BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR - Volume 5(6) May-June 2003

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Alternate Thinking to Destroying Pakistan

N. Sadhu

Are we Indians not happy, with the current status that we find ourselves in, over J&K?

Firstly, what is wrong with the current status of the J&K issue? There are two fronts, military and economics. The military has been facing with the militancy and has been indulging in warfare with the insurgents for over a decade now. In today's political scenario, where we are being led by a bunch of politicians who have no stomach for war (as seen by our two previous deployments), this is the best thing to happen to the Indian Armed Forces. Rotations of over four Corps level force north of Jammu, every three years will see our entire armed force having combat experience in a few years time. The lessons that we are learning here will come only with true face-to-face conflict. Given that we are not going to war in the near future too, this kind of training keeps the soldiers training up-to-date and the skills of commanding troops in conflict, razor sharp. The younger officers, who face the brunt of combat, will in about 10 or 15 years will command our forces and will not be the action starved crowd that we have at the top in the coming five years.

There is a tremendous scarcity of Officers who have seen combat at the highest levels of Command today, and there is a possibility that we maybe handicapped by this. Since `71, and then some rotations of forces in Sri Lanka, there are possibly very few `Strategic Level' thinkers in the Indian Army today who have braved combat, just to know what is feasible from the soldier at the lowest rank when actual fighting breaks out.

Economically, there doesn't seem to be too much of a strain on the economy of the nation, as most of the troops are taken care of by the defence budgets, and only the Kargil conflict saw some taxation to the common man. Do not be under the presumption that if there were no conflict, the defence budget would come down. The army has learnt to handle the so-called public perception of its equipment deficits and has armaments that are not necessarily public knowledge or that everyone can know because some Uncle or Brother is there in the Army. True as it may be, there is no shortage that cannot be cured as far as the Army or IAF goes, that Ordnance Factories, or our so called corrupt Defence Procurement Specialists in cahoots with retired Generals, cannot supply in a matter or three months of Avalanche Logistics Mode.

Therefore if looked as if the Army and a silent second rung of Defence in the Paramilitary are indulging in serious combat practice, we shall have a battle hardened force whenever the hostilities do break out.

This continuous training and deployment will manifest itself in the mean demeanor of the Indian Soldier, who will fight with renewed desperation and to vent his pent up frustration to solve the matter once and for all, when the war breaks out. In light of this, the casualties are within acceptable limits, and the odd hero story will emerge and plunge our nation into an hour of sadness. Often young Officers die out of enthusiasm and lack of wisdom, that comes from not learning lessons from troops in combat. The formation of the RR with its rotating troop structure has eliminated a large number of Officer/Troop casualties and Officers who have trained with RR Units are now spreading their wisdom within their own parent formations.

Therefore one hardly hears of a senior Major or Lt. Col taking a hit, while these 23 and 25 year old Lieutenants and Captains take a beating. It is okay to feel sad about this, but if almost every situation is analyzed, you shall see that something wrong resulted in the death of the young Officers, rather than superior tactics of the enemy.

Given the lack of damage to the economy of the nation due to this perceived low intensity combat, and a different view of the Army deployment there, one should not expect a quick resolution to the J&K conflict from the Indian side.

If not, what is the problem with the current status there?

Public perception, in India, that Pakistan is behind all of this J&K terrorism and infiltration is accurate. Where do they come from otherwise? Indonesia? It is ridiculous to hear that we keep accusing them across the border with this kind of talk We should focus on why our government is taking this stance of `accusing bordering on whining,' when you fully well know where they come from and where they go for vacations after killing our soldiers and the villagers once in a while.

We should question our own government as to what our Plan of Action is as to this problem. Apparently the funny thing is that we have no such charted solution. That leaves people like the readers of this Forum in a sweat and with froth in the mouth, spitting venom at the Pakistanis for all our ills in J&K.

Why? When they feel that we have no agenda to cure this ailment, why do you think the Pakistanis should stop anything? Give them some credit too. Analysts presume that the drug trade is funding a major part of the J&K operation from the Pakistan end. Good, so their government has nothing to loose if the whole thing escalates or slows down, at least there is no one complaining about the funds or lack of.

Given their situation, I don't see why Pakistan should shut down the tourist camps they have for terrorists from Yemen to Syria and every other country around us. I don't see why they should shut operations because we are not doing anything proactive about this ailment. They have figured that India has a common cold type virus, and do not have the political leadership capable of attacking the home of the virus. 

So common Indians cannot aspire for the problem to go away on its own and nor are we doing anything to make it go away.

What kind of a provocation would you deem fit for a war, given that two earlier (or rather the latest ones, Kargil and the attack on the Parliament have not taken you down the war path) incidents have not done the trick?

There should be a change in manner in which we look at a conflict with Pakistan in the future. There is a dim possibility is that India is going to react to any terrorist action with war, as our Politicians have decided that there is no punishment we cannot take and true to Gandhian thought, we do turn the other cheek.

The manner in which our nation has buckled to international pressure to a ceasefire in Kargil and to backing down from within 36 hours of war, and recalling a started movement of a Strike Corps during Op Parakram has exposed our behavioral pattern. Forget for a moment the causes for the deployment. The levels of deployment and the timing of the `cooling' exposed all our forces and our primary moves to the enemy. The stupidity of the whole deployment exercise has now sent the entire Perspective and Planning Command to the benches like little school boys to now sit with cartographers and re-think plans of simple crossings into Pakistan, as your best moves were displayed to him during Op Parakram.

The `provocation to attack' route is all but exhausted. It is the internal situation from within Pakistan that is going to cause it to raise the ante with India, as a face saving measure from whatever crisis it faces then. Supposing that they do start to face an Iraq style invasion or just a sound pasting from the US a few years down the line. The smartest thing to do then would be to attack India, which would make this place extremely uncomfortable for the Americans to enter and dole out their brand of `democracy-thru-a-gun.' 

Not just like Iraq, but for any number of situations from the President loosing control to the fundamentalists or extremists, the Mohajirs getting out of hand for the Punjabis… these are the situations that we should be preparing for. How to stall his forcing us into war, and letting him stew in his soup should be our primary aim. It is really hard for our planners to think that no war should be the agenda, and prolonging a stalemate on the borders would be the ideal thing for our nation. Coming to combat, answers to earlier questions have posed our point of view, of having a better-trained force and what a desperate enemy is going to do will be the prime target of our planners. Just maybe, our policy would be not to dismember Pakistan, but to negate his possibility of using a nuclear weapon to invite superpower intermediation. For a change maybe, just maybe, we could plan on letting his Strike Corps indulge in our Dhussi and Canals and maybe we can nuke his inbound force somewhere in the Deserts…

Reality, and perspectives of the clogged thinking of our Politicians and the rusted hierarchy of our Armed Forces will not permit us to think He will attack us slowly and surely raising the ante to a point where one will never be sure as to who crossed over with the first battalion, or breached the international border first. There is every bright possibility that he will escalate to a point where the inevitable war will almost snowball over and as everyone expects there will be serious inroads into Pakistan. We shall save the scenario for the future posts, but almost assuredly the nuke will be used, only as a matter of serving notice for a ceasefire. Since he is stated a possible first use, he stands to dictate the ending of hostilities, and the manner of his using will severely curtail your noble intentions of turning Pakistan into a `Sea of Glass.'

Do you see war as a solution to the problem?

War is therefore not a possible solution to the current mindset of the Indian leadership. We neither seem to have the `go' for it nor are the Pakistanis going to provide a stronger reason than ones they already have in the past five years. Given our reactions to the events in the recent past, we do not see that there is an agenda of what is to be done with the Pakistanis post a war too.

If there is going to be any way out of this, the only positive thing we can see will be that our troops will be better trained to enter conflict with a more frustrated reason to `end' this matter than them. Small changes now no longer require our forces to ask `down the line' to engage incoming fire, but can return twice as much for four times as long. Where has this change in attitude come from? 

The leadership has improved certain `features' in a soldier's life, to help him enhance his self-esteem, after the morale sapping withdrawal in Op Parakram. The Indian Armed Forces are now displaying a more de-centralized tactical appraisal system and this has given more power to the Officers at the front end of hostilities. A small measure it may seem to the common man, but for an Infantry man held back for years and years, one cannot imagine the pure glee that he gets when he is able to return Pakistani fire, small arms or Artillery, for as many days as the Pakistani had hours. Besides, our man can now begin proceedings if he wishes to disrupt any activity on the other side for as long as he wants.

This is where it hurts the Pakistani Government, strangely! The insurgency support comes off drug running and stealing and selling American supplies from Afghanistan. However, the expenses required from the Army come mostly from the already depleted national exchequer. Morale would require that Indian fire be retaliated upon, and slowly but surely the economic strains of such Artillery Brigade level week long duels are having a telling effect on the Pakistani Commanders.

Conserving supplies for a real time situation, and or letting the newfound Indian bravado going unanswered, is the new dilemma for the Pakistani Brigade Commanders. In a few years time, it is these dame officers who will be at the strategic planning level and it suits us fine that they go in those hallowed halls with a certain amount of self-doubt that their nation cannot really sustain combat with India. 

Herein lies India’s new strength. We are accepting a combat situation in J&K and relegating it to the status of a `training compound' where death is unfortunately real. Our troops are showing their presence and making the Pakistanis realize that they are dealing with a literally `richer' force and over a period of time, this will be our plus point in any possible combat with them. For our seemingly benign leadership, we should think that they are observing it in this manner, and hope it is so.

War as the arm-chair General sees it, need not be one where open hostilities are seen, but the situation being held under control, and forever being tuned in our favor is our current gain. Denying his forces any such opportunity to engage or proactively practice his deployments will always leave us in better light than him.

This is your new definition of war, and we are winning on all counts.

What kind of a result in war do you think is going to be enough leverage to get to your solution?

The lost cause of this war is probably because the strategic planners of this nation see another round of war happening another 25 or 30 years down the line. The unfortunate economic and political status of our neighbor leaves their ruling elite with a useful bogey, India, to keep the common man distracted from the ills that ail their society.

Currently it seems that our strategic planners see a successful ground war resulting in a severing of Pakistan along the Sindh-Punjab axis. The massing of forces and a Strike Corps along that axis during the most recent crisis will result in the creating of two beggars over the one we have to begin with. There could be the hilarious situation of Sindh actually wanting to join the Republic of India, versus staying alone in the future.

The Kashmir problem is like that of the Punjab two decades ago. Unless the local population decides not to harbor terrorists during the winter months, there can be no let up from the madness that prevails in their state. From what activities the Army carries out, there are bound to be mistakes and casualties amongst the local population. It is an unfortunate situation.

Given a few custodial deaths (or their variants like encounters or the innocent-bystander-variety) the Government is not going to see the need to remove the Army from IS duties, It would be ridiculous to expect that. All the locals need is one winter of discontent with the militants and to brave the gun for two months of Feb and March, when the base of this insurgency can be stamped out, by turning on the militants, their hideouts, and not giving them local guides.

Given the recent elections and the overall world view, the Indian government would have to then hand over more powers to the local state government, under who's auspices, the locals can then go about demanding their slow and irritating ride to self-rule. To end all this, the Kashmiris need to understand the simple fact that the Pakistanis are not in this for glory, and neither does Kashmir have oil to make it a diamond worth having.

The cause is just that of a doll to be used when the going gets rough from within and there is no sight of that problem going away in the first place. So it seems that form the current status that the future of Kashmir is to maintain `status quo' with the past decade.

A decisive Indian gain on ground will invite a nuclear volley, and may just provide Pakistan the excuse of using his weapons. Given the American backing of the government there, it would not be too hard pressed to imagine that the US would be a mute spectator to the event with enough force at hand to prevent a out of proportion response from India.

Even more unfortunate, would be a stale mate in the ground war. It would give the Pakistanis all the emotional and mental firepower to crow about the non-functioning of the so-called superior ratio that the Indians have towards them. A stalemate serves no purpose. It would be better then to let our forces fallback to certain areas that are strategically useless and then for once use the nuke on them. Scared as our Politicians are, you would never know that one of them could turn out to be a tiger in conflict. 

Apart from the solution to a problem, what would our nation stand to achieve by going in for war?

It seems to be the new wave of thinking, that our Tatas and Gammon India should go the route of the Bechtels and Halliburtons of the world. The only point of engaging the enemy would be to see that the puppet Government installed there takes to opening up the economy of that nation to our industry.

Not to take too much from the current situation in Iraq, but honestly, if there was to be a solution, it would be the manner in which we would have to think and be better of investing time, effort and manpower to planning along these lines.

To the people who watch this Indo-Pak front, the impasse must be a maddening status. The alignment of countries before the war with Iraq and the positioning to share the spoils, should teach us that there would be no future in our going to war alone with Pakistan. The situation should be made conducive to the Americans with their current phobia of Islam, and their troops reporting ground reality that the Pakistanis were of more concern in Afghanistan than the Taliban.

Of course we would have to front end the war and the bear the monetary considerations thereof. Instituting a Government there of our choice or one that is friendly to us, under the guard of the US would ensure that it reaches another state like the present day Iraq. 

The future of Iraq will of course tell on what may happen with Pakistan after our war with them. A strange precedent may teach us on what to expect out of destroying a set political establishment. Religious fervor could take over in Iraq and force the American installed guys like Chalabi, who have been in the US long enough to qualify as American citizens, out in favor of local religious leaders who are preaching from the sanctity of their religious places.

For this reason, a few years will go into preparation of what would be the road to take Pakistan along after a war gets over. Planning the war accordingly will take a little bit more.

The new wave of thinking will have to take over our nations strategists. The surprising move from the Indian Prime Minister to extend an invitation to talk, albeit with riders, would show sentiment towards this kind of thinking.

All out war without lessons from the current deposing of Saddam, would be viewed in poor light. The alacrity with which our nation has showed that there is a remote possibility of it learning would be remarkable to the above-mentioned Indo-Pak viewers. Given our dismal physical threatening of Pakistan in the past, apparently this mind-game route would at least be a nice start.

We need a war if we need to end the bone of contention in Kashmir. Given that our leadership has shown no such interest, it would be difficult to imagine a war. Alternatively, we should learn to think further than the irritant issue here, but that of being a real local power, by aligning ourselves with the powers-that-be and trying to gain an entry into making Pakistan an undeclared state of our nation.

Now, if war is the only way to do that, then so be it. For that, first you have to shake hands. And that offer was made last week.

The author would like to thank the DANK team for their invaluable help

 

Copyright © Bharat Rakshak 2003