of the conflict.
• Recognizing that the King in Nepal is both part of the problem and its solution.

Notes

1. This article is based on the author's extensive travels in Nepal since 1959, specifically his visits in June and September 2002 and August 2003 and meetings with Nepalese academics, journalists, politicians and Generals.
2. The background material for the Maoist Movement in Nepal is taken from a book by the same title written by Anand Swarup Verma, interviews and statements of Maoist leaders on their websites.
3. The paragraph on Location of Power is based on the relevant articles in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 and Electoral Laws (pages 73 and 74). Other comments on the constitution have been derived from interviews with Daman Dhungana who was associated with drafting the Constitution.
4. The analysis and assessment of RNA and its operations in based on discussions with RNA commanders, retired RNA Army Chiefs and the Indian Military Wing located in Pokhara, Kathmandu and Dharan in 2002-3. Similarly, the Maoist capabilities and operations are based on discussions with ex-servicemen across Nepal and the officials noted above.