The Indo-Myanmar-Thai Highway: Impact on Insurgency in India’s Northeast

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Introduction

At Yangon, in April 2002, India, Myanmar and Thailand joined together to announce a landmark international highway project- a 1,400 km-long highway, aimed at completion in 18 to 24 months. This highway would establish a land corridor connecting India’s north-eastern region with Thailand via Myanmar.[i] The road will connect Moreh on the Indian side in Manipur with Mae Sot town in northern Thailand, passing through Bagan town in central Myanmar.

Major stretches of road already exist though in a dilapidated condition which would have to be improved and interconnected. It would not only provide land access to Thailand, but also could be extended to bring to fruition the great old idea of connecting Istanbul and Bangkok through a highway. For India the project has been described as another step forward in its ‘look east policy’- a policy that can best be described as ‘listless’. In the year 2001, former External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, during his visit to Myanmar inaugurated the Moreh-Tamu road link between the two countries. The latest project however, is important from the point of view of the idea of the trans-Asian highway, linking India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and possibly also China.

Importance of the Highway

Of the 5,000-kilometer combined perimeter formed by India's seven north-eastern states, only 250 kilometers are linked to the rest of the country, while the remainder borders China, Myanmar, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Nepal.[ii] Thus, it is imperative that the economies of these States are developed through a process of linkage with the Southeast Asian countries, rather than making them wholly dependant on the grants from mainland India.

India's emphasis on connecting the north-eastern region to the outside world could not have come at a more propitious time, for it is part of a larger project to build Eurasian land and rail corridors that could connect Singapore to Istanbul and Europe via both the Subcontinent and China.[iii] The essence of the triangular road diplomacy among India, Myanmar and Thailand is about linking the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. In economic and strategic terms, that will be no small change for India.[iv]

The government of India and the Myanmar signed the Indo-Myanmar border trade agreement in January 1994 to exchange goods produced locally by people living along both sides of the border as well as to create a mechanism to deal with foreign trade transactions. Accordingly, the first trade route between the two countries was opened in April 1995 at Moreh in Manipur and Tamu in Myanmar.

It goes without saying that bilateral trade would receive a boost as a result of the proposed highway. The highway would provide the transport infrastructure necessary for building and strengthening trade and economic interaction with all the member countries of the Association of the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Myanmar and Thailand. More importantly, the India’s north-east, one of the country’s economically backward areas, would become India’s gateway to the fast developing ASEAN region. Properly utilized, the highway would also lead to good relations between countries in the region who would see reason in strengthening the economic linkages among themselves.

However, more importantly, this road and the successive opening of the economy would legalize the already thriving economy, which for the most part falls under the illegal category. Recent media reports indicate that the Union Commerce Ministry has decided to close down three gates at the Moreh point in the wake of complaints filed by several trade bodies in the region. The move is expected to arrest the thriving illegal trade between India and Myanmar.[v] A look at the volume of the trade through the Moreh point underlines the need to legalize the trade pattern. This would not only control the uncertainties in the export figure, but also would bring it at par with the import volumes.  

Table1 : Year-wise volume of trade through Moreh Point (Amount in Rupees)  

Perils of the Highway: A view from India’s Northeast

Economic exchange apart, the road might end up facilitating the movement of the illegal elements as well. Such doubts have already been expressed in countries like Thailand. A seminar held in the country towards the end of the year 2001 warned that ‘convenient transport network could facilitate the immigration of alien workers and make Thailand once again prone to long-banished diseases such as malaria, elephantiasis, cerebrospinal meningitis and tuberculosis. A speaker at the seminar suggested that Thailand be prepared for illegal immigrants, smuggled goods, drugs and trans-national prostitution. Others said that the transport routes would facilitate drug traffickers and the operation of 40-50 drug factories near Thailand.[vi]

Perils of equally important nature can be predicted for India as well. Indian northeast, for years together, remains a hotspot where thousand mini wars are still being fought. Demands of the forces fighting the Indian State range from secession, autonomy to greater realization of their historical rights. Fights over imaginary homelands have led to thousands of deaths in the region and many more are in the offing. It would not be misleading to comment that all most all the States in the region are affected either directly by such insurgencies or suffer from a fall out effect.  As the security force personnel comprising of the State Police, Paramilitary forces and the Army battle it out with the ‘sons of the soil’, the neighboring countries of India, intentionally or without motive, provide safe houses, camps, routes for procurement of arms and ammunition. The building of the new highway must be analyzed from the perspective of easy connectivity, not only for the economic revival of the region but also from the point of view of easy access to such dark corners by the insurgents.

A prime reason behind the protracted and almost un-winnable war against insurgency has been the foreign bases and hideouts of the outfits.  Most of the outfits in the northeast have their bases in neighboring countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar. These camps give them the advantage of unhindered practice and the ability to carry out hit and run operations. The highway project must be viewed with the backdrop of such activities.

A Boon to Militancy?

Since the late 1950s, the State of Manipur has been witness to a number of insurgencies. In fact, a New Delhi-based research institute, the Institute for Conflict Management, in its database lists as many as 36 outfits that were active in some point of time or the other in the State.[vii] Between 1992 and 2000, as many as 3006 insurgency related deaths have been reported from the State that included an astounding 1411 civilians.[viii] While both the hills and the Imphal valley[ix] have been affected by the incidents of insurgency, the Moreh town on the Indo-Myanmar border has had a history of insurgency as well as ethnic conflicts. Being the last border town in Manipur, Moreh shares its borders with Namphalong market shed of Burma. In June 1995, number of deaths was reported in clashes between the Kukis and the Tamil population in Moreh.[x]  Only recently, on November 7, 2002 unidentified militants shot dead two brothers in Moreh town. The victims owned a shop selling readymade garments procured from Namphalong and Tamu towns of Myanmar.[xi]

There has been a considerable rise in crimes along the Indo-Burma border in the Manipur sector.[xii] The border with Myanmar remains porous. It is possible that operationalizing the Highway would import further trouble into the disturbed region.

On the other side of the border, Mae Sot town in Thailand, which the Highway proposes to link up with Moreh, is in the proximity of Manerplaw, which served as the headquarters of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and host of insurgencies in the mid 1980s. However, things stand transformed now. The famous Kachin rebel leader Brang Seng is known to be courting the Indian strategic services.[xiii]

Most of the outfits operating in the northeast have their administrative and military camps in Myanmar. Differences between these two countries, for long, prevented a comprehensive crackdown on such camps. It also needs to be appreciated that most of these camps are located in the un-administered areas of the country with the help of the local insurgent outfits especially the Kachins, who continue to challenge the might of the military junta in Myanmar.

The threat from Myanmar needs also to be analyzed from the angle of growing Chinese influence in that country. Even though there has been marked cooperation between the Myanmarese junta and the Indian authorities in terms of counter-insurgency operations[xiv], the Chinese interest in the northeast is bound to be viewed with suspicion.  The Chinese have emerged as the most important suppliers of military hardware to Myanmar's military regime.[xv] The Chinese have also been accused of supplying arms to the insurgents in the northeast. Thus, as a result of the opening the highway, such arms supply might not be traversing the long and arduous route from Thailand to Cox Bazar in Bangladesh and then to the northeast. It might start traveling directly from the source to the clients.

Similarly, linking up Thailand with the northeast would not only bring the legal segments of the Thai economy close to the Indian northeast, but also would open up the illegal arms bazaars much more palpably. Insurgent groups in the northeast including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Manipur depend for much of their weapons supply on the black-markets of Thailand.[xvi] Even a decade and half after the cessation of hostility in Cambodia, the country remains an bottomless arms dump, which caters to the needs of the malcontents of the whole of South and Southeast Asia. The highway just might end up facilitating the transshipment of these tools of terror.

In addition the whole system of financing these little wars remains woefully under-researched. While extortion and funding from foreign sources partly finances the activities of the outfits, most of them are involved in underground economic operation that perpetuates their existence. These operatives, with seemingly legal fronts, are responsible for converting most of these outfits into profit-making business ventures.  A report of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs on the militants of the northeast, in 2000 suggested that ‘In Bangkok, the National Socialist Council of Nagland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) General Secretary Th. Muivah's nephew Paul and his Thai wife, Walaila K Luengdong own a toy manufacturing company. The PLA chief RK Meghan has huge investments in blue chip companies in Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore.’[xvii] It is only natural to conclude that the returns from such activities go into funding the insurgent activities. The linking up of the economy might intensify such commercial inroads.     

Argument in Favour

Senior journalist B G Verghese notes, ‘Growth triangles and quadrangles or sub-regional economic zones have many advantages. At one level they emphasize local neighborhoods along national boundaries, with shared cultures and natural resources or useful complimentaries that can provide a bond. They can be most useful, both politically and economically, as a constructive element in developing a frontier policy and building better cross-border relationships.’[xviii] The proposed highway has the potential to cater to the economic needs of the concerned countries.

Verghese further maintains borders between countries must be used as doorways, and not as barriers. ‘Open economies foster growth and tend to have a positive cross-border spill over effect.’[xix] ‘In an increasingly integrated world economy, there is a good chance that the locale disadvantage of the North-East can be converted into an advantage.’[xx] In an age of independence policy of isolationism has minimal chance of benefiting the regions with a history of underdevelopment.

The votaries of the highway would argue against the assumption that the building up of the highway would facilitate the movement of the insurgents and lead to the aggravation of trouble in the region. The malcontents are less likely to use the monitored highway for their safari. They would on the contrary, continue to traverse the rough terrains avoiding the watchful eyes of the security force personnel. In addition, attempts by the insurgents to use the Highway to their advantage could be foiled through intensive and effective monitoring. Further check can be provided through bilateral agreements between India, Myanmar and Bangkok, in which each of the countries take a pledge not to allow any activity against the interests of the other countries from their own soils. Speaking to the media the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra said ‘Thailand has always recognized the threat of terrorism to the peace, security, progress and development of all nations across international borders. Combating terrorism in all forms must be part of a worldwide regional and sub-regional effort. We wholeheartedly support concerted actions within the international community, at both the bilateral and multi-lateral levels, to prevent and eliminate this threat’.[xxi] As Myanmar too cooperates with India in controlling the activities of the insurgents, effective check can be brought on the mechanisms of anti-India activities from across the border.

Conclusion