The Mufti’s  Gamble

Amitabh Dubey

A little over six years ago, Farooq Abdullah was elected the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. In an emotional speech after his swearing in, Abdullah promised to turn his troubled state into “heaven on earth once again” by wiping out the then weakening insurgency, re-instituting “autonomy” and negotiating with Kashmiri secessionists to draw them into the national mainstream. In a similar fashion another veteran Kashmiri politician, Mufti Mohammad Saeed, was elected the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir in October this year. A detailed common minimum program signed by members of the ruling coalition promised among other things to heal the “physical, psychological and emotional wounds” of the Kashmiri people, to consult all segments of opinion (viz. secessionists) without preconditions and to relax the pressure on the general public from the security forces. The Chief Minister began to implement his promises right away by releasing several prominent secessionists from prison, whom he described as “political prisoners”. Although he  appeared more circumspect than his predecessor—conceding that the challenge ahead “scared” him—the hopes and expectations raised are identical.

Yet, there remain some important differences between the two coronations. Farooq’s election  came at the beginning of the Talibanization of the insurgency. The Mufti ascends the Chief Minister’s throne at a more propitious time: The Taliban has lost its sanctuaries and Pakistan is under diplomatic pressure to reduce jihadi infiltration. The insurgency consequently is weaker today ( though no less aggressive), and its immediate prospects  appear clouded. The government’s mobilization after the attack on parliament in December 2001 has arguably placed an upper bound on Pakistan’s support for its jihadis. In other words, there exists a strategic opening.

Domestically, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has proved more dynamic than its predecessor, the National Conference, in its attempt to boldly reposition itself as the political vehicle for pro-azadi Kashmiri opinion. This historic step carries potential costs  and benefits for the Indian state. The benefits are that of course that the PDP might displace the Hurriyat Conference as the repository of Kashmiri nationalism and help integrate  it into the national mainstream, especially if the ruling coalition is able to deliver on its promises of improved welfare and economic development.  If the PDP succeeds in this venture, it could help improve the flow of intelligence to the security forces and help root out the more recalcitrant jihadis. Public pressure might encourage the Hizbul Mujahideen to experiment with a second ceasefire offer, especially since Pakistan would find it harder to sabotage a peace effort this time.

On the other hand, a quasi-secessionist strategy could backfire in at least two ways. One is simply that it could produce paralysis within the ruling coalition because the Congress Party is likely to be less tolerant of  secessionist opinion. Unlike the previous government, the PDP’s paltry 16 seats (in an assembly of 87) make it dependent on the Congress Party (with 20 seats) and on other allies for support. An incoherent political strategy would in turn invalidate the psychological gains produced by this election and make it harder to woo Valley voters. The president of the National Conference, Omar Abdullah, has already indicated that his party (which retains 28 assembly seats) will attempt to woo the pro-azadi vote by renewing its campaign for “autonomy”, and stands ready to take advantage of any discord in the ruling coalition. But another danger is that the counter-insurgent campaign is itself weakened, as populist measures like shutting down the Jammu and Kashmir Police’s Special Operations Group (SOG) reduce the flow of intelligence to the security forces.

The latter is not an inevitable development, and the PDP has begun to back away from its promise to close the SOG entirely (the common minimum program makes no mention of the SOG), but the fact that the PDP campaigned on an anti-SOG platform means that its actions will be carefully watched. The SOG was set up in 1994 in the image of the Punjab Armed Police. Fighting terrorism is hard to do without local police support, since the best intelligence is provided by local sources.  The need for a local force  better suited than central paramilitary or army units to combat insurgency in urban areas was deeply felt. As in Punjab, this strategy came at a cost. The combatant culture and the financial and career incentives required to motivate policemen to take on dedicated jihadis are also likelier to produce adventurism and a disregard for human rights. This has led to a paradoxical situation in which the SOG is both an effective fighting force because of its intelligence gathering abilities and is despised for the human cost that  its operations impose. Hence, the PDP found it to be an effective target for political mobilization.

The key tactical question is whether restraining the SOG would hamper or aid the counter-insurgent effort. If the SOG’s tactics indeed antagonize a large section of the populace that might otherwise cooperate more fully with the government, then a reduction in SOG activity would be a good thing, and it would also help the security forces. However if the de facto disbanding of the SOG would create an intelligence vacuum that would encourage terrorism, then it would be a serious error. This is really a pragmatic rather than an ideological question, and is not an easy one to answer. A “hearts and minds” strategy really requires the state to ease up pressure on the general population, but poor timing could make things worse.

To sum up, the victory of the PDP-Congress coalition represents a real revival of the political process. The election campaign in 2002 witnessed greater participation from Valley Kashmiris than did the tepid campaign of 1996, which suggests a genuine opening. The average secessionist may not be ready to embrace the “idea of India”, but he or she is certainly weighing a tentative handshake.

The Mufti’s dilemma can best be summarized by mixing metaphors drawn from Kashmiri cuisine. If the yakhni (a Kashmiri soup) is too hot, the coalition might collapse. If the yakhni is too cold, the PDP will become just another National Conference, and the status quo will continue. And if the yakhni is just right, the jihad will launch an all out assault before it inevitably dies, and there will be a heavy price to be paid.

To the author it is also heartening to observe  that the combined forces of the Inter-Services Intelligence, the Taliban and the “International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders” have been unable to dislodge Kashmir’s political families. Indian democracy is resilient indeed!