Dinesh Mannan
On Jan 4, 2003 India made public its nuclear
doctrine and related administrative structure and
arrangements to manage its nuclear weapons.
(1)
This declaration has come nearly four-and-a-half
years after the “Shakti” series of 5 underground
nuclear tests carried out on May11 and May 13,
1998. The successful culmination of these tests
had allowed India to declare itself a Nuclear
Weapon State (NWS) in May 1998.
(2)
The storm of
opinions that was generated in the aftermath of
the Shakti tests has shown no signs of abating.
The debate covers a very big canvas with a wide
variety opinions about nuclear doctrine and
posture. The increasing awareness of Indian
populace on such important strategic issues is
seen from the number of think tanks that have
emerged. A number of books and articles have been
written on the relevant nuclear doctrine for
India. The issues concerning Indian nuclear
command & control are a vital part of all such
discussions.
The issues of Command & Control are a derivative
of the nuclear doctrine followed by a state.
Therefore, a meaningful study of Indian command
and control can only be made in the context of a
defined Indian nuclear doctrine. Indian nuclear
program has been unique when compared to that of
other nuclear weapon states. This uniqueness is
due to a long gestation period between acquiring
the capabilities to make a bomb and to actually
weaponise the option. The emergence of nuclear
capabilities in Indian neighborhood has been a
significant contributing factor for exercising
this option. Thus, the Indian nuclear doctrine can
be understood better only by reviewing the history
of Indian nuclear program and that of its
neighbors.
This article is an attempt to study critical
issues related to Command and Control that have
been raised in the media, and to find out from the
currently available public domain information, how
the recently announced Indian nuclear doctrine and
the National Command Authority (NCA) answer these
concerns. The article has three parts. The first
section briefly deals with the history of Indian
nuclear program and that of its neighbors. This
will help form a proper perspective of the
emergence of the formal Indian nuclear doctrine,
which is described in the second section. The
second section also covers the structure of NCA.
The third section addresses all the issues
pertaining to command and control that have been
raised in the media and tries to find out the
current state of affairs and the validity of those
concerns.
Emergence of India as NWS
Dr. Homi Bhabha laid the foundation of Indian
nuclear program in 1944. His proposal to the
Dorabji Tata Trust to set up an institute to train
nuclear scientists and undertake research in
nuclear physics was accepted and led to the set up
of Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in 1945.
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was also set up
in 1945 with Homi Bhabha as its Chairman.
(3)
In the early years, the focus was on the
development of atomic power. Though as early as in
1956, India had the capability to make an atomic
bomb in 3-4 years time if adequate resources were
diverted, the option was not exercised.
(4)
India decided not to pursue the atomic bomb path,
even when there was sufficient intelligence
available that the Chinese were pursuing a nuclear
weapons program. The Chinese exploded their first
bomb at Lop Nor in 1964, but the Indian PM
declared that India
would never make a bomb.
(5)
In 1967 the country sought security guarantees
from P4 nations, but they were unable to extend
the expected assurances.
(6,2)
As a result the Indian Parliament debated in 1968
and decided not to join NPT.
(2)
India carried out a ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’
on 18th May 1974 with a 12-kilo tons
yield. The government declared that it had no
intention of exercising the weapon option.
(7)
The ‘Pokhran device’ was not a weapon. It was too
bulky and not deliverable except by a transport
plane. The period between 1974 and 1987 saw
immense progress being made in India’s nuclear
power program but not towards making a bomb.
Pakistan's nuclear program was launched in earnest
shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the
1971 war with India, when ZA Bhutto initiated a
program to develop nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s
entire nuclear program was focused on weapons
applications. A major advance in Pakistan's
nuclear program was the arrival of Dr AQ Khan in
1975. He brought with him the plans for uranium
enrichment centrifuges, and lists of sources of
the necessary technology. However the Pakistani
weapon program received its greatest gift from
China with some of the most critical transfers
occurring from 1980 through 1985. China is
reported to have provided Pakistan with the design
of one of its warheads, as well as sufficient HEU
for a few weapons.
(8)
A report published in 1984 indicated that
Pakistan had obtained from the Chinese a proven
weapon design. By the early 1980s, Indian
intelligence was aware of the China-Pakistan
nuclear weapons deal.
(9)
Indian establishment had not seriously factored a
direct Chinese nuclear threat. When Indian
analysts concluded by the 1980s that China was
assisting Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, the
Pakistani nuclear threat became linked to the
Chinese threat. In the event of another
Indian-Pakistan conflict, India without nuclear
weapons could find itself in confrontation with a
nuclear-armed China.
(10)
Indian government was faced with the threat of a
Pakistani nuclear attack in 1987. This was
officially communicated by Pakistan's Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Zain Noorani to the
Indian Ambassador in Islamabad, Mr. SK Singh.
Pakistani nuclear scientist, Dr A.Q. Khan also
conveyed the same to the Indian journalist Mr.
Kuldip Nayyar. The then Indian Prime Minister Mr.
Rajiv Gandhi finally authorized weaponisation in
1988
(9,11)
In January 1990, Pakistan's Foreign Minister,
Sahibzada Yakub Khan, visited Delhi and spoke to
the Indian Foreign Minister, I.K. Gujral and the
Prime Minister V.P. Singh in terms, which they
regarded as verging on an ultimatum. Some time
later, the Indian Air Force was placed on alert
following the Pakistan Air Force being similarly
ordered. The Indian Prime Minister inquired of the
then Air Chief whether it was possible for the IAF
to intercept hostile Pakistani aircraft carrying
nuclear weapons. Air Chief Marshal Mehra replied
that no such guarantee could be given and that the
only logical answer for India was to acquire a
nuclear deterrent of its own.
These threats and the nuclear blackmail were a
staple policy of successive Pakistani government
in the 1990s.
(9)
Flight trials for delivery of Indian nuclear
weapons were conducted in 1990. The efforts to
adapt the delivery system to the weapon had
commenced even earlier (9) The
country finally decided to declare itself as a
Nuclear Weapon State with the successful ‘Shakti’
tests. It is significant to note the Indian Prime
Minister’s statement in Parliament wherein he
stated, “these are weapons of self-defence, to
ensure that
India is not subjected to nuclear threats or
coercion.”
(2)
Indian Nuclear Doctrine and Command
& Control (1)
1.
Building and maintaining a credible minimum
deterrent.
2.
A posture of “No First Use” (NFU): nuclear
weapons will only be used in retaliation
against a nuclear attack on Indian Territory or on
Indian forces anywhere.
3.
Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be
massive and designed to
inflict unacceptable damage.
4.
Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised
by the civilian political leadership through the
NCA.
5.
Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
weapon states.
6.
However, in the event of a major attack against
India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or
chemical weapons, India will retain the option of
retaliating with nuclear weapons.
7.
A continuance of strict controls on export of
nuclear and missile related materials and
technologies, participation in the Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, and continued
observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.
8.
Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear
weapon free world, through global, verifiable and
non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.
The information available on the NCA is as
follows:
(1)
1.
NCA would be a two-layered body comprising
Political Council and Executive Council.
2.
The Prime Minister chairs the Political Council.
It is the sole body to authorize the
use of nuclear weapons.
3.
The National Security Advisor chairs the Executive
Council. It provides inputs for decision-making
by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes
the directives given to it by the Political
Council.
4.
The Government has not declared actual composition
of the NCA at its Political and Executive levels.
However, various media reports
(12, 13)
state that political council comprises members of
the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and the
National Security Advisor (NSA) and the Executive
Council includes the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Committee (COSC) of the three Services, the three
Service chiefs, heads of intelligence agencies,
and the scientific establishment engaged in the
nuclear program.
5.
A tri-service command called the Strategic Forces
Command (SFC) has been formed to control
the country's
nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
The Commander-in-Chief, SFC is responsible for the
administration of the nuclear forces.
6.
The current C-in-C of SFC is Air Marshal T.M.
Asthana. The command is temporarily based in Delhi
and in the process of being relocated elsewhere.(12,
14)
NCA: Revisiting the concerns
regarding Indian command & control
The cauldron of debate has been boiling over ever
since the ‘Shakti’ tests. A debate on nuclear
issues arouses strong passions, and many it seems,
have succumbed to passion at the expense of logic
and reason. Opinions have been bandied around
without looking at facts and have even
overshadowed facts. The concerns about Indian
command and control have ranged from sublime to
down right ridiculous. Let us analyze some of the
serious concerns in light of the information
available in public domain.
Concern 1: NCA – Stabilizing or Un-stabilizing?
The concern:
Some commentators like Mr. Praful Bidwai have
opined that formalization of NCA is a
retrogressive step as it increases the instability
in South Asia. The declaration of NCA is a step
towards inducting the nuclear weapons in the armed
forces. This may escalate instability and impel
the nuclear players to
escalate from a state of "existential deterrence"
to actual threats.
(15)
Assessment:
The facts paint a different picture. It would be
fallacious to assume that prior to India’s
weaponisation, there was
"existential deterrence" and no threats were
exchanged.
As we have seen earlier, the threats and nuclear
blackmail by Pakistan was a regular feature then.
India became a NWS but did not announce the
formation of NCA. Yet this did not lead to
stability, if one takes into account reports
regarding Pakistani Nuclear adventurism during
Kargil crisis.
(16)
Nuclear game is all about posturing. An adversary
can be deterred only by the presence of credible
deterrence.
The declared Indian doctrine of No First Use (NFU)
and a massive retaliatory second strike provides
the required deterrence. It is definitely a step
towards stability. As noted by Shri Uday Bhaskar,
‘‘the declaration emphasizes India's stated policy
of nuclear restraint and in doing so has created,
almost imperceptibly, a climate of stability in
the region.''
(17)
Concern 2: Armed Forces kept ‘Out of Loop’.
The concern:
The evolution of Indian nuclear option has been
characterized by extreme secrecy and the
non-involvement of armed forces. An effective
command and control system is not possible without
the participation of armed forces. Kargil
Committee in its report stated that it was felt by
3 Chiefs of Army Staff that they had been kept out
of loop on Indian nuclear capabilities and that it
had been counter productive. (9)
Shaun Gregory also says along the same lines when
he states that a considerable challenge for the
India is to ensure that the military is fully
integrated in nuclear decision-making and fully
functional operationally (‘militarize’ its nuclear
posture) for an effective deterrence. (18)
Assessment:
The formation of the NCA seems to have adequately
addressed these issues. The executive council is
the arm of the NCA that is going to provide inputs
to the political council and execute the
directives given. This council is well represented
by the armed forces including the Defence
Intelligence Agency (DIA). Thus unlike the past,
the current political leadership will benefit from
the inputs of the armed forces and thus the armed
forces will have an important role to play.
Also with the setting up of Strategic Forces
Command, India has ‘militarised’ its nuclear
posture. A proper command has been established
with the flow of command from PM to NSA to CDS/
Chairman COSC to C-in-C SFC.
(19)
Concern 3: Absence of CDS (Chief of Defence Staff)
The concern:
It is important that in nuclear decision-making
the Cabinet must get ‘single point military
advice’. Before the declaration of NCA, there had
been a concern shown by many experts on the
existing system for higher direction of the war.
In the then existing scenario, all three Chiefs of
Staff rendered military advice to the CCS. The
COSC was only a recommendatory body with no real
executive powers. It lacked the capability to
coordinate and execute peacetime or wartime joint
operational planning, or to assist the COSC in the
execution of agreed joint operations.
(20)
A mechanism or forum to facilitate coordination
between the three services was also found to be
non-existent. Various experts have raised the
need for a CDS and integration of Services
headquarters with the defence ministry to evolve a
single point decision-making centre.
(21)
Assessment:
The CDS has not been appointed and no such
appointment is in the offing. In the interim, the
Chairman, COSC, is performing the role of CDS in
the current command and control system. The
Commander in Chief SFC reports to him in the chain
of command.
(19)
This has ensured the unity in command and control.
The government has also taken the first step
towards having a CDS by forming an Integrated
Defence Staff (IDS) in October 2001. It is
currently headed by Lt. Gen. Pankaj Joshi, who has
been designated Chief of Integrated Defence Staff
(CIDS).
(22)
A good beginning has been made in having
horizontal integration between the Service
Headquarters and the Defence Ministry. The
headquarters of IDS is staffed by officers
and personnel from the three Services, the
Ministry of External Affairs / Indian Foreign
Service, Defence Finance/Defence Accounts
Department, Department of Defence and the
Department of Defence Research and Development.
The
report on the first year of existence of HQ IDS by
the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff, Lt. General
Joshi is enlightening in terms of progress made.
(23)
Some of these are:
1.
The administration of defence,
involves a large number of activities active and
full-time interaction with various ministries and
agencies of government, DRDO, industry and so on,
where the services’ participation to the extent
required was missing. This has been a priority
area for the staff of HQ IDS.
2.
HQ IDS has become the executive arm of the COSC,
through which various decisions reached can be
implemented. This was a ‘gap’ that has been
bridged now
Concern 4: (Lack of) Tri-service command or
culture
The Concern:
Nuclear command and control would require a very
high level of coordination between the three
services in the conduct of war.
Various commentators have noted the absence of
integrated tri-service approach in
decision-making. The initial delay and hiccups in
coordination between the services in Kargil have
been highlighted. There has also been some
criticism of the ‘turf war’ between the three
services on issues related to the control of
nuclear assets, budgetary support and encroachment
on their ‘core competence’ by the other services.
(24)
There was also a need felt, to restructure the
Command structure in the field, and bring them
under a single Service commander, who would
function as the overall theatre commander.
(21)
Assessment:
The integration of the three services began with
the set up of IDS, which is a tri-service body.
The integration at the higher echelons of the
armed forces is intended to increase effectiveness
in operations. The formation of IDS has resulted
in increasing levels of integration between the
three services. Some of the achievements on this
score are mentioned in the first annual report of
IDS.
(23)
These are:
1.
Preparation of tri-service 15 years’ Long-Term
Perspective Plan (LTPP) has started.
2.
The work on preparation of joint doctrine for all
the three services has commenced. Interaction has
already taken place with the IDSA and the USI.
3.
The DIA is fully operational and coordination
between various intelligence organs of the State
has improved, including between the various
Services Intelligence Directorates.
4.
An office of Net Assessment, based on the US
Model, and headed by an officer of the rank of
brigadier or equivalent has started functioning.
The office seeks to provide the highest decision
makers alternative futures and a framework for
strategy development.
India also took a first step towards the system of
having integrated theatre commands with the set up
of Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). Its
functioning would be reviewed by the authorities
in 2005, and if successful the experiment would be
replicated.
(25)
There has been a lot of work done in the recent
times, on increasing the coordination of the three
services. There have been a lot of joint exercises
carried out by the three services where the
emphasis has been on jointmanship.
(26, 27)
The formation of SFC (a tri-service command)
responsible for the control of all nuclear
warheads and delivery systems is a further step in
the integration of the armed forces.
Concern 5: Ambiguities surrounding SFC
The concern:
Following concerns have been raised on the
structure and functioning of SFC from time to
time:
1.
Who does the C-in-C of SFC report to during
peacetime and during crisis?
(13)
2.
Does it have the custody of all the delivery
platforms? Or these would be seconded to it during
crisis?
(13,33)
3.
If the strategic command is to keep and maintain
them, wouldn't there be costly duplication of
maintenance infrastructure? Who will be
responsible for the training of the personnel?
(33)
Assessment:
1.
The chief of strategic command will report to
Chairman, COSC.
(19)
2.
Currently, the army has 2 missile groups (333 and
444 missile group). These groups are equipped with
Prithvi Missiles. Recent media report suggests
that the government has given the permission to
transfer these to the SFC. The report also
mentions that on induction, the Agni-I (range 700
KMs) and Agni-II (range 2500 KMs) would first be
made available to the SFC.
(28)
This suggests that all the nuclear assets may not
be with SFC. This may be due to the fact that many
of these delivery platforms are dual-capable, that
is they can be used for conventional weapon
delivery also.
(11, 19)
3.
According to Admiral Madhvendra Singh, “The
training in nuclear weapons and their delivery
system as well as their servicing would remain the
work of individual services”.
(19)
This seems to be a practical and cost-effective
solution as would cut drastically on the expenses
involved in duplicating the infrastructure.
Concern 6: Accidental Triggering of War on Faulty
Intelligence / Warning
The concern:
The absence of sophisticated, dedicated and
reliable early warning system and intelligence set
up could be a problem area in the fog of war. The
flight time of missiles and bombers between India
and Pakistan or India and China is a few minutes.
The reaction time available for launching a
counter strike is as low as 2-3 minutes in case of
Pakistan and around 10 minutes in case of China.
Missiles and Bombers are generally dual capable
i.e. they can carry conventional as well as
nuclear payloads. Faulty warning, or absence of
proper intelligence could accidentally trigger a
nuclear response to a non-existent threat.
(29)
Assessment:
The above criticism would be true if India adopts
a second strike option that is based on
‘Launch-On-Warning’ or LOW doctrine. This doctrine
presupposes that a first strike may result in a
significant degradation in the capability to mount
a retaliatory second strike. Thus as soon as there
is a confirmation of the launch of weapons against
it, the nation should launch its own strike. This
doctrine thus calls for weapons always on the
state of ‘alert’ and proper
delegation to the field commanders.
The available information in public domain shows,
that Indian reaction is not based on LOW doctrine.
Indian nuclear posture is modeled more or less
along the lines of “force in being” as suggested
by Ashley Tellis. This term refers to a nuclear
deterrent that consists of available, but
dispersed, components: unassembled nuclear
warheads, with their components stored separately
under strict civilian control, and dedicated
delivery systems kept either in storage or in
readiness away from their operational areas--all
of which can be brought together as rapidly as
required to create a usable deterrent force during
a supreme emergency.
(30)
Various reports suggest that this is the posture
that has been adopted by the government.
(31, 32, 52,12, 24)
While fissile core, also know as ‘pit’ is under
the custody of DAE, the triggering device and
weapon assemblies are in the custody of DRDO which
is also entrusted with the task of configuring and
mating the bombs with the missiles or bombers. The
delivery platforms are in the custody of armed
forces. The weapons can be reconstituted rapidly
during an emergency or national crisis. Since the
weapons are not configured and mated to the
delivery platforms, they are in a state of
‘de-alert’. The time to bring together all these
components and launch a second strike is reported
to be a few hours. This gives a sufficient time to
the Indian leadership to verify and confirm the
first strike before launching a counter strike.
Concern 7: Committee oriented NCA is not an
effective command system
The concern:
It has been opined in several quarters that the
committee system followed by the NCA is time
consuming, that is more suited for first strike
doctrine, where deliberation is a virtue. In a
second strike doctrine, the need of the hour is
quick decision making which a committee oriented
system cannot deliver.
(33)
Assessment:
Again, the above criticism would be only valid if
India adopts a second strike option that is based
on ‘Launch-On-Warning’ or LOW doctrine. As we have
seen earlier, this is not the case. The Indian
doctrine is based on an assured retaliatory second
strike (not reactionary second strike) designed to
cause massive and unacceptable damage. The Indian
arsenal is on a ‘de-alert’ and it takes some time
to make it go to an ‘alert’ status. Once the first
strike has been confirmed and the executive
council has provided its input to the political
council, the political council has sufficient time
at its disposal to discuss all the aspects and
decide on an appropriate course of action – in
this case a retaliatory strike. By the time, the
political council has finished its deliberation;
the weapons would be in a ready state.
Concern 8: Survivability of Command & Control
after first strike
The concern:
Indian doctrine is ‘No First Use’. This implies
that in case the deterrence fails for some reason,
India would be nuked first. A successful first
strike may significantly degrade or even
effectively impair India’s capacity to strike
back. If the nuclear arsenal or the command &
control are not capable of surviving the first
strike, then the whole concept of NFU as a
deterrent is defeated. The concerns expressed are
twofold. These are:
1.
Survivability of Nuclear Assets:
2.
Survivability of Command & Control
While first threat is potent enough, far more
worrisome is the second threat. The second threat
also called as ‘decapitation’ is of great concern
as in the absence of the command (decision makers)
or control (means to authorize the strike), the
nuclear arsenal even if it has survived the first
strike, is rendered useless.
(34)
An aerial nuclear command is difficult to target
by any adversary. However, there is an absence of
a reliably fast aircraft platform equipped with
secured communication and command and control
infrastructure to act as an effective aerial
nuclear command. The current fleet of Avros in the
Air HQ Communication Squadron is obsolete.
(35)
Assessment:
A quick scanning of various reports in the media
shows that the government is alive to this concern
and already has in place a mechanism to ensure the
survivability. It is also taking a lot of steps to
fill in any of the gaps in the arrangements. Let
us take a look:
1.
Arrangements for of Alternate chains of command in
place.
(13)
Some reports even link the elevation of Mr. Advani
to Deputy PM in this respect.
(24)
The structure of NCA and ANCAs (Alternate NCA) is
not declared, so that the chain of commands cannot
be targeted.
(24)
2.
In the time of crisis, the management of the
higher direction of the war would be from NCP
(National Command Post). There will be a number of
ANCPs (alternate NCPs) located at different
strategic locations. At least 1 such ANCP would be
within reasonable distance of Delhi.
(12,24)
3.
These NCPs would be housed in bunkers capable of
withstanding a nuclear strike equivalent to that
produced by the US B-61 mod11 earth-penetrating
nuclear bomb.
(24)
It may be noted that none of our potential
adversary is even remotely near possessing such
decapitating weapons. A decapitating attack on
ANCP would also require the attacker to possess
significant real-time intelligence sources
including space and human assets. If the recent
events in the Iraq war are any indicator, these
capabilities are still eluding the lone super
power.
4.
Significant investments have been made over the
years in protecting the communication system from
EMP attack.
(11)
5.
Portable field shelters against a NBC attack have
been developed by DRDO.
(37)
All wings of Indian armed forces have been
equipped and trained to operate in NBC
environment.
(38,39)
6.
The air-based command and control infrastructure
is being strengthened with the replacement of old
turbo-prop Avros with Brazilian Embraer jets.
These jets would be adequately protected against
air-borne or ground based missile attack.
(36)
7.
The government has been building capabilities to
provide quick response in the face of nuclear
attack. A Disaster Management Authority (DMA),
under the anvil of Home Ministry is being
formalized. This will have 4 companies of CISF
(comprising 4000 personnel) dispersed at strategic
locations across the nation adequately trained to
provide the required help.
(40)
Civil Defence authorities in Delhi are
being equipped to operate in NBC environment.
8.
IDS has issued a tri-service joint plan on
Disaster Management, and coordinating on these
issues with Defence and Home Affairs ministries.
(23)
9.
The current Indian second-strike capability is
based on a dyad of short to medium range bombers
and missiles. Looking at the the strategic depth
of India as well as the dispersal-disbursement of
weapon components ensure the survival of a
credible deterrence after a Pakistani first
strike. The threat is greater from a Chinese first
strike. The planned acquisition through lease of 2
Akula SSNs and the indigenous development of ATV
will make a formidable Triad that will be an
effective deterrent for a Chinese first strike.
(24)
In the meanwhile, the induction of Dhanush
missiles (a naval variant of Prithvi) will ensure
a sea-based deterrence.
(41)
10.
The survival chances of Indian arsenal are also
increased considerably as its missile launchers
are road and rail mobile. With an effective plan
of deception, concealment, random movement and
relocation of missile launchers judiciously mixed
with that of dummy launchers, the chances of any
first strike completely degrading the Indian
deterrent are remote.
11.
India is working towards an anti-ballistic missile
shield.
(42)
The co-operation with Israel, the acquisition of
Green Pine Radar System, the evaluation of Russian
ABM systems for limited theatre defence, the
request for technical information on Patriot
Missiles from US, the proposed deal for Arrow
Missile that is subject to US approvals and the
participation in the development of US missile
shield program are all indicators of India moving
vigorously in this direction.
Concern 9: Composition of NCA & ANCAs not
transparent
The concern:
Some experts have opined that there is need for
greater transparency in the chain of command. Some
have even called for designation of succession
through legislation. The example of USA is often
cited in this reference. It is argued that a
greater transparency will result in more credible
deterrence and increased stability.
Assessment:
The comparison of Indian situation with that of US
is not apt. The threat to Indian command does not
arise only from external state agencies but by
non-state players (terrorist groups) as well. A
complete transparency in the chain of command may
in fact endanger its security and thus promoting
instability rather than stability. In fact, some
ambiguity on this score, will make the task of
adversaries targeting the chain and alternate
chains of command more difficult, thus promoting
deterrence.
Concern 10: Lack of C4I2 Infrastructure
Concern:
This is a concern that is mostly expressed by the
nuclear non-proliferation groups and foreign
experts. Their belief is that given the backward
and abysmal technology infrastructure and accident
and disaster prone geographical location, there is
no way a credible C4I2 (Command, Control,
Communication, Computers, Intelligence and
Interoperable) system can be developed and
deployed in India. In the absence of such a robust
C4I2 system, an accidental nuclear war can be
triggered.
(43, 29)
Assessment:
This concern needs to be answered at three levels.
First, the concern of an accidental triggering of
war has already been answered earlier. Indian
nuclear posture is of de-alerted deterrence and
not based on the ‘fingers permanently on the
trigger’ philosophy.
Secondly, C4I2 systems are tailored and customized
to suit specific needs. The evaluation of Indian
system should not be based on a view through the
western glasses. Their perspective is based on
first strike doctrine or LOW doctrine that we have
discussed earlier. This would call for a very
complex C4I2 system as the objective would be to
completely degrade the second strike capability of
the adversary. It would call for counter-strike
capabilities (strike against military formations
and C2 infrastructure of the enemy). This will
need real-time intelligence based on space, air,
signal and human intelligence. It will call for
rapid and real-time retargeting solutions that
will call for immense computing resources. It will
call for a highly complex and modern early warning
system, and so on.
On the other hand, Indian doctrine of NFU calls
for a much simpler command and control system.
(11,18)
The objective of Indian second strike is to cause
an unacceptable damage to the adversary. The
objective can be achieved by a strike against a
few counter value targets (cities), which does not
require an elaborate real-time intelligence and
complex command and control set-up.
Thirdly, this criticism grossly underestimates
Indian capabilities - both existing as well as
emerging. Some non-proliferation supporters club
India and Pakistan together and talk of a poor
technology base of South Asia.
(43)
This is either being naďve or selectively
prejudiced or both.
The vast difference in the technological
competence between the two nations is increasingly
being acknowledged.
(44)
Let us take a look at some of the Indian
capabilities:
1.
Space based Intelligence Assets:
India has a very well established and highly
advanced system of satellites that can provide
ground imagery with a resolutions ranging from 36
meters to as fine as sub-meter resolution.
(45)
TES has been dubbed by many as India’s first spy
satellite.
2.
Space Based Communication:
India again has a fairly established system of
INSAT satellites that are used for communication.
(45)
Though, currently there exists no dedicated
military communication satellite, the same can be
easily manufactured and launched, as was done in
the case of TES.
3.
Existing / Planned C4I2 system:
The army has a fully automated communication
network for its field forces- AREN and ASCON for
rearward connectivity from field forces. To serve
its C4I2 functions, an Army Strategic Information
System (ASTROIDS) has been envisaged. The air
force has a dedicated communication network for
its air defence- ADGES complete with radar and
communication links for providing surveillance to
various air defence elements. For its logistic
operations there is an Integrated Material
Management On-Line system (IMMOL). AREN and ASCON
are being integrated into ADGES. The Indian Navy
already has networked major command and control
centres, logistic depots, maintenance
organisations and ships. Its operational
information system links the War Room in Delhi
with three Command Maritime Operation Centres. The
Navy also has an Integrated Logistics Management
System (ILMS. (xx)
(46)
Indian Navy has developed an encryption system
called ‘Trinetra’ for secure communication
in collaboration with IIT.
A
Data Fusion Centre (DFC) - a module of National
C4I2 is being conceptualised to function as a
decision support system for the National Command
Authority at the National Command Post (NCP).
(23)
4.
Early Warning Capabilities:
India already has considerable early warning
capabilities through a network of Area Defence
Direction Control (ADDC). These form a vital part
of Indian command and control setup.
(47)
The early warning capabilities against China are
being strengthened.
(48)
The Indian Air Force is also setting up a
monitoring centre near Chennai to track incoming
missiles and aircraft, detect underwater
activities, and intercept communication signals
within a range of two thousand kilometers. It is
expected to be operational in 2004.
(49)
India
is going to acquire its AWACS system soon. This
will be based on Israeli PHALCON system mated to
Russian IL-76 platform.
Concern 11: Safety & Security of Nuclear Assets
Concern:
The questions are often raised on the safety and
security of nuclear weapons. There is also a
concern about an accidental explosion or damage to
nuclear weapons by accidents like explosion, fire,
tempering etc. Questions are also raised about the
weapons being used without authorization and that
control devices like PAL are not in the technology
reach of Indians.
Assessment:
Indian posture calls for separate storage of core,
weapon assembly, and delivery platform. All these
three components are also under the custody of
different civil and military organizations. This
rules out the chances of their accidental
explosion or unauthorized use in times of
de-alert. In times of crisis, even if the weapon
is mated and ready for use, simple procedural
means such as the two-person rule (reinforced by
command authority separation) are sufficient to
ensure protection against unauthorized use. The
weapon can only be launched if the coded
instructions from 2 different channels and 2
different persons are fed in.
PAL is not based on a complex technology base as
made out by a few non-proliferation experts. It is
a simple technology.
(50)
There are numerous reports in media that talk
about such locks and control devices functioning
on Indian weapon device.
(51)
Conclusion:
The declaration of Indian nuclear doctrine and NCA
is a major milestone in India’s march towards
peace and security. It heralds the beginning of an
era of transparency in security matters. It gives
greater credibility to Indian deterrence and
promotes stability in the region. The No-First-Use
posture not only reflects the maturity and
restraint adopted by India, it also shows the
confidence of the nation in its capabilities. It
is a policy of nuclear restraint. The doctrine
also makes the command and control system
simpler, affordable and easier to implement.
Though a lot of work needs to be done in building
up India’s capabilities in terms of an effective
triad, and C4I2 infrastructure, it is reassuring
to know that a robust system is in place. What is
heartening is the rapid pace of progress in most
of the areas. It is hoped that the Indian armed
force will soon have a CDS.
The first meeting of the political council and
some of the strategic decisions that were made and
declared by CCS subsequently are an indicator that
the strategic thinking and strategic vision have
taken roots in the Indian decision-making.
Acknowledgements and Disclaimer
I am privileged to be an audience to some great
discussions on this and other topics at the Bharat
Rakshak Forum (www.bharat-rakshak.com/forum).
I have benefited immensely from these discussions
as well as the references provided therein. I am
especially thankful to Mr. Sunil and Mr. Nitin for
their prompt response and help. The opinions
presented in this article are entirely personal,
and do not represent those of my employer or any
other organization.
References
1.
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
Press Release, 4th Jan 2003
http://meadev.nic.in/news/official/20030104/official.htm
3.
Raja Menon (Rear Admiral, Retired, Indian Navy)
‘A Nuclear Strategy for India’
(New Delhi: Sage Publications), p 66
4.
Ibid pp. 69-70
5.
Ibid pp. 73-76
6.
Ibid p. 79
7.
Government of India, Press Note, 18 May 1974
8.
www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/
9.
The Kargil Committee Report (III – The Nuclear
Factor)
http://rajyasabha.nic.in/25indi1.htm#3
10.
http://meadev.nic.in/govt/johngarver.htm
11.
Ashok K Mehta (Maj. General, Retired, Indian
Army), “A Strategic Forces Command, finally!”
Rediff.com, 10 Feb 2003
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/feb/10ashok.htm
