The Resurgent Taliban: A Bitter Harvest

Laxman Bahroo

 A tree with a bitter seed
Fed with butter and sugar
Will still bear a bitter fruit.
From it, you will taste no sweetness

- Abu Shukur of Balkh[i]

Over the past year, there have been numerous media reports about escalating violence in Afghanistan attributed to the resurgent Taliban.  A movement that started insidiously in early 2002 and since has gained momentum.  Currently it is spreading across the Afghanistan’s Pashtun belt like a contagion.  This paper will detail the resurgence of the Taliban.  It will provide a brief overview of the major events in Afghanistan in the past two years. The article will focus on the origins and composition of the resurgent Taliban.  It will examine the leadership of the group and factors that encouraged its rise.  Additionally, the paper will attempt to discern patterns within the escalating violence and the potential long term repercussions.   

Background

Operation Enduring Freedom was launched on October 7, 2001 to remove the Taliban regime and allied Al Qaeda responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.  The operation consisted of US Special Forces working with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance on the ground and directing aerial bombing of Taliban frontline positions.  Opposition to the Taliban had also built up in the Pashtun belt.  Retreating Taliban were forced out not just by US bombings but also by local Pashtun warlords under the banner of the Eastern Alliance. Subsequently in December 2002, cave searches at Tora Bora by US led anti-Taliban forces resulted in surrenders and seizure of war material.[ii]  However, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban leadership remained elusive and are believed to have crossed into Pakistan.[iii]

The transitional government of Afghanistan was formed after the loya jirga or the grand council representing various tribal and ethnic factions was held.  The loya jirga is headed by President Hamid Karzai.  Unlike the Taliban shuras, it is more representative of Afghanistan’s diverse population and prominent positions are filled by non-Pashtuns.  The goals of the government were enunciated by President Karzai in his State of the Nation speech on Nowruz, Afghanistan’s New Year, on April 8, 2003.  The major goal for the Karzai government is the physical, social, and economic reconstruction of the Afghan nation.  The refurbishing of the ring road, revitalization of the economy, and providing education were among the highest priorities. Also problems of terrorism and corruption were acknowledged in President Karzai’s speech.[iv]

In order to pursue the outlined goals, the government first must establish itself as a recognized authority among various factions in Afghanistan.  This is a challenge since prior attempts have squelched regional autonomy and lead to uprisings.  Existing difficulties are compounded by the presence of powerful warlords with private armies and individual agendas.[v]   The Karzai government has attempted to promote disarmament and reign in warlords.  These attempts have been partly successful.  The government is unable to act resolutely against all warlords since in some cases the private armies that dwarf the 2000 man Afghan National Army (ANA), for example Ismail Khan, Governor of Herat, controls a 25,000 man army that is well funded with millions in revenue generated by transit fees.[vi] [vii]  Due to the inability to control warlords, there are frequent and bloody clashes in Mazar e Shariaf between long time rivals Ustad Ata Mohammed and Rashid Dostum and in western Afghanistan between Ismail Khan and Amanullah Khan.[viii] [ix]   

Afghanistan is a recipient of billions in international aid.  The funds are directed towards road repair, de-mining, healthcare and dam construction. The ANA and police are trained by foreign security forces. The bulk of the security duty is carried out by a multinational coalition under the banner of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). However when international aid is placed on a per-capita scale comparing it to other states ravaged by conflict, Afghanistan falls to the bottom of the list, below East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia and Rwanda.[x]   Many farmers claim that in order to make ends meet, they have replaced their crops with poppy and has resulted in a bumper crop of opium this year.  In addition to facing a multitude of problems resulting from three decades of conflict, parts of southern and central Afghanistan are in the grip of an unremitting drought.  The drought ridden provinces of Zabul, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Helmand, and Uruzgan are among Afghanistan’s poorest and least developed. This is the grim backdrop to Afghanistan’s most pressing security problem.

A Resurgence of the Taliban

The possibility of the Taliban’s resurgence was speculated when Mullah Omar called for an organized retreat in the face of superior US military force in late 2001.[xi]  Shortly after that the Taliban fighters retreated out of Southern Afghanistan and headed towards Pakistan.[xii]  In Northern Afghanistan Pakistani military personnel and associated Taliban frontlines retreated to the city of Kunduz.  The now infamous but clandestine airlift evacuated Pakistani military personnel, Taliban and Al Qaeda to Pakistan.[xiii] It was speculated that plans were afoot to wage an insurgent campaign against allied forces.

Leadership & Cadre

The leadership of the Taliban with the exception of few significant captures managed to slip away to safe havens, most likely in Pakistan’s tribal belt.  The tribal belt is a poorly developed and conservative region transformed into a haven for radicals by Pakistan’s religious policies, a flourishing drug trade and freely available weapons. The nearly intact leadership coupled with established ties to Pakistan’s intelligence service, and the madrassas affiliated with radical Islamic parties form the back bone of the resurgence.  In sum the nexus that brought about the initial Taliban is at work again. 

In March 2003, Mullah Omar, supported by 600 clerics, issued a call for Jihad against the US and its Afghan allies.[xiv] The Jihad effort named Saif-ul-Musalmeen (Sword of Muslims) was based in the city of Asadabad in Kunar Province of Afghanistan, Parachinar and Miran Shah respectively in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North Waziristan of Pakistan. Following the call for Jihad, Mullah Omar reorganized the Taliban and appointed a ten member Rahbari shura (leadership council). The council consists of known Taliban commanders such as Jalaluddin Haqqani (initially tasked with leading military operations against Operation Enduring Freedom), and local Taliban commanders from the Pashtun belt.  Furthermore the military committee divides the area into five operational regions.[xv]

Specifically, three regional commanders were given the task of reconstruction. Mullah Dadullah Kakar (a member of the Rahbari Shura) sheltered and funded by tribesmen carried Mullah Omar’s message to the madrassas.  Maulvi Hameed contacted madrassas in Baluchistan to garner recruits.  Hafiz Majeed consolidated the support of Pashtun tribal elders in Afghanistan.[xvi]  Additionally the emergence of Muttahida Majli-e-Amal (MMA) in the October 2002 elections in Pakistan further encouraged the movement.  The MMA is an alliance of Pakistani religious parties that received majority votes in NWFP and significant votes in Baluchistan.  The party won its seats on the basis of an anti-US campaign platform and has ties to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.[xvii]  

Potential Rahbari Shura Membership[xviii],[xix][xx]

The growing violence in Afghanistan has attracted 56 year old Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, veteran mujaheddin during the Soviet occupation and leader of Hizb-e-Islami faction. During the Soviet occupation, Hekmatyar was Pakistan’s favored warlord.  Hizb-e-Islami controlled 250 schools in Pakistan from which approximately 40,000 students graduated and formed the Lashkar-i-Isar, army of sacrifice.[xxi]  Later he gained notoriety for dissent against the Rabbani government and for the shelling of Kabul resulting in mass casualties. In 1996, Hekmatyar retreated from Kabul as the Taliban advanced.[xxii] He reappeared in 1998 as a guest of the Iranian government. However in February 2002, he was expelled from Iran because of several anti Karzai statements.  Since then Hekmatyar has been spotted in Eastern Afghanistan and his reemergence is considered an ominous sign, especially in Kunar and other Hizb-e-Islami strongholds.  It is believed that he serves to rally Pashtun disaffection against the Karzai government and the U.S.[xxiii]  Hekmatyar is thought to be behind the bombings and attacks on troops in the Jalalabad area.[xxiv] Additionally, a new force called the Secret Army of Muslim Mujaheddin has appeared onto the scene.  It is believed that this is an alliance between local warlords and the resurgent Taliban.[xxv]

The main source of cadre for the resurgent Taliban is the madrassas littering the Pakistani tribal belt.  The students in the madrassas, most belonging to very poor families, are indoctrinated into an extremely radical version of Islam and repeatedly told that Islam in under threat from infidels.[xxvi] The rise of the MMA has further encouraged Pakistanis to join the resurgence.[xxvii] [xxviii] Besides the madrassas, the cadre of the Taliban is derived from the survivors of Operation Enduring Freedom.  It is estimated approximately 200 members of Al Qaeda are still present in Pakistan. The 15,000 surviving members of the Taliban, approximately 10,000 are thought to have dispersed into border villages and 5,000 including leadership are in Pakistan.[xxix]

Other human resources available to the Saiful Musalmeen is the International Islamic Front (IIF) an umbrella organization affiliated with Al Qaeda founded in 1990 with the mission of Jihad against the U.S and Israel.  The IIF comprises of twelve organizations located in Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Philippines.[xxx] It is speculated that Chechens and Uzbeks (from Taliban frontlines prior to October 7, 2001) were involved in the upswing of violence in Afghanistan.  It can be said that potentially the IIF has a reserve of approximately 30,000 members from the five Pakistani affiliates.  The formation of the Secret Army of Muslim Mujaheddin illustrates that disgruntled Pashtun warlords in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan potentially form another source of sympathizers or active cadre.[xxxi]

The Pakistan Factor

"They say it's the Taliban, but we believe this is the action of the Pakistan government," – Hazarat Omar[xxxii]

The Pakistani government supports the resurgent Taliban, as it supported the original Taliban movement.  Pakistani support to the original Taliban was very deeply entrenched. It provided finances, foot soldiers, planners and intelligence to the original Taliban. The extensive Pakistani support to the Taliban is borne out of domestic and international compulsions ranging from strategic depth to economic gains. The support was evidenced by the Kunduz airlift. These goals did not disappear with 9/11 and the US attack on Afghanistan. 

The retreating Taliban crossed the “porous” border between Pakistan and Afghanistan despite the presence of Pakistani troops who were supposed to prevent such an occurrence.  Many members of the Taliban leadership and Al Qaeda are hiding in Pakistan.  As stated earlier the Pakistani Islamist political alliance, the MMA was able to galvanize voters with an anti-American platform.  Support to the Taliban increased further after the victory of the MMA.  Pakistani support is not just localized to the politicians and religious leaders, sections of the military and intelligence services also back the resurgent Taliban as a way of achieving desired goals. 

The Pakistani government’s support to the resurgent Taliban movement was widely exposed in December 2002.  At the time a US patrol near the Pakistan–Afghanistan border came under fire from the Al Qaeda-Taliban units.  As American forces retaliated, they came under fire from a Pakistani military organization, the South Waziristan Scouts.  During the exchange, US air support was called and bombed a madrassa – mosque complex locally identified as Angoor Adda.  The Angoor Adda complex was known to be a supporting facility for the Taliban and alleged to be the hiding place of a Taliban leader.[xxxiii]  This was not the only instance of American troops coming under fire from Pakistani militia.  Recently US troops on patrol engaged insurgents only to come under fire from Pakistani troops from across the border.[xxxiv]  

Pakistani support to the resurgent Taliban is multifold in the form of cadre, sheltering of leadership, and terrorist camps.  Many news reports mentioned that students in the madrassas of Pakistan particularly in the Pashtun areas join the resurgent Taliban movement.  Movement across the border is not restricted and several Pakistani Taliban fighters have mentioned the ease with which they can cross the border and have alluded to the presence of training camps in Pakistan’s tribal belt and near Islamabad.[xxxv]  Additionally, the five Pakistani member organizations of the IIF (operating freely or with barely concealed names) have in the past aided the Taliban and can potentially contribute up to 30,000 members into the insurgency.

The Pakistani support to the resurgent Taliban is not covert.  Several well known personalities and public figures have expressed support for the cause. Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, head of Lashkar-e-Taiba, stated that

“The US is at our mercy.  One leg caught in Afghanistan and the other in Iraq. Alla-ho-Akbar!”[xxxvi]

Maulana Hafiz Hussain Sharodi, Baluchistan's Information Minister and member of the MMA stated that

“Only the Taliban can constitute the real government in Afghanistan.”

The city of Quetta in Baluchistan province emerges as the main center of Taliban activity in Pakistan.[xxxvii] Recently Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Abdullah, stated that Taliban are freely operating in Pakistan.  He pointed to the large number of interviews and easy access by the media to the Taliban members in that region.  Additionally he stated that at least three prominent leaders; Mullah Asadullah, Mullah Kabir and Mullah Obaidullah (all members of the Rahbari Shura) are in Pakistan and cabinet meetings have been held in Quetta.[xxxviii] The large presence of the Taliban in Quetta has been mentioned by prominent US officials Zalmay Khilazid and General Frank Hagenbeck.[xxxix] Taliban and Al Qaeda presence in the city has resulted in a degeneration of the law and order situation in parts of Pakistan.  In July 2003, refugees Shia Hazaras were massacred in a mosque.  This was not the first time Taliban anger was vented against the Shias.  February 2003 witnessed attacks against Kashmiri Shias in Karachi and in 2001 massacre (described at ethnic cleansing) of Shias in Hazarajat, Afghanistan were carried out by Taliban associated organizations Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipha Shahba Pakistan (SSP).[xl]

Opium

"The drug traffickers need instability to help protect their business and the ones who cause the instability need drug money to fund themselves,"

-Mirwais Yasini, the Afghan Transitional Government’s Drug Czar.

Afghanistan has for years been one of the major sources of illicit opium in the world. In the 1990’s it was the source for approximately half of the world’s opium production.  The Opium business and war have been interlinked from the early days of Afghanistan.  During the 1980’s many warlords sold opium in raise funds.  The Taliban were well connected and financed by the drug and transport mafias in Pakistan, exacerbated this trend.  As they imposed uniform authority over the main poppy cultivating areas, they were able to provide an easier and less expensive way for drugs to be shipped out and in the process generated revenue that would be used to wage war. 

The recently released UN Opium Survey of 2003 has caused much consternation in the media.  In general the results of the report indicate an 8% increase since the past year in opium production from Afghanistan, accounting it for 75% of the world’s production.[xli]  In particular the opium cultivation has spread to 28 out of 32 provinces in the country, as compared to 18 provinces in 1999.  The pattern of growth is not uniform, well known opium growing provinces such as Helmand and Kandahar have recorded a 49 % and 32% decline respectively.[xlii]  However, this has been offset by a rapid rise in Eastern Afghanistan and the northern province of Badakshan.[xliii]  One reason for the growth in opium cultivation lies with faulty drug control policies.  In the preceding year, the British government funded a program that paid farmers to destroy their poppy crop.  The program was successful in reducing the opium yield, but it also increased prices. This year the program was handed to the Afghan government and policies were not as strictly enforced.  Therefore buoyed by higher opium prices and a lagging economy, Afghan farmers planted opium along side their crops or instead of other crops.  Farmers stated that opium cultivation paid five times more than wheat bounty from the same area.[xliv]  The UN survey underestimates total opium production, as it does not provide data from Zabul, Paktia and Paktika.  The reason for this omission is not known and can therefore only be speculated.

The resurgent Taliban forms a nexus with the Pakistan Army, Pakistan’s radical religious groups and the drug – transport mafia.  Links between the resurgent Taliban and the drug trade have been mentioned by Afghan government and UN officials.[xlv] Therefore it is hardly surprising to see that the location of attacks by the resurgent Taliban correspond to well known poppy growing areas.  Also new areas of increased poppy growth such as Kunar, Nangrahar and other provinces in Eastern Afghanistan have become the focus of the insurgency.  The initial and subsequent increase in Taliban attacks is also correlated to significant dates in the poppy planting cycle.  The initial increase in attacks starting in March coincided with the harvest of the poppy crop.  It is hypothesized that Richard Munguia, Red Cross worker, was captured and killed by a Taliban roadblock securing a poppy field.[xlvi]  The crescendo of attacks in the late summer and early autumn season correlate with the harvest and planting season for next year’s crop.  The recent upswing of insurgent violence in Uruzgan and Ghazni seems to be following the burgeoning opium trail.

Figure 1: A schematic representing convergent interests in the leading to the formation of the Resurgent Taliban

Insurgency

The attacks by the resurgent Taliban seem like random violence.  However upon inspection a pattern emerges.  The events from the end of Operation Enduring Freedom to present can be divided into three phases.  The first phase encompasses all of 2002 and up to March of 2003.  The second phase spans from March 2003 to June 2003.  The third phase extends from June 2003 to present day.  In general, the phases blend from one to the other.  However, when retrospectively examined each phase is distinct in the tempo and type of attacks.   In examining the attacks, four distinct targets are identified.  They are humanitarian aid workers, local population, security forces, and spectacular attacks against symbols of authority.

The initial phase (2002 to March 2003) of the insurgency manifested as attacks primarily directed against the local population, security forces, and aid workers.  These attacks were sporadic in nature, and casualties were low.  The predominating attacks involved bombings of local schools, regional government offices, hit and run attacks on military bases and camps[xlvii] [xlviii].  Majority of the attacks were confined to border provinces of Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Zabul, and bordering regions of Kandahar and Helmand Provinces.[xlix] [l] [li] [lii] [liii]

Despite the low tempo, several spectacular attacks stand out.  Among the first was the assassination of Vice President Qadir.  Haji Abdul Qadir was a well known mujaheddin commander and an anti Taliban leader.[liv]  His assassination was a possible vengeance attack.  General Fahim, Afghan Defense Minister, narrowly escaped assassination in Jalalabad on April 8, 2002.   President Karzai and his (then) supporter Gul Agha Sherzai, Governor of Kandahar were almost assassinated in Kandahar.  This event is particularly important as it indicates Pashtun discontent with Karzai and his supporters.[lv] The Pashtuns in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan did not celebrate the demise of the Taliban unlike the rest of the country.  In fact there is an undercurrent of anger towards foreign presence.[lvi]  During this later part of first phase warning signs of impending escalation became apparent.[lvii] [lviii]  Security threats in the hinterland provinces bordering Pakistan such as Zabul were first reported and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar reappeared onto the scene.[lix] [lx]

The second phase started in March 2003 with an ominous call by Mullah Omar for Jihad.  Reports about the restructuring of the Taliban and the formation of a Rahbari Shura circulated. In this period the tempo of the insurgency escalated from the first phase.[lxi]  There was an increase in spectacular attacks such the killing of President Karzai’s ally, attacks on airbases, and UN offices. [lxii] [lxiii]  Additionally, attacks on security forces also escalated and news of the resurgence became more commonplace.[lxiv] [lxv] Two major attacks set the tone for this phase.  In April 2003, Ricardo Munguia, a Red Cross engineer from El Salvador, was caught by a Taliban road block along with 20 Afghans.  He was shot on Mullah Dadullah’s orders.  The death sent shockwaves thru the humanitarian agencies in Afghanistan and the international media.[lxvi]  Secondly disturbing reports emerged about the Taliban control over several districts of Zabul province.[lxvii] [lxviii] 

The third phase and current phase of insurgency started in June 2003 to present day.  The third phase is marked by several disturbing trends.  Overall it is a general escalation of violence and increasing casualties.  In particular spectacular attacks against symbols of government authority have increased.  The phase began with an acknowledgement of General Frank “Buster” Hagenback, based in Bagram Air Base, that the Taliban have control over “swathes” of territory.[lxix] [lxx] General Hagenback was referring to the southern border provinces of Afghanistan.  Shortly after that the media reported on the Taliban capture of Zabul.  There were reports of a 300 strong Taliban force to aid those holding Zabul.[lxxi] [lxxii]

The frequency and lethality of spectacular attacks dominates the third phase.[lxxiii]  Attacks have targeted UN offices and main cities.[lxxiv]  In one week of August 2003, 85 people were killed in assorted and well coordinated bombings in Afghanistan.[lxxv]  Specifically two spectacular attacks were the most shocking; in October 2003 attacks occurred on Bagram Airbase and later a prison break took place in Southern Afghanistan.[lxxvi]  The raid on Bagram Airbase is significant for two reasons; firstly it is the northern most Taliban attack and secondly because Bagram Airbase is the headquarters of CENTCOM in Afghanistan surrounded by layers of security.  The prison break resulted in the escape of 40 Taliban captives and the disappearance of aiding security guards.[lxxvii] These raids serve a psychological purpose. They indicate the resurgence of the Taliban and erode the morale of the pro-government Afghans.

The Taliban have launched an offensive against the pro-government forces.  Attacks preferentially directed against the Afghan security forces (ANA and police) have increased.[lxxviii]  Other attacks designed to weaken the government are raids on government offices and killing of pro-government clerics.[lxxix] [lxxx]  The regions affected by the insurgency have also widened to include centrally located provinces.  The provinces of Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Zabul and other border provinces still remain the focus of the insurgency. By the end of October 2003, reports from Ghazni and Uruzgan indicated an increasing Taliban presence.  Aid workers in Uruzgan have been evacuated because of safety reasons.[lxxxi]  There are reports (mid October 2003) of heavy fighting in Uruzgan province between insurgents and Afghan troops.[lxxxii]       

Over the last 18 months of the insurgency and especially over the last 8 months, several disturbing trends have been noted.  Other groups have joined the Siaful Musalmeen.[lxxxiii]  The various factions of the IIF have gained prominence in the last few months, as many attacks against ISAF forces are thought to be the work of Chechen and Uzbek terrorists.[lxxxiv]  Jihadis from an earlier generation have joined with the Taliban. Most notably Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Hizb-e-Islami are known to be operating in Eastern Afghanistan and it is believed that he is responsible for several rocket attacks and ambushes of US soldiers.[lxxxv]  Also recently Yunis Khalis, leader of the Hizb-e-Islami–Khalis faction has also called for a Jihad against the US and allied forces in Afghanistan.[lxxxvi]  

Two revelations in the last phase foreshadow ominous events.  Firstly the discovery of video tapes from captured Taliban fighters’ record field activity ranging from ambushes and planting of mines.[lxxxvii]  The videos serve two purposes to authenticate insurgent attacks for payment but also as propaganda and recruitment videos.  Secondly news items indicate that approximately 2,500 Taliban fighters are poised to cross the border into Afghanistan prior to the onset of winter.  The large scale of purchases motorcycles and mobilization of manpower in around Quetta, Baluchistan Province of Pakistan indicate the long term agenda of the resurgence. [lxxxviii]     

Counterinsurgency

U.S and allied forces have over the past 18 months carried out high level operations coupled with local cordon and sweep operations.  The operations can be subdivided into two categories.  The first type which seeks to recover and eliminate weapons caches that provide lifeblood to the insurgents. Operation Viper, March 2003, launched in Helmand province sought to remove hidden weapons left by the Taliban.  During this operation forces swept the villages in search for weapons held by the local population.[lxxxix]  Joint weapons recovery operations Carpathian Thunder and Carpathian Lightning were carried out in April of 2003 by US, Romanian and Afghan forces. These operations in Zabul province yielded the largest cache of arms thus far in Afghan operations.[xc]

The second type of operation is designed to neutralize any overt threats to the Afghan government by directly engaging insurgents. Operation Anaconda in March 2002 was the first such operation after the Tora Bora cave searches.  It involved approximately 2,000 troops including Afghans in the Shah-I-Kot Valley near Gardez in confrontation with large Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives.[xci]   Operation Mongoose in February of 2003 was the largest operation launched after Operation Anaconda.  The operation was launched after US forces came under fire in the Spin Boldak (Kandahar Province) area of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan.  Operation Mongoose resulted in the casualties of 18 rebels.[xcii]  Similarly, Operation Eagle Fury, February 2003, was launched after US forces in Helmand Province were ambushed.  The operation succeeded in eliminating some insurgents and cornered several Taliban leaders.[xciii]  Operation Valiant Strike, March 2003, was a large scale operation by the 82^nd Airborne to neutralize a growing threat in the Kandahar province.  Prior to the operation, insurgent activity against local security forces had increased.  The operation involved 1000 troops and was based on gathered radio transmissions and resulted in a fierce eight day clash with resurgent Taliban forces. [xciv]   Operation Warrior Sweep is a joint operation involving 1000 personnel of the ANA and U.S military tasked to neutralize insurgents in the Paktia province.  It was the first major anti insurgency operation involving the ANA and a test of its potential.[xcv]    

Taliban Strategy

In examining the events from 2002 to today one can hypothesize the strategy of the Taliban.  It is a coordinated attempt to alienate the people from foreign influence, the Afghan government, and thus to create a power vacuum.  The insurgency first took hold in the most impoverished and conservative provinces (Zabul, Paktia, Paktika, Khost) feeding on disenchantment of the locals towards the Karzai government.  After building upon local discontent, the Taliban attacked foreign and local humanitarian workers and the local facilities built by the aid.  Following this, locals supporting the Afghan government or the U.S were accused of spying and assassinated.  This further reduced local goodwill and made the population hapless in the face of Taliban onslaught.

The next step was to attack local government offices, police stations, kill government officials and ambush patrolling troops. Most of the attacks have been concentrated on the newly built ANA; some have also ambushed US and ISAF forces.  The purpose is to induce desertions in the ANA.[xcvi]  The ANA is currently behind schedule in terms of recruitment, facing financial trouble and problems over loyalty. The local population has gradually become more amenable to the Taliban’s anti-government and anti-US messages.

Figure 2: Hypothetical strategic framework for resurgent Taliban activity 

Propaganda plays a major role in the resurgence.  Night letters (previously used by the mujaheddin) or shabnamas were used to communicate Mullah Omar’s orders with the masses in the Pashtun region.  They have heralded the Taliban’s resurgence, the call for Jihad, and encouraged the people to rebel against the Karzai government and U.S.  The other aspect of the propaganda is the spectacular attacks such as bombings in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Bagram and prison breaks.  These aid the Taliban because continuous media reports boost recruitment.  Also these attempts enable the Taliban to demonstrate that they are a major player in Afghan politics. 

The aim of the Taliban is to drag the US, allied forces and the current government in Afghanistan into a quagmire. The hit-and-run attacks are directed at demoralizing troops and causing casualties by using minimum resources.[xcvii]  Ambush attacks by the Taliban cause soldiers to carry out intrusive search and seizure operations in the affected regions.  This results in further anger against the US and the Karzai government which is subsequently capitalized by the Taliban to gain recruits and sympathizers.[xcviii] Taliban members who are interviewed by media sources openly state that their raids are low cost while US deployment and response is far costlier. They hope to frustrate the US into quitting Afghanistan because of rising human and financial cost. They state that once the US leaves Afghanistan, the Taliban will easily achieve their ultimate goal, to replace the government in Afghanistan with their authority. [xcix] 

Summary and Repercussions

Two years after the retreat of the Taliban, the jubilation and promises of a better Afghanistan are under increasing threat from an insurgency capitalizing on Pashtun discontent in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.  The insurgency is nurtured by religious fundamentalism, geopolitical power plays, burgeoning opium production, and armed factions of Afghan politics.  Like the Taliban and the Mujaheddin before them, the resurgent Taliban threaten to influence events beyond Afghanistan.

The resurgent Taliban movement is an umbrella group unified in the implementation of the Saif-ul-Musalmeen with the goal of removing the Karzai government and U.S presence from Afghanistan.  It consists of the members of the original Taliban movement forming the Rahbari Shura, Al Qaeda operatives and the IIF.  Its newer members are the former Afghan warlords like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Yunis Khalis and local Pashtun warlords forming the Secret Army of Muslim Mujaheddin.  The movement is funded by religious and narcotics groups in Pakistan.

Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan cannot be glossed away.  Pakistan is the source of the original and resurgent Taliban movement.  Taliban leaders are given safe haven, recruits easily cross the border, government-religious leaders give open support to the Taliban, and the Pakistan Army aids them in every way.  In numerous engagements the retreating resurgent Taliban pursued by allied forces have been able to disappear in areas where the border is guarded by Pakistani Army.  The city of Quetta in Baluchistan province has emerged as the major center of the resurgent Taliban movement.  The insurgency is also tied to the drug mafias and transport of opium through Pakistan constitutes a major route of distribution to the world.  For Pakistan, the resurgent Taliban serves as a constant source of pressure on the Karzai government and the U.S to consider Pakistani sensitivities in any action.  Additionally it serves as a temporary pressure release of jihadi frustrations that furthers geopolitical goals. The U.S must force the government of Pakistan to improve security and cooperate with capture of known Taliban leaders residing in Pakistan.  American reluctance to pressure Pakistan over the issue stems from fear of provoking a fundamentalist takeover of the country.  In reality it allows Pakistan to repeatedly aid the resurgent Taliban and feign lack of security in the border areas.

In the coming year, both the United States and Afghanistan will hold elections.  The resurgent Taliban have established themselves as the major force in several outlying provinces by successfully driving out humanitarian workers, attacking government offices and ambushing soldiers.  Also they have regularly disrupted of life in major cities by spectacular bombings.  Indicators show that the insurgent violence will escalate in the coming months in light of numerous reports of large scale purchases and mobilization.  A deteriorating law and order situation in Afghanistan will prevent the holding of free elections. This will limit the mandate of the current government or any incoming government and further disgruntle an already frustrated population.

The situation in Afghanistan could affect the United States.  Increasing US and ISAF troop casualties and reports of increasing violence could result in local political fallout.  This is especially true since Afghanistan was touted as a successful battle in the War on Terror and said to be moving towards democracy.  Successful elections in Afghanistan would lend credence to the administration’s claim of success.  Unfortunately in the current environment in Afghanistan elections could result in am escalation of violence with the assassination of candidates, elected officials, and killing of voters.  The precarious situation in Afghanistan coupled with continued violence in Iraq could act synergistically, adding to the political problems currently facing the administration.

Success of the resurgent Taliban would further embolden radical movements from the world over.  Afghanistan a country bordered by five others cannot be viewed in isolation.  The Taliban violence in Afghanistan originates in Pakistan aided at multiple levels by public, criminal and official sectors borne out of domestic and geopolitical needs.  American criticism of Pakistan has been sporadic at best and muted at worst.  This is largely due to American dependence on Pakistani security and intelligence, some of whom support the Taliban.  The United States needs to diversify its engagement in the region.  Greater engagement of Iran, India and Russia will break Pakistani monopoly and reduce its role as a spoiler.

The engagement of the many factions within the Afghan politics would also build a more stable government in Afghanistan.  Solely supporting President Karzai allows the marginalized factions to sympathize with the resurgent Taliban and former warlords.  Dual engagement by the United States of Karzai at the center and prominent locals in the periphery would serve to build a stronger security network and undermine the insurgent activity of the Taliban.  Recent “engagement” of former Foreign Minister Muttawakil is a possible indicator of this US policy.  The United States along with the international community need to increase troop deployments and investment in Afghanistan.  Pure increases in funds will not provide the same benefit, since large scale infusions could be misappropriated by corrupt government officials.

Unfortunately over the last year the important developments in Afghanistan have been sidelined by events in Iraq.  The upswing in violence in Afghanistan was timed with a shift in focus towards Iraq.  The change in focus allowed Pakistan to increase support to the resurgent Taliban with little fear of American response.  The continued unpredictability in Iraq continues to steal attention and Afghanistan continues to play second fiddle.  As seen in the recent $87 billion package, only $1 billion is set aside for Afghanistan.[c]  Recently General Abizaid, head of US Central Command, described the situation in Afghanistan to be as difficult as the situation in Iraq and U.S intelligence has reported increased activity by Al Qaeda and Taliban forces.[ci] If the current government in Afghanistan is not stabilized and other allies (international and national) are not engaged, the situation will slowly unravel with under increasing violence.  Afghanistan has a long standing history of frustrating international powers.  In the third time in as many decades, Afghanistan has become the focus of a global jihad attracting radicals from around the world; the first two times produced devastating consequences for the world.

Special thanks to Dr. Chandrasekharan for his valuable input

Background Readings:

The Taliban: Pakistan’s Proxy and Regional Impact

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-6/bahroo.html

Politics of Afghanistan

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-3/bahroo.html

References: