L. N. Subramanian
Introduction
Over the last decade, the
Indian Armed Forces have accelerated the purchase
and deployment of new complex weapons systems.
Correspondingly, public’s perception has ranged from
excessive optimism about the miraculous performance
of the weapons or a hysterical outcry if weapons are
not inducted or the Chinese or Pakistanis claim to
have purchased or developed one. In reality a new
weapons systems brings in logistical, maintenance
and other operational issues. Additionally unless
tactics and strategies are accordingly integrated,
the weapons system will just remain an expensive
parade ground showpiece, as is the case in many
armies that purchase the latest weapons systems at
the whims and fancies of the decision makers.
In this article the author will
examine the issues and problems faced by the
introduction of the BMP (Bronevaya Maschina Piekhota)
Infantry Combat Vehicle in the 80s in the
Indian Army. The author will use as the basis an
article from the April 1989 issue of Combat Journal
titled “Mechanized Infantry – Where have we gone
wrong? “ by Lt. Col. Mahesh Chadha. This will serve
as the prototypical example of how a new weapon
system must be integrated to yield its full
potential.
Background
The tank battles and the charge
to Lahore of the 1965 Indo-Pak war brought the need
to keep tanks and infantry matched up. The
Pakistanis with all their alliances got off the
blocks first with the introduction of the M113. In
the initial stages the Indian Army raised motorized
units. These were 1-ton troop carriers that were
later replaced by the TOPAZ Armored Personnel
Carriers (APCs).
Later on in a reaction to this
the Indian Army introduced BTR –60s and SKOT APCs
(armored personnel carriers). Though in all
fairness wheeled APCs were in vogue however, the
Indian Army had to go with what was available. These
differed in design, armament and capability and not
much thought was paid to it. Infantry units were
converted with no change to their existing
structure. The strong parental regimental influence
made sure that no new innovations were applied.
Initial Organization
The Mechanized Regiment
battalions were first formed into 4 rifle companies
and transport company. The APCs were brought in for
the rifle companies. After the specified tasks the
APCs went back to Transport group and Riflemen went
back to Infantry duty. When embarked the crew
consisted of a commander in charge of running the
APC and a commander in charge of the rifle section.
There was no unison in fighting. The supporting
arms still followed the Infantry structure with a
Recoil Less Cannon (RCL) platoon, a Medium Machine
Gun (MMG) platoon ad a Mortar platoon. In addition,
reconnaissance ability required similar in line to
the recce troop in the Armored units.
Outside of the Mechanized
Battalion there were problems in gelling these with
the armored units. The aim was to have a combat
group with Armor and Mechanized Infantry as a
complement to each other and fight in unison.
Initially, the Mechanized Infantry were asked to
follow on the Armor. This was no different then the
normal infantry role other than the use of APCs to
travel instead of trucks. The break up of the
infantry in proportionate numbers rather than
maintaining cohesiveness of platoon/company caused
further problems. Armor wanted to assign supportive
tasks to the Mechanized Infantry feeling that they
were stealing their thunder and Mechanized Infantry
felt that the Armor guys were holding them back.
Meanwhile the concept for
Mechanized Infantry changed from a battle taxi to an
Infantry Combat vehicle more integrated with Armor
and enabled troops to fight along with fire support
and some anti tank capability. Additionally, the
Soviet BMP-1 the world’s first and arguably the best
Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV) was imported.
The low silhouette BMP however
had one immediate issue; it could carry only 8
troops. So once again new organization structure,
fire drills etc. had to be planned. Attempt to use
NATO or Warsaw Pact tactics not suited to the Indian
context proved both expensive and unsustainable in
the long term.
In addition to the BMPs,
problems arose with the weapons composition of the
infantry. Initially 2 Light Machine Guns (LMGs) were
provided per section. This was a waste considering
that the BMP came with its 7.62 mm machine gun.
Likewise with a 73 mm gun (although in practice this
gun has proved inadequate) as well as ATMs provided
a fair antitank capability and a Carl Gustav 84 mm
RCL was issued to the sections. In defense its
providers insisted it was needed for illumination!
In the process the more important need to assign a
SA 7 was denied causing important Air Defense
resources to be allocated for routine tasks. There
were also complaints about the wisdom of carrying
the relatively longer 7.62 rifle in the confined
spaces of the BMP (no folding stock versions were
available).
Next arrived the BMP 2 with its
reduced capacity of 1 less soldier. In order to
maintain numbers the extra member was moved around
to the platoon leader’s vehicle in essence
separating him from his parent section.
In order to provide the
Mechanized Infantry with its recce rule another type
of vehicle was provided the BRDM. With little
thought to organization and commonality units ended
up with a mix of BMPs and BRDMs. The BRDM however
lacked any Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) to
counter any tank threat and were not fully equipped
to scan the Ditch-Cum-Bund defenses they would
encounter. In addition there was no special training
for the troops who were meant to use these in recce
roles behind enemy lines. The Recce units were
limited to a somewhat defensive role.
Last but not least the
personnel selection also proved to be an issue. When
the Mechanized Infantry was expanded and a whole
group of officers were transferred from the
infantry. A sizeable number were in the 3 – 5 yr and
the 11 to 13 years service group. The latter group
struggled to adapt to the Mechanized infantry role.
The company commanders at this group were the ones
who struggled with employing the BMP flexibly in Sri
Lanka.
The Army’s think tanks were
also grappling with these issues. Some of the
suggestions made by Lt. Col. Chadha were:
The BMP needed to be
employed as part of a combat group with a company as
the minimum sub unit. It should not be split up into
ad hoc units. Both the Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV)
commander and the Infantry commander would be
assigned the task and let situation evolve. The ICV
was to be looked at as a system with a mechanical
component and an infantry component. All should be
under one commander and should be considered
versatile infantrymen whose tasks involve ICV
driver, a missile operator cum gunner, a rocket
launcher plus the usual LMG operator and riflemen.
This would mostly retain the infantry composition of
a section of one NCO and 9 other ranks. The section
commander based in the turret guides both the BMP
driver and gunner and the infantry. During
dismounted operations only 2 persons man the ICV and
the others dismount. This creates a flexible fire
support and assault group for the platoon.
There were questions whether
mortars were necessary for the Mechanized infantry
to carry with it. The 73 mm gun was quite close to
mortars up to 4000 meters. Moreover the mortars
could not be fired from any existing vehicles
(TOPAZ) and were usually dismounted. It was felt
that either the mortars wee discontinued or they had
vehicles capable of carrying and firing from within.
Ambulance versions were also needed for safe
evacuation of casualties. For maintenance tasks it
was suggested that forward repair teams essentially
technical Mechanized Infantry personnel could carry
light repairs. They were to be supplied with high
mobility wheeled vehicles to carry spares from
supply points.
The Present
The result of the internal
discussions in the Army of the 80s and 90s are now
visible. The BMP 2 units are now much better staffed
with a more optimum weapons mix. There are mortar
carriers, ambulances, guided missile carriers,
engineering vehicles and other specialized versions
of the BMP to provide the group with the flexibility
to operate at optimum levels.
The BMP now operates with more
flexibility in built up areas, smaller ops as well
as in the large exercises conducted in recent years
under NBC conditions. They have been used
occasionally in Jammu and Kashmir for both
psychological effect as well as providing offensive
support in an urban and rural counter insurgency
campaign. Furthermore, plans continue to move the
design forward with the Abhay.
Thus we see that it took at
least a decade to properly induct and employ the
BMPs as part of a combat group. Over that period
the BMP also evolved into a host of other useful
weapons systems or was part of other weapons
platforms. This is not unique to the Army, as the
Navy and Air Force also have to grapple with complex
weapons systems. The Air Force for example is
introducing one of the most complex and potent
weapons systems ever the SU-30MKI. The learning
process shows in this induction. The numbers are not
rapidly being built up as the Air Force absorbs the
initial deliveries and refines its organization and
personnel accordingly. For example the SU-30
squadrons have one of the best mixes of experience
and youth. It will be a few years before the Su-30s
will be at their optimum capabilities. And that will
be a story we will recap in 2015.
References and Additional
reading:
-
Mechanised Infantry – Where have we gone wrong? By
Lt Col Mahesh Chadha , April 1989 Combat Journal
-
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1970s/Pawan/Chapter04.html
-
http://afvinteriors.hobbyvista.com/bmp1/bmp1.html
-
http://afvinteriors.hobbyvista.com/brdm2/brdm2a.html
- http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-5/defexpo.html
