Analyzing South Asia:
The Dangers of A Groupthink
Kaushik Kapisthalam
After decades of being on the backburner, the 9-11
terrorist attacks forced
America to take a fresh look at the South Asian
region. The last time the US had focused on this
region was immediately following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, which required US
policymakers to structure their policies to fit
the Cold War paradigm. However, the post 9-11
focus on South Asia required
America
to view South Asia with completely different
policy objectives in mind, foremost of happens to
be the eradication of anti-American Islamic
terrorism.
As before, US policymakers as well as legislators
base their policy decisions on the analysis
provided to them by independent analysts. The
robustness of the analysis, therefore, is critical
to prevent poor decision-making. The intelligence
analysis leading up to the 9-11 attacks, as well
as the WMD-program in
Iraq are classic examples of where the data was
analyzed to fit what was thought of as “common
sense” conclusions. In both cases, the holes in
the analysis have themselves been subject to
further analysis. However, it does not appear
that the fundamental mistakes underlying poor
analysis are being corrected. The reports
generated for the Congressional Research Service
on Missile Proliferation1 in
South Asia
as well as on India-US2 and Pakistan-US3
relationships seem to suffer from a fundamental
flaw of groupthink, where the analyses follow a
predetermined thought chain and data is
selectively used to justify the analyses.
What is Groupthink?
Groupthink is not a new concept. It was first
conceived in the 1950s and has since been used to
explain many policy and decision-making failures.
Janis4 defined groupthink as:
“A mode of thinking that people engage in when
they are deeply involved in a cohesive group, when
members striving for unanimity override their
motivations to realistically appraise alternative
courses of action.”
Janis was analyzing the poor decisions that led to
the
Bay of Pigs invasion, for example, and has based
much of his conclusions on the seminal work of
Asch5 on Social Psychology. The
process leading to poor decision making is briefly
described as6 deriving from (a)
Isolated, cohesive, and homogeneous decision
making leading to the classic symptoms of
groupthink exhibiting (b) closed mindedness,
rationalization, squelching of dissent and a
feeling of righteousness and invulnerability
leading to (c) an incomplete examination of the
alternatives, a failure to examine risks and
contingencies and an incomplete search for
information all of which then lead to (d) poor
decision-making.
Groupthink in the India-Pakistan Context
In the
India and Pakistan realm, groupthink dictates that
India and Pakistan must always be hyphenated and
every obvious deleterious act by Pakistan has to
be “balanced” with a reference to a “causal”
action by India, however gratuitous or illogical
the “causality” sounds. In essence, the “experts”
review all the data from within the established
paradigm and force-fit the anomalous data to the
paradigm by resorting to logical gymnastics. In
this process the “experts” dismiss data that is
inconsistent with the paradigm as “questionable”.
By not questioning the India-Pakistan dyad
paradigm and its underlying assumptions, no new
ideas are generated, and more importantly, key
trends are missed because of faulty analyses.
Why India and Pakistan are Not a Dyad
Tracing all the way back to the partition,
India
and Pakistan have a history of conflict that has
resulted in three major wars (1971, 1965, and
1948), one minor one (1999), and proxy wars in
Kashmir
(1984-present) and Indian Punjab (1981-1993). It
is therefore easy to assume that the other drives
each nation’s foreign policy objectives, and
strategic imperatives. Further, since the two
nations were hewn by the British along religious
lines, it is easy to assume that the conflict is
between Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India. Finally,
since much of the conflict has occurred over the
territory of Kashmir, it is easy to conclude that
the future of Kashmir is the root cause of the
tension. The reality is significantly different.
Religious Definitions are flawed
India is a functioning democracy, where a variety
of religions and races live in harmony. While
India does suffer from occasional ethnic,
religious or regional tensions, they generally
tend to be localized and remain so due to the
strong democratic infrastructure. The only other
multi-cultural parallel to India is the United
States. Although the United States is a Christian
majority state, it is well recognized that viewing
US actions from a religious prism is flawed.
Viewing India as a Hindu State is just as
incorrect. Pakistan, on the other hand is a
religious state. Its entire raison d’etre is
based on its claim that it is the home for the
subcontinent’s Muslims. Its very name, in Urdu,
means “Land of the Pure”, meaning wherein the pure
are implicitly defined as being Muslim. Pakistani
actions and government statements are routinely
couched in Islamic terms. Creating an analysis
that is based on Muslim Pakistan versus Hindu
India is doomed to failure, because it fails to
understand the fundamental drivers of the two
states. The Indian ethos is secular and
democratic, while the Pakistani ideology argues
that Muslims should reject all non-Muslim
governments, even if they are democratic.
Accepting that ideology at face value strengthens
the arguments of Islamic fundamentalists
everywhere.
Kashmir is not the Root Cause
The other basis involves positioning
Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint. Often, the
discussion circles around the “self-determination”
of the Kashmiris, without ever questioning the
meaning of “self-determination” in the appropriate
context. The notion of self-determination was one
that gained currency during the colonial age when
vast peoples were under occupation and without
basic individual rights. The notion of
self-determination implied providing to the people
the right to democratically elect their leaders,
make their own laws and taxation. In the Indian
state of Kashmir, the citizenry are free to elect
their leaders and routinely replace their leaders
through elections. The most recent elections had
a voter turnout that was observed by the US
Embassy, and saw larger percentage7 of
people casting their ballot than vote in the US
general elections. All this occurred despite a
ferocious campaign of terror unleashed by Pakistan
based Islamic terror groups. American troops
facing a terrorist insurgency in Iraq will
probably appreciate that it is hard to conduct
democratic elections in the face of terror. On the
other hand, the part of
Kashmir
that is under Pakistani control has never had a
free election in its history.
As the
Kashmir
linked terrorist groups themselves admit8,
Kashmir is just the first step in their
campaign to impose their version of intolerant
Islam on the world.
Therefore, any argument linking Pakistan’s
fulfillment of its obligations to curtail
terrorism with “concessions” from India over
Kashmir is both facile and dangerous. Should the
terrorists win in
Kashmir,
they will be more emboldened, not less. The same
Islamism that calls for “liberation” of
Kashmir shouts anti-American slogans in Pakistan
and engages in proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction to America’s enemies.
Analyzing
Pakistan
As
noted above, any analysis of Pakistan that ignores
the fundamental role played by religion is doomed
to failure. Not only is Pakistan an Islamic
state, it is a state that depends on Islamism to
survive. The only nationalist sentiment that
keeps Pakistan together is grounded in Islam, and
enmity to other religions. There is a strong
correlation between a Pakistani ethos of aspiring
to be the “leader” of the Islamic world and the
fact that every global Islamic terrorist act has a
Pakistani connection9. To the rational
observer, though, it is evident that the emergence
of Al Qaeda, the sanctuary provided to them by
the Taliban, the ability of the 9/11 planners to
move funds freely and operate from a comfort zone
could all be tied to the Pakistani policy of
encouraging Jihad. This Pakistani policy has still
not changed for the most part. By Gen.Musharraf’s
own admission10, Pakistan’s support for
the United States in its war on terror was
grounded in the Treaty of Hudaybiya11,
where Prophet Mohammad urges a temporary alliance
with the Jews until the time was right to turn on
them.
Many South Asian analysts treat the Islamists and
the Pakistani Army Establishment as distinct
entities. The reality is that the Musharraf led
Army and the Islamists represent two sides of the
same coin.
Pakistan cannot completely shut down the Jihad
machine because it cannot let go of the Islamists,
and it cannot let go of the Islamists because it
will not let go of its irregular war with India
over Kashmir. Permitting Pakistan to link an end
to its support to Islamist terrorists with an
ever-elusive comprehensive Kashmir settlement
allows it to maintain open-ended support for
Islamist terrorism against American and Western
interests around the world. If anything, any
Kashmir compromise would likely free up the
Pakistani Jihadi hordes to focus more on American
interests, rather than killing Indians.
Analyzing
India
India is typically analyzed from within the
framework established for Pakistan. Since
Pakistan
is an Islamic state, and it is at war with
India,
this must be because India is a Hindu state.
Pakistan is known to have been the recipient of
nuclear weapons proliferation from China and
missile technology proliferation from China and
North Korea, therefore India must be the recipient
of proliferation from other states. Since
Pakistan is known to have proliferated nuclear
technology to North Korea, India must be a likely
proliferator as well.
This framework is fundamentally flawed.
India is a civilization-state that believes it has
a role on the world stage because of its
democratic polity, population, historical ties and
multi-cultural ethos. It understands that the
greatest threats to its long-term strategic
position derive from China, not Pakistan. It has
built up a significant pool of highly scientific
talent, which is starting to play a major role in
the global marketplace. With regard to Indian
nuclear weapons technology, there is not so much
as a whisper of technology transfer to or from any
other nation. Similarly, the allegations12,13,14
regarding missile technology transfer have been
thoroughly discredited15.
The technical capability that
India has developed has enabled it to steadily
build up a space launch and satellite fabrication
capability. Suggesting that it is the recipient
of proliferated or stolen technology severely
underestimates the strength of its indigenous
technical capability. India’s record with regard
to not proliferating either nuclear or missile
technology is also one of long standing. There
are no reports of any kind, that suggest that the
Indian government has ever proliferated nuclear or
missile technology to any nation, much less to
nations that are known to be state sponsors of
terror or failing states (such as North Korea,
Syria or Saudi Arabia). Again, quite clearly, the
equality-theorem fails. India does not behave
like Pakistan, because it is not like Pakistan.
Examples of Flawed Conclusions
Congressional Reports, by their very nature, are
intended to provide all sides of the discussion,
without prejudice. However, one must not use this
as a crutch for a failure of analysis. A
scientific discussion of Earth’s shape including
all sides of the argument, for example, will
devote very little time to the Flat Earth theory,
because it has been discredited. Consequently, it
is essential that such discredited notions not
make their way into such reports. There are a
number of suggestions made in the CRS Report1
on Missile Proliferation that trace their
antecedents to the above referenced groupthink.
This article will address some of the more
egregious ones. It is not suggested that this is
the extent of the groupthink evident in the
report.
"MTCR-Related Issues. Some experts have expressed
concern that
India or Pakistan might export their missiles or
nuclear technology to other nations, increasing
the number of nuclear missile-armed nations
thereby increasing the security risk to the United
States and other countries."
This is a classic example of the flawed
conclusions that derive from the discredited
India-Pakistan dyad. The reality is that there is
plenty of non-classified, open source material16,
including CRS reports17,
confirming that Pakistan has exported its
nuclear technology to other nations including
North Korea, and has been continuously obtained
missile technology from North Korea and China18.
Therefore, not only is there a “risk” that
Pakistan “might” export its missiles or nuclear
technology, it is a well-known fact that this has
occurred. Worse, there are clear links19
between Al Qaeda and Pakistan’s nuclear
establishment20.
In contrast, there has been only one case of
export violation concerning a private
Indian company21.
Indian authorities have fully cooperated in the
multilateral investigation and punished the
concerned individuals and private entities.
Clearly, the nature and pattern of India's
behavior show that it makes more sense to put
India in the same bracket as major industrialized
nations where private organizations may break
export laws for profit, but the governments guard
sensitive technologies vigorously. This contrasts
with the Pakistani patterns of behavior, which
puts it in the category of rogue governments
deliberately engaged in proliferation. The
Pakistani entities that have been sanctioned are
fully government owned22
and the responsible people have still not been
brought to justice. Clearly, the gratuitous
mention of India as a proliferator in the same
league as Pakistan, is egregious and misleads
American lawmakers.
"Export Controls. Another option that could be
explored is a multilateral initiative to assist
India and Pakistan in improving their export
control systems, particularly as they pertain to
missile technology."
The only time there is a need to improve an
“export control system” is if there has been
demonstrated to be a flaw in it. In the case of
Pakistan, it is clear that WMD technology has been
exported. As to whether this is due to a lack of
control, or despite it – due to the will of the
Government of Pakistan - is debatable. In the
case of India, such controls are clearly
irrelevant – as it has never exported the
technology. Given its irrelevance to India, is
the exploration of such an option in the case of
India a valid recommendation? Alternatively, is
this merely another aspect of the dyad that
suggests that if a recommendation is relevant to
Pakistan it is relevant to India?
"Were the
United States to provide such systems to India and
Pakistan, issues related to technology transfer
would arise. Policymakers, including many in
Congress, would be concerned about the potential
for onward transfer of advanced U.S. missile
defense technology to countries such as North
Korea, Iran, China, and Russia."
Again, the authors attempt to create equivalence
between a state that has been known to engage in
technology transfer (Pakistan) and one that has
not. Clearly, India has the potential to transfer
missile technology to a third party, but so do
other “responsible” missile powers such as the
United Kingdom. The suggestion that the UK might
be a potential proliferator to interests inimical
to the US would be met with scorn. Yet, the
proliferation record of India compares with that
of the United Kingdom. When recommendations and
suggestions are made that are divorced from the
facts, as they exist, they will result in poor
conclusions and decisions.
"Congress might also review the scope of the PSI
in terms of India and Pakistan - will proscribed
shipments to or from these countries be
interdicted or will we choose not to interdict in
order to maintain favorable relations with both
countries and their continued cooperation in the
global war on terror?"
“A series of U.S.-sponsored naval interdiction
exercises called “Pacific Protector” were
conducted in September 2003, involving Australia
and Great Britain, as part of the PSI.85 While the
Administration claims that the PSI does not target
any particular country, many experts believe that
the PSI was developed in response to growing North
Korean missile exports and technological
assistance to countries of concern. In theory,
both
India and Pakistan could be subject to seizures of
WMD and missile-related items under the PSI."
The Proliferation Security Initiative23
(PSI) is relevant in the context of countries that
may be believed to be engaging in the trafficking
of proscribed materials. Prime candidates in this
regard include China (for trafficking to Pakistan,
North Korea, Iran and Iraq)
, Pakistan (for trafficking to North Korea, Iran
and Saudi Arabia)
. India on the other hand, has not only never
engaged in proliferation, but has been the only
nation to actually interdict third-party vessels
to recovery missile components when it seized the
North Korean vessel, the KuWolSan24
while it was on its way to deliver missile parts
to Libya and perhaps Pakistan. In other words, a
review of the facts at hand will suggest that
India is a prime candidate as an enforcer of PSI,
whereas Pakistan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and
China are likely to be the targets of such
activity. Yet, the groupthink tainted analysis
leads to the laughable conclusion that India and
Pakistan are to be treated in the same fashion
with respect to the PSI.
"Another facet of
U.S. concern in this area regards fears that
terrorists in Pakistan or India might gain access
to nuclear materials in those countries. Options
for addressing this possibility include
authorizing expansion of Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs aimed at securing Pakistan's
and/or India's nuclear assets, or otherwise
seeking to make the region's nuclear arsenals
safer through new initiatives"
This suggests that terrorists operate in a similar
fashion in India and Pakistan, suggesting that
there is an equal probability of their acquisition
of nuclear materials. The actuality is that there
is a preponderance of Islamist terrorists in
Pakistan, many of whom have links to the very top
of the Intelligence services, the Armed Forces and
the Government of Pakistan. Top Pakistani nuclear
scientists, including the purported “Father” of
Pakistan’s nuclear program, have openly associated
themselves25
with Al Qaida linked terrorist groups. In
addition, the past few chiefs of Intelligence as
well as many retired Generals have also supported25
the same terrorist groups. Given this and the fact
that the Pakistan army provides the security of
Pakistan’s nuclear material, this is an alarming
threat.
In India, on the other hand, for terrorists to
obtain nuclear materials they would have to
organize an attack on the nuclear and military
establishment. Indian nuclear security, however,
appears to be strong. There have been no reports
in Western, Indian or other media of security
problems in DAE, DRDO or IAF facilities. Therefore
it seems unlikely that terrorists could break in
and steal such material in India. Certainly any
theft of nuclear material from India is far less
likely than the former USSR, which cannot account
for all of its nuclear material.
"Among the future developments that could
exacerbate regional tensions are the increased
influence of Hindu nationalism in
New Delhi and/or the increased influence of
Islamic fundamentalism in Islamabad."
The author makes the critical flaw of suggesting
equivalence between “Islamic fundamentalism” and
“Hindu nationalism” in understanding the regional
threats. While the current democratically elected
Indian government has a good number of Hindu
nationalists, the Islamic fundamentalists already
control Pakistan. Indian Hindu Nationalists have
also never had any record of threatening the US or
any of its allies, unlike the Islamists in
Pakistan. Comparing the threat to American
interests from Pakistani Islamists with a
theoretical one from Hindu nationalists is as
absurd as comparing Al Qaeda with the Christian
Right in America. As to regional tensions in South
Asia, the most likely reason for any escalation is
a terrorist attack by the supposedly banned
Pakistan based terrorist groups in India. Any US
efforts to reduce tension, consequently, must pay
most attention to the Pakistani unwillingness to
rein in the Islamist terrorists.
"Some experts believe that
India's ballistic missile program is motivated
primarily by a desire for political and
technological prestige, and to a lesser extent,
strategic military considerations towards Pakistan
and China."
Clearly there may be “some experts” that believe
that Indian missile program is motivated by
“prestige”. Equally there are “some experts” that
believe that the Earth is flat or in the
“Creationist Theory” of humans. Granting their
views credibility serves the dangerous role of
undermining a true understanding of the drivers
behind India’s acquisition of ballistic missile
technology.
India has a long, contested border with China,
which still occupies a large area of land it took
from India in the bloody 1962 border war. China
still has claims on more Indian territory. Given
this, it is patent that the impetus for India’s
Integrated Guided Missile Development Program was
the rapid advances made by China in the field of
missile development and more importantly due to
the weak American response Chinese nuclear and
missile proliferation to
Pakistan.
Any one else in the position of Indian planners
need only have seen the rapid advancements in the
range, payload and numbers of Chinese missiles and
the total failure of global non-proliferation
regimes to affect Chinese transfer of missiles and
nuclear technology to Pakistan would have reached
the same conclusion - India needs to develop
indigenous missiles to ensure a credible
deterrent. To deny this causal chain of events and
to claim that a nation of the size of India has
democratically elected rulers who make national
security decisions to assuage egos is preposterous
to say the least.
"The BrahMos Cruise Missile. Concerns have been
raised about current and proposed
U.S. missile defense vulnerability to the alleged
supersonic, stealth enhanced BrahMos cruise
missile being developed by
Russia
and India. Could these missiles in the hands of
hostile states and non-state actors, provide them
with a dangerous asymmetric military advantage?"
There is no doubt that the provision of these
missiles to hostile states and non-state actors
would provide them with a dangerous asymmetric
military advantage. Equally, the provision of the
Trident, by the United Kingdom to “hostile states
and non-state actors” would provide them with a
similar asymmetric military advantage. However,
the United Kingdom shows no such inclination.
Understanding the strategic compulsions of the
various nations will introduce clarity of
conclusion.
The Government of Pakistan has consistently
believed it can compensate for its lack of
strategic depth and military inferiority with
regard to India, by using non-state actors to
advance its strategic goals. It is compelled by
the same strategic compulsions to obtain nuclear
technology from China, to trade the same
technology to North Korea in exchange for missile
technology, and to trade both to Saudi Arabia in
exchange for financial and religious
considerations. Pakistan has also never been
willing to end such dangerous dealings, even when
US officials point out that it endangers American
and global security, preferring instead to take
superficial actions to show false results.
Pakistan also seems to believe that its possession
of nuclear weapons and its apparent recklessness
with them would insulate it from any adverse
actions by America. India on the other hand is a
status quoist state. Antagonizing the United
States or consorting with non-state actors does
not serve any of its goals.
Summary
The CRS report on Missile Proliferation in
South Asia1 singularly fails to take a
deeper look into
Pakistan’s
proliferation pattern. The report underplays the
fact that Pakistan’s nuclear/missile “partners”
include
Iran,
Iraq and North Korea, all anti-American regimes.
Worse, the report fails to discuss the
well-documented links between Al Qaida and many
Pakistani nuclear scientists as well as
high-ranking Pakistani military officers. The
report also leaves unsaid the various statements
by high ranking serving26 and retired
officers27 of the Pakistan Army as well
as political leaders28 advocating using
the strength of Pakistan's “Islamic Bomb” to
“make a stand” against America and even Israel.
This, in conjunction with the nuclear
proliferation by
Pakistan
cannot be construed as anything but a threat to
American interests. Instead, the report seems to
gloss over what many dispassionate observers see
as an ever-growing threat from Pakistan by linking
it with a non-existent threat posed by
India.
This only serves to underestimate and becloud the
clear and present threat faced by America. Unless
American analysts make an attempt to think out of
the India-Pakistan box, any analysis of
South Asia
will remain fundamentally flawed.
1.
Feickert, A. and Kronstadt, K. A. (October
17, 2003)
“Missile Proliferation and Strategic Balance in
South Asia,” CRS Report for Congress. Order Code
RL32115.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/25582.pdf
2.
Kronstadt, K. A. (October 9, 2003) “India-US
Relations” CRS Issue Brief for Congress. Order
Code IB93097.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/25293.pdf
3.
Kronstadt, K. A. (October 3, 2003) “Pakistan-US
Relations” CRS Issue Brief for Congress. Order
Code IB94041.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/25377.pdf
4.
Janis, I. L. (1982) “Group Think: Psychological
Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes”
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0395317045
5.
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10.
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11.
Pipes, Daniel (2003, October 25) Back in the News:
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http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/106
12.
Milhollin, G., (1989) “India’s Missiles – With a
little help from our friends” Bulletin of Atomic
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13.
Milhollin, G., Testimony before the US
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14.
Milhollin, G. "Made in America: How US
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http://www.himalmag.com/July98/Nuclear%20bomb/nuclear38.htm
15.
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with little help from anyone” Bharat Rakshak
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http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE2-4/thundyil.html
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http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/Pakistan%20and%20North%20Korea.pdf
17.
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Mass Destruction” Trade between Pakistan and North
Korea” Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress. Order Code RL31900.
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL31900.pdf
18.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/index.html
19.
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2003/ma03/ma03albright.html
20.
Sanger, David E (December 9, 2001)
“Nuclear Experts in Pakistan May Have Links to Al
Qaeda” New York Times
21.
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/south/01/25/sprj.india.iraq/
22.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2902747.stm
23.
Smith, Dan (2003), “The Proliferation
Security Initiative: A Challenge Too Narrow”
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2003)
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/papers/prolif2003_body.html
24.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56111-2003Aug13.html
25.
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International. -
http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=22122001-021209-4151r
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