Jammu & Kashmir: Winds of Change or a Big Deception

Dr Ajay Chrungoo

The spate of ‘Fidayeen’ attacks on the Army in Jammu, terrorist assaults on pilgrims at Qazigund and Vaishnodevi (Katra), or the Nadimarg massacre, should in the normal course, put to rest any doubts about the internal security scenario in the state. However, given the pattern of government responses to the ‘War of Attrition’ in the state, we may see the continuance of the attitude of self-deception through a blatant denial of reality. How many statements, coming from those at the helm in the Centre as well as the state, have we seen in recent days, which proclaimed the ‘Return of Normality’? The indicators that the Government of India chooses to determine critical situation projections are vague and flawed. The process of analysis at the highest level appears to be emanating from political considerations rather than any objective, scientific approach. The dictum appears to be that secular pretensions have to be preserved in J&K regardless of reality.

About Normality

If we rely on more concrete yardsticks of judgement than the number of tourists visiting the Kashmir Valley, then at no point of time since the new government took over, has there been any dramatic improvement in the situation. In fact, there are definite indicators, which should have put both the state as well as the central government on high alert. The number of terrorists killed during the tenure of the present government has shown a steep fall from 797 between November 2001 and March 15, 2002 to 462 between November 2002 and March 15, 2003. The claims about low infiltration during roughly the same period should be seen more in the context of the higher levels of interdiction. For example, the number of terrorists killed along the LoC in Poonch sector has been more between January-April 2003 than in the corresponding period in the previous two years. Since January 2003, there have already been seven Fidayeen attacks in J&K, out of which six have been directed at well-fortified security installations. In comparison, there were just ten Fidayeen attacks in the whole of 2002. Most of which constituted the period when the present PDP-Congress alliance was not at the helm. Fidayeen attacks are an important indicator of the reach, sway and morale of terrorist operatives.

The kill-rate of security forces in the Fidayeen attacks is 1:2, i.e. one terrorist killed for two security men in the Valley. In Jammu the kill rate is 1:4, i.e. one terrorist killed for four security men. The better performance in the Valley appears to be due to better perimeter security. In Jammu, which has around 200 cantonments and security camps, the security cover is still rudimentary. The number of violent incidents in the state has been 729 in January-April 2003 as compared to 955 in January-April 2002. However, these statistics do not make us any wiser because of the increased number of security forces killed as compared to the terrorists in the same time-span. In January-April 2003, 198 security men and 407 terrorists were killed while in January-April 2002, 175 security men were killed as compared to 660 terrorists. It simply means that the ratio has deteriorated from 1:3.7 in 2002 to 1:2.05 in 2003.

The decrease in violent incidents in 2003 in the state can be related to factors other than an actual improvement at the ground level. These factors are tactical imperatives emanating from the flirtation by terrorist groups like Hizb-ul-Mujahideen with the ruling PDP and unusually high levels of snow and rain from January to March this year, which might have reduced LoC crossings or terrorist movements within the state. 

Understanding the New Government

One of the most important instructions given by the new Chief Minister to the Unified Command immediately after taking over was to tell them to distinguish between the foreign terrorists and local terrorists. This reduced the anti-terrorist operations to a joke. Immediately in the aftermath of this meeting on November 18, 2002, the number of local terrorists killed fell dramatically. It also enabled the terrorists to intensify their operations with fewer constraints. The results were immediately evident when the ratio of security men killed to terrorists killed went up in the month of November 2002 to 1:2, the worst level since the Kargil War.

The new government, when it took over, should have been guided more by the security environment, not only in the state but also in the region itself, before taking critical decisions with regard to security operatives in the state. Around 800 civilians had been killed during the various phases of electioneering in the state. That such violence was inevitable given the stakes, which elections had generated, is not a valid argument for a variety of reasons. The separatists had already unfolded a comprehensive strategy of proxy participation in elections as well as a grand alliance with Mufti’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Why should terrorist think-tanks risk men and resources when security forces were on highest alert and at peak concentration in the state? In the prelude to the elections, Pakistan had also started imposing some restrictions on Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad.

The terrorist infrastructure has demonstrated a capability right through the post 11 September period, of being able to sustain its strike capabilities despite unprecedented international isolation and pressures, weakening of Pakistani leverage to extend direct support, elimination of the Taliban factor including the training sanctuaries of Afghanistan and massive mobilisation of Indian troops along the Indo-Pak borders and the LoC. The pre-election violence was a vivid demonstration of this capability. The happenings at Akshardham on September 24, 2002, just before the PDP-Congress took over the reigns in the state, and the terrorist strike on Raghunath Mandir on November 24, 2002, when the new government was not yet settled in, were significant signals for Mufti Mohd. Sayeed to review his promises to the electorate, particularly on issues related to the security of the state. The then PDP leader, and now its President, Mehbooba Mufti declared immediately after the election verdict, “You cannot expect us to compromise on certain issues.” What are these certain issues, which are more sacred to the PDP than the security of the state, need to be enunciated clearly. They constitute the ideological substratum of the party and are not merely tactical considerations to wean away separatist support structures in the Valley as the Government of India tends to believe. The PDP government moved swiftly to disband the SOG (Special Operation Group of J&K Police) towards a fulfilment of its promises.

PDP-Separatist Flirtations

One thing goes to the credit of the PDP: it has been more direct about its relationship with separatist formations in Kashmir Valley. In its Interview to India Today (October 21, 2002) Mufti Sayeed clearly admits support from terrorist organisations like Hizbul Mujahideen. When asked whether PDP got the support of militants, especially HM during the elections, he answers brazenly, “They might have done it in certain pockets but it shows that even militants want an honourable exit route.” Subsequent developments and revelations by separatist leaders have shown that the separatist support to PDP has been more comprehensive and broad-based, cutting across factional rivalry amongst them.

Immediately after the election results, the Kul Jamaat Hurriyat Conference Chairman, Abdul Gani Bhat said, “I am happy that the National Conference has been defeated. I hope that the new government will keep its promises and open a dialogue with all of us. We are keen to be included in a dialogue.” Mufti himself revealed the other aspects of the agenda on which he had sought separatist support. He was asked to comment on whether the PDP performed well because it spoke the Hurriyat language ‘short of secession’ to which he replied, “Our party articulated the people’s hardships, the human rights violations by the security forces and the senseless violence.” Dr Fai of the Kashmir American Council was jubilant after Mufti’s victory. The support to Mufti extended across the factional war in Hizbul Mujahideen. Both the Majid Dar and the Salahuddin factions, had in essence, agreed to engage with the PDP. That the PDP had developed an alliance with the broader spectrum of separatist leadership to support them is evident from the recent revelations of Sajjad Lone of the People’s Conference. He reportedly said that the Jamaat-e-Islami cadre, including those affiliated to Gilani had voted tactically in support of the PDP.

So far, Mufti has kept his promises to the separatists. The “exit route” which he claims to be building for separatists, in essence means dismantling the very objectives which the Government of India aimed to achieve through internationally-recognised elections.

The Game

In the post-election scenario, separatists encountered the grave risk of isolation. A credible election would put into question the very credibility of the separatist leadership as the true representatives of the people. With an elected government at the helm and with international goodwill behind it, the ‘War against Terrorism’ would assume a new punch. Pakistan’s position on Kashmir would become untenable – such were the expectations in the post election scenario.

An inkling of what was to emerge from the new government came from the interview, which Mehbooba Mufti gave to Tim Sebastian of BBC. The detailed explanations given by her, implicitly revealed that the PDP was endeavouring to assume a position of neutrality between India-Pakistan and separatist formations in J&K; that it would act more as an arbitrator between these three actors; that its stand on a peace process was identical with the positions of both the Hurriyat and Pakistan; that it does not have a hostile or unsympathetic attitude towards a Pakistani role in Kashmir, and that it was reluctant to unambiguously condemn terrorism. Tim, during the conversation, was forced to comment that Ms Mufti was justifying terrorism. Chief Minister Mufti Mohd Sayeed, subsequently commented many times that all efforts by the Government of India to solve the Kashmir issue had failed outright and there was no alternative other than talking to the separatists.

The entire process of conducting elections at such a heavy human and material cost was relegated to a win-win manoeuvre for separatists. Here was an elected government, which was decisively undermining its own position and virtually according a ‘veto’ role to those who boycotted the elections. The ‘exit route’, which Mufti is claiming to build, is basically a life-saving device for separatists discredited by the people, isolated internationally, and unsure whether violence levels can be sustained for very long so as to keep the Kashmir pot boiling. The separatists have also got a good bargain from another angle. As the Government of India, for reasons best known to it, continues to pat the present government on its back for its acts of commission and omission, it is pushing the National Conference to change its stand on ‘Accession and Pan-Islamic terrorism’. Senior NC leader, Mustafa Kamal said recently that the Kashmir issue could be settled through ‘plebiscite’. The NC President raised the question that if all the elections in the state till the recent one were unfair, then the Accession, which was ratified by the ‘Constituent Assembly’, could also be questioned. We see the separatist agenda gradually transforming into a wider consensus.

Implications

PDP politics has effected the situation in the state in two more ways. One, it has stifled the widening of the social base of mainstream national politics in Kashmir. The Congress party has won 4 seats in Kashmir on its own, which is the most significant achievement of the recent elections. That there is an increased appreciation about India in the Valley was revealed by the “Mori Survey” conducted before the elections. The man behind the survey was Lord Eric Reginald Avebury from UK who has a long history of taking a strongly pro-Pakistan position on Kashmir. The survey reflected that the majority of Kashmiris would prefer to live with India. The blind and frequent endorsement of PDP politics by the Government of India has put serious pressures on this emerging mainstream consciousness in the Valley. In the absence of a political outlet, it is bound to get channelized to the so-called moderate varieties of separatism.

The second manner in which PDP policy perspectives have created maximum impact is in the conduct of security operations in the state. Disbanding of the SOG was a purely political decision. It was a promise that had played a critical role in motivating the separatist leadership to support the PDP during the elections. The SOG has been by far the most successful anti-terrorist operation in the state, using local resources. The force lost more than 400 policemen in the anti-terrorist operations and killed more than 1,500 terrorists. It had introduced for the first time, such asymmetry to anti-terrorist operations that the terrorist infrastructure was finding difficult to cope with. The SOG rendered subversive penetration, which had crippled the local police force, ineffective and new life was emerging in the local police force to galvanize it.

The disbanding of SOG, whatever the justifications, has a broader meaning for the separatist constituency. For this constituency, it means that through a subversive alliance any anti-terrorist operation emanating from the government could be crippled or dismantled. In the terrorist war, as we are facing demonstration of subversive control from time to time is more crucial to sustain the morale of terrorist operatives than the actual acts of terrorism.

The PDP unfortunately, is also sustaining a diatribe against the security forces in the state even while it is at the helm of affairs. Recently, the President of PDP alleged that “state terrorism” was intact in Jammu and Kashmir and said that the Indian troops were ignoring the state government’s policy of ensuring “humane policing”. She said, “…troops in lower rungs have not changed their mindset and remarkable human rights abuses have taken place last month...The people have come out on the streets to protest and I am with them.” Such indictment of security forces is a sure recipe for creating security dysfunction.

Self-Deception

The two main indicators, which are being used to project that the situation in the Valley is returning to normality, are the number of tourists and the political mobilisation taking place there, depicted by the number of people who attended the rallies of the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition.

Reliance on the tourism inflow as a major indicator of the internal situation primarily reflects political compulsions. However, a few aspects need to be taken into consideration. One, that after the unleashing of violence in the state after 1989, overall pilgrim tourism, particularly to Vaishno Devi and Amarnath cave has gone up by around fourfold. In the past, pilgrims to Amarnath cave rarely exceeded 50,000. Vaishno Devi has now become the pilgrim centre that attracts the largest number of pilgrims in the whole of Northern India. This rise in numbers of Hindu pilgrims to the state appears to be paradoxical in relation to the internal situation, which has seen religious cleansing with operations spilling over to Jammu, after the total Hindu cleansing of the Valley.

Are we witnessing a form of reaction from the Hindu middle class of India, which wants to communicate its resolve to uphold national integrity in J&K at all costs by undertaking pilgrimages to the state despite grave risks? The rush of Kashmiri Hindu pilgrims to Kheer Bhavani is not something that is unique to the tenure of the present government. In fact, the process of visiting Hindu shrines in the Valley by the Kashmiri Hindus started many years earlier. Far from being an acknowledgement of an improving situation in the Kashmir Valley, it is only a declaratory response that Kashmiri Hindus have not given up Kashmir forever. The reaction was greater this year because of the Nadimarg massacre. The public rebuff and protest, which Mufti experienced when he visited Kheer Bhavani on Zeshtashtami this year, did not receive mention in the media for secular considerations. Mufti and his entourage had to be whisked away when he tried to address the pilgrims and eulogise the situation in the Valley. The pilgrims reacted vociferously, rejecting his claim and the situation threatened to assume violent proportions.

The public response to the visit of Vajpayee and Sonia Gandhi should be seen in the context of the patterns of political behaviour of the Valley, which have always been deceptive. Till recently, the NC used to attract sparse gatherings, but the trend has now changed. Omar Abdullah, discarded till yesterday, is attracting huge gatherings in the Valley after the NC started making pro-secessionist noises. There is a famous political joke in the Valley. Bakshi Ghulam Mohd was once asked, when he was Prime Minister of Kashmir, as to how many people supported him. He remarked “40 lakhs.” (The total population of the Valley then was 40 lakhs). When asked how many supported Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah, he again quipped, “40 lakhs”. The number of people attending a particular rally can be misleading. The issue that should worry the Government of India is the content of politics around which political mobilisation is sought by the PDP. People are told that violence has achieved its objective of projecting Kashmir as an issue that has to be solved and that the time is now ripe for political engagement with the Government of India. Such an argument has wide support. The Jamaat-i-Islami endorses this view, as do various other constituents of the Hurriyat. The differences as exist, are only on the timing of such a process and Pakistan’s role in it.

If a consensus is emerging in a large section of separatist opinion, to enter into a serious political engagement with India on their terms, and if Mufti is providing the space for this, then the kind of mobilisation that we are seeing in the Valley assumes a different meaning altogether. India is ready for a significant political concession in the Valley and Kashmiris should facilitate it. This is the under-current in the Valley. But to construe it as a wind blowing in favour of India in the separatist strongholds or to endeavour to find an ‘exit’ route would be fatally erroneous.

Dangerous Signals

The respectability and recognition that the present PDP government has given to the terrorist movement in the state is unprecedented. Mufti calls the movement a ‘Tehreek’. Mehbooba Mufti minces no words and describes the problem as ‘ideological’ without knowing, if it is so, how a ‘healing touch’ is going to help.

The eulogisation of terrorism by both the Chief Minister and the President of the PDP, was done blatantly on 13^th July, 2003 by paying tributes to martyrs who fell to the Maharaja’s bullets in 1931. Mufti Sayeed promised to construct a memorial to the martyrs of 1931 and others who are dying continuously “for the cause”. Mehbooba Mufti in her address, assured the gathering that the blood of the 1931 martyrs and “those young boys who attained martyrdom over the last 12 years” would not go waste. The underlying message and the dangerous symbolisation can be fully understood by reading how the leading local daily, Greater Kashmir, captioned the story – “Emulate Hamas: CM to Militants”. It went on to say that, “The Chief Minister sought to reassure the people that there would be no sell-out in Kashmir… ‘I am accountable to my people and I assure you that I will do everything possible to protect the national identity of Kashmir and bring peace with dignity’… The Hamas in Palestine chose to fight politically and our boys holding guns should not take much longer to understand the situation.”

The Flaw

Over the years, the Government of India has tried to counter religious separatism in the state by patronising apparently moderate varieties of Muslim sub-nationalism. Those political formations, which toned down their public opposition to accession, without altering their fundamental ideograph, were seen as possible instrumentalities to counter pan-Islamism and secessionism. This strategy merely resulted in a symbiotic relationship between the ‘rabid communalists’ and ‘moderate communalists’. We have seen its interplay. The NC opposes the Jamaat publicly but rehabilitates its cadres administratively. The Jamaat curses the NC publicly but supports it clandestinely in elections.

The strategy of the separatists has changed only in form and not in content during the recent elections. They chose to split their support to two political formations; both wedded to Muslim identity politics and its constitutional fortifications. We now have the NC and the PDP competing for the same space.

The new strategy has unleashed competitive separatism and communalism. It has widened the subversive space. Using indicators like tourist inflow to the Valley or the number of people that flock to the rallies of National Leaders, are acts of self-deception. The nation-building strategy in the state has to change. Squarely facing the challenges of Muslim communalism and its militarization, without indulging in subterfuges is the need of the hour.

This piece has been reproduced here from the latest issue of the India Defence Review with the permission of the editor.