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Alternate
Thinking to Destroying Pakistan
N.
Sadhu
Are
we Indians not happy, with the current status that
we find ourselves in, over J&K?
Firstly, what is wrong with the current status of
the J&K issue? There are two fronts, military
and economics. The military has been facing with
the militancy and has been indulging in warfare
with the insurgents for over a decade now. In
today's political scenario, where we are being led
by a bunch of politicians who have no stomach for
war (as seen by our two previous deployments),
this is the best thing to happen to the Indian
Armed Forces. Rotations of over four Corps level
force north of Jammu, every three years will see
our entire armed force having combat experience in
a few years time. The lessons that we are learning
here will come only with true face-to-face
conflict. Given that we are not going to war in
the near future too, this kind of training keeps
the soldiers training up-to-date and the skills of
commanding troops in conflict, razor sharp. The
younger officers, who face the brunt of combat,
will in about 10 or 15 years will command our
forces and will not be the action starved crowd
that we have at the top in the coming five years.
There is a tremendous scarcity of Officers who
have seen combat at the highest levels of Command
today, and there is a possibility that we maybe
handicapped by this. Since `71, and then some
rotations of forces in Sri Lanka, there are
possibly very few `Strategic Level' thinkers in
the Indian Army today who have braved combat, just
to know what is feasible from the soldier at the
lowest rank when actual fighting breaks out.
Economically, there doesn't seem to be too much of
a strain on the economy of the nation, as most of
the troops are taken care of by the defence
budgets, and only the Kargil conflict saw some
taxation to the common man. Do not be under the
presumption that if there were no conflict, the
defence budget would come down. The army has
learnt to handle the so-called public perception
of its equipment deficits and has armaments that
are not necessarily public knowledge or that
everyone can know because some Uncle or Brother is
there in the Army. True as it may be, there is no
shortage that cannot be cured as far as the Army
or IAF goes, that Ordnance Factories, or our so
called corrupt Defence Procurement Specialists in
cahoots with retired Generals, cannot supply in a
matter or three months of Avalanche Logistics
Mode.
Therefore if looked as if the Army and a silent
second rung of Defence in the Paramilitary are
indulging in serious combat practice, we shall
have a battle hardened force whenever the
hostilities do break out.
This continuous training and deployment will
manifest itself in the mean demeanor of the Indian
Soldier, who will fight with renewed desperation
and to vent his pent up frustration to solve the
matter once and for all, when the war breaks out.
In light of this, the casualties are within
acceptable limits, and the odd hero story will
emerge and plunge our nation into an hour of
sadness. Often young Officers die out of
enthusiasm and lack of wisdom, that comes from not
learning lessons from troops in combat. The
formation of the RR with its rotating troop
structure has eliminated a large number of
Officer/Troop casualties and Officers who have
trained with RR Units are now spreading their
wisdom within their own parent formations.
Therefore
one hardly hears of a senior Major or Lt. Col
taking a hit, while these 23 and 25 year old
Lieutenants and Captains take a beating. It is
okay to feel sad about this, but if almost every
situation is analyzed, you shall see that
something wrong resulted in the death of the young
Officers, rather than superior tactics of the
enemy.
Given the lack of damage to the economy of the
nation due to this perceived low intensity combat,
and a different view of the Army deployment there,
one should not expect a quick resolution to the
J&K conflict from the Indian side.
If not, what is the problem with the current
status there?
Public perception, in India, that Pakistan is
behind all of this J&K terrorism and
infiltration is accurate. Where do they come from
otherwise? Indonesia? It is ridiculous to hear
that we keep accusing them across the border with
this kind of talk We should focus on why our
government is taking this stance of `accusing
bordering on whining,' when you fully well know
where they come from and where they go for
vacations after killing our soldiers and the
villagers once in a while.
We should question our own government as to what
our Plan of Action is as to this problem.
Apparently the funny thing is that we have no such
charted solution. That leaves people like the
readers of this Forum in a sweat and with froth in
the mouth, spitting venom at the Pakistanis for
all our ills in J&K.
Why? When they feel that we have no agenda to cure
this ailment, why do you think the Pakistanis
should stop anything? Give them some credit too.
Analysts presume that the drug trade is funding a
major part of the J&K operation from the
Pakistan end. Good, so their government has
nothing to loose if the whole thing escalates or
slows down, at least there is no one complaining
about the funds or lack of.
Given their situation, I don't see why Pakistan
should shut down the tourist camps they have for
terrorists from Yemen to Syria and every other
country around us. I don't see why they should
shut operations because we are not doing anything
proactive about this ailment. They have figured
that India has a common cold type virus, and do
not have the political leadership capable of
attacking the home of the virus.
So common Indians cannot aspire for the problem to
go away on its own and nor are we doing anything
to make it go away.
What kind of a provocation would you deem fit
for a war, given that two earlier (or rather the
latest ones, Kargil and the attack on the
Parliament have not taken you down the war path)
incidents have not done the trick?
There should be a change in manner in which we
look at a conflict with Pakistan in the future.
There is a dim possibility is that India is going
to react to any terrorist action with war, as our
Politicians have decided that there is no
punishment we cannot take and true to Gandhian
thought, we do turn the other cheek.
The manner in which our nation has buckled to
international pressure to a ceasefire in Kargil
and to backing down from within 36 hours of war,
and recalling a started movement of a Strike Corps
during Op Parakram has exposed our behavioral
pattern. Forget for a moment the causes for the
deployment. The levels of deployment and the
timing of the `cooling' exposed all our forces and
our primary moves to the enemy. The stupidity of
the whole deployment exercise has now sent the
entire Perspective and Planning Command to the
benches like little school boys to now sit with
cartographers and re-think plans of simple
crossings into Pakistan, as your best moves were
displayed to him during Op Parakram.
The `provocation to attack' route is all but
exhausted. It is the internal situation from
within Pakistan that is going to cause it to raise
the ante with India, as a face saving measure from
whatever crisis it faces then. Supposing that they
do start to face an Iraq style invasion or just a
sound pasting from the US a few years down the
line. The smartest thing to do then would be to
attack India, which would make this place
extremely uncomfortable for the Americans to enter
and dole out their brand of
`democracy-thru-a-gun.'
Not just like Iraq, but for any number of
situations from the President loosing control to
the fundamentalists or extremists, the Mohajirs
getting out of hand for the Punjabis… these are
the situations that we should be preparing for.
How to stall his forcing us into war, and letting
him stew in his soup should be our primary aim. It
is really hard for our planners to think that no
war should be the agenda, and prolonging a
stalemate on the borders would be the ideal thing
for our nation. Coming to combat, answers to
earlier questions have posed our point of view, of
having a better-trained force and what a desperate
enemy is going to do will be the prime target of
our planners. Just maybe, our policy would be not
to dismember Pakistan, but to negate his
possibility of using a nuclear weapon to invite
superpower intermediation. For a change maybe,
just maybe, we could plan on letting his Strike
Corps indulge in our Dhussi and Canals and maybe
we can nuke his inbound force somewhere in the
Deserts…
Reality, and perspectives of the clogged thinking
of our Politicians and the rusted hierarchy of our
Armed Forces will not permit us to think He will
attack us slowly and surely raising the ante to a
point where one will never be sure as to who
crossed over with the first battalion, or breached
the international border first. There is every
bright possibility that he will escalate to a
point where the inevitable war will almost
snowball over and as everyone expects there will
be serious inroads into Pakistan. We shall save
the scenario for the future posts, but almost
assuredly the nuke will be used, only as a matter
of serving notice for a ceasefire. Since he is
stated a possible first use, he stands to dictate
the ending of hostilities, and the manner of his
using will severely curtail your noble intentions
of turning Pakistan into a `Sea of Glass.'
Do you see war as a solution to the problem?
War is therefore not a possible solution to the
current mindset of the Indian leadership. We
neither seem to have the `go' for it nor are the
Pakistanis going to provide a stronger reason than
ones they already have in the past five years.
Given our reactions to the events in the recent
past, we do not see that there is an agenda of
what is to be done with the Pakistanis post a war
too.
If there is going to be any way out of this, the
only positive thing we can see will be that our
troops will be better trained to enter conflict
with a more frustrated reason to `end' this matter
than them. Small changes now no longer require our
forces to ask `down the line' to engage incoming
fire, but can return twice as much for four times
as long. Where has this change in attitude come
from?
The leadership has improved certain `features' in
a soldier's life, to help him enhance his
self-esteem, after the morale sapping withdrawal
in Op Parakram. The Indian Armed Forces are now
displaying a more de-centralized tactical
appraisal system and this has given more power to
the Officers at the front end of hostilities. A
small measure it may seem to the common man, but
for an Infantry man held back for years and years,
one cannot imagine the pure glee that he gets when
he is able to return Pakistani fire, small arms or
Artillery, for as many days as the Pakistani had
hours. Besides, our man can now begin proceedings
if he wishes to disrupt any activity on the other
side for as long as he wants.
This is where it hurts the Pakistani Government,
strangely! The insurgency support comes off drug
running and stealing and selling American supplies
from Afghanistan. However, the expenses required
from the Army come mostly from the already
depleted national exchequer. Morale would require
that Indian fire be retaliated upon, and slowly
but surely the economic strains of such Artillery
Brigade level week long duels are having a telling
effect on the Pakistani Commanders.
Conserving supplies for a real time situation, and
or letting the newfound Indian bravado going
unanswered, is the new dilemma for the Pakistani
Brigade Commanders. In a few years time, it is
these dame officers who will be at the strategic
planning level and it suits us fine that they go
in those hallowed halls with a certain amount of
self-doubt that their nation cannot really sustain
combat with India.
Herein lies India’s new strength. We are
accepting a combat situation in J&K and
relegating it to the status of a `training
compound' where death is unfortunately real. Our
troops are showing their presence and making the
Pakistanis realize that they are dealing with a
literally `richer' force and over a period of
time, this will be our plus point in any possible
combat with them. For our seemingly benign
leadership, we should think that they are
observing it in this manner, and hope it is so.
War as the arm-chair General sees it, need not be
one where open hostilities are seen, but the
situation being held under control, and forever
being tuned in our favor is our current gain.
Denying his forces any such opportunity to engage
or proactively practice his deployments will
always leave us in better light than him.
This is your new definition of war, and we are
winning on all counts.
What kind of a result in war do you think is
going to be enough leverage to get to your
solution?
The lost cause of this war is probably because the
strategic planners of this nation see another
round of war happening another 25 or 30 years down
the line. The unfortunate economic and political
status of our neighbor leaves their ruling elite
with a useful bogey, India, to keep the common man
distracted from the ills that ail their society.
Currently it seems that our strategic planners see
a successful ground war resulting in a severing of
Pakistan along the Sindh-Punjab axis. The massing
of forces and a Strike Corps along that axis
during the most recent crisis will result in the
creating of two beggars over the one we have to
begin with. There could be the hilarious situation
of Sindh actually wanting to join the Republic of
India, versus staying alone in the future.
The Kashmir problem is like that of the Punjab two
decades ago. Unless the local population decides
not to harbor terrorists during the winter months,
there can be no let up from the madness that
prevails in their state. From what activities the
Army carries out, there are bound to be mistakes
and casualties amongst the local population. It is
an unfortunate situation.
Given a few custodial deaths (or their variants
like encounters or the innocent-bystander-variety)
the Government is not going to see the need to
remove the Army from IS duties, It would be
ridiculous to expect that. All the locals need is
one winter of discontent with the militants and to
brave the gun for two months of Feb and March,
when the base of this insurgency can be stamped
out, by turning on the militants, their hideouts,
and not giving them local guides.
Given the recent elections and the overall world
view, the Indian government would have to then
hand over more powers to the local state
government, under who's auspices, the locals can
then go about demanding their slow and irritating
ride to self-rule. To end all this, the Kashmiris
need to understand the simple fact that the
Pakistanis are not in this for glory, and neither
does Kashmir have oil to make it a diamond worth
having.
The cause is just that of a doll to be used when
the going gets rough from within and there is no
sight of that problem going away in the first
place. So it seems that form the current status
that the future of Kashmir is to maintain `status
quo' with the past decade.
A decisive Indian gain on ground will invite a
nuclear volley, and may just provide Pakistan the
excuse of using his weapons. Given the American
backing of the government there, it would not be
too hard pressed to imagine that the US would be a
mute spectator to the event with enough force at
hand to prevent a out of proportion response from
India.
Even more unfortunate, would be a stale mate in
the ground war. It would give the Pakistanis all
the emotional and mental firepower to crow about
the non-functioning of the so-called superior
ratio that the Indians have towards them. A
stalemate serves no purpose. It would be better
then to let our forces fallback to certain areas
that are strategically useless and then for once
use the nuke on them. Scared as our Politicians
are, you would never know that one of them could
turn out to be a tiger in conflict.
Apart from the solution to a problem, what
would our nation stand to achieve by going in for
war?
It seems to be the new wave of thinking, that our
Tatas and Gammon India should go the route of the
Bechtels and Halliburtons of the world. The only
point of engaging the enemy would be to see that
the puppet Government installed there takes to
opening up the economy of that nation to our
industry.
Not to take too much from the current situation in
Iraq, but honestly, if there was to be a solution,
it would be the manner in which we would have to
think and be better of investing time, effort and
manpower to planning along these lines.
To the people who watch this Indo-Pak front, the
impasse must be a maddening status. The alignment
of countries before the war with Iraq and the
positioning to share the spoils, should teach us
that there would be no future in our going to war
alone with Pakistan. The situation should be made
conducive to the Americans with their current
phobia of Islam, and their troops reporting ground
reality that the Pakistanis were of more concern
in Afghanistan than the Taliban.
Of course we would have to front end the war and
the bear the monetary considerations thereof.
Instituting a Government there of our choice or
one that is friendly to us, under the guard of the
US would ensure that it reaches another state like
the present day Iraq.
The future of Iraq will of course tell on what may
happen with Pakistan after our war with them. A
strange precedent may teach us on what to expect
out of destroying a set political establishment.
Religious fervor could take over in Iraq and force
the American installed guys like Chalabi, who have
been in the US long enough to qualify as American
citizens, out in favor of local religious leaders
who are preaching from the sanctity of their
religious places.
For this reason, a few years will go into
preparation of what would be the road to take
Pakistan along after a war gets over. Planning the
war accordingly will take a little bit more.
The new wave of thinking will have to take over
our nations strategists. The surprising move from
the Indian Prime Minister to extend an invitation
to talk, albeit with riders, would show sentiment
towards this kind of thinking.
All out war without lessons from the current
deposing of Saddam, would be viewed in poor light.
The alacrity with which our nation has showed that
there is a remote possibility of it learning would
be remarkable to the above-mentioned Indo-Pak
viewers. Given our dismal physical threatening of
Pakistan in the past, apparently this mind-game
route would at least be a nice start.
We need a war if we need to end the bone of
contention in Kashmir. Given that our leadership
has shown no such interest, it would be difficult
to imagine a war. Alternatively, we should learn
to think further than the irritant issue here, but
that of being a real local power, by aligning
ourselves with the powers-that-be and trying to
gain an entry into making Pakistan an undeclared
state of our nation.
Now, if war is the only way to do that, then so be
it. For that, first you have to shake hands. And
that offer was made last week.
The
author would like to thank the DANK team for their
invaluable help
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