Leila-1: External Commentators

J. Price

War games and simulations serve a number of purposes for government and military bodies– to prepare players, to develop primary and alternate courses of action, to test and refine procedures, etc. In the world of academia and think-tanks they form part of the body of research that ultimately aims to advise policy.

When it comes to Bharat-Rakshak, a public-interest consortium, the rationale has to change. As individuals and nations we are separated from each other by the insulation of our own unique experiences. The thicker that insulation becomes, the less we are able to empathize or understand the ‘other’, and it becomes only a matter of time before this lack of mutual empathy destructively interferes with our ability to craft win-win solutions to common problems. Here the goal is to strip away some of that insulation between government and public, and between India and the rest of the world. The real value of a grand-strategy simulation lies not in the end-result, but in the way that India’s difficult security choices are explored through the process of top-level decision-making.

Conducting such simulations takes a lot of hard work, and the BR team deserves credit for the many, many hours of hard work and commitment to high standards despite a diverse array of full-time careers and the limits of available resources. The result is an excellent foundation, with plenty of food for thought. My focus in this post-game review is the interplay of Indian and Western priorities in Indo-Pakistani crises, especially after the traumatic events of 11 September 2001. 

At around 1:30 PM EST on the 13 September, Pakistan’s President Musharraf accepted US Secretary of State Collin Powell’s seven demands over the telephone without hesitation.  Since then there has certainly been doubt over Musharraf’s sincerity, and perhaps regrets that the list did not include specific demands regarding the hunt for Al-Qaeda inside Pakistan. Regardless of that, the stability of an at least nominally co-operative government in Pakistan became more than a regional matter of some concern to the West; it became an essential element of US and Western security. A counter-reaction that could put some 147 million Sunni Muslims and a nuclear program in the hands of revolutionary fundamentalists would carry unacceptable risks. The view at the top as described in Bob Woodward’s new book Bush at War was that ‘Squeezing Musharraf was risky’, and that the only thing more important was the war to deprive Al Qaeda of its virtual state in Afghanistan. The high-intensity phase of that war ended in March of 2002 with Operation Anaconda in the Shah-e-Kot valley, leaving the survival and effective control of a ‘moderate’ government in Islamabad as an American foreign policy priority second only to the war in Iraq.

India obviously does not and cannot share such a valuation of Islamabad, and that fundamental difference means that 9/11 has actually widened rather than narrowed the gap over how to deal with Pakistan’s terrorist provocations. The West finds itself boxed in on one hand by pre-9/11 fears of the consequences of escalating sub-continental conflict, and on the other by the post-9/11 fears of what might happen within Pakistan if Musharraf appeared weak in the face of robust Indian military retaliation. One way out of the box, as we saw in the January and June crises, is to apply all available pressure on India to accept Pakistani promises, apologies, denials, etc as well as Western guarantees.

In ‘Leila-1’ the briefing documents for the players build up a scenario where events as well as internal pressures create a situation where some sort of significant retaliation against the Pakistani government is absolutely unavoidable. Balancing that with economic and external factors, the evolving consensus at the mid-point was punitive action against Pakistani military and terrorist targets. The decision  reached is a logical outcome of the discussed costs and benefits. At that point the scenario writer and moderator throws in the pre-planned ‘wild card’ of an assassination attempt against Musharraf and an attempted fundamentalist take-over. 

The Prime Minister says in the simulation after news of the bombing “From the point of view of India, I believe it is also irrelevant. We have been attacked in a most brutal manner. The attackers or those that give them sustenance need to be destroyed (at best) or taught a lesson (at least). Now, whether the coup succeeds or not, we will have to respond to the attacks. In my view, all that matters is whether the coup will make things easier for us in terms of military operations, international diplomacy, and disruptive internal tendencies.”

This is entirely realistic given the magnitude of the death and destruction within India. If such avowedly anti-Western forces such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed or Harakat-ul-Mujaheddin were to seize power (and the nuclear button), there is no doubt that the United States and other countries would behave some interest in de-fanging Pakistan. However there are many reasons to think this doomsday scenario is in fact one of the less likely outcomes in Pakistan’s future.

Where the simulation goes awry is in assuming that the external factors would move in India’s favor, or at worst remain static even if Musharraf survived or a Musharraf-like individual succeeded his incapacitated superior. Given the fragility of such a situation, American and Western concerns would mean the most strenuous opposition to even those punitive options that might have been acceptable before the wild-card.

Now of course its possible that an Indian cabinet might chose to go ahead anyway, but the kernel of value in BR simulations lies within the process rather than the end-result. At no point was it recognized that post 9/11 the West is far more likely to apply progressively more coercive measures (short of combat) against any perceived Indian threats to Pakistani internal stability. The range of possible actions with serious economic and military consequences is long – sharing intelligence with the Pakistanis, pressure on key third party military suppliers such as France, Israel and Russia, credit ratings and insurance rates, perhaps even the physical interposition of peacekeepers, etc. The BBC’s November “Situation Room” with a host of notables  (http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcfour/features/situation-room/whos-who.shtml ) war gaming an Indo-Pakistani crisis certainly pointed in that direction, and BR’s own work could provide the missing red-team perspective. 

At the very least there should have been some discussion of how the Indian government would effectively link Musharraf’s government with the terrorist acts within India in the minds of decision-makers and opinion-makers around the world. As players themselves have noted, the first reaction after hearing of the attempted coup is that the same party was behind both events. Without such linkage India could easily find itself diplomatically isolated if it pursued a confrontational approach, a condition under which India has never taken any sort of military action.

The players can not be blamed for this – the time available and their dependence on their briefing documents means that they had to ‘wing it’. As concerned individuals they were not only simulating a given scenario, but their place in it as politicians, bureaucrats and general officers with decades of experience between them. This is not to say that those problems cannot be compensated for in future simulations. Moderators and scenario writers must budget additional game time and moderator guidance if they chose to toss surprise developments at the participants.

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, the former director and senior director for counter-terrorism in the Clinton administration offered some insight in to the frustrating challenges they faced in extracting meaningful co-operation from Pakistan against Al-Qaeda beyond empty promises in their book The Age of Sacred Terror. In their view, American concerns over nuclear and conventional escalation during Kargil, and transition issues during Musharraf’s coup were intentionally leveraged by elements of the Pakistani government until they occupied so much of the available ‘bandwidth’ that there was little time or energy to consistently hold the Pakistanis to their word regarding Bin Laden and the Taleban, despite the appalling human cost of the embassy bombings and the attack upon the USS Cole. The results of this simulation are a reminder that the myth of both the utility and vulnerability of ‘moderate’ military power in Pakistan is a problem that we in the West have not yet satisfactorily recognized, let alone dealt with. Until that happens it can be expected that Pakistan will continue to attack India’s stability not only to keep India off balance, but to distract any developing Western focus on its reluctance to fully join the coalition against Al-Qaeda. It can also be expected that until such time India will face great limits in how much Western sympathy for its losses to terrorism will count for in terms of support for retaliation.

J. L. Khayyam Coelho

The following article discusses the Leila-1 scenario gamed on the Bharat -Rakshak Forum from 23.30 on 29 December to 2.20 on the 30th of December.

The discussion is based on the use of the "wild card" introduced into the game and it's implications. It should be noted that this is not an attempt to say, "this is what should have occurred", but to highlight certain aspects which maybe relevant in such a situation.

The sequence of events that is discussed here is as follows:

1. The four options are detailed first.

2. The wild card is thrown in.

3. The PM eventually opts for option 3 with the door to option 4 being left slightly ajar.

Validity of the Options:

The first question to be asked is whether the options on the table are still valid after news of the coup attempt comes in. Specifically:

1. The attacks on India followed by a coup could hardly be coincidental. Consequentially there is every chance that the coup plotters deliberately planned it this way. If the coup and the terror attacks are linked, and given the game's structure, it seems impossible to assume that they are NOT linked, then the coup and terror plotters are attempting to "play" GoI into a standard series of moves which they have no doubt thought about.

As a result, they might want to provoke us to respond within certain parameters. Why and what are these parameters? And if so would we want to respond with a set of options, which they might well, be aware of? Therefore the question arises whether or not the options on the table are still valid? And if so, why?

2. If Pakistan's internal power structure is taken to be a condominium with the Jihadi's and the ruling Anglophone Pakistani elite, then the coup attempt implies the final push for, as the Game's CDS says: "the so called Army of Islam [attempting] to gain itself a country, much like the Punjabi Army got Pakistan".

In such a scenario the validity of the options come into question for the following reason: The options are part of a response to Pakistan. The coup changes the nature of "Pakistan" per se since the nature of the Pakistan state from Zia's time has been "Jihadi inside and sophisticated RAPE** outside". The RAPE plays a crucial part since they are the interface between Pakistan and the world.

The coup removes this interface. That is a radical change to "Pakistan" per se, because it removes the necessary constraints that the Pakistan state has long used to interact with the world. The coup implies the discarding of the "English speaking moderate" mask, which in turn implies that elements in the Pak hierarchy are ready to "reveal" themselves as they "truly are".

As such the options available, which imply rational players who understand the international rules of conduct, comes into question.

The PM's Choice:

However, given that the options are all that is available to the PM within the Game, then the question is whether or not a different option could have chosen by the PM. I will argue that another "logical" end point for the PM was Option 1.

To understand this it's necessary to understand two points. Firstly, a cardinal rule of international relations between major powers is that: "the only intolerable situation is loss of control".

This arises from the fact that; implicit in every facet of government to government relations is the understanding that a government is just that: A Government. The body with the power and ability to control its sovereign territory. This defines a “government" as far as any other government is concerned.

The coup attempt destroys this almost immediately. The coup shows a catastrophic failure of control regardless of it's success or failure, or whether Musharraf is alive or dead. And "loss of control" or even the semblance of it, in a nuclear armed, semi-Jihadi state over rides virtually any other concern.

(It should be noted too, that this is well known to the Pakistanis. Note the large number of statements and articles written by senior Pakistanis on how the ISI is "under control" and "not a rogue organization", etc., despite such claims being tantamount to an admission by Pakistan that it does engage in proxy wars and terrorism).

The second point to understand is the difference between what national security managers refer to as a "problem" or as a "threat". In a broad sense, both of these terms are used interchangeably. But they are not interchangeable. For example, from an Indian view, both Myanmar and Bangladesh can be considered as “problems" for India due to their harboring of terror groups on their soil. Neither however, can be considered as a “threat" to India.

In a similar sense, Pakistan is not a “threat" to India. It's open support for terrorism is a “problem” and it does try to “threaten" Indian national security, but by no stretch of the imagination can it be considered an existential threat.

Governed by the RAPE**, Pakistan is a "problem" due to their necessity to maintain the anti-Indian component of Pakistan's state ideology to maintain control of the state. It is not however an existential “threat" since they will not risk a war with India, which might threaten their own existence and control of the Pakistani state. The decision-making hierarchy in Pakistan is not suicidal and the risk of nuke war is non-existent if their personal interests are not threatened.

A Jihadi Pakistan, however, may change Pakistan's status from a “problem" to a “threat". A Pakistan controlled by supra-national entities whose first loyalty is to something other than “Pakistan" means that there is every possibility of just such an existential war being fought. Witness Afghanistan, where the Taliban, a non-Afghan supra-national ideological grouping was willing to see Afghanistan destroyed rather than give up their “ideological purity".

Both these conditions, also apply to the US. Pakistani “loss of control" is as important to the US as it is to us because it pushes the Pakistans nuclear weapons from “current problem, latent threat" to “immediate threat".

As far as a coup goes, the US is in exactly the same situation. If an internal coup did happen either with the approval or knowledge of the US then it would certainly not occur in any manner that implied that there was a "loss of control", even for a short time in Pakistan. Musharraf being forced to resign while another General takes over is one thing, Musharraf messily blown up in a car bomb another while mass terrorist attacks occur on India, another. The US, in fact, has an arguably greater stake in such a situation than India. While the Jihadi networks target India with a far greater frequency than the US, it is the US that they consider to be in occupation of the Holy Land and it is the US they hold responsible for Israeli behavior.

As a result, it would seem that the situation is such that GoI would be forced to immediately consider the situation with respect to Pakistan's nuclear weapons and their status. Since no knowledge is known, within the game, about this situation, it seem that GoI would be forced to attempt to neutralize these assets as soon as possible.

The nuclear weapons must not only be removed, but their scientists must also be stopped from re-creating them. The only option that guarantees that is Option 1. (Option 2 would simply create a failed state with a massive refugee problem and the possible interference of outside powers at a later date).

It should be also be noted, that the situation is the opportunity of a lifetime. The perfect excuse to remove a recalcitrant problem and open up new geo-strategic opportunities for India. 

The US will have no choice but to back us. Not only for their own interests, but because once India moves on Option 1, they MUST. They cannot afford not to.

After all, as GoI would no doubt inform them, India has limited resources and if the US/China etc. attempt to stop us, then there is every possibility, in fact a surety, that attempting to stop us would result in our failure to get all the Pakistani nukes, in which case there is no knowing where the nukes could possibly turn up. London, Moscow, NY, even Beijing.

Once we go for option 1, every other game is off the table. Until the nuclear weapons are neutralized the US and China would be constrained to help us.

Problems that may arise later on would be negotiated in the context of a non-existent Pakistan and 1/2 a million odd Indian soldiers in the new States arising from the Former Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Consequently, Option 1 seems to be a logical choice at the time, with a possible re-evaluation upon further information.

**Rich Anglophone Pakistani Elite.