Gulf War – II : A Heuristic Pattern Prediction Exercise

Brig G. D Bakshi, VSM

Abstract

There has been much speculation and inspired leaks in the US Media about a possible Anglo – American invasion of Iraq.   Employing   the heuristic pattern prediction model   designed by Steve Chan,¹  this paper seeks to extrapolate the likely  contours of a probable   military conflict in the Gulf based upon a pattern analysis of the preceding Gulf  War(1990– 91) and the more recent American Operations in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan (Oct 2001) .   The paper is confined entirely to the military aspects of this projected conflict.   It does not seek to pass any value judgments on the morality of such an invasion and what implications it could have on the traditional concept of state sovereignty as enshrined by the Westphalian concept of Nation States since 1648.   The aim of this paper is to determine the kind of military strategies the two adversaries could adopt based upon the current state of technological asymmetry and the declaratory military doctrines of the Americans.    This should enable us to extrapolate from the last conflict, factor in the lessons likely to have been learnt by the two antagonists and try and forecast the type of military campaigns and strategies that both sides would adopt next.   Col Trevor Dupoys Quantitative Judgment Model could then be employed by experts to predict the outcome of the conflict in terms of overall success or failure; rates of advance and casualties likely to be suffered by the two sides.   This paper however will confine itself to a heuristic approach as opposed to the latter algorithmic exercise in forecasting.

Pattern Analysis of Gulf War – I

We are currently in the throes of a Revolution in Military Affairs initiated by advances in Information Technology (IT).   The Gulf War of 1990 – 91 is regarded by many as the culminating event   of    the    RMA    generated    by IT advances made since the 1970s.    The American institute of National Strategic Studies defined such a culminating event as follows

“A final feature of a definition of RMA  is a culminating event” a battle that employs new systems, operational concepts and organization and that clearly demonstrates a dramatic change in the conduct of warfare”².

Most authorities regard the Gulf War as the culminating event of the RMA based on IT.  It would be useful therefore to review the doctrinal debate that was raging behind the scenes during the time of the first Gulf War. As part of the development of the Air – Land Battle doctrine, the Americans had evolved the electronic wherewithal to actualize the concept of a look deep strike deep”.

Precision Munitions had dramatically reduced the CEP and enhanced the lethality of  air delivered ordnance.  A transparency revolution had been generated by Satellites, Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), AWACS, JSTARS and a whole host of ELINT platforms.   These advances in information technology made Information based Warfare possible.

The two basal concepts of Information warfare that were being hotly debated at the time of the First Gulf War were:

• The Strategic Attack Paradigm.

• The Operational Attack Paradigm.

Col. John Warden of the US Air Force was the originator of the Strategic Attack Concept.   Warden visualized the modern nation state as a system of fire concentric rings as under:

• At the core was the political leadership.

• Next was the communication infrastructure through which this leadership exercised command and control (Warden called it systems essential).

• The next ring was the state infrastructure – Information infrastructure, industrial  and transportation infrastructure, its power/electrical grid system etc.

• The fourth was the population.

• The fifth circle was the nations fielded armed forces.

Historically, Warden argued, that the traditional way of war attacked the outer most ring of the deployed armed forces first.  Only once this was defeated could we attack the inner systems.   Such an attack paradigm was centered on a direct approach strategy.  It tackled the enemy strength rather than his weakness.  It also entailed fighting that system in a sequential or serial strategy.   Warden argued that modern air power combined with Information systems now gave the option of ignoring the enemy’s deployed armed forces and directly attacking his key vulnerabilities (the leadership, info-structures etc)³.  These in essence were the real “Center of Gravity”.  The entire attack paradigm was aimed at inducing paralysis of the enemy.  Paralysis, not focused attrition therefore was the prime defeat mechanism.

The Operational Attack Paradigm 

The then American Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (now the Foreign Secretary) Gen Colin Powell and the National Security Advisor Brent Scrowcroft were   the prime opponents of this “Air alone strategy”.  The Army and Marine Corps strategists felt that this new Wardens Concept violated the tenets of the then in vogue “Air – Land Battle Doctrine”.  They strongly felt that the armed forces are still the prime center of gravity of a nation state and must first be defeated.  Unless they are defeated no credible victory can be gained.  So what then was the true Center of Gravity of Iraq?  Was it Saddam Hussain and his National Information architecture and Power Grid?  Or was it the Republican Guards?  There was a fierce debate on this key conceptual issue.  The debate got so heated that at one stage American Air Force Chief Michel Dugan had to be sacked for his strident advocacy of the Air – alone option.

The debate is there with us to this day.  Proponents of the Operational Attack Paradigm say that the failure to destroy the Republican Guards and take out Saddam Hussain, cheated the coalition of a true victory. That is why America is being forced to think in terms of launching a second invasion of Iraq almost a decade after the first one.

Analysis

It would be useful to take a closer look at the alternative Operational Attack Paradigm. This concept is more attrition oriented ⁴.  It is premised upon:

• Precision Attrition: (Through precision guided Munitions with CEP of less than a meter).

• OODA Loop Warfare:  IT has expanded the battle space and compressed the time dimension.  To gain victory, we must exploit time as a key resource. This implies so speeding up operations that we get inside the enemies, Boyds or OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action) Loop.  The ability to use time effectively is as important in the information age as employing mass was in the Industrial era. A commander who is faster on the OODA loop can attack and complete destruction of each subordinate element before the enemy senior commander can coordinate a response⁵.

• Coherent Operations: Jeffrey Cooper argues that information technology has eliminated the fog of war that has long plagued attempts to coordinate military operations.  The information revolution; Cooper says, has facilitated a cognitive revolution⁶.The battlefield transparency or enhanced situational awareness is a major battle-winning factor.

The Democrats under Bill Clinton replaced the Bush (Sr) Administration after the Gulf War.  Where the Bush (Sr) dispensation had opted finally for the operational paradigm of attack (by sacking Michael Dugan), the Clinton administration was enamored of the concept of “casualty-less wars”.  It adopted the strategic attack paradigm in Yugoslavia.  The prolonged air campaign in the Balkans had failed to cause any significant attrition on the Serb Armed forces.  Promoters of the Strategic Attack Paradigm (Air Power alone option) had hotly debated that the sortie rate in the Gulf War was 2560 per day whereas in the Yugoslavia Air Campaign it barely exceeded 5-650 sorties a day.  It could not therefore be treated as a test of the Air – War doctrine.  Yugoslavia finally capitulated once her oil infrastructure was targeted.  It was the Third Ring that produced decisive results here and not the First or the Fifth.        

What is critical to  note is that both Saddam Hussain and Slobodan Milosevic were the prime targets of the American air campaigns.  Both survived intact (even though their Defense Ministries and Armed Forces Headquarters had been pulverized by cruise missiles and Gator Glide Toss bombs designed to destroy deep bunkers.  The problem in attacking the inner most ring is the availability of precise targeting information about the top leadership.  Despite the Americans best efforts in Gulf War-1 and the Balkans they failed to cripple or kill the top leadership.  The air alone doctrine therefore falters on this count.  The most current validation is in Op Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  Both Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar have escaped the fury of the American Air Forces/Naval aviation assaults.  The precise targeting coordinates to kill and eliminate key political/military leaders are still not available despite all the revolution in Information Technology.  Such targets are well protected, hardened and take adequate evasive measures to avoid destruction in detail.

Let’s face it, the Americans targeted Saddam Hussain repeatedly but failed.  Most such targets take care not to make electronic emissions.  Dudhayev, the Chechen Warlord had made the mistake of using a Cell Phone.  The Russian Air Force killed him based on this electronic lead.  This feat may no longer be replicable.  No such critical target is likely to be as foolish as to leave its electronic signature openly. Viability vise that leaves the National Information Infrastructure (NII) and the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) as the most logical targets of attack based on the Command and Control model of war. 

Historical Overview of Gulf War I       

We have recounted the fierce conceptual debate that shaped the outcome of the First Gulf War and led to varying degrees of emphasis on differing target systems at various stages of the war.  Inter Services rivalries and turf wars also played their part in fuelling such debates.  Fortunately for the Americans, the Nicholes – Gold Water Amendment had forced jointmanship on the American Armed Forces just prior to the Gulf War as legislation by the Senate.  The Single theatre Commander approach had significantly reduced inter-services dissensions and generated substantial synergy.  Yet it was not adequate enough.  Let us therefore now identify some of the landmark events/lessons of the First Gulf War and establish the broad trends and patterns:

§         Saddam Hussain had viewed the Americans as an ally in his war with Iran.  He had in fact told them of his intention to invade Kuwait.  He had in specific conveyed this intention to April Gillespie, the American ambassador in Iraq on 25 July 1990⁸.  He had specifically sought to know what America’s reaction would be.  She had tacitly encouraged him by saying “We have no opinions on Arab-Arab conflicts like your border dispute with Kuwait”.   A former White House Press Secretary Mr Parie Salinger9 also confirms the same. 

§         The Americans manipulated this information cynically.  They pretended to go along and set up Saddam for a major blow.  The US Central Command had already wargamed contingency plans for war with Iraq in 1989.  These were code numbered Contingency Plan 100 2-90.  These had been extensively wargamed in the Summer of 1990 itself.¹⁰.   Saddam however was deceived into thinking that the entire CNN led outcry to his current invasion was bluff and bluster.  The Americans in fact would not invade.  If they did, Saddam had no intention of fighting.  His military aim was confined to ensuring the survival of the Bathist regime.  In this he succeeded eminently.

§         After the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam withdrew his elite Republican Guards from that state.  He sent in second rate reservist formations that dug down in a purely defensive stance.  His intention was to avoid conveying any further hostile intent towards Saudi Arabia.

§         Saddam thus tied himself down in a purely reactive and defensive stance.  He foreclosed the Proactive option of capturing the Saudi Ports of Daharan and Daflan and thus seriously interfering with any American build up against him.

§         The Americans therefore got six months to complete a massive military build up in the Gulf without any let or hindrance.  Iraqi air and missile strikes or a number of limited Khafji style attacks could have played havoc at this stage and seriously disrupted the American plans for attack. Lt Cdr S.J. Singh calibrates the American build up in three distinct strategic phases:

(a)     Containment (August – October 1990)  The Coalition was built up and      consolidated in this phase.  American diplomacy was seen at its best in this      period.  A 150,000 US troops were built up in Saudi Arabia and the sanctions      regime enforced.  The ostensible aim was to deter Iraq from any further      adventurism.  A line was drawn in the sand. 

(b)      Coercion (November 1990 – 15 January 1991)  UN Security Council      resolution 674 of 29 October 1990 made Iraq liable for damage and financial      losses resulting from its invasion.  On 08 November 1990 George Bush      committed another 2,00.000 troops in the region.  The emphasis shifted to      coercion in this phase.

(c)  Combat (16 January – 28 February 1991) The emphasis shifted from coercion to military compellence.  A 42 days concerted air campaign was launched. This was followed up by a virtually unopposed 100 hours ground war which ended in complete Coalition victory.

Military Aspects

Fighting the Last War

The Iraqi failure to adopt a proactive policy of attacking Saudi Arabia and seriously disrupting the American build up, as well as its hubris that its battle hardened troops could overcome the Coalition’s technological advantage, in a purely defensive war, was seriously flawed and misplaced.  It stemmed from the patently wrong military lessons that Iraq had drawn from the last Iraq – Iran war.  This turned out to be a war of pure attrition (like the First World War).  The Iraqis had dismally failed to exploit their high-tech Soviet equipment in this war. In specific, the low competence levels of the Iraqi pilots led to poor results that led them to play down the value of air power.  As such they came to place over reliance on their artillery and set piece defensive battles.  Given a situation of a vast technological asymmetry, this was an invitation to disaster.  In addition,  the Iraqi Army then was war – weary after the 95 months blood letting with Iran.  Its morale was low and crumbled rapidly once the war started.

Force Ratios           

Even in defense, Iraq did not commit its best front line forces in Kuwait.  It did not defend Kuwait City, which it could have easily turned into a Stalingrad of sorts and forced the Coalition into attrition intensive combat in heavily built up areas.  Saddam had no intention of seriously contesting the Coalitions advance.  At the first sign of invasion he ordered a precipitate withdrawal from Kuwait.  This was a disastrous military decision in the face of an attack and contributed more to Iraq’s defeat than any asymmetry in technology.

American analysts like John Mueller have gone to the extent of questioning whether what took place in Iraq could be called a war at all¹².  An authoritative study for the American Senate conducted by Lee Aspin and William Dickinson¹³ has greatly reduced the estimates of Iraqi troop strength in Kuwait.  The table below illustrates this:

Table 1: Estimate of Iraqi strengths (Source : Lee Aspin and W. Dickinson, Defense of a New Era : Lessons of the Persian Gulf War)

Christopher Bellary, a British War correspondent wrote ¹⁴  “Two years after the war saw a progressive reduction in Iraqi body counts.  The initial estimates of over 600,000 Iraqis in the Kuwait Theatre of Operations (KTO) was rapidly revised to 400,000.  There were wild initial estimates of Iraqi casualties.  Some figures varied from 40,000 to 100,000.  These were rapidly scaled down to 25,000 dead by Air Force Gen Charles Horner.  More professional and clinical estimates debunked this entirely.  John Heidenrich, a DIA analyst from the USA, used interviews with Iraqi prisoners of war and other parameters and revised the casualty estimates to 1500 casualties in the air war and 6500 in the ground war¹⁵. In the end the American military seems to have been mesmerized by its own high decibel propaganda campaign via CNN.  In the climate of media hype and overkill, objectivity suffered greatly.

The paens of self-praise and insufficiently contextual initial accounts stressed the fact that for the first time a numerically inferior (but technologically vastly superior) force had routed the much larger host of the Iraqi army.  These subjective estimates of American Force ratios conveniently leave out the large contingents of Arab Armies provided.  These, along with some Marine Corps Divisions, were consigned to invade Kuwait per se, while the Americans, British and French staged the “Hail Mary Maneuver” through the emptiness of Southern Iraq. The messy fighting in the built up areas and the heavy casualties would have had to be borne by the Arab Armies if Saddam’s forces had stood up and fought.

Mueller states that early estimates of Iraqi troops strength were over 545000 troops in some 42 to 43 divisions.  By comparison the Coalition Forces numbered 795,000 at their peak.¹⁶ Estimates of Iraqi troop strength have now been whittled down to 183,000.  This gives the coalition an unprecedented force ratio of almost 5: 1 as opposed to the standard 3: 1 regime accepted the world over for attacks.  It was not American technology against Iraqi mass but Coalition mass and technology against an Iraqi Army that was unwilling to fight.  It was not battle hardened – it was war weary. It had a serious morale problem.

Operational Strategy

The American deception plan of an amphibious feint depicting a Marine invasion of Kuwait’s coastline worked brilliantly.  Under its cover the American, British and French Mechanized forces launched a wide hook through Southern Iraq towards South of Basra.  It was anticipated that the core of the Republican Guards (and its high value Iraqi Armored Divisions) that were arrayed around Basra would move further South to counterattack in Kuwait.  The Guards would then be hit in the flanks and destroyed as they moved South wards.  The Republican Guards did not drive South to Kuwait as anticipated and the Anglo-American and French hammer blow largely hit the thin air.  Thus the very keystone or anchor premise of the American strategists proved to be incorrect.  The enemy did not behave as he was expected to.  The Iraqis had a theatre reserve built around the core of the Republican Guards Division.  This was an eight division sized force (comprising two Armored, one Mechanized and three Infantry and one Special Forces Division).  In addition there were three Tank Divisions that formed the core of the Iraqi Strike Reserves.  Of these only the Twalkahama (Mechanized) Division and the Medina Republican Guards Tank Division had moved cautiously westwards to contest the Coalition advance in Southern Iraq.  The Medina division had put up a surprisingly stiff fight and given pause to the Coalition advance.  A ceasefire was called before the major tank battle could develop between the American VII Corps and the elite Republican Guards Divisions.¹⁷   

Southern Iraq and not Kuwait therefore had become the key theatre of operations.  The initial Iraqi deployment in the vast and empty flank consisted of the 12^th and 52^nd Iraqi Armored Divisions and six Infantry Divisions.  Their situational awareness was very low and they appear to have been totally surprised by the wide outflanking maneuver.  The best feature of the American plan was its deception effort towards the coast of Kuwait.  In this perception management exercise the Americans succeeded entirely and deserve full credit.

Optronics

By most parameters, the American M-1 Abrams, and the Russian built T-72 tanks of the Iraqis were more or less equally matched.  The major differential however was in their optronics.  In most engagements the image intensifier sights of the Abrams picked up the T-72s from well beyond a 1000 meters at night.  The IR night sights of the T-72, were hopelessly outranged.  Most future battles will take place at night.  Hence modern optronics will play a critical role and could give the decisive edge in tank-to-tank battles.  This is one of the most CRITICAL lessons of this war. In day engagements between the American 1^st and 3^rd Armored Divisions and the T-72 tanks of the Republican Guards, Medina Tank Division, the results were more even and this Iraqi formation gave a good account of itself.  In fact, the stiff resistance put up by this tank division was one of the contributory factors for the famous halt order of President Bush (Sr) of 28 Feb 1991.¹⁸

Basic Issues

The basic conceptual issues at the end of the war were still the fierce debate between the proponents of the Strategic paradigm of Information War versus the Operational paradigm.  John Warden and the American Air Force strategists felt that the Republican Guards were not the key Center of Gravity.  They formed the fifth and outermost concentric ring and need not have been tackled first.  The key center of gravity was Saddam Husssain and the Revolutionary Command Council. 

Repeated attempts were made to kill Saddam Hussain and target the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces headquarters.  Lack of precise targeting intelligence permitted Saddam Hussain to escape unscathed despite all the Cruise Missile and Gator Glide toss bombs designed for deep penetration of underground bunkers.  The attack on the Information Infrastructure and the top leadership however did cause significant paralysis.  The Republican Guards however survived unscathed.  These, so the American Army and Marines felt, were the key center of gravity.  Today, if the Americans are lamenting their halt order of 28 February 1991, it is precisely because it allowed the core of the Iraqi Army to escape and survive. The Armed Forces therefore are a key Center of Gravity of any state.  In War they have to be defeated/destroyed.  The very fact that the Americans are talking of a second invasion of Iraq today,  should serve to clinch the debate between the “Air-alone” strategists and the older Air- Land battle school which treated the enemy armed forces as the prime canter of gravity in war.

The Yugoslav Campaign

The American air offensive in the Yugoslav campaign first targeted the Serb armed forces.  Better defensive tactics, camouflage and concealment and more skilled Air Defense operators ensured that despite all the sound and fury, very little damage was done to the Serb Army.  The Yugoslav Information Infrastructure and Milosovic himself were targeted.  Once again, lack of precise targeting coordinates allowed him to survive the campaign.  The NATO air campaign began to drag on ineffectually.  The expenditure of PGMs was enormous and dangerously depleted the American stocks.  GPS kits were added on to conventional Gravity Bombs.  In desperation the Americans now targeted the third ring – the oil and power of Yugoslavia.  It was this that forced the Serbs to throw in the towel¹⁹.  The contest was far too asymmetric. Nonetheless the results achieved may not be permanent and a decade down the line we could well see a reversal/regression in the Balkans situation.    

The Afghan Campaign

Op Enduring Freedom was launched by the Anglo-American forces to topple the Taliban regime and destroy the Al-Qaida base in that wasteland.  The salient lessons of this campaign have been:

• The tremendously enhanced lethality of the Special Forces-Air Power combine. Very small teams of Special Forces (Operating in conjunction with the local opposition forces) have been able to cause very high rates of attrition by accurately designating targets for air strikes.  At the heart of this quantum jump in lethality is the new Laser Target Designation Binocular system called TAMER (Technology Advanced Mini Eye-safe   Range finder).  This was developed by the American Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DAPRA) and has turned out to be tremendous force multiplier in the Afghan campaign. Improved ground to air, light weight communications have further synergized the Special Forces-Air Power combination.²⁰.

• Enthused by the Afghan success, many American analysts have spoken of employing the same Special Forces-local opposition forces and Air Power combination against Iraq.   

• This could be a mistake; the two operational settings and contexts are vastly different. Notably:

(a) The Force to space ratio was extremely low in Afghanistan (40,000 Taliban versus 15,000 Northern Alliance). The low Force to space ratio permitted the American SF to operate unhindered.²¹

(b) The Force asymmetry levels between the Taliban and Northern Alliance were not as marked as would be between the Iraqi Army and the rag tag and disparate opposition groups of Iraq.²².

(c) The Taliban had pretensions to being a National Govt. Very foolishly it decided to fight the American in the city redoubts instead of in the classical guerilla style in the countryside.  It had survived the Soviet invasion only by adopting the guerilla warfare mode of operations.  It was bound to court disaster in a conventional conflict for it was nothing more than a rabble.  Even that rabble was disoriented due to the last minute withdrawal of Pakistani ISI/Military advisors and key personnel.  Fighting quality wise the Taliban was nothing more than half trained rabble.  Its fierce image had deliberately been hyped up by the Western Media in the phase when it wanted to use Jehad as leverage against the Central Asian States.  This Jehad unfortunately boomeranged on America itself and the Western Press was hoist with its own petard.

• It must be noted that one singular failure of the Afghan Campaign (as with the Iraqi and Yugoslav air campaigns) was its failure to kill the top Taliban /Al Quaida leadership.  Both Osama Bin Laden and Mulla Omar and a large number of Al Qaida and Taliban leaders have survived the American air offensive²³. Specific coordinates of such individual targets are still far too difficult to get and hence attacking John Wardens “first concentric ring” remains a difficult proposition.  However, attractive it may sound in theory, even the current state of the art technology does not give us the means for this very high precision engagement (unless the target is foolish enough to use cell phones or other electronic emitters).

The Iraqi Perspective

There is unfortunately, no Iraqi account available of this campaign.  One of the most perceptive analyses of the Iraqi strategy in the Gulf war is by Capt JD Mc Killip of the Canadian Army. He states “Iraq had a clear and sound national strategy supported by a consistent and logical operational strategy”²⁴.  After the initial shock of the realization that contrary to private assurances, America was going to intervene, Iraq conducted operations that were both consistent with its foreign policy goals and the military reality of confronting a Coalition of 26 technologically advanced nations²⁵.  Fundamental to understanding Iraqi Strategy, says Mc Killip is an acknowledgement that Iraq had no intention of fighting a war to retain Kuwait.  Iraqi National Strategy was based on the assumption that the International Community would condemn and then accept the annexation²⁶.  

Hussain’s obvious goal was to avoid a real war with the Coalition (because the result would have been  a foregone conclusion). The only reasonable strategy was to keep high value Iraqi forces away from the main battle areas to preserve them while using second-rate reservist formations to present a high defensive posture in Kuwait²⁷.   This made the Coalition forces very cautious and bluffed them into inaction for a few months. The committal of a few good infantry divisions in Kuwait could easily have extracted a very heavy cost in lives and acted as a dampener on the Coalition will to prosecute further operations into Iraq proper.  The key would have been to turn Kuwait city into a quagmire a la Stalingrad or Leningrad.  Such an Urban Warfare Centric strategy could hold the key to any future Iraqi plans for Gulf War II.

Gulf War II: Pattern Predictions Of a Future Conflict

American Options

It is obvious that both the sides have learnt their share of lessons from Gulf War these and I would be fully factored into any future conflict.  Based upon the pattern analysis of Gulf War I and subsequent American wars in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, we can make some heuristic predictions on the likely strategic options for Gulf War II for both the Americans and the Iraqis.  Basically there are three invasion models available to America.  These are listed below:

•     Desert Storm Encore Model (Air Land Battle).

•   John Wardens Air War Model.

• The Afghan Variant. (Special Forces-Air Power Combination)

Desert Storm Encore Model

Colin Powell during his tenure as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff had laid down the Powell doctrine.  This enunciated that in any future conflict American forces would not be committed in a piece-meal or halfhearted fashion (a la Vietnam) they would be “the biggest boys on the bloc”.  The formidable nature of the force architecture itself would ensure decisive victory.  Furthermore, American troop committal would only be made with a clear endgame resolution in sight.  Powell insisted upon a joint inter services effort and went to great lengths to tame the American Air forces vaulting single service ambitions.  Collin Powell was later to bitterly oppose the manner of NATO intervention in the Balkans.  The John Warden School however had its heyday in this latter conflict.

In the Afghan War, American strategists were highly averse to the idea of large-scale committal of ground troops to combat in Afghanistan.  The combination of Special Forces and Air Power worked well due to a number of factors listed earlier (low force to space ratio, the Taliban’s stupidity in opting for a conventional battle despite being an over rated rabble).  The success of the Afghan war has enthused American hawks to try and replicate this strategy in Iraq. It is interesting to note that Collin Powell has been consistently opposing an Iraqi adventure.  This could only stem from his realization that building a second ground war coalition for Gulf War II would be a very difficult proposition indeed.  It is noteworthy that in Gulf War I, the Coalition had built up a peak troop level of 795,000 men as against the final estimates of Iraqi troop strength in Kuwait of just 183,000.  The Force ratio built up for the offensive was almost in the region of 5:1.  The media hype of a small high-tech Western Force routing an antiquated but much larger Iraqi host was just hyperbole.   

If the Americans wish to replicate the Desert Storm build up, could they count on the European nations for troop committal? Even more critical is the fact of host nation support in the Middle East. Would Saudi Arabia or Jordan be willing in the existing inflamed political situation to host a large Coalition force for the invasion of Iraq?  In 1990, the Americans had panicked the Saudis into providing such support in the aftermath of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait.  After his war with Iran, Iraq had emerged as a significant regional threat and many Middle Eastern countries were frightened enough to offer support.  With the current highly inflamed political situation caused by the Palestinian – Israeli conflict, such support for Gulf War II is highly unlikely.

There are therefore, serious impediments to cobbling together a major Coalition on the Desert Storm one model.  The Force architecture then assembled over a six months period included:

          (a) An armada of 2700 combat aircraft (These had flown 110,000 sorties in 43²⁸ days and dropped over 88,000 tons of bombs.  7 percent of these were PGMs).

(b) 290 Tomahawk Cruise missiles had been fired against 200 targets in the initial strikes alone²⁹.

(c) The American Third Army (ex the Central Command) had spearheaded the ground offensive.  It had two Corps namely:

                    (i)     XVIII Air Borne Corps.

                             82^nd Air Borne Division..

                             101 Air Assault Division.

                             24 Mechanized Division (along with 3^rd Cav Regt).

                             French 6^th Light Armored Division.

                    (ii)     VII Corps.

                             US 1^st Armored Division.

                             US 3^rd Armored Division.

                             US 1^st Mechanized Division.

                             British 1^st Armored Division.

                             In addition it had an American Armored Brigade

                             and an Armored  Cavalry Regiment³⁰.

This works up to a vast juggernaut of a total of 11 NATO divisions consisting of three Armored, two mechanized, one Light Armored division along with two Airborne/Air assault  divisions and three Marine divisions.  Large contingents of the Arab forces are totally excluded from this massive orbat.  These amounted to a staggering total of 1,37,000 troops (from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Oman and Pakistan) in Gulf War I. They (along with the Marines) assaulted Kuwait frontally and would have borne the brunt of the heavy casualties if the Iraqi Army had stood up and fought.  This holding force architecture of Arab armies may be largely missing in Gulf War-II.  The French Armored Division is also not likely to be available for this conflict.  A mobile hammer (or mechanized) force without a large “anvil” of local contingents is not likely to be viable or capable of achieving spectacular and lasting results that  possibly entail an occupation of Iraq and forced change of regime.  This may entail a much larger manpower committal of Infantry and Marine divisions in a likely nightmare scenario of combat in built up areas.  The Iraqi Army, in all probability, has recovered from its war weariness and could be expected to give a better account of itself in close quarter battle in set piece engagements for the defense of the homeland.  Irregulars and local levies could also add to the casualties by sniping, ambushes and raids.  Quite obviously such a major ground war would have to be preceded by a 40-60 days long concerted air campaign that could start from the innermost ring of the leadership outwards.  If Saudi Arabia denies basing rights, a bulk of the air effort would have to come from offshore Naval Aviation.  Iraqi oil, industrial and information infrastructure is likely to be heavily targeted and could bring about the economic ruin of that country.  The key to success or failure therefore would be the morale of the population. Saddam Hussain (sans all the propaganda) is popular in his country and in the defense of the homeland per se; most populations do rise to the occasion.  This therefore is not likely to be a clinical and casualty free campaign.

It is doubtful if the fully overmatching force architecture for this encore for Desert Storm can be realistically built up.  The Saudis, Germans and Japanese had bankrolled the last war (Saudi Arabia had given 16.8 billion dollars, Germany had given 6.6 billion dollars and Japan 1.3 billion dollars).  This time around they are likely to be less generous.  There is no convincing casus belli for a massive invasion and nation state destruction exercise. From the point of being a Just war, enforcement of UN resolutions was used as a moral foundation for Gulf War I. This time the American hawks wish to leave the UN out of the loop entirely.   No wonder Colin Powell, the originator of the Powell Doctrine of overmatching force committals, is the odd man out in Washington over the rising crescendo for Gulf War II.  The American top brass also do not seem to be much enthused by the prospects of a massive ground war – especially if most of it may have to be fought in the cities and built up areas.

John Warden Air War Model

If a massive Air-Land operation exceeding the scale of Desert Storm is not viable the next best option is an Air offensive on the lines earlier proposed by John Warden and subsequently carried out in Yugoslavia.  The committal of air power resources would have to be far higher.  The rate of sortie generation may have to cross the Desert Storm benchmark of over 2500 per day as opposed to the Yugoslav peak level of 500-600 per day.  The Air war format could take the following form:

§         US pressurizes Iraq to accept UN inspection teams for locating weapons of mass destruction. 

§         Under the guise of such inspection, the US inspectors focus on the Presidential palaces of Saddam Hussain.  The aim would be gain precise coordinates for air strikes to eliminate him and the top Iraqi leadership.  

§