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Leila-1:
Notes
from the Game Design and Moderation Team
Anaath Das
Game Background
The year 2002 was clearly a
very eventful year for Indian security analysts and
serious foreign students of sub-continental
security. To
most such people, the attack on the Sansad
(Parliament) by Pakistani terrorists on December 13,
2001 portended that 2002 would bring with it more
than its fair share of tension and acrimony to the
region.
This assessment was proven
accurate by ensuing events:
the terrorist attack on the Jammu &
Kashmir State Assembly, Godhra, emotionally charged
elections to the state assemblies in Jammu &
Kashmir and Gujarat; and finally, Akshardham.
It is in this context that
Leila-1 was conceived.
The intent was to pick a scenario that seemed
entirely in keeping with the tone, tenor and
substance of Pakistani terrorist provocations and
attendant responses from the Indian state and
polity.
A linear progression was
assumed, ensuring that the provocations contained in
the scenario were more virulent than the most recent
real-life provocations.
It remained to be seen if the game
participants, representing the Indian state
apparatus, would respond with greater force than
before.
Adding an edge to this
scenario was the fact that the most recent response
of the Indian state was Operation Parakram, the
greatest mobilization of the Indian armed forces
since Operation Brasstacks in 1987.
It was also understood that all worst- case
scenarios assumed the prospective use of nuclear
weapons.
Game Framework
Firstly,
the game was set up to closely replicate operational
dynamics found in the Government of India (GoI).
These extended to issues as diverse as the
Warrant of Precedence (rules governing speaking
privileges in Cabinet meetings and elsewhere),
Communications Security procedures, imperatives of
individual bureaucracies, reactions from the voting
public, and moves by third party nations.
Secondly, considerable effort
was expended to simulate the “look and feel” of
GoI and its individual organs. At a superficial level, this included careful inclusion of
individuals of diverse ethnic, religious and
regional backgrounds, as is common in the Indian
state apparatus in real life.
At a more subtle level, many pains were taken
to incorporate the Weltanschauung of each
sub-bureaucracy and to make the high-level briefings
presented to the political executive come across as
true amalgamations of such distinct inputs.
Next, a good deal of
deliberation went into the process of selecting the
players. Key
considerations were the players’ ability to think,
act and communicate in ways very similar to those
found among high level Indian officials.
Finally, Sunil Sainis, the
moderator and a glutton for punishment, took upon
himself the rather taxing task of ensuring that the
participants did their bit to ensure a high level of
fidelity to real-life in their deliberations and
decision-making.
The Game as it
was played
An examination of the
contributions of individual players is warranted, as
the validity and real-life applicability of any
conclusions drawn from the game would have to be
seen in the context of the quality of their efforts.
The following observations
attest to the perspicacity and process-discipline of
the players:
J
E Menon as Prime Minister (PM) took care to
- Keep
his own opinions close to the vest
- Indulge
organizational and bureaucratic impulses
Y
I Patel as Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
- Seized
the opportunity to "frame the debate"
by defining the various options very clearly
- Took
care to include troop morale imperative
D.
Ramana as National Security Adviser (NSA)
- Took
the trouble to lend analytical perspective and
bring comparative frameworks (like the case of
Tsarist forces at Tannenberg and Warden’s
Effects Based Operations model) to the process
- Proffered
para-diplomatic and other channels of
information
L.
N. Subramaniam as Raksha Mantri (RM)
- Brought
needed attention to tactical action items
- Set
up his expectations clearly, favoring a mix of
two different options presented by the CDS
Laxman
Bahroo as the External Affairs Minister (EAM)
- Acted
as a window into US interests (faithful to
Ministry of External Affairs practice as of
2002)
- Focused
on the diplomatic options and fall-out
Game Outcome
To those familiar with
the inherently cautious and conservative nature of
the Indian political leadership, the outcome should
not come as a surprise at all.
To recap, the four military options posited
by the CDS were:
1. Dismemberment of
Pakistan and establishment of friendly regimes in
the new countries thus formed
2. Destruction of administrative, economic and
military infrastructure of Pakistan, accompanied by
temporary occupation of territory and seizure of
vital assets for coercing current regime into
destroying its terrorist infrastructure
3. Permanent recapture of territory to facilitate
conduct of anti-terrorism operations
4. Execution of open-ended punitive campaigns to
coerce Pakistan into reconsidering its campaign of
terrorism against India
Of
these, the PM chose option 3.
Whether options 1 and 2 were considered
beyond the politico-military-economic capabilities
of the Indian state as of 2002 (and hence too
risky), is a debatable issue.
But neither option is in line with proclaimed
official policy of successive Indian governments,
that it is not in India’s interest to dismantle
the sovereign Pakistani state.
The players also rejected option 4, as it
could have been very escalatory, possibly
engendering nuclear conflict.
The
players’ fidelity to real life patterns, while
ensuring that they did not choose risky solutions
like counter-proliferation and naval blockades, also
possibly precluded them from being too innovative in
their approach.
This was most evident when the wildcard was
introduced, presenting, in essence, the possibility
of de-capitation of the Pakistani state, combined
with the possibility of terrorist possession of
nuclear devices.
These prospects could justifiably have been
regarded as “game changing” inputs.
That these prospects did not really alter the
decision-making dynamic is remarkable.
Ironically, this could also be regarded as a
faithful simulation of real life manifestations of
the “fog of war” and the inertia of large
bureaucracies.
Summing
up, Leila-1 proved that the developers, players and
moderator were more than adequate to the task of war
gaming sub-continental security scenarios.
It is hoped that additional games will soon
follow, adding clarity to a field that needs clarity
now more than ever.
Anoop
C.
General
comments: The purpose of the game was
three-fold:
a.
Simulate the crisis conditions in which a CCS must
take decisions
b.
To determine if BR's shadow cabinet can provide
radically different ideas on possible reactions
c.
Provide understanding to on-lookers about the
challenges faced in responding to such a crisis
d.
Entertainment
On
most counts, the game was successful. It was
extremely enjoyable and educational to observe. The
players took their roles so seriously that they even
imitated the way in which CCS members probably
address each other! To be fair, the time constraint
prevented the (b) from happening even if it were on
the cards.
Comments
on specific aspects of the game
1.
Game logistics: The Internet format and the time
available curtailed the discussion of the scenario.
In the next attempt at a wargame, the participants
may be given their broad briefings (like hierarchy
of Pakistani decision making circles, evolution and
social chart of terrorist organizations) well in
advance - say a day or two - so that participants
can get truly familiarized with their roles.
2.
Decision making:
a.
Military
: The CDS listed 4 possible military options vis-à-vis
Pakistan and analyzed the cost-benefit ratio of the
options. Given the prevailing international climate
and the nuclear threshold, Option 4 seems to be the
best option to adopt as a long term strategy and
Option 3 to be the best response to a particularly
large provocation. What was surprising was that the
Defense Minister's input into the military aspect was
not well differentiated from that of the CDS,
probably due to the nature of the situation. This
leads to the question - in a crisis scenario
requiring the CCS to meet, what really is the input
expected from the MOD especially after the CDS post
becomes operational?
b.
Strategic
: In my opinion, the PM correctly refused to
consider external reaction as a primary constraint.
Instead, he focused on the constraints imposed by
economic and internal security issues. This is
particularly relevant because the consensus seemed
to be on
Options 3 & 4. If Options 1&2 were being
seriously considered, then external pressures would
have to be considered as a constraint.
c.
Impact
of Mid-Game Wild Card: The main purpose of the wild
card was to 'shake up' the decision making pattern
of the CCS. Prior to the game commencement, the wild
card was intended to determine whether the CCS can
see beyond the LeT/JeM's claims about possession of
nuclear weapons to determine it's impact on India's
security. Interestingly, only the CDS seemed 'shaken
up' :-), probably a result of the alarmist updates
he was getting. It appears that since the rest of
the CCS were not getting the same updates, they
could not 'correctly' fathom the threat posed by the
wild card. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude
that their decision-making would have remained the
same even if they had been aware of the scenario as
painted to the CDS. However, in post-game
debriefings, no different concrete proposal was put
forward to deal with the wild card scenario.
Keeping
in mind the limitations of the Internet to discuss
strategy in real time, for the next rounds of wargames,
we may perhaps:
-
Lay
out not only the background but also limit the
discussion to only 1 possible reaction.
-
Limit
the discussion to only 1 aspect of the scenario
in each wargame
For
example, in Leila-1 terms, this would mean (1)
choosing to go only for Option 4 and (2) discussing
only the military/financial/internal security
management/handling foreign reactions aspects of it.
When
we begin discussing in greater detail about each
option, the quality of understanding of each forum
member is vastly improved. The downside is that the
game will be much like another thread on BRF and
will lack the excitement of Leila-1.
G.
Mohan Ram
I
was the youngest member of the team. This was the
first time that I participated in an exercise of
this nature. I helped with some parts of the game
development but for the most part I was an observer.
The experience was quite educational.
Sunil
Sainis
Public
discussion on Indian policy issues are conducted
inside a triangle. The base level of discussion lies
along the line that India is never the aggressor,
the second side of the triangle lies a wall that
separates public debate and policy execution and the
third side comprises publicly stated policy
positions (ex. NFU). The scenario has been designed
to fit albeit snugly into this triangle. I fully
understand that reality will not be so forgiving but
I am genuinely not interested in poking through the
boundary of the triangle. Anything that seems to do
that is accidental and not a deliberate act.
The
scenario was conceived with the madness of Godhra
Ahmedabad in the back of our minds. For me
personally also hanging in the shadows was Bombay
1992-1993. Both these events have profoundly
influenced my thinking of the way India works. The
model suggested for the ISI sponsored terrorist
strikes, is a variation on the model I suspect was
at work when Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir (then DG-ISI) and
Brig. Aslam Bodla (also ISI) organized the serial
blasts in Bombay city in 1993. I do not think that
the threshold is `unrealistically' high esp. post
1998.
However present day ISI strategy I suspect will be
far more complicated than the simple version we have
come up with, the political spectrum today is much
richer than it was in 1993, and this will be
reflected in the ISI's planning models. I am
generally convinced that the ISI have a fairly
good idea of what it takes to harass us in India,
what limits their ability to cause damage is their
operational limitations, and more importantly our
own ability to sense their designs.
With 20/20 hindsight, it appears the briefings were
too long and too detailed to be read in less than
one hour. There was no way to game this before as
this was not a high school drama we were staging. So
there was really no way (apart from personal
conversations) to gauge the extent to which each of
the participants can absorb detail. So whenever I
spoke to the players during the game, to nudge them
along, the reaction I got each time esp. from the
NSA and CDS was "the briefings are taking time
to read".
The briefings of the NSA and the CDS were much
longer than those of the ministers. It took a week
to write the NSA and CDS briefings. Now if our
players had been retired bureaucrats or ministers
themselves they would have had familiarity with the
names and places in the briefings. However as they
weren't the NSA and CDS were left swimming in a soup
of acronyms and unfamiliar analyses. This
contributed to slowing them down.
While
this would have been okay in a `on-the-table'
environment, in the `thread environment' this meant
delays between posts. The delays added up, and the
game which should have ended at 0130 EST went on
till 0300 EST. So with that constraint we had to call
it off at that point. Scheduling was pretty hard
with participants in different countries across the
globe so the time cut-off was pretty serious. Kudos
to J E Menon for putting in parts that was not in the
original scenario, ex. "Briefing the opposition
leaders". Also J E Menon took up the MHA part after
the original participant had to suddenly drop out.
The briefings were written in an `interlocking'
fashion so for example, the CDS would receive the
same `information' as the NSA, but the `analysis'
for the CDS was different from the one for the NSA.
So in the case of the wildcard for example, the NSA
had large inputs containing political analysis, the
CDS had a large amount military analysis. So when Y.
I. Patel says that he saw the imminent nuclear strike, it
is understandable because he was given reasons to
see why that may be the case.
By contrast the NSA was given a political analysis
that placed the statements emanating from the coup
plotters (Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar) in their
historical context. He did not know the details of
the military situation, and as Y. I. Patel indicates
unlike the real CCS, the ability to discuss the
details threadbare was lost due to the public
discussion format.
In
dealing with the problems of Pakistan, the game
briefings suggested a John Warden style command and
control model. Ramana used parts of the briefing to
illuminate the inner workings of Pakistan and the
trouble that would be encountered if we tried to
conduct a `total war’, i.e. identifying centers of
gravity and the pressure points would be very
painful and slow. Even if the attrition model was to
be used to hit the `inner rings' of Pakistan, it
would be an enormous pain to actually grind down
Pakistan's economy to a halt, because it not only
comprises the `white' economy but also the bulk of
the worlds (over 70%) trade in Heroin. Stopping this
trade would take time. Another thing to bear in mind
is that the battlefield is unpredictable; a
prescriptive approach (such as the `total war’
idea) may prove entirely inadequate. It was best if
the NSA didn’t really get drawn into too much
prescription and left the field open to some balance
being reached at the highest level between
prescriptive and a descriptive/intuitive response.
Both
the NSA and CDS actually fulfilled their roles
brilliantly. Y.I. Patel was instantly able to pickup
the imminent nuclear threat, and Ramana on the other
hand picked up the political dynamics at play and
the opportunity it presented. This I sense is a
fairly realistic aspect of nuclear stand-offs. I was
eager to reproduce it and I think in that we have
succeeded.
The `Mid-Game Wildcard' conceived brilliantly by
Anaath Das, achieved its purpose, it threw the
policy makers off balance and forced them re-orient.
The discussion wasn't as animated and we couldn't
see the reactions on their faces as we would have
had we been simulating this "on-the-table"
but end result was the same.
We were not able to support a realistic framework of
politics for the CCS. There were almost no political
cues provided to the participants in the briefings.
This would be unreal in a coalition politics model
that we projected.
As to why the scenario ended where it did, well time
and effort. It practically broke our backs to get it
this far, so expanding it will take a lot of work.
In this scenario itself some of the effectiveness
parameters were put in by hand, in reality this
would need a simulation framework to get a handle
on. For example, the CDS quotes a 75% and 97% p-kill
on a certain mission profile, now those numbers are
totally hand made, to do this gaming at a higher
level will mean doing this with all the bells and
whistles. So we'd need a full time staff of 20
professionals to actually do this.
I was really desperate to simulate a failure of
intelligence. I was hoping one of the CCS would ask
the question, however this did not materialize. To
clarify there is no failure of intelligence in the
scenario. It is more of question of deeming what
specifically is expected from the intelligence
community and a matter of sources and means.
Generally speaking IMO an intelligence asset
operates on three levels, `alert', `forward' and
`live'. The extent of risk of loss that the asset is
subject to increases as we proceed from `alert' to
`live'. At the `live' stage the asset relays
information regardless of its personal safety. The
problem in most cases is not the absence of assets
but that of the means to contact them. To ask an
asset to go `live' in order to transmit information
would be to more or less guarantee its loss. Given
the tense situation, the sudden discovery of a
highly placed asset could easily spark an
escalation. So all things considered one is forced
to make the call and order the assets to operate
sub-optimally at `forward' status. The opposing side
also does its part to keep information hidden. In
our scenario we depict an ISI that is gripped by
fear of penetration and consequently ups the
security within the establishment. Given the
practical occupation of Pakistan by the Americans
who want to shut down the ISI's lucrative Al Qaeeda
bureau, this is not unrealistic.
Taken
all together this was an immensely instructive
experience. I would like to take this opportunity to
thank all the forum participants who helped with
ideas and encouragement. This effort would not have
been possible without your help.
Jai
Hind
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