Sunil Sainis
(Moderator)

posted 29 December 2002 11:31 PM      

Hi everyone,

This is our first attempt at grand strategy simulation. It is now 2030HRS PCT, the simulation begins now.

JE Menon
 (Prime Minister and acting Min. Home Affairs)

posted 29 December 2002 11:37 PM      

Gentlemen,

You are all by now fully in the picture on events taking place in key defense installations, temples and communally sensitive areas in several parts of the country. It is not established, in the briefings available so far, whether these actions are being directed by the Pakistani government as part of an agenda against India vis-à-vis J&K and other unresolved issues, or by a faction within the Pakistani ruling establishment which has an internal game-plan. This uncertainty is by now an established pattern. Actions already taken, to be taken, and some thoughts are below:

1. NSCS has been given executive authority to move forces to potential targets of the enemy as required, keeping in mind general requirements in case of conflict escalation. I expect MHA will have something to say on this as well.

2. The first priority, in my mind, is to secure the internal scenario. Otherwise we will not have the sufficient flexibility to explore all avenues of action to deal with the latest outrage.

3. Public opinion is going to be highly incensed, especially in view of recent history of attacks. The pressure for action will be intense. I will have to take the opposition parties into confidence. After this meeting, I’ll have to make a speech to the people. Before that, I will discuss developments with the opposition leaders.

4. I am anticipating probable communications from the P5 members during the course of our meeting. Feedback is coming in from our embassies. These will be reviewed and a report will be ready within the day. Going from past experience, it is my expectation that there will be general sympathy, understanding of our plight and right to retaliate against attackers, followed by a call for restraint.

5. I have asked Principal Secretary in as non-participant in view of the grave situation to distill the essence of our discussions and send it over to the Finance Secretary, who will be asked to provide an appropriate briefing based on that to captains of industry…

Now, gentlemen, please give me your points of view about what course of action we should take to respond to these murderous actions. What are our options? Based on your collective input and recommendations, I will decide on the nature of the response.
  

Subra
(Raksha Mantri)

posted 29 December 2002 11:49 PM      

Thank You Mr. Prime Minister

I think in terms of who in Pakistan is directing it - it only makes a difference where the pain needs to be directed at.

The present inputs point to the Pakistan if factor but we need to look a little wider than that. In addition to pressure for action from the public we now need to take into account the morale of armed men on the ground.

The initial aim is to increase the fiscal and physical discomfort to elements of the Pakistani Forces. Towards achieving these aims we should

1. Increase readiness level to 5 with ability to immediately act in the North and West. Increasing aggressive patrolling and special reconnaissance activity along the border, the LoC and the AGPL.
2. Shore up internal security and internal lines of comm.
3. Move forces to eastward locations to stall any interference
 

Lakshman
 (Minister External Affairs)

posted 29 December 2002 11:52 PM  

Mr. Prime Minister,

Based on the assessment of the MEA, the international situation shows the following trends:

Public awareness in the west

analysis - the news cycle currently is focused on India and the attacks, it will change shortly and concentrate on troubles at home (US economy) or Iraq and NK

What to do - given the exposure the terrorist attacks in J & K - we should use this new found public awareness before the news cycle changes and other things re - enter the public consciousness. To this end, we should send out our talking heads, embassy staff and academicians favorable to India. We should work thru op ed column and advertisements in newspapers. In the TV and internet fora - we should issue press conferences regarding the details of the acts, and put staffers out in front of the cameras.

The message: We should show the terrorism for what it is, religious hatred. In this sense for the western media we should show linkages to 9-11 and point to the connections between the terrorist organizations acting against the US and those acting against India are in the same continuum and have fraternal linkages.

US

Assuming that the US has not read the situation accurately or underestimated it. This is a potential opportunity for intelligence cooperation against a similar threat. This would dovetail nicely with our media offensive.

However, if the US is using India to gain leverage against Pakistan. Then certainly we also have a convergence of interests - at least publicly. However this time India must be prepared and state to the US that we are not satisfied with the yield of previous interactions. Unlike previous times, when Russia or US were used a guarantors this time, we would now like to be the determiners of what is satisfactory compliance on the part of Pakistan in its curtails and dismantles the terror infrastructure. The dismantling will be a gain for the US and India as both will squeeze a capitulation from Pakistan. However, the US will be wary of squeezing the General - President too much, lest he become a target and this would lose the US an ally and replace it with someone they are unable to do business with.

In conclusion, India can gain in either scenario given that there will be some measure of convergence with the US.

Pakistan:

The GoP's condolences etc are meant to distance them and give them some international cover in case of the obvious finger pointing. The GoP will make its usual statements - condemnation, raising the point that Indian govt. agents carried this out and promises of curtailment and even nuke threats for any Indian action - in anticipation of the now predictable International pressure.

Our western - international media blitz can be well prepared to counter Pakistani claims. We must not allow there to be any one sided view of event by the media. Pakistani complicity can be pointed out with the use of American made plastique from a company that went bankrupt after the afghan intervention. Also the usage of indigenous language is also an indicator of complicity. (This should also be part of our media offensive, or a card that we can play if our requests for cooperation are not.)

China

Analysis: China is following a two track policy of trying to show sympathy but also quietly saber rattling, it will not allow itself to be taken out of the equation. This is not a new policy for China wrt to India. IT is also a variation of the way; it treats the US war on Terror. Sympathy on one hand, complicity with the guilt on the other. Meanwhile it makes it presence felt in any decision in the region.

China has considerable interest in Pakistan; it also has interests in Burma and SE Asia. Also China has a large amount of problems in Vietnam, Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan. We too can follow a two track policy with China

1) Send an envoy to china - to personally convey to them their importance in the situation and more so the gravity of the situation for the Indian people. China must understand that this is not merely raising the Pakistani bogey.

Furthermore we must convey to china what while they have considerable interests with respect to Pakistan that we are not opposed to making an arrangement taking into account each others particular "sensitivities and troubles" We would both do better to stay out of each others internal affairs (border disputes, province law and order problems, rogue provinces, etc).

2) While interacting and willing to work with them, we must also we willing to show them that we can exert pressure if needed. Indian could dispatch high-level delegation to Japan, Vietnam, and Taiwan.
Using sympathies in SE Asia can also challenge China's very active policy. China can be painted as being complicit and supporting Pakistan, who is the country responsible for the heinous terrorist acts. So Chinese support to Pakistan, allow it to be a country where terrorists can train and export their crimes. Most notable to SE Asia where fragile govt. and economies can be affected.

In conclusion: The two-fold strategy should convey to china that we are willing to reach an agreement with them, but we will not do so on their terms. Nor will we be allowed ourselves to be bullied by them. All in all, international sympathies are with China and they would indeed look like running dogs, if they were to attack a govt. that was a victim of terror, especially in the sensitivities of the Post 9 - 11 era.

Others
The outpouring of sympathy in Europe, SE Asia and Nepal gives us leverage:

Europe: We can expect to have visits by the UK and France, possibly Germany and the EU.
There will be the usual message of restraint. In most cases, European powers will be an extension of the US policy of restraint. Engagement will give us some additional media exposure and public sympathy.

Nepal - We can finally get an agreement to curtail Pakistani activities, joint border patrolling and a joint intelligence setup. The last two would benefit both given the Maoist linkages with radical organizations in Northern India.

Bangladesh - We can use international pressure and sympathy to get a response on Bangladesh's complicity in anti - India groups ranging from NE to Islamists. We can pressure them by two means - one is economic and the second is thru western public opinion. Bangladesh would be far more susceptible to both (more so than Pakistan) as its not an ally and not pretending to cooperation in the war on terror.

SE Asia will yield with results with more diplomatic pressure. (SE Asia can be used as a wedge with respect to China - see above)
One point - Burma needs careful watch, their lack of response is concerning as there had been a 6 years of very active engagement over mutual security issues. Their response could be getting more incentives from us or they could be sections in their govt. with sympathies to Pakistan given Gen Musharaff's pleasant visit about a year and a half ago. We must study the Burma situation more to come up with reasons why their response was non-committal to bordering on obstruction.

That is all Mr. Prime Minister
 

Sunil Sainis
(Moderator)

posted 30 December 2002 12:00 AM      

Moderation Request:

Guys please keep posts down to 400 words or less

JE Menon
(Prime Minister and acting Min. Home Affairs)

posted 30 December 2002 12:03 AM      

I have received a detailed briefing from Sri Pandey (Secretary, Home), on the background of events leading up the violence of today. As you all know, Home Minister is at the moment indisposed due to health reasons. Points to note, and requests received from Secretary are as follows, with authorization as thought appropriate

1. Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) requests permission to put in observers in states where there are gaps in Central Intelligence Officer (CIO)-Director Gen. Police (DGP) capabilities. Approved

2.  Secretary (Research) and Sri. Pandey have offered the use of airport facility in central India. Per the recommendation Shri. Pandey would like to stage an airborne rapid reaction force comprising some battalions for emergency riot control at this location on permanent alert. Approved.

3. Despite, the enormous strain it will be possible to get the police and intelligence machinery to function properly for about 45 days or so. Beyond this period the heightened alert will produce severe communal strain within the police organizations themselves. We need to consider this in response modalities.

4. Home Secretary recommends the closure of schools and offices. It asks that the next few days be declared days of national mourning. All police stations must be made to round up communal criminals under the NSA. Section 144 CRPC should be clamped on all communally hypersensitive zones. Have given OK for two days mourning in non-sensitive areas, and up to 5 days in sensitive areas.

5. Home Secretary also recommends the use of special control measures on media. The authority to shut down cable channels should given to the highest ranking police officer in all major cities. Approved with strong cautionary note. Each incidence of media shut down to be reconfirmed with temporary MHA.

6. Home secretary requests bringing all internal security forces in the country to condition-red. All police officers are to be asked to report to duty. All units of the CPMF in reserve are asked to remain ready to move at a minimum notice. All leave is cancelled. Approved.
 

Ramana
(National Security Advisor)

posted 30 December 2002 12:03 AM    

1. The first priority is to ensure law and order is in place. The recommendations of the DIB to facilitate the control of communal tension should be implemented
2. As a further step the recommendations of the MHA (CIPU) raising the alert status of all internal security forces and in addition all military units should be included in the notification.
3. Having secured the home front the real perpetrators of this long running hate campaign have to be tackled.
a. The first step is to send high-level emissaries to Bangladesh and Myanmar to cooperate in ending the terror activities originating from their territory. Simultaneously options to offer incentives the leadership in those nations should be explored.
b. Second step is attack core of the Army of Terror that is at the center in POK and in Pakistan
i. This does not cross any `redlines’.
ii. The magnitude of the outrage demands swift retribution.
c. All forces in should be put on alert status to handle any escalation.
 

Y I Patel
(Chief of Defense Staff)

posted 30 December 2002 12:12 AM  

Mr. Prime Minister and CCS members

The men and women of India’s armed forces stand ready and willing to carry out their duty. The latest series of terrorist incidents on army camps as well as places of worship is causing rising levels of anger that may become difficult to control in the tense areas of Jammu and Kashmir. While our soldiers are the most disciplined anywhere, they are human too, and in situations like this there is a high probability that they may resort to excesses unless their pent up fury is given suitable outlet. All three services have fulfilled long standing requirements during last year’s mobilization, and the extensive and unprecedented exercises gave us invaluable experience. We are prepared for war, limited or unlimited.

Though the provocation is unprecedented, the use of military force in anger is a heavy responsibility. Waging war in this day and age causes unprecedented forces to be unleashed. We end up riding a tiger, and we should make absolutely sure that the tiger knows where to go and what to do before he is uncaged. In other words, the military needs a clear, unambiguous, and exhaustive mandate before it goes to war. The mandate includes:

• Political objectives that balance projected benefits against likely costs and required means. These objectives have to be specific enough to permit translation to concrete military and non-military action, with provision of objective benchmarks that can be used to gauge the extent to which stated goals have been achieved
• A viable end game or exit strategy. The armed forces must know when to stop fighting a war and start executing a post-hostility consolidation campaign. Defeat would be snatched from the jaws of a hard fought victory, by not adequately planning for an end game
• Constraints used to guide military action to confirm to overall geopolitical objectives

The political mandate must be consistent with the prevailing geopolitical framework:
• It is perfectly acceptable to call armed forces to operate under political constraints necessary to ensure achievement of national goals. The contours of such constraints, however, should be detailed at the planning stage; not as an afterthought after the shooting starts
• All constraints should be continually reviewed once the shooting starts, for occurrence of contingencies that change the underlying premises
• The mood on the home front is a vital factor in the conduct of war. Armed forces do not operate in isolation from their parent society. If they sense that the nation is behind them, they will fight like devils. If they sense that they are fighting an unpopular or unjustified war, their will to fight will collapse
• Military action is bound to have international repercussions, which, in turn, will influence our own conduct of war. Military considerations should therefore be included in formulation of national strategy

The Joint Operations Directorate has prepared plans for several contingencies. These plans are being updated on my instructions, to confirm to last known enemy OrBat and likely dispositions. The plans for military operations have been divided into four broad categories to aid policy making, but it should be noted that a limited amount of “mixing and matching” may be feasible. An overview description of the four categories follows:


1. Dismemberment of Pakistan and establishment of friendly regimes in the new countries thus formed

2. Destruction of administrative, economic and military infrastructure of Pakistan, accompanied by temporary occupation of territory and seizure of vital assets for coercing current regime into destroying its terrorist infrastructure

3. Permanent recapture of territory to facilitate conduct of anti-terrorism operations

4. Execution of open-ended punitive campaigns to coerce Pakistan into reconsidering its campaign of terrorism against India


Threat of war can also be employed to coerce some limited concessions from Pakistan; however, India’s credibility requires that we be prepared to follow up on the threat if the Pakistanis do not fold like they did last time.

1. Dismemberment of Pakistan, and installation of friendly regimes in the new countries thus formed

In this option, physical dismemberment would be achieved by inflicting massive damage to administrative and military targets; and occupation of extensive areas to sever lines of communication between different parts, and to serve as base territory for the occupation force and the newly installed regime. This option would shatter all red lines for use of nuclear weapons in the first hour of combat. To prevent the war from going nuclear, concurrent operations would be undertaken to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. However, our existing resources are not sufficient to guarantee that all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will be taken care of.

Critical preconditions for this option are: (a) availability of a friendly political grouping that can step up to claim power once the dismemberment is affected; (b) supportive international stance; (c) national will to withstand possible nuclear retaliation, economic embargoes and political isolation.

If precondition (a) is not obtained, there is great risk of our army getting bogged down in pacifying hostile population and in fighting urban wars. The occupation force will have to be deployed for an extended period of time to engineer a transition to a friendly government. The armed forces therefore strongly recommend that if this option is to be followed, a political framework should be in place before commencement of combat. The armed forces are prepared to execute this campaign under constraints such as avoiding destruction of economic targets that would cause the population to become hostile, or that would hurt post-combat reconstruction efforts.

If precondition (b) is not at hand, especially in the form of overt or covert acquiescence from the sole superpower, then we should be prepared to defend ourselves as well as any captured territories against military operations launched by third parties.

Precondition (c) is probably even more critical than the other two requirements. Absent a national consensus on preparedness to live with adverse short term repercussions, this option should not even be taken up for consideration.

This option depends on the fulfillment of some extremely stringent preconditions; however, it is the also the one that can offer the greatest possibilities for the long term solution of India’s by Pakistan problem. Subsequent options have been designed to be implemented when one or more of these preconditions are not satisfactorily met.

2. Destruction of administrative, economic and military infrastructure of Pakistan, accompanied by temporary occupation of territory and seizure of vital assets for coercing current regime into destroying its terrorist infrastructure

This option is a more destructive but less politically ambitious variation of option 1. In this option, military operations would be designed for maximum destructiveness. No attempt would be made to overtly topple the existing regime or install a new one, and a tacit goal would be to invite international rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts by making Pakistan a basket case. The leverage can be increased further by seizing strategically vital pieces of territory along the IB, taking large number of POWs, or seizing other vital assets. As in option 1, attempts will be made to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. As before, no guarantees can be made that the attempts will be totally successful.

This option does not rely on the availability of a friendly political grouping in Pakistan, or on an international stance sympathetic to India’s cause. However, it does require national consensus on preparedness for adverse short term repercussions. The existing regime may be mauled into submission; collapse of administrative structures may cause Pakistan to collapse and splinter; the regime may become extremely unpopular and be toppled; or international reconstruction efforts would establish a successor regime that would be less inclined to support terrorism against India. These are all desirable outcomes; however, none of them is guaranteed to happen since we will not be in a position to establish control over the final outcome. Consequently, a conclusive solution to India’s Pakistan problem may not be obtained.

3. Permanent recapture of territory to facilitate conduct of anti-terrorism operations

In this option, strategically important tracts of territory in POK/PONA would be recaptured, with the intention of reducing or eliminating terrorist infiltration and rationalizing LOC/LAC. While military operations would be constrained for not crossing red lines for nuclear use, they will not be confined to POK/PONA, since defending forces will need to be isolated. Limited diversionary and pinning attacks would have to be carried out along the IB, and air strikes across the IB will also be necessary.

This option can be used without preconditions (a) and (b), and are somewhat independent of precondition (c) as well. However, military commanders will need operational flexibility to modify goals to exploit unanticipated openings or to counter retaliatory thrusts by Pakistan.

The risks associated with this option are that Pakistan may indulge in highly escalatory counter strikes such as conventional missile attacks on population centers. While the likelihood of Pakistan escalating to the use of nuclear weapons is rated as low by the military, it can not be totally ruled out.

4. Open ended punitive campaigns aimed at making the cost of supporting terrorism unacceptable to Pakistan.

In this option, air raids, artillery firestorms, or commando raids would be employed to impose economic, military, or political costs on Pakistan.

These operations have the virtue of being extremely flexible, reversible, and if required, deniable. They can be calibrated to raise or lower the temperature as required. Furthermore, they can be designed to provoke Pakistan into an overt response, which can then be exploited for further advantage. This is the lowest risk option, since plans can be formulated to inflict considerable pain on Pakistan without risking Indian lives. The limitation of this option is that limited means can only achieve limited ends. Since calibrated raids are not likely in themselves to significantly reduce Pakistan’s overall economy or warfighting capabilities, Pakistan itself will be left with several options for countering our moves. Consequently, the outcome will be more inconclusive than in any other option.
 

 Sunil Sainis
(Moderator)

posted 30 December 2002 12:17 AM      

Moderator's Note:

Okay looks like the game has gone ahead of the planned outline. But that’s not a problem. I suggest going straight to the discussion soon after the PM makes his summary post.
ps. looks like we are going to have to pull the time a little bit.

JE Menon
(Prime Minister and acting Min. Home Affairs)

posted 30 December 2002 12:33 AM      

Gentlemen,

From what you have said so far, I can sense the following. There is a sense that a firm response must be made. The following pre-recommendations and parameters for action are evident.

1. Raksha Mantri is suggesting upping to red alert. I see no reason why this should not be done. We need to put Pakistan on notice. Has anybody claimed responsibility for the events yet? NSA?

2. MEA’s discourse is in keeping with what needs to be done. There is nothing objectionable. I recommend that we be constantly updated with state of mind reports from these countries. Burma needs to be looked at carefully, and China needs special care. We are used to the Americans by now. They will only be interested if we seem to be planning for military response. For the time being, all hands should keep cards close to the chest.

3. MHA’s recommendations are necessary. Must we wait for an optimistic situation report regarding communal flare-ups before taking a final decision on response? I don’t think we have the time for that. We also do not know the scale of operations from enemy. These attacks may continue. Your thoughts are needed.

4. Finance Minister suggests we have a 2-month window to conduct 2-front war in current economic scenario. We have an estimated 45-day window of opportunity from MHA Secretary, in view of fissiparous tendencies in police forces. I believe, therefore, that we have a month give or take a few days for successful military operation start to conclusion (if that option is chosen).

5. CDS has recommended various military options. I am open to all. But please take the parameters recommended by Finance Minister and MHA into account before giving your recommendations.

My personal feeling, as NSA has suggested, is firm and swift retribution. Without this, India will once again appear weak and vacillating. We have been pushed too far. The people will not accept non-response in some visible form. Nor will the opposition leaders, whom I will have to take into confidence soon.

Speak freely gentlemen. I would like the NSA and CDS to give their thoughts during the discussion...
 

Ramana
(National Security Advisor)

posted 30 December 2002 12:38 AM      

As of now there has been no claim of responsibility by anyone. However indirect evidence and intercepts indicate our unfriendly neighbor's hand. Whether these elements are under direct control of the nominal leadership is not clear. More likely the Terror Core of the Pak elite executes these operations.

Sunil Sainis
(Moderator)

posted 30 December 2002 12:39 AM      

Moderator's note.

"Speak Freely" means its okay to break the warrant of precedence.

Time pressure dictates that we forgo the break.

Y I Patel
(Chief of Defense Staff)

posted 30 December 2002 12:44 AM      

Sirs

Our intelligence inputs clearly indicate that Pakistan is involved directly, though we can not discern if these events are officially sanctioned or the handiwork of a rogue group.

Our experience from last year's mobilization suggests that it may be desirable to start some limited raids in the next few days, even if we eventually settle on a much more ambitious goal. This form of action has the advantage of striking while the sympathy is on our side. Pakistan continuously plays the game of forcing India to be the one to observe restraint. We have some ideas of our own, about how we can put the ball back in their court, so to speak.

 

Subra
(Raksha Mantri)

posted 30 December 2002 12:45 AM    

Mr. Prime Minister,

My preference is for a combination of options 2 or 4 or some combination of that. The suggestions made by me earlier will allow immediate launch of either option.

We have a fairly long list of key personnel and admin structures involved in the terrorist business. They need to be destroyed.

In the meantime I have a question for the MEA. The CHina aspect is still not clear. They could be playing the Korean game here. Be both the instigator and offer the solution. How do you propose to counter that?
 

Lakshman
 (Minister External Affairs)

posted 30 December 2002 12:49 AM    

Mr. Prime Minister,

My colleagues have all brought up valid points. I feel that something needs to be said the our military scenarios in the current environment.

CDS option 1 will be difficult from the international viewpoint. The US will not simply allow us to enter and take over Pakistan. For various reason ranging from loss of influence to disruption in the ongoing ops. China will also not just willingly give up its interests in Pakistan and a Quid pro quo may be difficult to arrange.

Options 2 - 3 will be similarly difficult. As the US will be under pressure to come to Pakistan’s aid. Failure to do so will result in instability of the regime and decrease US influence.

Option 4 is possible in the international climate albeit for a limited time. Though Pakistan nuke blackmail and scare tactics on the US will make this a limited option and one where timing is essential. No one will fault us for defense but we must keep the news in our favor and the sympathies with us.

Sunil Sainis
(Moderator)

posted 30 December 2002 12:50 AM      

****** ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ********

Message to participants from DG-Kalapahad:

DG (K): Hello Mr. Prime Minister Sir, I have a phone call here for MEA from our embassy in Islamabad, Shall I patch it through Sir?

JE Menon
 (Prime Minister and acting Min. Home Affairs)

posted 30 December 2002 12:51 AM      

Yes, make it so.

 

Sunil Sainis
(Moderator)

posted 30 December 2002 12:52 AM      

DG(K) “Yes Sir, hello Aman, you are connected now.. Please talk. “

" Thank you Mr. Director...

Hello Mr. Minister Sir, this is Aman Siddiqi, the first secretary-administration in the Islamabad Consulate. We have just seen a huge explosion due northeast of our position, our boys think Gen. Musharraf's convoy has been attacked. An Iranian diplomat was injured in the explosion and he has now taken shelter in our consulate. He claims the presidential motorcade passed his vehicle going in the opposite direction and then he heard a big explosion, which injured him. He wants to call his embassy from here. We can't locate our boss, the high commissioner, I talked to him on the phone just an hour ago, he is in Karachi today, what are your instructions?"
 

JE Menon
 (Prime Minister and acting Min. Home Affairs)

posted 30 December 2002 12:58 AM      

MEA,

Please ensure that the Iranian diplomat gets all the courtesies and hospitalities. Please speak to the Foreign Minister in Tehran and give necessary assurances.

Can I have inputs from NSA & CDS please?