Harvinder Sahota

The Indian Express wasn’t exaggerating much when its editorial of 11 January called Messrs Muivah and Isak of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) India’s most important NRIs. Sadly, few in the media and even fewer amongst the general pubic appreciate the significance of the duo return to India decades after they abandoned it to wage war against it. Still fewer will appreciate their willingness to travel on Indian passports, after having fought for decades to achieve a sovereign Naga homeland. The fact of the matter is that to most Nagaland is a mere place on a map. Yet the Naga insurgency is the Gordian knot of northeastern insurgency. To untangle it would bring benefits not just to the region, but also to the entire country. The list of positive fallout is quite large and it is important to list some of the major ones.

First, the Naga insurgency (the NSCN (I-M), in particular) provides the logistical and philosophical underpinnings for most of the other groups in the region – including the ULFA, NFLT and the Bodo groups. Without NSCN support most of these groups would cease to function as effectively as they have. Several of these groups have concerns similar to those of the Nagas – namely, the preservation of their traditional way of life – and are certain to look upon any model of peace building between the Indian government and the NSCN as worthwhile emulating. Indeed the leaderships of the ULFA, the Dima Halam Daoga and NDFB have announced their willingness to follow in the footsteps of Muivah and Isak. Even the Myanmar based NSCN faction led by S.S. Khaplang has sent feelers to the Indian government about peace talks. Any return of peace will not only stabilize the northeast, but also make it possible for a revival of the regional economy. Greater investment from the rest of India and access to energy reserves in the northeast holds out the possibility of enhanced national development with fewer regional imbalances.

Secondly, as a corollary to the first set of benefits the government of India will be able to significantly ease its security posture in the region. Central police and paramilitary organizations can then be redeployed to meet external threats. Indeed the five year long ceasefire between the security forces and the NSCN (I-M) that preceded the peace talks allowed the Indian Army to re-deploy divisional size forces to the west during the war in Kargil. The strategic benefits that would accrue from a permanent solution would be significantly greater. A permanent solution would allow the disengagement of an entire Army Corps and dozens of Assam Rifles battalions from counter-insurgency operations. The transfer of such sizeable forces to Army HQ Reserve status would significantly alter the balance of forces against Pakistan or China.

Whilst one is optimistic about the course of events, it would be dishonest not to recognize the hurdles that lie ahead. The two most significant hurdles come from the fragmented nature of the Naga society. Not only are the Nagas divided into various tribes; they also reside across state and national boundaries. As Tangkhul Nagas Muivah and Isak represent the largest section of the Naga people and certainly command the most significant of all insurgent forces. But they do not represent all. The return of peace to the Naga people makes it imperative that factions such as Khaplang’s accede to any agreement. Indeed the Naga groups who are already at peace with India (such as those led by S.C.Jamir) must also be comfortable that their interests are not trod over in a rush to reach a settlement with the Tangkhul leadership. Furthermore, administrative boundaries of the current state of Nagaland are smaller the historical Naga homeland. Naga tribes are spread across Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. If the various Naga insurgent factions have been united by anything, it this by their demand for a unified Nagalim. Indeed Muivah is himself a native of Ukhrul in Manipur. It is almost certain that any attempts to rearrange the boundaries of these states to accommodate a ‘Greater Nagaland’ will be strongly resisted by the Meities and the Assamese.

The days, months and years ahead are likely to challenge all parties to the conflict(s) to come up with innovative solutions and no one knows where we will all end up. Indeed substantive talks are yet to begin. It is significant that a start has been made. The return of peace of Mizoram in the 1980s after almost three decades of a bloody insurgency holds out the hope that the same can happen in Nagalim. It is not inconsequential that the Chief Minister of Mizoram Mr. Zoramthanga, himself a former rebel, should represent the government of India in talks with the Nagas.

One hopes that Mr.Isak’s declaration that “there will be no more fighting between Indians and Nagas” means the end of five decades of war.