Leila-1: Participant Reviews

 J E Menon (Prime Minister and Minister Home Affairs)

·         There was a lack of time for preparation and running the scenario.

·         Format - ideally, the CCS meeting could have been conducted round a table, with the whole thing recorded on tape and transcribed. The time we spent on typing up stuff would have been more wisely spent fleshing out and justifying decisions.

·         Game rules allowed 400 words per post, which means limits on verbosity - not that it was a particularly impeding factor for MEA & for the CDS. Moreover, if MEA did not provide an overview, game observers would be left with even less in terms of meat. Not everybody understands the general situation around us very well.

·         Tremendous work done by the game team in briefing preparations. The material is so good that we have concluded it cannot be put on line. However, digesting it was no easy task - combined with briefing bombardments. I thought that was realistic. In reality, the situation is probably more intense.

·         As we were about to start the game our Home Minister suddenly dropped out. Hence PM was juggling two humongous briefings. I could not do full justice to MHA post. Not that the PM's post was done justice to, but I certainly paid more attention there.

·         In my way of thinking, as PM, I have two primary responsibilities: security and prosperity. The first one has been challenged by the attacks. The second, i.e. prosperity, can be affected primarily by two things in the scenario circumstances; economic turmoil & domestic instability. Hence the Minister Finance & MHA assessments of safe windows for action were critical for me. Now, both economic turmoil and domestic instability can be generated by external players (Pakistan or others), but this is beyond my control as far as immediate decision making is concerned; all I can do is work through MEA & CDS to try and minimize the related impact. Those were my redlines. It was on that basis that I concluded that Option 3 was optimal, and within that scenario parts of Option 4 could be fitted in.

·         The nuclear issue – game-playing rules precluded overt discussion of usage dynamics. The NFU declaration is in effect. The words "put on alert" signified a response similar to that taken in the Kargil situation. Communication with US, China, etc… was a subsidiary objective which could be undertaken after reminding Pakistan of second strike. On the whole, however, I agree there wasn't much discussion on the question of nuclear weapons at all. I suspect that in a first CCS meeting, this would be the reality. I would suspect that in a second CCS meeting, after briefing opposition leaders and public, things would be discussed with greater clarity.

·         On the matter of informing the public, please note that the first move to the National Command Post for the CCS meet was precipitate and under specific "Continuity of Government" rules which precluded public communication. Also there would not be much to tell the public without having some broad consensus on response options. It would have been little more than either calming or heating rhetoric. Such an approach would serve little real purpose, and may not serve the function of "information" and instead cause further confusion. However, it is noted that an address to the nation would be crucial in the first hours of such a scenario materializing - after a political consensus/military option matrix is clearer. Similarly the President would be fully briefed after meeting with the opposition, but before informing the public.

·         I did not regard foreign reactions as a constraint in the given environment. Please note that I had assessed with inputs from MEA about potential reactions: namely general sympathy, much wringing (and some holding) of hands, but ultimately advocacy of restraint. Now what are the polar alternatives, broadly speaking:

1.      To the negative part of the spectrum from my assessment: No sympathy and dismissive attitude towards the outrage as being insignificant, combined with warnings against escalation; or

2.      To the positive part of the spectrum: Extreme sympathy and support, plus assurances of military aid and joint operations in the event we launch a war.

·         To be realistic, one could justifiably assume that the actual response could fall anywhere in the spectrum in between my assessment and these polar alternatives. In the existing global climate, it was my feeling based on MEA briefing and NSA/CDS inputs that the actual response would not deviate much to the right or left of the assessment I made.

The key player whose response should matter is the US. Factors to be considered here:

1.      We don't want their help, unless it is offered - i.e. we don't want to get caught in an obligatory cycle;

2.      We don't want them to interpret our action as being inimical to the physical security of their people in theater;

3.      We do not want them to assume a "mediating"/investigator role, i.e. "we must first determine who carried out attacks before you retaliate";

4.      We want to soothe their primary concerns, of nuclear conflagration, by giving assurances of NFU, and vague outline of offensive options - without committing at this stage to limitations on strike targets;

5.      We do not want them to get any impression that "high-level" diplomacy on their part is of any value at the moment, hence my emphasis on informative rather than consultative diplomacy through the US Embassy.

I feel that under these circumstances the call for restraint can be taken for granted. Any option less restrictive than that can be taken as a bonus, which will only buttress our planning. To the "international community", such as it is, we must emphasize the nature of the terrorist threat that is faced with repeated media coverage of the carnage caused - much of this will come in the form of gratis images purveyed by the international media. What should be pre-empted is any move at the UN to try and codify the call for restraint in a resolution format. Discreet briefing of the Russians via Embassy and other back channels should help in ensuring that such a situation does not materialize. I believe we could enlist the help of at least one more country in this regard. (I regret that I did not mention the diplomacy with regard to the Russians during the game). This will be actually a key factor in the scenario. In fact, my feeling is that the event will spin itself to some degree given the nature of the outrage, and given the global climate. Perhaps we now see the cumulative benefits of having Pakistan's name mentioned a couple of times in every article or incident related to world terrorism.

As far as economic costs are concerned, i.e. the kinds that the US linkages might generate (quite apart from the possibility of sanctions), it must be factored that an attack of this nature will in itself impose costs. The question to ask, I suppose, is whether an Indian strike back will impose significant costs additional to

1.  What the terrorist strikes and their aftermath will impose in the short-term, and

2.  What the image of an India that cannot defend itself against such attacks will impose in the long-term.

The mystery, therefore, is whether Pakistan has crossed the Indian tolerance threshold by fomenting the terrorism acts that sparks the scenario. As a matter of ground realities, that will always remain an open question. I feel it should for that will keep our strategic response options wide open.

There was a comment by one of the observers that after the coup the options were no longer valid. Based on the wildcard briefings this is still a "coup attempt". Having said that, we have to assume that it is (as CDS indicates) a coup attempt that, if successful, could signal a move by the Army of Islam to take over a country.

Moving on from there, it must be assumed that the coup is either

(a)   A coordinated event with the attacks (if Army of Islam is indeed taking over),

(b)   A coincidental event, or

(c)   An orchestrated event by an "unknown force within Pakistan" with mysterious objectives .

I did not feel that the coup attempt "changed the nature of Pakistan per se". The fact on the ground remains that forces in Pakistan have attacked us. If the coup leaders are behind the attacks our options remain the same. In essence, we must decide whether to

(a)   destroy Pak as a state,

(b)   destroy its infrastructure and its military's prestige,

(c)   capture territory in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, or

(d)   carry out open ended punitive strikes in Pakistan occupied Kashmir.

If the coup leaders are not behind the attacks, our options still remain the same, though we may need to delay our actions to judge if this is true (and that is part of my final recommendation).

If the coup fails, well we are back to pre-wildcard situation. I felt that the options provided by CDS were extremely lucid and helped me on the decision path.

Had the wildcard, been that Musharraf was assassinated and Jihadis had gotten a hold of nukes, the response would have been different.

L. N. Subramanian (Minister of Defense / Raksha Mantri)

As MoD/ RM, I received the following briefings:

1. A note from the PM,
2. A background document from Secy.  MOD (based on inputs from intelligence services) about 8 - 10 pages
3. Briefing from DIA, Secy. MOD production, military analysis

I was told that the PM would be asking for options/opinion.

So the first step was to make a few bullet point based on the briefings of the recommendations. After this was done, it was possible there could be questions from the PM on

1. Damage assessment
2. Alert levels
3. Status of supplies etc
4. War waging abilities

Now I assumed that as MoD I have the ability to go outside of briefings to get certain other assessments. I accordingly prepared these hoping to use these for any discussions. Some of these elements would be against the measured thinking the CDS was getting input from.

As the game started the pressure mounted to have my first answer to the PMs questions. Then it was settling back to see what the others were coming up with. The first red flags from my perspective were the undue worry about US (foreign) concerns. The pressure for that would be mounted on the MEA the most followed by NSA. So accordingly I was now primed to jump on the poor MEA bloke.

For sometime the suggestions from MEA, CDS and NSA were going in exactly the direction I feared. Also the predictable escalatory pattern/options being advised was a concern. That is why I suggested 4 or 2. I did not unfortunately more explicitly state that.

Luckily for me I did not have to fight too much. The PM concurred with my view on US/foreign angle with much more elegance then I would have.

Laxman Bahroo (Minister External Affairs)

As the person designated the Minister of External Affairs in the simulation Leila -1, my primary task was to look at the events from an international perspective.  This meant that I would be receiving information from my counterparts in other governments and India's global diplomatic corps.  Equally important, the MEA would execute decided policy and predict - counter any repercussions of Indian action.  In doing so, I suggested an interaction with the US, Europe, Japan, Southeast Asia, Middle East and China.  Coincidentally, these are the focal regions of Indian foreign policy.

In the scenario of Leila - 1, I decided to focus on the international media attention given to the terrorist strikes.  I suggested that we use this opportunity to portray India's loss and stance on issues.  The international media focus is a nearly unprecedented opportunity as usually news about India and Pakistan is plagued with "typical" sound bites.  Applying diplomats and embassy staff coupled with frequent and interactive briefings will allow India to shape and influence opinion and potentially transcend the usual sound bites.

In any situation on the subcontinent, the MEA must interact with those countries that have vested interests in the region and those countries with which we have expanding ties.  Therefore interaction with the U.S is critical due to their involvement with Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Similarly, China is another key countries with whom India must hold discussions.  South East Asia is increasing tied to India and the focus of a burgeoning foreign policy for the last decade.  Additionally, it is also another forum for communication with China, Japan and the US as these countries are also member of the Asian Regional Forum (ARF).  Individual countries in South East Asia must also be engaged, as several of them were conduits for terrorists striking India.

China deserves specially attention by the MEA.  China has vested interests in Pakistan, competes for influence and a policy of strategic encirclement of India.  Therefore, China must be approached from two distinct sides.  On one side, we must engage China to acknowledge their interests in Pakistan.  Additionally, we must show China that we are amenable to a dialogue on a wide range of issues and the improvement of bilateral ties.  Simultaneously, we must also show China that India is unwilling to succumb to their pressure and that they too have strategic vulnerabilities.  In this case, India must engage Vietnam, Taiwan and Japan.  Succinctly, we must demonstrate that while we intend to act resolutely regarding Pakistan but are not interested in humiliating China.  However, if needed India will show resolve against Chinese intransigence.

As the scenario progressed, various military options were mooted.  As the MEA, I provided the predicted international response to various military options.  A full military option and "lite" version of the same, in my viewpoint, are not possible due to US and international pressure and fear over nuclear war.  Additionally, the Chinese and the US interests in Pakistan would place them in a position of having to defend Pakistan in order to prevent diminishment of influence and thus embroil them in a military conflict.  Therefore, the option of punitive strikes seemed the most desirable option from an international viewpoint.

The news of the possible assassination significantly changed the international environment regarding Pakistan.  The assassination of President Musharraf raises the bogey of a fundamentalist or an openly sympathetic regime coming to power in Pakistan and armed with nuclear weapons.  Such a regime would directly threaten the US and India and harm the interests of Iran, Russia and even China.  In this  "worst case" scenario, the world would be more conducive to Indian military strikes especially if they would destroy Pakistan's nuclear weapons and reduce or eliminate the offensive capability of the Pakistani military.

In summary, my experience as the MEA was balancing national interests with the permissiveness of the international environment, receiving international response, formulating counterpoints and executing policy.  All of the above must be done while taking into account the often rapidly changing international environment, quickly assimilating fluid situations and providing the best course of action to the cabinet and the Prime Minister.   

D Ramana (National Security Adviser)

I played the role of the National Security Adviser. The game was fast moving, which is also typical of the Indian situation. I had just returned from a long journey just before the start of the game. As soon as I got home, I got a call from a participant who was supposed to play the role of the MHA, this participant stated difficulty in participating. I directed him to the Moderator, who realised that our "MHA" would have to drop out. In typical of Indian fashion the role of the MHA was handed over to the PM.

The briefing papers were stunning in details and gripping and beat all the thrillers read in the popular press, it took me a while to read them. This too was typical of information overload that can occur in such situations. I was confronted with many little details with the nuggets buried in them. I was quite tired after a six-hour drive in snow covered mountains and family constraints. I then get told that one of the players cannot participate - all this gave an added degree of realism to the game. What amazes me was how  quickly we came to terms with these events and narrowed the options to suit available resources.

I used the John Warden model presented in the briefings to illustrate the idea of the different faces of Pakistan- the Rich Anglophone Pakistani Elite which is cultivated by the Western media, the armed forces, the jihadis/fundamentalists, and the hoi polloi. Unlike other countries the dividing lines between these `rings' were quite gray. The ancient Indian political genius, Chanakaya wrote of circles of influence around ‘vijeshu’, to me it appears that John Warden is an update of this old idea. 

The scenario was quite academic till the wild card. Before that the important thing to do was to stem communal violence and further attacks. Since there was no claim of responsibility or indicators there was no open and shut case for action against Pakistan. The back channel reports about the non-involvement of their leadership were another thing to consider. Till the wild card, the only proactive step was to put forces on alert and warn the neighbors who were becoming willing allies of the terrorists at same time need to prevent their falling into the overt belligerent mode due to the warning.

The wildcard made the need for action along either option 3 or 4- beyond this point to do nothing was impossible. Since the intentions of the coup plotters were not known, I felt that the choice should be based after it was known. As others say option 4 would have endless possibilities in breaking the ties etc. in the long run. I chose the short view due to the magnitude of the terrorist attacks and the possibility of the coup having negative implications. If the coup plotters were those interested in preserving Pakistan they would welcome the opportunity to clean up and if they were true Jihadis then they would be hit and the Terror core holding the nation together shattered.

I am still going over the materials, as the pace was hectic to see if I would have changed my recommendations but I still do not see any changes. I read the information about China and US but felt that they were marginal to the rapidly unfolding event. Given more engagement time they would play a role but if action was decisive, they would reconcile themselves. I have read the comments about the world powers would restrain India in such an event, but the magnitude of the assault requires a firm response, which would over ride any miniscule benefits of visas and trade.

After the wildcard options 1 & 2 were on back burner. It had to be either 3 or 4 depending on coup perpetrators. As others say something worse to follow was on cards only matter of time. Other measures were contemplated but needed time. Also the concept of total war was on the cards but could be activated once the threshold was breached and if the other side used their assets.

All in all this scenario makes one think deeply about the problems confronting India.

At the core of Leila-1, (whether the creators realized it or not) is what is the right response by India to a hostile takeover of the Pakistani leadership after the threats about using nuclear weapons as first resort?  If one reads the briefing one understands that some sort of a long-term strategy to bring about a mind change in TSP is needed for the safety and security of the Indian public. Also a major clean up of the underworld-TSP and the parallel politician- underworld nexus has to be undertaken. This is of prime importance, it is not about religion but about safety of the public. One step is to straighten up the political campaign finance reform is needed.

Proper communication cannot be emphasized in a fast moving scenario like this. This has to be between the proper channels in government and the cabinet so that all are on the same page. Further it is essential to address the public with a quick communiqué to reassure them that proper steps are being considered.

A shortcoming was the lack of proper analysis and assessment. The briefings were long and extensive and one had to assess the recommendations quickly as time was of essence. This forces the policymakers to be their own assessors and adds burden.

The cabinet practice of the PM taking over the vacant minister’s portfolio is not useful in crisis as it deprives the Cabinet of valuable advice. It is imperative to develop expertise in depth so that leaders can step in without effecting egos and ambitions. Similarly national security and command issues should be gamed with Cabinet level officials. They should get an understanding of the issues through National Defense College type of exposure.

I was a bit worried about the Finance Minister's idea of shutting down the stock exchanges for lengthy period, as that would be counter productive to the economy. Instead there should be cool off markers like 500 points or 10 percent of SENSEX index to trigger such actions. Further electronic trading on the NSE should be allowed. Trading has to take place or else the markets collapse.

The scenario provokes one to think about the No First Use doctrine. At the basic level what is India’s response to a jihadi /fundamentalist takeover of Pakistani nuclear arsenal? The events of 9-11 and the war in Afghanistan raise the possibility very high of such an event. Further how to handle non-traditional means of delivery?

What was interesting is that by logic and by reading the situation it was Option 3 or 4 either if the coup was friendly or otherwise.

Thanks to BRF for giving me an opportunity to participate and learn.

Y. I. Patel (Chief of Defense Staff)

Leila 1 was designed as a role-playing game that would help participants work through options at a grand strategic level.  The game was controlled through a series of exquisitely crafted briefings, which were submitted to the participants before as well as during the game.  The participants were forbidden from making the exact contents of the briefings public, and the simulated pressure of events was a personal experience restricted to the lucky few who participated directly in the role-playing.  Consequently, the non-participating readership will now find it difficult to imagine the intensity of the experience for the participants. I am very grateful to the team who designed the game and gave me the chance to play a role in this game.  It was a fascinating and educative experience, and one that I hope I can share through this review. 

I participated in the game as the Chief of Combined Defense Staff.  I initially saw my role as being restricted to providing advice on the conduct and possibilities of military operations.  However, the briefings were so designed that I had to assume an additional role of processing information and providing recommendations on subsequent courses of action.  The impressions and critique that follow are based on briefings I received from the National Security Council (NSC), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

I got briefings similar to the ones shown publicly; however, I was not told about the Track II message from the Pakistani President or the diplomatic messages of support from Americans. I was additionally informed about a possibility of Chinese intervention if Pakistan appeared to be on the verge of collapse.

The scenario was not unexpected, though I had hoped for something milder that would cause more animated discussions about the necessity for going to war. The contours of the response were evident, and I started reviewing my alternatives accordingly. I also reviewed what to tell the CCS if they asked about China, and about how we would deal with the presence of Americans in Pakistan. 

The detailed briefings had to be digested quickly, and the resulting information overload served as a device for simulating the pressure experienced in real situations.  The briefings were compartmentalized to make the participants conform to inputs from their parent ministry (in my case, the Combined Defense Staff).  However, the compartmentalization and time pressure led to some amount of confusion and loss of signals between participants.  This confusion can be avoided in the future by adopting mechanisms to ensure that people know when information is being transmitted separately, who is getting what type of information, and so on. For example a "cc" list in briefings would let readers know who else was reading the same material.

Another aspect about the design of this game is actually a real life problem: those who process and collect information should not also be responsible for providing advice. In this case, the CDS had to process and transmit DIA information, in addition to providing policy advice. These two hats are mutually incompatible, especially for a military position. Military people are supposed to advise on options and implement. Advocacy of policy should not fall on CDS, as it inadvertently did in this case. This aspect of the game is discussed in additional detail later in this review.

Opening statements were good all around; though after the first round I would have welcomed more pointed questions about the possibilities of options 3 and 4. I am glad I was at least able to put on record why option 1 is so easy to talk about but so difficult to execute.

In hindsight, I should have articulated option 4 much better. I failed to do so. That option can be used in many ways - to drive a wedge between PA and Army of Islam, between Pakistan and USA, to bait PA, to indirectly hit Chinese interests, so on. I have not explored these possibilities further, but had I made them more explicit maybe someone would have picked up the ball.

At this point in the game, one shortcoming of game design comes became very apparent: there should be one person to give CCS the news (CJIC); one to tell them what to make of it and what to do (NSA) and one to tell them how it can be done (CDS). Absent CJIC, NSA and CDS ended up wearing two hats each. We were overloaded and the real strengths of our roles were underused.

My role came to center stage when the Wild Card was introduced into the game. I got four pages of briefings from DIA and NSC.  The one from DIA contained information that no one else got to see, and that I was forbidden by game rules to quote directly.  It contained detailed information on the progress of the coup, the possibility of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist organizations, and the assassination attempt on the Pakistani president.  In short, the briefing I received painted an extremely urgent and alarming picture that called for immediate strong action.

I responded to this briefing by trying to convey the gravity of the situation to the rest of the participants.  However, the limited communication cues provided by the Forum format for the game prevented my sense of urgency from being transmitted to the other participants.  I subsequently realized that another major reason for the disconnect between my interpretation of the “Wild Card” related events and the team response was that the NSA had been given a modified briefing from the one I got, which caused him to interpret events very differently.  Consequently, NSA and CDS ended up tendering conflicting advice, and the voice of the lower ranked CDS got drowned out.

I continue to believe that there were two games: pre wild card, and post wild card. If the events of the pre wild card game are to be used as a benchmark, then the final response recommending options 3 and 4 was the best one. 

However, in the post wild card game, everyone knew at least two vital things: there was a massive attack on India, and within a few hours of it, there was a coup attempt in Pakistan. At that point, there is no room for restraint or long-drawn and open ended actions suggested in Options 3 or 4. Any reasonable leader is obligated to assume causality between the two events. Security and prosperity of one billion Indian citizens demands that.

On top of that, the team was informed that terrorists may have nuclear weapons. We were a few hours after the worst terrorist attack on India, and were being told worse may be coming soon.  This is not a realistic scenario, because it rests heavily on the assumptions that (a) India had prior information that nuclear weapons had fallen into terrorist hands and it chose to do nothing; and (b) that USA would remain an uninvolved spectator if it was even rumored that such an eventuality had come to pass. Be that as it may, the scenario presented to the team called for immediate action on India’s part to try to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; either by itself, or in conjunction with USA.  Whether the Pakistani president was dead or alive was immaterial. Whether terrorists really had nukes or not was immaterial. The preordained and designed outcome of the game was immaterial. The scenario had a life of its own, and there were just two facts the team had to worry about: lots of Indian's had died, and there was a real possibility things could get worse. None of the stated post wild card reactions indicated any sense of this very real urgency that real leaders would have felt. Options 3 and 4 were irrelevant at that point. The right course would have been to throw them all out and start thinking about how to cope with the new reality.

The lost possibilities of the wild card are regrettable, because the wild card scenario gave us a credible handle to get a natural ally involved on India’s side. In a war game played on the British Broadcasting Corporation’s “Situation Room” drama, the players representing America indulged in a comfortable delusion that they have a choice in remaining uninvolved in an Indo-Pakistan war, and that they can sustain their Faustian bargain with Pakistan even when hostilities between India and Pakistan break out. I believe that they do not have a choice. The repercussions of an Indo Pak conflict would suck America on side of its natural ally.  There is a precariousness and unnaturalness in America’s anti-terror alliance with Pakistan.  Sometime in the near future, America will have to face this contradiction squarely.

All in all, this was a fascinating and educative experience, and I want to reiterate my thanks to the moderator and planning team for giving me this chance.  The game made us confront some very real issues, which are to some extent mirrored in the current debate on India’s No First Use (NFU) doctrine for nuclear weapons.  I hope that such games become a regular feature in Bharat-Rakshak’s repertoire.