Post-2002 Crisis: Its Time to Wake Up!

Amit Gupta

Introduction 

It now seems that India and Pakistan have temporarily averted a war. It is time, therefore, to see what lessons can be learned for crisis behavior, Indian defense capability, and for the emerging trilateral negotiations between India, Pakistan, and the United States. India's leadership has painted the crisis as a "victory without war" and while most of India's diplomatic objectives have been met serious defense, diplomatic, and long-term strategic issues need to be addressed.

Assessing the Crisis

The following arguments have been made in an attempt to assess the crisis:

1) Indian officials have argued that the country successfully engaged in crisis diplomacy. It was able to get Pakistan to back down from its support for cross border terrorism and agree, at least to Deputy Secretary Armitage, to dismantle the terrorist training camps.

2) Nuclear deterrence worked. A claim made by both General Musharraf and President Abdul Kalam albeit with different rationales in mind.

3) India's nuclear and conventional capabilities could work to seriously hurt Pakistan in a war.

4) Pakistan succeeded in internationalizing the Kashmir crisis and the United States has been dragged into the dispute as a permanent mediator.

5) President Musharraf claimed that if a war took place, Pakistan would launch an "offensive defense."

6) Some Indian officials and policy analysts believed that Pakistan's nuclear weapons had been "secured" by the United States and that they would not be used in a conflict.

The first thing to recognize is that coercive diplomacy did not work on Pakistan, it worked on the United States. It did not work because the Americans view India as a strategic partner with whom they have a special relationship. It worked because the United States was worried about the adverse impact on the war on terror in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan. The situation was similar to that during Desert Storm when Israel threatened to retaliate against Iraqi missile strikes and the United States feared that such an attack would destroy the international coalition that had been built up against Iraq. In the case of the May-June 2002 crisis there was also concern, albeit less so, of the impact of the world's first possible nuclear war. While the Bush administration has, under its new doctrine, talked of preempting terrorism by first strikes ( it is unclear what types of weapons would be included in this option), and Secretary Rumsfeld has not ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict, it becomes a different set of calculations when two countries actually employ such weaponry.

Permitting India and Pakistan to use nuclear weapons would have led to an open season on their use. Countries that could threaten American security interests notably Iran, Iraq, Libya, and N. Korea would have been given a justification to use nuclear weapons to defend themselves. And now preemption is being touted as a defensive measure something that has been considered a rather dubious justification under international law. It was these considerations that created a concerted international response rather than any successful attempt to brow beat Pakistan into discontinuing a decade long policy of supporting cross border terrorism and there in lies the danger. The next time the United States may not be in a similar position of vulnerability or not even be in the region.

The fact is that despite delusions about the importance of South Asia, Stephen P. Cohen correctly argued in the mid-1970s that South Asia had no intrinsic value to the United States. Its value came from emerging events in the international system. Cohen's argument remains valid today. There are no strategic resources in South Asia. Emotional ties with the region are few especially when compared with those the U.S. has with Europe or Israel. Despite market reforms, trade with the region remains insignificant. And India is at least a decade away from emerging as a serious international rival to China.

The United States has been interested in South Asia for specific events that had little to do with the internal characteristics of the region. In the 1950s it was because Pakistan fit into the United States' plans to contain the Soviet Union and Peshawar could be used for launching U-2 flights over the U.S.S.R. In the 1980s it was the war in Afghanistan, and now, in the new millennium, it is because Pakistan is a country that happens to be next to Afghanistan. At some point of time the United States is going to have to declare the mission in Afghanistan over and then Pakistan is free to resume its support for Kashmiri terrorist groups (This may happen sooner rather than later given that Afghanistan is getting increasingly embroiled in the domestic feuds between warring tribal groups and the Karzai government has little respect or legitimacy outside Kabul). That is a strategy that no Pakistani government military or democratic is going to give up. Fueling the Kashmir insurgency has very little to do with ideas of Kashmiri rights or Pakistani identity. As I have argued elsewhere, it keeps India tied down in Kashmir and thus strengthens Pakistan's security. Moreover there are no alternative strategies vis-à-vis India in Pakistan. When the crisis of May-June 2002 was ongoing President Musharraf suggested that the denuclearization of South Asia, the buildup of a conventional Pakistani military capability, and a settlement of the Kashmir issue would help bring peace in South Asia. None of these approaches helps bring stability to the region.

Denuclearization would leave Pakistan severely disadvantaged against India and any infusion of conventional weaponry would not shift the military balance that is currently in India's favor and continues to shift in its favor. As India builds up its armed forces with new aircraft like the Su-30 and the Mirage 2000,more ships and submarines, and a new generation of battle tanks, the conventional balance is only going to increase. For Pakistan the problem is that, unlike the 1950s and early 1960s, it does not have a weapons supplier that will provide it with better quality weapons at greatly subsidized rates or for free.

As for Kashmir the problem is that Pakistanis have not recognized two facts. First, Kashmir, as Sisir Gupta argued, is the symptom and not the disease that infects India-Pakistan relations. If Kashmir were to become a part of Pakistan tomorrow, and the problem is a lot more complicated than portrayed by Islamabad, it would still leave India as a country of a billion odd people on Pakistan's doorstep. As the Pakistani scholar Aslam Siddiqui argued in 1948 , when a small country borders a large country the latter naturally seeks to dominate it. The small nation must, therefore, attempt to resist such domination. India would remain a very large power with all the capabilities of overshadowing and potentially dominating Pakistan. Pakistan's security dilemma would not be resolved. Second, if Kashmir were to go to Pakistan it would give the Hindu far-right the legitimacy it needs amongst a larger group of Indians and the question for Pakistan would then be, "Do you want to live next to one billion angry Indians who support a regime with a nasty ultra nationalist agenda?" The fact of the matter is that the BJP has taken a more moderate line than expected on foreign policy. It took the initiative on the Lahore summit and invited General Musharraf to Agra despite his role in creating the Kargil crisis. An ultra nationalist government is unlikely to negotiate especially if it believes
that its technological superiority, growing economic strength, and its links with external powers are likely to allow it to prevail against Pakistan. Also, from an Indian perspective, it does not make sense to help create an independent Kashmir which then becomes a latter day Afghanistan a base for terrorist operations throughout South Asia.

The chances of a meaningful settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan remains bleak. Nor can New Delhi bank on a regime change in Islamabad leading to a better understanding between the two countries. Neither Benazir Bhutto nor Nawaz Sharif have the imagination or the courage to forge a new policy towards India and to rein in the military. What then should be India's policy towards Pakistan and how does the United States and the west fit in?

The U.S., the West, and 9/11

In the aftermath of 9/11 the attitude in the west towards Islamic insurgencies has hardened. Thus whether it is a Kashmiri Islamic insurgency with "guest Islamic terrorists" in it, or it is a Palestinian insurgency where the majority just happens to be Muslim, there is little sympathy for such movements. The Pakistanis have recognized this and it is this western attitude that was partially responsible for President Musharraf's decision to stop backing the Kashmiri insurgent groups. It is unlikely that in the near future western public opinion and state policy is going to change on this issue. Secondly, the Kashmiris are not the Palestinians, the Pakistanis are not the Israelis, and in the eyes of the United States government South Asia is not the Middle East. Unlike the Palestinian case, there are ethnic, religious, and political divisions in Kashmir that makes it one of the world's more intractable problems. This difficulty is reflected in some of the solutions that have been advanced the most recent of which is the short sighted plan for the trifurcation of Kashmir. Pakistan, unlike Israel, does not have the ability to try and seek a successful military solution of the problem. And the United States is not going to serve as the long term mediator in the region.

The United States is not going to invest in South Asia. the time, resources, and prestige that it does in the Middle East Not only is the region of a lower level of importance but the Bush Administration does not have a proactive view of world order. In its initial foreign policy proposals the Bush Administration was more interested in pursuing a policy of unilateralism, establishing national missile defense, and in dealing with the potential challenge posed by China. Since 9/11 the policy became reactive to the terrorist threat as evidenced by the sudden push to set up bases in Central Asia and the befriending of Pakistan. The reactive nature of U.S. foreign policy was also evident in the reaction to the Middle East crisis with the initial attempt to stay out of the Israel-Palestine problem. As the costs of 9/11 start to be totaled there will be a disinclination to engage in long term commitments outside regions that are not critically important to the United States. Long range mediation over Kashmir, therefore is a nonstarter. The U.S. is unlikely to intercede and call Prime Minister Vajpayee and General Musharraf to Camp David to knock heads together to reach an agreement. What it will do is put pressure on both countries to resume a dialogue and here it is in the Indian interest to talk to Pakistan although not on Kashmir. A dialogue on Kashmir, set on Pakistani terms, is out of the question because it would stall, just as the Agra summit of 2001 did, on Pakistani intransigence on Kashmir. What can and should be discussed with Pakistan is the latter part of the 1999 Lahore declaration on nuclear issues specifically the attempts to safeguard one's nuclear forces from unauthorized use, theft, and accidental launch.

In the United States concern is being expressed about the safety of Indian and Pakistani nuclear systems and there has been talk of using some of the measures developed in the Cooperative Threat Reduction agreements with the states of the former Soviet Union to help secure South Asian nuclear arsenals. There has also been discussion of safeguarding the nuclear arsenals of both sides by supplying Permissive Action Links (PALs) that would lock the weapons and prevent unauthorized use. These concerns are primarily focused on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal because India's democratic structure and civil-military relationship are viewed as being strong enough to prevent unauthorized use.

It might be difficult for Pakistan to accept help from the United States in safeguarding its arsenal given the short-term nature of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and the problems that lie within it. Thus while the United States views Pakistan as an ally in the war on terrorism it remains concerned about the Pakistani willingness to use nuclear weaponry and the fear that these weapons might fall into the wrong hands. This has led to press reports about the U.S. "securing" Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and of plans for American and Israeli commandos to capture these weapons and their production facilities if the possibility of a Pakistani use occurred. A Pakistani government would, therefore, find it difficult to trust any such proposal from the United States. India, similarly, is unlikely to allow U.S. officials to look at bomb designs to provide the kind of locking devices and safety measures used on American warheads. India and Pakistan need to discuss how to do this and to provide proof to each other that it has been accomplished. One way to do this is for the Pakistan to talk to China*which in the past has provided substantial assistance in the nuclear and missile spheres to Islamabad.

Pakistan's Mindset

Ambassador Chinmoy Garekhan makes the point that Indians tend to treat Pakistanis as fellow Indians and, therefore, are much more generous in their dealings with that country than with other states. Thus India is far tougher in its negotiations with China than it is with Pakistan. The Indian government continues to ask for the return of Aksai Chin, a frozen tundra, while no one in
India, since 1972 (with the possible exception of L. K. Advani), has asked for the return of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. So we now have a situation where CNN reporters describe Srinagar as Indian occupied Kashmir while Muzaffarabad is called Pakistan. Pervez Musharraf's ancestral home in Delhi was renovated at great cost yet the General showed little or no interest in it and the Indian media fawns over the general when he comes to India.

The only official who treated Musharraf with the contempt he deserved was Air Marshall Tipnis. The Air Chief refused to salute a Pakistani General who carried out the Kargil operation (even as Prime Minister Vajpayee was talking peace in Lahore), led an army that tortured Indian soldiers (a clear violation of the Geneva Convention), and he refused to take back the bodies of his dead troops (who were then buried with full military honors by India). Yet Indian officials continue to treat Pakistan and as part of the Indian family and not as a foreign country. So the question we need to ask is, what is the advantage of this policy of treating Pakistanis as wayward but culturally akin people? There is nothing to be gained from it. Pakistan has the world's largest illegal arms bazaar, it is a hotbed for terrorism, it has backward laws that denigrate women, it is a major conduit for drugs, and it cheats at cricket.

In contrast, Pakistanis have no delusions about India. They see India as a threat because of its size, its democratic status, its intellectual strength, its cultural diversity, the role of women in Indian society, and the freedom that comes from being a pluralistic society. That is why in Pakistan there is a concerted effort to discuss India-Pakistan relations in terms of two historical events the partition of 1947 and the war of 1971. Thus Pakistanis still talk of the two nation theory even though it was disproved with the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh has a coherent national identity based on language, culture, and ethnicity it does not need the crutch of radical Islam to legitimize itself and while relations between India and Bangladesh have their own set of problems they stem from state to state disputes and not from visceral issues of religion and identity. 1971 is seen as evidence that the Indians will dismember Pakistan because New Delhi is not reconciled to its existence. Pakistanis conveniently ignore that Indira Gandhi stopped the Indian Army from continuing the war in West Pakistan when it would have been militarily feasible to do so. In short the only way Pakistan would feel secure with India is if it became a hard-core Hindu fundamentalist state which is unlikely to happen or if it broke up into many smaller pieces. Solving Kashmir would only encourage Pakistani nationalists to drive a larger wedge into the Indian polity.

Military Readiness

The fact that Pakistan views India as a serious threat to its territorial integrity is apparent in its warfighting plans. Unlike India, which views nuclear weapons as the weapons of last resort, the Pakistanis are likely to use them very quickly in a war. If Kargil was any indication, the Pakistanis were arming their warheads even though it was clear that India was not going to cross the Line of Control and was unlikely to expand the conflict beyond the Kargil-Drass sector of Kashmir. Further, recent reports indicate that the Pakistanis have developed tactical nuclear weapons precisely to hit Indian troops early in a conflict. Couple this with the large missile inventory that Pakistan has purchased from N. Korea and China and it becomes suicidal to disregard Pakistani intentions.

General Musharraf was not bluffing when he test fired the Ghauri, Abdali, and Ghaznavi missiles. Incidentally, could someone tell the Pakistan military to take the Chinese markings off their missiles before they test fire them? It makes their claim of an indigenous missile program laughable. In a future war the Pakistanis will exercise the nuclear option because there seems to be little understanding in that country about what the consequences of a nuclear exchange would be. The international community has not been forceful enough in suggesting that the first use of nuclear weapons is tantamount to committing genocide. In fact there should be a strong international move to make try anyone who uses nuclear weapons first in the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.

India's political leaders, therefore, need to wake up from this belief that they can wage a war with Pakistan and expect it to adhere to civilized rules of combat. Instead, India has to be prepared to face a nuclear attack. If that happens, India must be in the position to react quickly and forcefully to destroy Pakistan's long term warfighting capability. That would require putting
the Nuclear Command Authority in place, deploying weapons at locations that make them militarily usable, and, most importantly, getting the military fully involved in the nuclear mission.

To sum up, Pakistan was not deterred in May-June 2002 by Indian coercive diplomacy. It was deterred by American pressure. It is clear that General Musharraf views the promise to halt infiltration as a stop gap measure and not a permanent state of affairs. Thus there are limits to American pressure and to American interest in the region. If that is the case, India needs to be able to exercise its options effectively to stop the terrorist state that is Pakistan.

Amit Gupta is the author of Building an Arsenal: The Evolution of Regional Power Force Structures and the co-editor, with Raju G.C. Thomas, of India's Nuclear Security. His latest major article was, "N plus 20? India's Third Tier Nuclear State Dilemma," Asian Survey Vol. 51, No. 10, November/December 2001.