BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR - Volume 6(4) January February 2004

 

Kashmir Pandits: Problem Prospects And Future

Dr Ajay Chrungoo

The tragedy that has befallen Kashmiri Pandits is not an aberration of the secessionist movement in the State. It constitutes the basic challenge to the Indian civilization and the Nation State in Jammu and Kashmir. For Muslim secessionism to succeed, the destruction of Kashmiri Pandits in the Valley has been an imperative since Kashmiri Pandits represent both the civilisational and the political frontline of India in the Valley.

Kashmiri Pandits: Civilisational Frontline

The famous Chinese philosopher and author, Lin Yu Tang says, “India has a rich culture, a creative and imaginative literature and is the world's teacher in trigonometry, quadratic equations, grammar and phonetics, Arabian Nights, animal fables, chess, as well as philosophy and has inspired Boccaccio, Goethe, Herder, Schopenhauer, Emerson and probably, Aesop. A trickle of Indian religious spirit flowed to China and inundated the whole of Eastern Asia. Not too little but too much is India's trouble.”1 ‘Too much’ contribution has been the irony of Kashmiri Pandits. It has brought them too much trouble in history.

The 'trickle' of Indian spirit that inundated almost the whole of China and Eastern Asia flowed from Kashmir. Kashmiri Pandits ‘Sanskritised’ the Himalayas. The contribution of Kashmiri Pandits to language, linguistics and grammar, philosophy and religion, aesthetics and historiography, astrology and mathematics is unparalleled and is deeply embedded in the edifice of Indian civilisation.  Eminent writer and thinker, Nirmal Verma has this to say, “Can we ever forget that Kashmir lives in our memory both as the birthplace of the immortal classic Rajtirangini and as a place where Shaivite Buddhism reached its height of sophistication?  Could Kashmir or any part of India be uprooted from its past which is shared by others.”2

The connectedness of Kashmir with Indian civilization through roots that transcend both time and space is recognized beyond doubt.  Chinese records of the Tang Dynasty, writings of Hiuen Tsang and Ou-Kang, Al-Beruni and Abu-Fazl bring out beyond doubt the central place of Kashmir within the expanse of Indian civilization. Even Nehru, whose fiddling with Kashmir subverted the secular vision of Independent India at its very inception, was more emphatic about Kashmir's place within India than anything else that he articulated about Indian history and civilization. “Kashmir has always been in history for thousands of years – not always but essentially a part of India and for hundreds of years it was politically a part of India long before the British came. Culturally of course, it has been one of the biggest seats of Indian culture and learning throughout history, for about 2,000 years.”

Kashmiri Hindus played critical role in shaping the consciousness of India about its north and northwestern frontiers. It was natural. Relations of Kashmir with Afghanistan (Gandhar) reach almost the boundaries of time. In fact for a long time, Kashmir and Gandhar (Afghanistan) both represented the same 'Janapad' of India. The exchange in arts, religion and trade between the two was always there. Lalitaditya Muktapida's military expeditions into northwestern India took place when in the west the Sassanid Empire had collapsed in 637-42, and its Muslim conquerors had just reached Sindh (712 AD) and not yet penetrated the Afghan Mountains and the Punjab. And in the north, the Chinese empire of the Tangs was breaking up, including its hold over Central Asian regions of Kucha, Khotan and Khasghar. During Lalitaditya’s reign, Kannauj was also unable to compete with the power and resources of the Karkotas.  “In this vacuum, Lalitaditya built up his ephemeral empire.”3

Cultural exchanges of Kashmir with China and Central Asia were taking place much earlier, in fact, immediately after Kanishka’s Buddhist Council in Kashmir.  Introduction of Mahayana Buddhism into Khotan was done by a Kashmiri Monk; Vairocana who also introduced a new language into the region.4 Kashmir took a frontal role in the transmission of Sarvastivaadin Buddhism directly to China. The number of Buddhist scholars who went to China from Kashmir exceeded those who went from other parts of India.5

Suffice to say that the Kashmiris had enough fund of experience and insight across the impregnable Himalayas in the north and beyond the Hindu Kush in the North-west through a history of extensive cultural, religious, economic and military interface. After the fall of Afghanistan (Gandhara) and the impregnable Hindu Kush passes to Islamic expansion, Kashmir assumed the importance of central spur of the civilization frontier of India in the North.

This central position, which Kashmir had assumed after the Islamic conquests in the North, explains the intervention of Sikhs in Kashmir Valley. Why should Guru Tegh Bahadur intervene only on hearing the plight and misery of Kashmiri Pandits? If he represented the emerging force in the North, it was natural that the many Hindus ravaged by Aurangzeb in the plains of North India would have sought his protection and intervention. How could Pandit Birbal Dhar who petitioned Maharaja Ranjit Singh to send a military expedition to Kashmir succeed in persuading the king?  Ranjit Singh had not long ago sent his troops to Kashmir and its Governor, Azim Khan 'gave them a battle in which they were routed.”6  The dialogue between Sikhs and Kashmiri Pandits had less to do with either suicidal bravado or mere religious appeal. It must have been a dialogue, which recognized the necessity of holding on to the most critical components of the civilization frontier in the North at all costs.

The strategic sensitivity which the Kashmiris had developed while Islam was making its entry into the northern frontiers of India has been well recognized. Commenting on this aspect Al-Beruni says that the Hindus of Kashmir, “are particularly anxious about the actual strength of their country and, therefore, take great care to keep a strong hold upon the entrance and roads leading into it. In consequence, it is very difficult to have any commerce with them. …At present they do not (even) allow any Hindu whom they do not know personally to enter, much less the other people.”7  The insights which the Kashmiri Hindus had of the region surpassed those of anybody else.

The Kashmiri Pandit represents the living component of the connectedness of Kashmir with India, besides history and geography. Proselytising war machinery even after reducing Kashmir to the proverbial 11 families (during the reign of Sikander – the Iconoclast) had failed to wipe out this 'living link'. Snapping this link would uproot Kashmir, as it did with Persia and Afghanistan after the Islamic conquests. Destruction of Kashmiri Pandits through conversion, expulsion or extermination has always been a focus for the Muslim expansion into the northern frontiers of India.

From the second quarter of the 14th century, when Muslims captured the power in the State, to the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Kashmiri Pandits faced a sustained genocidal war against them. Zainulabuddin's reign was a brief oasis in this campaign of tyranny. “Sikander meted out the greatest oppression to the Hindus. It was notified in the city that if a Hindu does not become a Muslim, he must leave the country or be killed. As a result, some of the Hindus fled and some accepted Islam and many Brahmins consented to be killed and gave their lives. It is said that Sikander collected through these methods, about three Khirwars (six maunds) of sacred threads and burnt them. Hazrat Amir Kabir who was a witness to all this orgy of brute passion and vandalism, at last advised him to desist from the slaughter of Brahmans, and told him to impose Jazia instead of death upon them. All the Hindu books of learning were collected and thrown into the Dal Lake or were buried beneath stones and earth.”8 The Muslim campaign against Kashmiri Hindus has been described by Jonaraja as the falling of swarms of 'locusts' on standing paddy crops.9

On 20th June 1819, the Sikh Army entered triumphantly into Srinagar city with Birbal Dhar at its head. Kashmiri Pandits earned a reprieve after more than four centuries.

The peaceful conversion of Kashmir Hindus is a myth: No historical account of Kashmir by any Hindu or a Muslim historian of the times corroborates it.

Political Frontline:

The advent of the twentieth century in Kashmir saw Kashmiri Pandits once again playing a pioneering role in modernising the Kashmiri social milieu. Kashmiri Pandits lead from the front the struggle against the British in the State. While Muslim politics in Kashmir Valley sought annexation of the State with the British Empire, Pandits sowed the seeds of consciousness against colonialism. On  May 4, 1930 Gandhi was arrested after launching the historical Salt Satyagraha. 'Under the leadership of Jia Lal Kelam a hartal was observed in Srinagar and a procession taken out in protest against the arrest of Congress leaders. At a number of places, foreign clothes were burnt in bonfires.10 Earlier, in 1919 AD, when the Congress launched the civil disobedience movement, Kashmiri Pandits took out anti-British demonstrations in Srinagar.

Kashmiri Pandits played a stellar role in the integration of the freedom struggle against the British in the State with that in British India. The first All India State Peoples' Conference was presided over by Shankar Lal Koul. In his presidential address, he made two points. One, Independence of India from British rule and second the unity of the peoples of the States with peoples of British India.11  Shanker Lal Koul's address was a pioneering declaration. Integration of the National Movement between the Indian States and British India was formally proposed by another Kashmiri Pandit, Dwarika Nath Kachroo, who was the Secretary General of the All India State Peoples' Conference. This was done against the opposition of all Congress leaders.

Kashmiri Pandits again played a critical role in the transformation of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference. The basis of this transformation was the publishing of a 'National Demand'. Out of the 12 signatories of this demand, six were Kashmiri Pandits.  Kashmiri Pandits founded the communist movement in Kashmir. Dr NN Raina fathered this movement. It was he who brought veteran communist leaders like Fazl Ilahi Qurban and Dr Kanwar Mohd Ashraf to Kashmir in 1940.

The two most significant developments which took place in the State after its formal accession with India bore the seeds of future destabilisation for Kashmiri Hindus. One was that the new Indian State conceded not only part of the territories of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan but also the strategically most significant Northern Areas during the Pakistani invasion called ‘tribal raid’.  Indian leadership, demonstrated abject ignorance of the frontiers of Jammu and Kashmir, both from civilisational as well as strategic point of view. “Kashmiri Pandits Sanskritised the Himalayas, Sikhs and Dogras gave them the strategic form, British politicised them and the Government of India right from its inception started dismantling them”, says the eminent political scientist of the State,  Professor MK Teng.12

Lying deep in the womb of this crucial concession in the geography of the State was repudiation of the civilisational and strategic imperatives of India. The Kashmiri Pandits represented the living content of Indian civilization in Kashmir. If the Nation can afford to concede the Northern Areas it may well close its eyes to a crucial social group, which represented the continuity of India in Kashmir.

The second development, which heralded an era of subversion of the national vision and creation of a de facto Muslim State on the territory of India, took place on January 3, 1949. On this day, National Conference leaders, who were running the interim government headed by Sheikh Abdullah, gave the first formal expression of their outlook. “The Conference leaders further wrote to Patel, that Pakistan had offered the Muslims of the State complete independence in their internal affairs and freedom to frame a Constitution for the Government of the State without any interference from the State of Pakistan. In order to neutralise the effect of the offer Pakistan had made, the Conference leaders suggested that Government of India should also issue a declaration, which assured the Muslims in the State that they would be ensured internal independence, the future constitutional organisation of the State would be framed by the Constituent Assembly of the State, the accession of the State would be limited to three central subjects of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications and the future of the State Army would be determined by agreement between the Interim Government and the Government of India.”13

This formal expression was the outright repudiation of the lofty ideals of secularism for which Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference became heroes in an India that was torn apart by the two-nation theory.  Sheikh Abdullah had advised the people of Jammu and Kashmir on  March 26, 1938 to end, 'communalism by ceasing to think in terms of Muslims and non-Muslims while discussing our political problems.”14  On January 3, 1949, just two days after the ceasefire came into force, the National Conference and Sheikh Abdullah did a volté face. They were now seeking a relationship with India on the basis of the Muslim majority character of the State. In fact, they were seeking a political organization separate from that, which was to be evolved in the rest of India.  This meant creation of a Muslim State on the territory of secular India.

The National Conference was in fact running a parallel movement with the Muslim League for the Muslims of Kashmir. Eminent political thinker, WC Smith described the nationalism of the National Conference as not superseding Muslim Nationalism in a larger Indian Nationalism, ‘but on the contrary 'undercutting it in still smaller more local loyalties.’

India's accepting NC's position by according special status to Jammu and Kashmir, recognizing its Muslim majority character, gave birth to an elementary contradiction in its secular nation-building vision. India projected Jammu and Kashmir's accession as the refutation of the two-nation theory. But it conceded the principle of the two-nation theory to keep and govern the State. Muslim communalism became a legitimate expression in a secular India. This elemental contradiction proved fatal for the Hindus of Jammu and Kashmir particularly the Kashmiri Pandits.

However, Kashmiri Pandits still hoped that the dawning of an era of a modern Nation State with democracy and secularism as its cardinal principles, end of monarchy and beginning of popular rule and last but not the least the breaking up of the feudal order would lead to the emergence of an egalitarian society. They hoped that Muslim communalism might lose its appeal and the genocidal attrition, which it had witnessed in the past, would henceforth become an event of the past. The community played a crucial role in the democratic movement of the State. It galvanized opinion against imperialist intrigues and Pakistan's machinations. When Sheikh Abdullah was arrested, Kashmiri Pandits took out the first procession in support of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad who was finding himself almost besieged. This was a crucial breaking of the ice without which transition from the Abdullah era was almost impossible. Pandits also organised the first public meeting for Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq at the Tourist Reception Center when he took over the reigns of government. Kashmiri Pandits contested Muslim communalism. Even the Kashmiri Pandit Communists chose a different role for themselves as compared to their counterparts in the rest of India. They disowned the Adhikari Thesis and chose to fight Muslim secessionism instead.

For Muslim identity politics, success of democracy and secularism was anathema. Pandits provided the seed social group for democratization and secularization of the Kashmiri social milieu. Pandits were now a political frontline to be destroyed for dismantling India in Kashmir.  

Beginning of Destabilisation:

The special status, which was conceded to Jammu and Kashmir, constitutionally fortified Muslim identity politics. Pursuing Muslim communal preferences and precedence became legitimate politics. It found expression in the ruthless Muslim exclusivism and hegemony. Establishing Muslim hegemony all around the State started with the Muslimisation of administration and creating a political order where Muslim precedence was ensured.

Carving out of administrative units and electoral constituencies in Jammu and Ladakh, purely to preserve balance in favour of Muslims started with the creation of a Muslim majority Doda district in Jammu province and making the 1941 census as the basis of delimitation in the 1951 elections to the Constituent Assembly. Sheikh Abdullah had already succeeded in delinking the census operation conducted that year in the entire country from Jammu and Kashmir. The Muslim leadership ruled the State almost by decree for one decade, setting into motion processes to fortify Muslim precedence and destabilize Hindus and Buddhists in the entire State.

The mindset of the National Conference leadership towards the Hindu minority, even in Kashmir Valley where there was no danger to the Muslim hegemony, found expression in apparently innocuous but dangerously exclusivist expression. Sheikh Abdullah would often describe Kashmiri Pandits as 'Aamaanat' — a custodial property. Through such expressions, "Sheikh Abdullah was simply putting local Hindus outside the scope of the nation-building process in Kashmir and also subtly suggesting that the citizenship rights of this minority were non-inalienable. In fact, earlier, Sheikh Abdullah had prevailed upon Nehru not to accord any constitutional protection rights to minorities in the Valley even while he was insisting for a separate identity of Kashmiri Muslims in the Indian Constitution.”15

The destabilization process of Kashmiri Hindus started zealously after independence. The first step was Economic Destabilisation. "It was initiated through the Muslimisation of administrative services and implementation of discriminatory and arbitrary land reforms. The specific purpose of these land reforms was not to create an egalitarian socio-economic order in rural Kashmir but to appease middle and rich Muslim peasantry."16 For the same reasons, orchards were exempted from the Agrarian Reforms Acts. Contemporary scholars of the time, Daniel Thorner and PN Bazaz have made important observations about these land reforms. Next to follow was 'Educational destabilization' through introduction of communal quotas in professional institutions and denial of routine promotions to Kashmiri Hindu employees. Judgments of Supreme Court of India on the issue of promotion of teachers and admissions into professional colleges are an eloquent testimony to the processes involved to destabilize Hindus.

Reservation on communal basis deepened the communal consciousness among the educated class of Kashmiri Muslims. The introduction of 'communal quotas' for jobs in the service sector set the tone for the 'Muslimisation' of administration. The normal recruiting process was, circumvented and the upward mobility of an upstart Muslim middle class ensured. This class got sensitized to communal politics and started resenting even the symbolic presence of Kashmiri Hindus in the State services. A large number of Jamaat-i-Islami cadres as well as sympathizers, as a result of this campaign of "Muslimisation of Administration," gained entry into crucial segments of State administration. With the strong support of the State government, Jamaat-i-Islami was thus free to organise chains of schools for preaching fundamentalist ideology. "It affected Pandits in two ways. One, the Jamaat initiated a silent but highly venomous campaign against them across the length and breadth of the Valley. Second, as the new rural Muslim middle class faced stiff resistance from its urban counterpart and demonstrated similar upstart instincts to overtake it, it began visualizing its success through the total destabilization of the Hindu community in the Valley."17

That the Kashmiri Pandit was seen as an impediment to the political imperatives followed by Muslim separatism was manifest when he was openly described as a 'fifth columnist.'17a The rationale for unleashing genocide against Kashmiri Pandits was built well before the physical assault on Kashmiri Hindus began in 1989. It was only a matter of time before this epithet of 'Fifth Columnist' got replaced by 'Mukhbir' and 'Kafir' — the spy and the infidel.

The Beginnings of Genocide:

Kashmiri Pandits were deeply suspicious about Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference from the beginning. To them, both represented 'communal' and 'fascist' influence on the Kashmiri Muslim Social milieu. This was communicated by them to the Congress leadership from time to time to the consternation of Nehru. One time associate of Sheikh Abdullah, Prem Nath Bazaz had from the beginning seen through the democratic and secular facade of Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference. With regard to the future of Kashmiri Pandits he had prophetic premonitions. "It is time they (KPs) realize the stern reality …the internal conditions of the State can in no way improve; indeed they will deteriorate and some day something might happen which will jeopardize the life of the community. It is, therefore, wise and sagacious to take time by the forelock and prepare the community psychologically and otherwise for the inevitable."18

The Kashmiri Pandits were well aware of the simmering dangers in the State. The stridency of Muslim communalism and separatism and its deep roots in the social milieu was never hidden. It was quite manifest even in the most liberal sections of the Kashmiri Muslim social milieu.  "I will give my soul and life for India but my heart is with Pakistan,” sang Mehjoor the darling lyricist of Kashmir of those days.19  Muslim leadership would often carry a lump of salt known as Pakistani salt in Kashmir and show it to the public during their election campaigns only to symbolically indicate that if they won, Pakistan would not be far away. Often, they would wave a green handkerchief to demonstrate their commitment to the imperatives of Islam.

The return of Sheikh Abdullah to power in 1975 and the invasion of Afghanistan by the then Soviet Union created the space and support for militarization of the social milieu of Kashmiri Muslims. Everything, which happened in the State, was brazen enough not to escape notice by anybody, not to speak of agencies of the State. The plans for an armed uprising of Kashmiri Muslims belong to the era immediately after Sheikh Abdullah was arrested in 1953. The 'Plebiscite Front' and 'Alfatah' only represented the internal simmering within Kashmiri Muslim society for militarization. The 'National Liberation Front' was created in Pakistan as early as 1968 to start violence and disruption on the soil of Kashmir.20 International Muslim congregations were held in Kashmir, only to whip up a mass hysteria for revolt. To build up a pitch for Pan-Islamic resurgence, many Islamic countries would send their representatives to Kashmir frequently. Their visits and the lavish distribution of funds under the cover of educational aid and charity were known to Government of India.

As the process of armed uprising of Kashmiri Muslims started, the expression of Muslim communalism with regard to Kashmiri Pandits underwent transformation. The historical names of places of Kashmir were changed through government circulars and replaced by Islamic names. Physical intimidation of Kashmiri Hindus started in earnestness.

A prominent Kashmiri Pandit in the remote village of Tangmarg became one of the first victims of Muslim terrorism. Terrorists killed him and the case was hushed up. Signs of Muslim fundamentalism appeared in a pronounced manner from Sopore. Its expression in Anantnag was more aggressive. Poster campaigns to intimidate Hindus asking than to vacate appeared in the period of the early eighties. 'Jihad' for creation of an 'Islamic Republic of Kashmir' was declared through posters and sermons in the mosques. Kashmiri Pandit shrines were attacked from time to time. Their properties were usurped fraudulently or disputes about Hindu temple properties raked up with the connivance of the Government.

Along with such happenings, a campaign for the social boycott of Kashmiri Pandits was launched by Muslim organizations starting from Anantnag. "What steps has the administration taken to mitigate the sufferings of the minority community in Lok Bhavan (Anantnag) which is subjected to complete boycott by the majority community."21 reported Martand as early as August 15, 1985. The campaign of social boycott spread subsequently. The stealing of idols from temples in the Valley also became a frequent happening.

"…Twenty idols including the famous Mahakali image of rare black stone in Hari Parbat Fort temple made under the rule of Maharaja Gulab Singh, the first Dogra ruler of the State, a priceless ninth century image of a deity stolen from Lok Bhavan in Anantnag and scores of items of puja have been unearthed by the police…Terracotta Ganesha, Balram, Shankarpursha and Nandi idols of black stone have been lifted … other priceless images stolen include Shiva linga of Dewan temple, Goddess Kali of Anantnag, fossil image of the thirteenth century and other memorial stones of fourteenth century …Five policemen who had suppressed the first incident of attempted theft of the Mahakali idol of Hari Parbat Fort have been put under suspension …One Pakistani made pistol and a revolver have been seized from the possession of the arrested persons who have been charged with theft…"22

"Anti-national elements threw a bomb at the Shiva temple, and later set it on fire at Handwara, near the famous shrine of Kheer Bhawani …the fire gutted the entire temple complex."23

"Bombs were lobbed at temples in Srinagar also, which created a scare amongst the Hindus. It was a calculated device to dissuade them from going to the temples and adhering to their way of life."24 February 1986, witnessed an organized fundamentalist orgy against Kashmiri Pandits in the entire Valley, particularly in Anantnag district. This was a weeklong un-provoked violence resulting in the demolition and burning of residential houses and shops of Hindus and damage and destruction of dozens of temples and shrines, breaking and stealing of idols and throwing others into the river. Many families were displaced from Anantnag. The attack was perhaps a prelude to the religious cleansing operations started subsequently in 1989. The role of important Muslims leaders in inciting these riots has always been suspect.

The references made here are only to underline the fact that religious cleansing operations did not start suddenly in 1989. The stridency of Muslim communalism was building up over a period of time.  Militarization of the Muslim social milieu was getting reflected from time to time from the beginning of the eighties itself. Lieutenant General Vijay Madan, a military strategist remarks that, "To believe that Government, its intelligence agencies, the army guarding the LoC in J&K and the paramilitary forces similarly employed, none had a clue of what was brewing across the LoC since at least 1986 onwards, if not earlier, is to stretch one's credulity to unimaginable limits."

Exiled And Abandoned:

The exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from the Kashmir Valley started from the second half of 1989, immediately in the aftermath of the gunning down of prominent Kashmiri Pandit leader, Tika Lal Taploo. It started initially as a trickle. Towards the end of 1989 it became an overflowing stream and by March of 1991 more than ninety percent of the Hindu population living in Kashmir Valley had been internally displaced. A selective and sustained campaign of killings of Kashmiri Pandits throughout the length and breadth of the Kashmir Valley and the atmosphere of communal intimidation, accomplished an almost total religious cleansing of the Valley.

The pattern of assault on this Hindu minority was 'kill one and scare ten'. It was only after the displacement of the members of the Hindu minority from the Valley that mayhem of loot, plunder, arson of Hindu properties was let loose by Islamic zealots. For almost four years, the household goods and clothes looted from abandoned Hindu houses, and temples and shrines were openly sold in Sunday markets commonly known as 'Bangladeshi Markets' at Hazuri Bagh-Iqbal Park area of Srinagar.25 More systematic ‘residential cleansing’ soon followed this orgy of loot and arson. Concentrated Hindu localities were burnt 'whole hog’. Hindu houses located in Muslims areas were broken into and forcibly occupied. Fraudulent deals and illegal occupation of Hindu properties became common news.26 Temples and shrines were attacked, burnt, and plundered across the length and breadth of all the districts of Kashmir Valley. Idols and murals were either broken or stolen only to be sold in the antiques market.

In Anantnag and Kupwara districts, the 'residential cleansings' is more extensive. The remnants of Hindu property like plinth structures etc. are being openly excavated and sold for cheap property material. To quote a few examples: the Trakroo Mohalla, a KP locality just opposite to the Kshir Bhavani temple at Tikker in Kupwara no longer exists. The Hindu houses and Dharamshalas in Luk Bhawan-Uma Nagri Anantnag are now non-existent.27

A classical genocidal process is destroying Kashmiri Pandits: All patterns of this process are quite manifest and cannot escape notice — physical cleansing, residential cleansing and administrative cleansing. What is happening with the displaced Kashmiri Pandits living in exile in Jammu, Delhi and other parts of India is only the extension of this genocidal process. Yves Ternon writes in his seminal essay, 'Reflections on Genocide' that, "The deportation has the simplicity of the neutron bomb: it wipes out men and preserves the environment. Regrouping in camps diminishes resistance, facilitates extermination and makes it possible to camouflage it, to give it the appearance of a natural death. Genocide is in fact an easy game in which the victor is designated before hand, a violence that goes only one-way. The risk is not as in war, a risk that is shared."

The manner in which the Government of India and the State Government have handled the genocidal war on Kashmiri Hindus and their internal displacement has not only helped in 'camouflaging' the genocide but also in giving it the appearance of a natural death. The then Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, who was at the helm of affairs in the State in 1990 has brought out this fact in a veiled manner.  "Whatever be the vicissitudes of their history and whatever unkind quirks their fate might have brought to them in the past, these all pale into insignificance when one reflects on what is happening to them at, present...The grim tragedy is compounded by the equally grim irony that one of the most intelligent, subtle, versatile and proud communities of the country is being virtually reduced to extinction in free India."28

The cardinal principles that have guided the Government of India in responding to the internal displacement of 3,50,000 persons of an entire community, do not emanate from the proper understanding of the genesis of displacement, character and sway of the forces which brought about religious cleansing and the political vested interest within, which has abetted the genocide.

The first response of the Government of India to the displacement of Kashmiri Hindus was to deny the tragedy. The registrations process for displaced persons was started by the voluntary non-governmental organization Jammu and Kashmir Sahitya Samiti. Even the initial shelters and relief measures were started by this organization rather than by the Government. When the Government moved formally to register the displaced persons in March 1990 and provide them with relief and shelter, its policy projections did not go beyond a few months. This was amazing when the Government had enough evidence with regard to international linkages of the terrorism in the State, it sway and reach amongst the Muslims and the widespread entrenchment of communal forces in the social milieu of Kashmir.

The very location of the 'migrant camps' reflects what the Government was contemplating. Most of the camps were created adjacent to watersheds and nullahs. Major camps at Purkhoo, Muthi, Mishriwallah, Nagrota are basically on the banks or floor beds of these nullahs. That these nullahs and watersheds are flooded with water during monsoons reflects either the abject apathy of the Government or the perception that the government did not visualize that these 'Camps' may be required beyond the months of July 1990 when the monsoon would set in.

By March 1990, more than 21,001 displaced families were registered with the Relief Commissioner, which increased to 56,041 families by the end of March 1991.29 When the State Government and the Government of India decided to build camps for the displaced Hindus, it only developed a contingency plan for building camps for a small percentage of the displaced population. We don’t have more than 5,720 families living in 14 Government run camps in Jammu.30 It is not clear what criteria were used by the Government to decide the scope of accommodation in relief camps.

This piecemeal and ad hoc attitude of the Government is revealed clearly by the fact that it took seven months to accept in principle that the displacement may last for an indefinite period, necessitating the sanction of release of salary for displaced employees in Jammu and Delhi. Eighty-three orders over a period of four years i.e., 1990-1993 had to be issued in order to ensure some basic rights and benefits for displaced employees. The employees had to resort to hundreds of protest demonstrations and dharnas to make the Government agree to their demands.31 Displaced Hindus had to struggle in the same way with the Government for basic amenities and accommodation in camps, education, relief and rations in the excruciating heat.

The Government from the very inception was reluctant to define and characterise the problem. The internal dynamics of the Government reluctance were more or less revealed by its reply to the NHRC. A letter dated May 6, 1996 (Case No: 802 on the file of NHRC) pens Government’s views clearly "…the complainants are appropriately styled as migrants as they have migrated on their own from areas in the Valley to the Jammu area of the same State or other areas of the country. Their claims to designate them as internally displaced persons, is not acceptable to the Government of India on the ground that the displacement has been self imposed."

Even though the Prime Minister and the Home Minister have been unambiguous about describing the deportations of Kashmiri Pandits as 'ethnic cleansing', yet these expressions appear to be more for external consumption. The handling of relief and rehabilitation matters by the various successive Governments reveal a sadistic apathy as if some weird exclusivist outlook has gripped State functioning both in the State as well as in the center. For example, in year 1990-91 the State Government asked for a supplementary provision of grants to the tune of Rs 500.00 lakhs. This entire amount remained unutilised.32 For the same year, for the construction of geodesic dome accommodation for migrants, a supplementary grant provision of Rs 200 lakhs was sought and not a single penny utilised.33 This is not an isolated example. For the year 1994-95 the grant provision for construction of one-room tenements for migrants was Rs 300.00 lakhs. Only Rs 32.57 lakhs were utilized, leaving an excess saving of 267.43 lakhs. In the same year, the Government had kept a provision of Rs 384.00 lakhs for  food grains for the migrants. There was no utilisation.34 The money available for critical areas of relief and rehabilitation of displaced persons was not utilized. Where was the money utilized? Which were the considerations for the Government more critical than providing shelter and food to its uprooted citizens.

The Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General up to March 1991 states, “The Survey Committee appointed (April 2, 1991) by the Relief Commissioner reported that of 4,226 tents pitched in different camps 846 tents, outer flies of 1,001 tents, and inner flies of 174 tents required replacement and 1,478 tents required repairs." It was seen in the audit that supplies were not verified with reference to the approved samples, nor was any guarantee obtained from the suppliers as a safeguard against defects detected subsequently, before releasing payment to the suppliers. "…Though an amount of Rs 2.50 lakhs was allotted by the Government for repairing the tents no repairs were carried out as the tents had outlived their prescribed shelf-life of 2 years."35 Out of 4,667 tents procured during 1990-91, 1,167 tents worth Rs 37.62 lakhs were purchased in Delhi and were accepted without inspection and all of these tents were found leaking and damaged during the pre-Monsoon rains of May June 1991."36

When Government decided to build one room tenements (ORTs) to replace tents, the same criminal negligence was seen time and again. 1,637 ORTs were constructed during the years 1992-96 at a cost of 6.49 crores. "These tenements developed cracks in the walls and RCC roofing immediately...and started leaking during the monsoon seasons. The Managing Director of the company, attributed (August 1995) these defects to highly economic specifications of construction keeping in view the expected early return of migrants to Kashmir Valley and further stated that the specification would be improved upon in future construction. Accordingly, the Managing Director proposed (August 1995) waterproofing of the ORTs at a cost of Rs 6.25 per sq. foot (revised to Rs 7.25)."37 The Relief Commissioner Jammu, however, declined to bear the additional cost of waterproofing but intriguingly projected (April 2000) an additional requirement of Rs 22 lakhs to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, for the proposed leak proofing of the ORTs.38 Similar was the story of 499 ORTs (geodesic dome tombs) constructed in 1991 at a cost of Rs 80.56 lakhs at Muthi camp, Jammu. The ORTs started leaking immediately.39  In some cases, the money provided for construction of ORTs was not used and the amount raised with the company account depriving the exchequer of the original amount and interest thereon as well as 'migrant families' the benefit of accommodation.

The grant of free rations to the displaced families was not devoid of bungling either. Excess billing of Rs 3.98 crore was done by the Food and Supplies Department for the period 1995-96 to 1999-2000.39a

In the area of ex-gratia payments in respect of immovable property damaged by militancy, 34 percent test-checked ex-gratia cases were sanctioned by the DCs, 6 years after filling of First Information Report; 53 percent cases after a delay of 1-6 years. Only 13 percent cases were sanctioned within a year of the filing of the FIRs. "The disbursement of the ex-gratia payments by relief organisations to the owners / legal heirs was also made after a delay of up to 3 months (11 percent), four months to one year (48 percent) and more than a year (41 percent) from date of sanction...Abnormal delay in sanction / disbursement of ex-gratia payments to migrants defeated the very objective of providing timely relief / succour to migrant families."40

The handling of other critical areas has been no different. In the area of sanitation, each toilet constructed in camps catered to 14-29 persons, each bathroom catered to 22-312 persons. In the area of health care in camps, even though dispensaries were provided with adequate staff, yet the related infrastructural facilities and equipment are conspicuous by their dearth. "The dispensaries are lacking first-aid equipment / dressing material...and medicines, affecting the functioning of the dispensaries and consequent delivery of health care services in camps."41

The human tragedy, which accompanied the Governmental lapses in rising to the occasion, has been colossus. Hundreds of displaced people died because of inadequate shelter and food, and having to struggle and agitate in excruciating heat and humidity to persuade the Government to act. Heat strokes, snakebites, gastro-enteritis and sheer stress consumed lives, a fact that was no secret being extensively reported by the media.

"During the last ten days, six Kashmiri migrants including two traders, have died of sun-stroke...Besides, over 60 migrants at different transit camps and other places have suffered sun strokes this month, with the mercury maintaining at 42 to 45 degrees Celsius."42.

"Dengue fever...has struck the Kashmiri exiled community living here since the exodus in 1990 in a big way, as the virus found the helpless, virgin, non immune population at its mercy...There is an estimate of ten thousand members of this displaced community already having fallen victim to this pestilence."43. "The younger group of migrants between 16 to 25 years are mostly suffering from psychoneurosis and the age group between 25-40 years are suffering from gastric stress related disorders. The age group above 40-50 years are suffering from stress diabetes."43a.

"The survey also reveals that diseases like tuberculosis, kidney ailments and high blood pressure are rampant among the refugees. A disturbingly high portion of those who died during the last five years belongs to the under 35-year age group."44 At Purkhoo camp...200 have died since the camp was set up, but the number of children born is just five."45

The Government has not conducted a single health survey despite a huge loss of life to the displaced community. Dr Jetender Singh, a reputed Diabetologist in Jammu did a study on displaced persons in Kashmir and reported a 'Diabetics epidemic' caused mainly by stress. "It is a violation of biological human rights not only of the diseased but also those who are yet to be born."46

Around 5,000 displaced persons died because of disease, stress and heat strokes, snakebites and accidents, during the first four years of exiled life. This was the time when the Government was still struggling to decide the location of camps, erecting substandard tents, building one room tenements (ORTs) which would immediately leak, providing dispensaries without medicines etc.

The administrative expenditure incurred by the Government mainly for ‘payment of or disbursement of cash \ ex-gratia relief ranged from Rs 726 to Rs 1,247 per family' during the period 1995-96 to 1999-2000.47 During this period, Rs 450 per month per head to the maximum of Rs 1,800 per family per month cash relief was given to displaced Kashmiri Hindus.48 This comes to about Rs 12 per head per day. Around the same time, the government was spending around Rs 50 per day on each surrendered or arrested terrorist. The standards for relief to Afghan refugees in India were considerably higher.

The most glaring aspect of the State's response to the entire issue of displacement is that it uses characterisations like 'ethnic cleansing' only for international consumption. Internally, it is guided by a policy framework, which considers displacement as a mere aberration. The Government of India, even while the religious cleansing operations have spilled over to Jammu, does not recognise that Hindus in the State and particularly in the Kashmir Valley have been targeted as a social group because of their religious affiliation and political commitment to India and that they have suffered a genocide.

The government policy of 'Return and Rehabilitation' of Kashmiri Hindus reflects a perverted symbolism which the Nation State has pursued with regard to Jammu and Kashmir. The State has concerned itself only with symbolic secularism in Jammu and Kashmir. It merely wants a symbolic presence of Hindus in the Valley and seeks their return for this purpose. It has always been reluctant to stand up to the challenges of Muslim communalism in the State. Its response to genocide and religious cleansing of Hindus in the State has been guided more by considerations of restricting its fallout in the rest of the country rather than reversing them.  There is a strange convergence of interests between the subversive goals of Muslim separatists and the Indian State. Subversive Muslim politics seeks a symbolic return to camouflage the pan-Islamic ideological content of the so-called 'freedom struggle' in the State. The Indian State seeks symbolic return of Hindus to disguise and camouflage the compromises it has made with Muslim communalism.

This has created a vicious cycle. The Government builds hype on 'return' without any control on the ground. Radical Muslims unleash a backlash. A massacre follows. There is a lull for some time before one more hype of return is built. The Sangrampora, Wandhama, and Nadimarg massacres are only repetitions of a bloody cycle in which Kashmiri Hindus find themselves.

Prospects:

The return of Kashmiri Pandits means reversal of genocide perpetrated against them. It implies a fundamental change in the outlook of the Indian Nation State. The Nation State has to own up to its responsibilities to India as a civilisation. It has to fulfil its responsibilities to the Indian Constitution and a secular vision where religion is comprehensively delegitimised as a denominator for sharing political power. The present territorial perspective of secularism has to be shunned. Indian secularism and the process of Islamisation of Kashmir are incompatible. Compromise with any form of Muslim communalism in Kashmir, even for tactical reasons is basically anti-national. The demographic imperative of Muslim secessionist movement cannot be reversed unless the Indian State recognises it as a threat to national interests. The present secular paradigm incorporates a weird view of the national interest. It is pushing the Nation State to define itself not only in terms of its neutrality to the genuine secular Hindu needs but also in terms of disowning them.

The Prime Minister, during his visit to Jammu and Kashmir in the aftermath of the Nadimarg massacre said, "I did not talk about displaced Kashmiri Pandits in my public speech deliberately. I did not want to whip up emotions in the country." The substratum of this Statement is negative. In fact, the same substratum has governed the policy of India with regard to the problems of Hindus in the State. The Indian Nation State views the challenges to secularism in Jammu and Kashmir only in terms of their fallout in the rest of the country. The Indian Nation State does not concern itself with the health of secularism in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. That is why the overwhelming sway of Muslim communalism and its militarisation do not form a cause of concern for the State. In fact, camouflaging Muslim communism under the cliché of 'National Aspirations' and 'Alienation' has been the theme song of the State. It has provided 'subversive space' which will tear apart not only the State of J&K but the entire fabric of co-existence in the country. The Indian Nation State has gradually drifted towards a masochistic view of secularism through holding Hindus hostage. It seeks legitmisation of Muslim identity politics in the State through delegitmisation of the elemental interests of non-Muslims in the State. The return of Kashmiri Hindus is not sought in terms of return of a secular order. It is sought so that the Indian State can circumvent and bypass the real ideological challenges in the State.

Kashmiri Pandits may not survive as a distinct social group unless the Indian State begins to own this group. This means rediscovering a commitment to both the civilisational continuity of India and secularism in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. At present the scenario looks nothing but grim.

Future:

Kashmiri Pandits have played critical roles in the long history of Kashmir. Now too their role is critical. Will they countenance and compromise with a so-called 'freedom struggle' based on destruction of the 'spirit of freedom? Will they, under coercion, agree to provide a secular facade to Muslim communalism? Will they go with a vision of India based on the negation of the civilisation of India? The struggle of Kashmiri Pandits during the years of their current exile has been aimed at three areas besides their immediate survival: one, to change the image stereotypes about this community in the country; two, to correct the Human Rights discourse; and three, to correct the political discourse.

KP Image Stereotypes:

There are three main stereotypes that have determined the sensitivity of the political class in India about Kashmiri Pandits. Kashmiri Pandits have been projected as the main feudal class of Kashmir, a community of landlords. Kashmiri Pandits have been projected as a ruling class both in the pre-independence and the post independence eras. Kashmiri Pandits have been projected as a community that had usurped employment services in Kashmir and caused Muslim alienation.

Kashmir Pandits (KP) as a feudal class is a myth created by the communists to rationalize their support to Muslim Nationalism in the State. The pre-1947 record registers of the State reveal that there were two Kashmiri Pandit landlords in the Jammu and Kashmir State. As compared to this, there were 100 Muslim landlords in Kashmir Valley alone. Landlords were then defined as those who had a Revenue Free Land.

In contrast to this, the number of KP Chak Dhars was more. Chaks were basically fallow lands, which were brought under cultivation during the reign of Maharaja Pratap Singh. These Chaks were offered voluntarily to anybody in the then State to improve production and the incentive was exemption from tax on such land for 5-10 years.49 "Not many people were coming forward to take on the responsibility for developing the uncultivated pasture lands of the Valley. Ownership of land under Pathans, Sikhs and early Dogras was considered a great liability."50 The land reforms conducted in Jammu and Kashmir by the National Conference, fixed 22 acres as the ceiling. This was primarily because most of the land below 22 acres belonged to Muslims in Kashmir Valley.51 In 1989-90 Muslims of Kashmir owned 97.4 percent of agricultural land, 96 percent of orchards and 98.7 percent of Kareva highland growing saffron.52

Kashmiri Pandit as a ruling class is an even bigger myth. In the pre-Independence era, because of better educational background and harmlessness as a political class, once in a while, a few KP's might find a place in the high office of the ruler. Overall, KP's were as subjugated and marginalized as anybody else. The perception that Kashmiri Pandits were patronized by Dogra rulers to subjugate Kashmiri Muslims is incorrect. The following data is revealing in this context:

Kashmiri Pandits in High Offices of Jammu and Kashmir before Independence53

 

Year

Total No. Officers

Local

Kashmiri Pandit Officers

1910-11

8

Zero

1911-12

11

Zero

1912-13

22

Zero

1913-14

24

Zero

1914-15

23

Zero

1915-16

27

Zero

1916-17

33

Zero

1917-18

27

Zero

1918-19

27

Zero

1919-20

31

Zero

1920-23

27

Zero

1924-25

29

One

1925-26

30

One

1935

38

Three

1937-38

39

Four

1940-41

50

Five

1941-43

68

Eight

1945-46

66

Eight

                                                                                               

After Independence, the number of KP in high offices of the State government has been fractional.

The perception that Kashmiri Pandits had usurped the employment cake of the State is equally false and motivated. The number of Kashmiri Pandit employees in the State government services in 1989-90 was 11,342 out of 1.74 lakh government employees in the Kashmir Valley which means a low figure of 3.5% 54. KP's constituted 0.5 percent of Horticulture Industry, 0.02 percent of industries using electric power, 0.4 percent of handicraft and handloom industry, .01 percent in small scale industries, 0.8 percent in State Transport Corporations, almost zero percent in Boat transport and Boat Tourism, 2.2 percent in Tourist Industry, 2.4 percent in State subsidy.55

Another perception which has affected the sensitivity about Kashmiri Pandits is that they were an extension of the Nehru-Gandhi Dynasty, enjoying power and pelf. And that after the 1971 defeat of Pakistan the 'kitchen cabinet' of Indira Gandhi constituted by Kashmiri Pandits was responsible for the squandering of the gains of the war and settling the Kashmir issue for good. KP's constituting a small minority in Kashmir Valley were not responsibly for the rise of either Jawahar Lal Nehru or Indira Gandhi. That they had KP bureaucrats in their inner circle must have been guided by considerations other than helping their community in Kashmir. Perhaps the same considerations which Narsimah Rao or the present ruling leadership has in choosing their henchmen. Only one Kashmiri Pandit, PN Haksar with left-liberal moorings, supported the line which India ultimately stuck to in dealing with Pakistan after its defeat in the 1971 War. No record or revelation has come to the fore that anybody else supported this line - neither TN Koul nor PN Dhar, nor RN Kaw to name a few. Referring to the failures of the Simla Conference, PN Dhar remarks,"Strange as this may sound, the Indian team did not seem to be very comfortable with the fact of having won a war...or perhaps our collective historical experience makes us feel more at home with setbacks."

**(The author is Chairman Panun Kashmir and Head of Editorial Board of Kashmir Sentinel)

References:

  1. The Wisdom of India Ed., by Lin Yu Tang, JAICO, 1956.
  2. India of My Dreams: Nirmal Verma.
  3. Cultural and Political History of Kashmir: Vol. I, PNK Bamzai.
  4. Ancient Khoten: Stein
  5. India and China: Dr PC Bagchi
  6. History of Kashmiri Pandits: Jia Lal Kilam
  7. Kitabul-Hind: Alberuni, Eng. Tr. – Sachau (Alberuni’s India)
  8. History of Kashmir: Hassan.
  9. Rajtaringni: Jonaraja.
  10. Freedom Struggle in Jammu and Kashmir – Dr Santosh Koul.
  11. Indian Annual Register – 1927.
  12. Interview with Prof MK Teng.
  13. Article 370 – MK Teng.
  14. Presidential Address to Muslim Conference by Sheikh Mohd. Abbdullah – 26 March 1938.
  15. Regional Minority: Crisis and Alienation, A case study of Kashmiri Pandits – BL Shiv Puri.
  16. Ibid
  17. Ibid
  18. Atish-e-Chinar
  19. Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir: PN Bazaaz.
  20. Kashmir; Some Realities, Some Follies: Sham Koul.
  21. The Indian Express: May 3, 1968
  22. Crisis In Kashmir: PL Koul
  23. The Indian Express: April 12, 1985.
  24. The Indian Express: April 26, 1985.
  25. Ibid
  26. Survey by the Author.
  27. Kashmir Sentinel, Jammu.
  28. Survey by the Author.
  29. My Frozen Turbulence: Jag Mohan
  30. C&AG Report – J&K, Ended March 31, 1991.
  31. Report of the Relief Commissioner Jammu.
  32. Exiled Employee: A Contemporary Reality.
  33. Appropriation Accounts of Government of Jammu and Kashmir: 1990-91.
  34. Ibid
  35. Appropriation Accounts J&K: 1994-95.
  36. Audit Report of C&AG, J&K: March 1991.
  37. Ibid
  38. Audit Report C&AG, J&K Ended March 31, 2000
  39. Ibid
  40. Ibid
  41. Ibid

  42. Ibid
  43. Ibid
  44. Daily Excelsior, June 23, 1993.
  45. Interview: Dr KL Chowdhary.
  46. Interview: Dr PM Dhar.

  47. Trumpet Delhi September 15, 1995.
  48. Times of India
  49. Interview: Dr Jetinder Singh.
  50. C&AG Report, J&K: 31 March 2000.
  51. GOI submission to NHRC Case No. 802.
  52. Freedom Struggle of Kashmir: PN Bamzai, Wazir Committee Report 1954
  53. Ibid
  54. Land compensation Report to the Constitution Assembly of J&K.
  55. White Paper: Teng / Gaddoo.
  56. Administrative Reports of Jammu and Kashmir State.
  57. Data – Services – J&K Administration.
  58. White Paper: Teng/Gaddoo.  

Copyright © Bharat Rakshak 2004