Positive-Sum Game Accruals in US-India Relations

Anupam Srivastava

Three sets of issues impinge crucially upon the decisional calculus of the governments of the United States and India as one examines the evolving strategic template of their bilateral relations in recent months. The foremost relates to the US response to the attacks on September 11, 2001 (hereafter referred to as “9/11”). The second relates to the challenges and opportunities in establishing a more technology-embedded framework of India’s engagement with the United States, among others.[i] And the third relates to a broader set of politico-strategic factors that influence the landscape of Asian security and prosperity within which both the United States and India conceptualize and pursue their respective national interests and policies. This article will confine itself to the discussion of only the first two sets of issues, although the third factor will serve as the cognitive backdrop to the overall narrative and the embedded analysis.[ii]

Post 9/11 Environment and US Response

US relations with Pakistan, for obvious and important reasons, were deeply influenced by the events of 9/11. However, it is important to stress that the post 9/11 US approach toward India and Pakistan is not a simple return to status quo ante reminiscent of the Cold War era.

In a longitudinal sense, US policy toward India and Pakistan had begun a process of hesitant and episodic shift from the earlier “zero-sum game” to a “positive-sum game” dynamic by 1996-97. The nuclear tests of May 1998 rudely jolted this process but concerted and skillful bilateral diplomacy had essentially restored the process by the end of 1999. Thus, the earlier approach of “balancing” India and Pakistan was being set aside for the new approach where non-zero sum outcomes were considered feasible, even desirable, in the US decisional calculus.

There were varied reasons for this gradual shift. In the US policy discourse, it was argued that effective US leadership in the post-Cold War era necessitates a paradigm shift from the earlier mindset. Constructing strong, if bounded, partnerships with “pivotal states”[iii] in key regions of the world would ensure desirable outcomes. This approach would obviate the need to commit inordinate policy attention and attendant resources, as well as preempt criticism stemming from strong direct presence in that region.

Developments within South Asia also impinged upon the domestic discourse, and policy outcomes, in the United States. India’s sustained economic growth and growing consensus for accelerating the reforms, along with greater pragmatism in its foreign policy and national security discourse, enhanced the claims for closer attention. On the other hand, Pakistan’s sluggish economy revealed deep structural malaise, with continued enervation of democratic institutions of governance. These factors, apart from Pakistan losing much of its relevance as a front-line state against the Soviet threat, provided the rationale for the gradual US policy shift vis-à-vis South Asia.

In this context, an element with long-term bearing upon US policy toward South Asia needs to be stressed. This relates to the differing prioritization of factors in policy formulation by the Democratic versus the Republican proponents in US policy debate. At the risk of over-simplification, one can state that in South Asia, where significant US economic interests are not at stake, the Democratic party, on balance, has accorded primacy to the non-proliferation agenda (both nuclear and missile).

On the other hand, the Republican administration under the stewardship of George W. Bush has attempted to situate its policy toward South Asia within the framework of its overall conception of Asia.[iv] It perceives the region to be a vital locus for economic and technological dynamism for at least the next two decades, as well as a zone with unsettled security equations amongst the major players, namely China, Russia, Japan and India. Thus, without downgrading the salience of the non-proliferation agenda regarding South Asia, Republicans have sought a wider engagement with India, and a more limited agenda of engagement with Pakistan.

A related aspect that bears iteration is the centrality of vital American national interests that ultimately determine the nature, scope and mode of US involvement with any country or region. This was demonstrated most conclusively by the American response to 9/11. A few days before the attacks, on September 1, the US State Department had placed China Precision Machinery Import- Export Corporation (CPMIEC)[v] and Pakistan’s National Development Complex (NDC) under sanctions, triggered by the transfer of parts for the nuclear-capable Shaheen-I and Shaheen-II missiles.  The Chinese transfers, of items covered under Category II of the Annex of the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime), violated its commitment to abide by the MTCR guidelines.[vi] These transfers were spotted by a US satellite on May 1, 2001 as the convoy crossed the Sino-Pakistan land border.

However, in the aftermath of 9/11, all major US sanctions against Pakistan were lifted, including the ones imposed upon both NDC and CPMIEC. On September 22, Glenn, Symington and Pressler sanctions, imposed dueto Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, were waived for U.S. national security reasons. On October 17, after General Musharaff’s decision to “join” the “war against terrorism”, US Congress voted to allow President Bush to waive the coup-related sanctions pursuant to Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Nevertheless, as stated at the outset, it is critical to underline that 9/11 has not meant a return to the earlier zero-sum approach in US policy. The revised aims and expectations of US engagement with Pakistan reflect the primacy of counter-terrorism, but this does not contradict what the US perceives as the domain of its shared interests with India.

To be sure, there is a common agenda of what the United States seeks in its relations with both Pakistan and India over the longer term. This includes various items on the non-proliferation agenda (ranging from CTBT and FMCT, to strengthening dual-use export controls, and materials protection, control and accounting or MPC&A in civilian nuclear facilities); the doctrinal and operational aspects of nuclear and missile development & deployment; command & control issues; safety & security of weapons-related installations, and, of course, de-escalation of tensions and an enduring solution to Kashmir. However, beyond this common agenda, the ambit of US interests in Pakistan diverges considerably from its interests in India.

This wider role for Pakistan in the US-led “war on terrorism” is geared to systematically eliminate all future threats of extremism emanating from its soil, or by its actions or influence elsewhere, that can threaten US territory, assets or forces abroad. In this context, securing control of part of the Pakistani military base in Jacobabad for the US Air Force and building a US base in Sargodha, indicate the serious commitment of long-term US presence in Pakistan to pursue the above aim. Similarly, the decision to build military bases in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan underscore US intent to purge the threat of extremism to its national security from Pakistan as well as Central Asia. An allied US goal is to ensure that the custody of Pakistani nuclear facilities, or the area around these installations, does not fall into physical control of the jehadis or elements sympathetic to that cause.

Public support for Musharraf, according to the US assessment, serves several purposes in pursuit of the above goal. For one, it sends a strong signal to the corps commanders, Army GHQ, ISI and the top Pakistani military leadership that Musharraf is “untouchable,” in order to ward off any coup attempts against him. For another, the quid pro quo expected is that in return for this show of public support, along with economic bailout packages and other assistance, Musharraf will incrementally cleanse the domestic polity of elements inimical to US interests.[vii]

The above issue derives greater significance from the US assessment that despite all its shortcomings, the Pakistani Army remains a disciplined organization where coups are staged by generals, not lower rank officers. The end of the US IMET (International Military Exchange and Training) program with Pakistan following the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan has meant atrophying of sustained relations with the junior officer corps of Pakistan. The Pentagon suspects that in the intervening years, some officers with pro-Taliban sentiments, many of whom were recruited during Zia ul Haq’s tenure, have risen to the rank of majors and even colonels, but not generals. With Musharraf removing the two generals implicated in nefarious ties with Al Qaeda, the obvious US expectation in return from granting him unflagging support is that he has the latitude to demand total loyalty from his top brass. As such, the onus, and the accountability, for cleansing the Army vests with Musharraf.

A second set of US objectives is to enlist cooperation from Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in severing the intricate horizontal, often vertical, linkages between extremist outfits across Central Asia. In this context, the US government closely monitors the statements and actions within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrghistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as its newest member (in 2001).[viii] It is understood that both India and Pakistan had expressed interest in joining the SCO but no knowledge of any formal discussion on this matter is available in the public domain.

In the post-Cold War period, Central Asia has been plagued with the menace of drug-trafficking, illegal small arms trade and religious extremism, and their growing inter-linkages with elements across West Asia, the Caucasus, as well as South Asia. Indeed, in recent years, strategic analysts have noted the growing economic dimensions of the demand for the independence of Kashmir. Such analyses note a dangerous trend emerging in the drug trafficking business, one that attempts to connect the “Golden Crescent” (comprising Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) to the“Golden Triangle” (comprising Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam). This is sought to be done via the disputed territory of Kashmir, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, in order to link the two drug markets that, alongwith the illegal small arms market, are collectively estimated at around $6 billion annually.[ix]

Given the harsh terrain and fragile economies of the Central Asian states, exploration of the considerable energy assets located on their territories would improve their economic prospects and might dampen the impulse for greater violence. However, in all scenarios of exploration and transportation of oil and natural gas from this region, whether through inter-state highways or over-land pipelines, cooperation of relevant States Parties would be paramount. This is yet another reason for greater policy coordination to address the principal economic and political underpinnings of terrorism in the region. For all of the above reasons, the United States is likely to remain engaged with Pakistan and the Central Asian states, and the shadow of this engagement will fall upon its relations with India, but not necessarily in negative ways 

Lessons for India

This section summarizes the key conclusions for India that devolve from the preceding analysis. The foremost set of derivatives relates to Kashmir and the recent military-diplomatic maneuvers. Following the dastardly attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, New Delhi’s decision to deploy troops in requisite operational configurations, backed up by resolute but not inflexible diplomacy, yielded salutary accruals from Washington and other major international capitals. The terms of Indian phased pullback of forces, contingent upon Pakistan living up to its publicly-enunciated commitments to turn off the spigot of cross-border insurgency, is also a mature step and is recognized as such in most policy circles.

On balance, India appears to have won this latest battle in the “war of attrition” against Pakistan, in the process reserving the right to reassemble its forces, and even attack select terrorist camps across the LOC, should Pakistan prove unable or unwilling to live up to its word. This is a significant development, from both an operational-military as well as a psychological standpoint. For all the talk about the inadmissibility of a conventional confrontation below the nuclear threshold, India’s experience in Kargil, and its qualified success in this current standoff, demonstrate otherwise. This is not to suggest a nonchalant approach for the future, particularly given the horrific consequences of a possible nuclear confrontation. Rather, it is to submit that if India takes calibrated steps to counter a Pakistani aggression, and conveys its resolute will to the adversary and the international community, then its prospects for triumph are much brighter.

One lesson, however, that the Indian military-diplomatic leadership should take from this current round and apply in any future situation, is to clearly indicate that any Indian attack would be limited to a small area within a few kilometers of the LOC in “Azad Kashmir/POK.” The onus of expanding the theater of conflict, including rattling the nuclear saber, then rests with Pakistan. Further, Pakistan is on record considering all of Kashmir to be disputed territory. As such, an attack on POK could not be construed as an attack on Pakistani territory per se. Either that, or Pakistan does consider POK as its sovereign territory. In that case, it should live up to its commitment to stop the use of all its territory for launch of terrorist actions against any country, including India. And if it is unwilling or unable to do so, then it loses the sovereign right to protect that territory from limited Indian counterattack should the region continue to abet cross-border terrorism.

The above argument is not designed to be polemical or provocative. Rather, it is to illustrate in sharper relief that Pakistan’s strategy of use of force (and abetting of terrorism) to wrest a military solution of Kashmir on its own terms has become untenable, and increasingly even in its domestic discourse. In any event, Musharraf’s post 9/11 decision to join the war against terrorism has increasingly shrunk his room for domestic maneuver, so much so that he has reportedly begun to question, in private counsel, the wisdom of pursuing the plebiscite issue.[x]

The second set of implications for India from the recent standoff and international diplomatic intervention relates to the immediate steps regarding the Indian side of Kashmir. GOI needs to take all appropriate steps to reduce human rights violations, ensure free and fair polls in J&K in October, and invite the international media to monitor this to the extent feasible. In the meantime, it should expend requisite economic resources to revive the state’s economy, in tandem with appropriate political resources to discuss genuine devolution of administrative powers to Kashmir with the entire spectrum of political leadership in the state.

A third set of implications relates to the bandwidth within which cooperation by the United States, indeed the international community, is likely to be situated regarding Kashmir. To begin with, given New Delhi’s reluctance to any third-party mediation regarding Kashmir, it should only expect private US admonishment to the Pakistani leadership for abetting cross-border insurgency. Moreover, Washington would not be prepared to place additional pressure on Musharraf to completely end all support to insurgency in Kashmir lest this stiff demand upset his precarious equilibrist act and endanger larger US interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Central Asia.

As such, it is far more productive to pursue avenues of US assistance in enhancing Indian national technical means (NTMs) for counter-terrorism, specifically designed to upgrade the Indian technical capability for surveillance and interdiction of insurgents. Valuable steps in this direction include the April 2002 purchase of 8 weapon locating radars (AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder manufactured by Raytheon Co.), joint military exercises in Agra, and future exercises – some simulating high altitude combat akin to fighting in Kashmir - planned in both India and the United States.  Some of this was fine-tuned during the July 2002 visit to the United States by the Indian Air Force Chief. The fifth round of meetings in Washington in July of the US-India Joint Working Group (JWG) on Counter-Terrorism, building upon the excellent previous work, ably complemented this process. The essence of this cooperation, particularly in the area of real-time intelligence-sharing, lies in improved US understanding of challenges faced by India in containing the cross-border component of the problem in Kashmir. The upcoming trips of Secretary Powell and his deputy, Armitage, signal Washington’s intent to remain engaged at senior levels beyond the current Indo-Pak standoff.

A fourth, and most important, set of derivatives relates to the final solution of Kashmir. As the above analysis elucidated, it is increasingly clear that use of force to redraw the existing boundary in Kashmir (meaning other than the CFL/LOC/IB)[xi] will not be tolerated by the international community, and no other viable avenue to redrawing the boundary remains. The inescapable conclusion from this is that the eventual solution of the boundary lies in the political domain, and at “LOC or thereabouts” (details to be worked out between working groups of India and Pakistan). It is time the political leadership in India makes a sustained attempt to generate national consensus around the final settlement of Kashmir, and accordingly take a pro-active approach on the matter. A reactive approach, in the face of relentless Pakistani use of international media, is unhelpful and ultimately sterile.

Additionally, the Indian strategic community must complement this task, including recognizing the crucial distinction between the “all or nothing” approach on Kashmir by Pakistan’s ruling leadership versus the mature analysts in Pakistan’s public policy discourse. The latter are genuinely concerned with human rights abuses in Kashmir and seek greater political representation and economic opportunities. Therefore, the Indian strategic community should build pressure on GOI for genuine devolution of economic and political rights to the people of Kashmir, and hold it to a higher standard of transparency and accountability in its governance of Kashmir. This approach would complement the growing voice from the Pakistani side, and hasten the process of “negotiated settlement.”

Finally, it should stress that one of the unfortunate consequences of this “war of attrition” with Pakistan reflects in the growing polarization of Hindu-Muslim sentiments in India. This was in stark evidence during the riots in Gujarat in March-April 2002, and threatens the Indian secular fabric, especially in the external judgment. This implies that until Kashmir festers, non-proliferation and WMD deployment-related issues will continue to cast a long shadow over the positive agenda of US-India engagement. Further, the unsettled Kashmir dispute will remain like an albatross around the neck of Indian aspirations, and greatly circumscribe its options to emerge as a strong actor on the Asian stage and beyond.

Matrix of US-India Technology Cooperation

A careful assessment of India’s engagement with the advanced industrial countries reveals an increasingly calibrated mix of economic, security, and politico-strategic policies. The salutary dividends of this overall approach signal both the growing pragmatism in India as well as the need to consolidate these accrualsfor the longer term. In this context, the biggest impediment to India’s aspirations resides in the domain of non-proliferation. To a large extent, India’s capacity for rapid economic growth, defense forces modernization, technology-embedded investment flows, and all-round development, is feasible with increasing integration into the global matrix of security (and economic) institutions.

A related and almost inescapable inference from analyzing India’s engagement with these states is the extent to which they coordinate, even subordinate, their policies to those of the United States.[xii] The latter enjoys a unique unipolar moment with its unsurpassed power and capabilities, and brings them to bear in shaping the international system. The bulwark of this system, at least the one with crucial reference to India, is the non-proliferation order. Accordingly, this section confines itself to a discussion of issues most relevant to US-India dialogue regarding non-proliferation and export controls.

During the Cold War, the single-minded US pursuit to deny all advanced technology to states (including India) that could serve as a conduit for the Soviet Union, reached the point where non-proliferation became the lens through which Washington perceived the state of Indo-US relations. The post-Cold War years have removed several problems in this regard. Nevertheless, one testament to the continued importance of export controls in Indo-US context is the fact that following the nuclear tests of 1998, the United States included it as one of the four benchmarks in its subsequent dialogue with India.[xiii] Since then, bilateral efforts have traversed a good distance, with the two remaining US concerns being whether its technology could be diverted to military (WMD related) uses within India, and whether indigenously developed sensitive Indian technology could be exported, transferred, or smuggled to countries of US concern.

For the record, the Indian position vis-à-vis international agreements is that it has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in 1998 deposited a list of chemical weapons production sites to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at The Hague. Similarly, it has signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and has been an Observer at the Australia Group (AG). Since 1998, it has sent representatives to outreach seminars organized by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), but remains outside the NPT, NSG, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).

India has an extensive, long-standing and well-defined legal and procedural framework for export controls. In recent years, GOI has taken a number of additional steps to strengthen national export control regulations as also make the process more transparent to the domestic and international community. One such step is that classification of commodities and technologies has been progressively harmonized with EU classifications by revising the Indian control list (called “Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies” or SCOMET). As a rough index, the EU classification could be considered the median point between the Indian and US systems. As such, harmonizing Indian control lists with EU classification facilitates trade with EU, while also making Indian control lists more familiar to the US side and more compatible with US expectations and procedures.

In addition, under the Indo-US MOU of 1995, GOI provides extra guarantees for the end-use and re-export of imports from the United States. Since 1999, the two countries have exchanged three delegations that have discussed bilateral cooperation on export controls, with a fourth meeting scheduled for August 2002.[xiv] Indian delegations have expressed interest in adapting U.S. procedures and practices on training businesses regarding Internal Compliance Programs and automated licensing online.

In light of the above progress, most US concerns about diversion of technology, either to other countries or to WMD uses within India, can now be taken care of through specific agreements regarding re-exports and end-use verification. Accordingly, the most promising avenues of future US-India export control cooperation include more rigorous training of customs officials, establishment of exporter database, popularizing the need for internal compliance programs, and establishment of online procedures for processing export licenses. Regarding the last item, GOI has developed an Electronic Data Interchange, but its data bank and functioning need improvement. Finally, the US side can provide much valuable assistance to India from its vast experience in promoting greater government-industry partnership, and in regulation of intangible technology transfers to and from India,[xv] especially as India is becoming a significant exporter of IT software and services.

In conjunction with the above, a related avenue of US-India engagement should be on practical steps required to “reduce the distance” between India and the four multilateral export control arrangements (MECA), i.e., NSG, AG, MTCR, and WA. Instead of a detailed treatment of rapprochement with the MECA, brief elucidation of three clusters of issue areas would indicate the need for the Indian public policy community to examine them in greater earnest.[xvi]

The first relates to nuclear issues, including civilian nuclear energy, and broadly relates to CTBT, FMCT, NPT and NSG. It is fairly certain that India would not join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS), and no other category reflecting India’s post-Pokharan-II status as a possessor state is likely to be created or offered to it for joining. It is also fairly certain that India will develop and deploy a “credible minimum (nuclear) deterrent” (CMD) in the foreseeable future. What is not clear is what India’s stand is likely to be on CTBT and FMCT. Yet, clarity about the Indian stand on them is clearly linked to the prospects and terms of any rapprochement with the principal States Parties of the MECA.

Regarding India’s nuclear weapons program, either the Pokharan-II tests validated the operational parameters of the devices tested or they did not. Further, either new types of devices need to be tested before completely foreclosing the testing option or not. A decision to test would require a painful process of explaining to the international community why India wishes to swim opposite to the current of phased movement toward arms control and reduction, albeit unevenly enforced. In either case, clarity, and therefore consensus, on this subject needs to be generated. It is not sufficient to speculate that the refusal of the US Senate to ratify the CTBT implies it is now a dead treaty, or that India’s voluntary moratorium against further testing fulfils the essential requirements of CTBT. This issue is being raised because of its salience in the policies of the principal proponents of MECA.

A similar situation confronts India’s stance regarding the FMCT. Either the country has produced sufficient stockpile of fissile material or expects to reach sufficiency by the time negotiations on FMCT begin in earnest. Linked to this is the fact that either India’s CMD is open-ended or it is not. So far, GOI has assured the international community that civilian political oversight over its weapons program is designed, among other things, to ensure that the military would not periodically assess a growing level of threat, and hence demand a larger arsenal. This logic, that resulted in bloated Cold War arsenals of the P-5, stemmed from concerns regarding issues of targeting, redundancy, survivability, mobility, etc.

Thus far, India’s stance on FMCT appears similar to the US position in that it would agree to cut-off in future production of fissile material, but not on elimination of existing stockpiles. But greater clarity on this subject might be required soon. This is because the principal protagonists of multilateral regimes, stung by the US scuttling of BWC and problems in enforcing the CWC, are determined to revive the FMCT in earnest at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Rapprochement with MECA members regarding CTBT and FMCT assumes significance if significant technology cooperation with these states has to ensue. This also affects prospects for cooperation in the civilian nuclearenergy sector where GOI has set itself the target of generating 20,000mW of electricity by 2020 to meet the growing domestic demand.[xvii] Russia is building two 1000mw nuclear power reactors in Koodankulam which, added to existing domestic capacity, totals about 6000mW. Even if India is able to install additional indigenous pressurized water reactors (PWR), that appear to be working well by international standards, it will leave a shortfall of 6000-8000mW. This deficit represents an important opportunity for the United States (and France).

Russian intent to build additional reactors is complicated by its obligations under the NSG (which it joined in 1992), that require the recipient country to place all its nuclear facilities under “fullscope safeguards” ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since this would imply India placing its civilian as well as weapons-related facilities under international safeguards, GOI is understandably not prepared for this.[xviii]

One modus vivendi being explored is for GOI to “island” all its weapons-related facilities, and place all civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards. The net consequence of this would be to place almost 90% of Indian fissile material under international safeguards, which should represent a significant step forward in promoting US non-proliferation objectives vis-à-vis India. It would also permit the United States (and France, at a minimum), to enter the lucrative market of building civilian nuclear power reactors in India. This represents a practical means of accommodating Indian needs and US stipulations regarding non-proliferation. However, this approach faces stiff opposition from the non-proliferation purists in US and international capitals who perceive this as capitulation to the Indian side, or worse, as signaling to other nuclear wannabes that endurance pays off. Further, even this assistance to the Indian civilian nuclear program is likely to be stoutly opposed by those who would argue that this violates the NSG obligations assumed by supplier states.

On the other hand the Zangger Committee, created as an implementing arm of NPT, permits providing nuclear assistance to countries if the concerned facility(ies) be placed under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). There is a difference of opinion regarding the substantive interpretation of the “fullscope” (of NSG) versus the “facility-specific” (as per Zangger) safeguards clause, and this represents a potential area of negotiation for India to receive assistance in building additional nuclear reactors for power production.[xix]

The second cluster of issues relates to chemical and biological weapons, precursors, as well as the civilian component of India’s research program. As stated earlier, the country ratified the CWC in 1998, was elected a member of the Executive Council of the OPCW, and is engaged in a time-bound process of destruction of its CW stockpile. India has also signed the BTWC and was a participant to the recent BW conference that ended on a stalemate, among others due to certain objections regarding enforcement raised by the United States.[xx] Nevertheless, the issues concerning regulation of biological research in any country, ensuring against diversion of this capability into BW program, and proscriptions against exporting such capability to an unauthorized entity, remain relevant for India.

Further, India intends to rapidly develop its biotechnology research and emerge as a major player in the lucrative global market. In this regard, IT would serve as the technical backbone for high computational biotechnology research for India, particularly in the areas of genomics, proteomics, and stem cell research. However, this research resides squarely in the domain of dual-use technology, and the prospects for inadvertent or unauthorized technology transfer are immense. Moreover, as India positions itself to become a knowledge-based, and knowledge-exporting, economy, it raises the challenges for legislating and regulating intangible technology transfers, especially through conferences, travels of skilled personnel, and communication via phone, fax, emails, etc.

The third cluster relates to India’s relations with international efforts to regulate missile/civilian space programs. The gains from joining the MTCR are debatable, especially because no explicit set of technology assistance to a non-P-5 member exists, as has been borne out by the experiences of Brazil and Ukraine, to name only two. As such, the issue of India’s membership in MTCR requires greater cost-benefit analysis.[xxi] At the same time, India should carefully evaluate the advantage of joining the “International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation” (ICOC) that is currently under review. The ICOC is not formally linked to the MTCR, but its draft document was adopted at the MTCR’s plenary session of September 2001 in Ottawa, Canada. Further, 78 countries (including India) participated in the February 2002 meeting aimed at exploring universal support for the draft document.[xxii] In essence, this French-led initiative seeks to distinguish between space programs that produce space launch vehicles versus military missile programs. The aim is to provide technical guidelines to safeguard against inadvertent transfer of missile-relevant technologies, but not throttling cooperation between genuine civilian space programs of member countries. It is worth examining if membership in the ICOC would represent an optimum for India between joining the MTCR versus remaining a marginalized voice of dissent from outside the international efforts at regulating missile/civilian space programs.

In sum, while these issues do not occupy the center stage in the strategic discourse within India, or regarding India, they nevertheless represent a very important impediment to establishing a technology-embedded framework of India’s relations with the United States and the principal States Parties of the MECA. This is especially relevant because India prefers not to enter into negotiations regarding major defense acquisitions unless licensed production, co-production, or some element of know-how transfer is not part of the process. Indeed, the Indian Ministry of Defense has recently proposed an “offset clause” that it hopes to make mandatory in all future procurement negotiations. In essence, this clause would require the exporting country to agree that certain components of a major weapon system that India seeks to import will be manufactured indigenously.[xxiii] This would ensure a steady supply of war material even during adverse diplomatic conditions, besides generating additional employment, expertise, and revenue within the country. As one of the top ten arms importers in the world, this signals India’s intent to leverage its growing economic clout to secure superior terms of trade.

Conclusions

India’s relations with the United States has traversed a great distance in recent years, acquiring greater complexity and maturity, and the encouraging signs of bounded areas of differences or hard-nosed negotiations not eclipsing the greater domains of shared or convergent interests. The specific derivatives of their bilateral relationship, as defined within the parameters of this article, have already been covered in the preceding sections. As such, this concluding section mentions two broader points that will remain relevant for the overarching template of their future engagement.

The first relates to the need to create new “win-sets” in bilateral dialogue. Each side has emphasized the “rightness” and “fairness” of its position but not paid adequate attention to how a reformulation of that argument might make it more acceptable to the other side. It should be stressed that regardless of the intellectual quality of one’s argument, unless the proposed solution has gains that each side values, neither would have a sufficient stake in ensuring that the agreement endures. This has greater relevance for the Indian side, which has far fewer resources and options than the United States.

And the other observation, again of added relevance to India, is the need for better coordination between the “top down” and “bottom up” approaches in influencing US policy. Not unlike other countries, if the United States is convinced that closer engagement with another country serves its vital national interests, it will seek to adjust those domestic regulations that might otherwise impede this process. Accordingly, Indian efforts should include making a persuasive case of the overarching strategic template wherein vital national interests of each side converge, in tandem with efforts focussed on individual issue areas. This approach is likely to complement the process within the United States to secure closer cooperation with India.

This effort could receive valuable support from the US House of Representative members who are part of the “Congressional Caucus on India.” If efforts to create a new “Friends of India” in the US Senate succeed, that body could also greatly augment this process. The growing economic success, political visibility, and energy of the Indian-American community could also assist in building stronger bilateral relations.

In sum, Indo-US relations in recent years have become multi-dimensional and multi-layered, which is a sign of growing maturity and pragmatism, although significant differences remain. The dominance of non-proliferation as a single-issue index for measuring the overall relationship has gradually given way to a more broad-based ambit of engagement. India has neither sought, nor should expect, a “full embrace” and total convergence of bilateral interests across all issue areas. However, as all mature states in the international system, it should seek cooperation only in areas of mutual interest, and fully expect the United States to pursue similar engagement with other states in the international system. In the contemporary international environment of shifting priorities and fluid alliances, mutual gains and pragmatic assessment of shared interests, not abstruse morality or diffused priorities, should guide the sum, substance and style of India’s engagement with the United States.

About the Author

Dr. Anupam Srivastava serves as the Executive Director of the India Initiative of the University of Georgia, and of the South Asia Program of the University’s Center for International Trade and Security. 

References  

[i] The author wishes to thank Ploughshares Fund for their generous support for part of this research. 

[ii] This article draws from parts of the author’s chapter, “The Strategic Context of Evolving Indo-US Ties,” in Satish Kumar, eds., India’s National Security Annual Review 2002 [New Delhi: Sage Publishers, forthcoming 2002].   

[iii] India is regarded as one such pivotal state. See, Stephen P. Cohen and Sumit Ganguly, “India,” in Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds., The Pivotal States: A New Framework for US Policy in the Developing World (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999). See also, Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000].   [iv] For a nuanced exposition of this theme, see Richard J. Ellings, and Aaron L. Friedberg, eds., Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose, 2001-02 [Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001]. 

[v] For a detailed description of the military-industrial institutions and actors in China, see Evan S. Medeiros and Bates Gill, Chinese Arms Exports: Policy, Players, and Process, [Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Department of the Army], August 2000. 

[vi] It should be noted that while China is neither a member nor an “adherent” to the MTCR, it has nevertheless made an explicit commitment to abide by the guidelines of MTCR (first made in 1992). Further, since 2000, its official communiqués have enunciated efforts to incorporate changes into the domestic legislation in order to conform to the MTCR guidelines more closely. 

[vii] This sentiment has been expressed in off-the-record conversations of the author with several senior US government officials in recent months. 

[viii] For a good account, see Robert Karniol, “Shanghai Five in major revamp,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 23, 2001. 

[ix] Pervez Iqbal Siddiqui, “A CEO heads ISI set-up in Kathmandu,” The Times of India News Service, September 10, 2000. 

[x] This was conveyed as part of the presentation made by Najam Sethi at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 17, 2002. Sethi, chief editor of Daily Times, is a prominent journalist of Pakistanwho was jailed by Nawaz Sharif and later released upon the personal intervention of former President Clinton. 

[xi] CFL stands for “Cease Fire Line,” LOC for “Line of Control,” and IB for “International Boundary.” 

[xii] This impression was confirmed recently during the author’s meetings with senior government officials of several countries during a visit to Washington (June 2002) and to Paris and Vienna (July 2002). It further emerged that Washington has signaled to these countries the need to present a united front in negotiating with India (and Pakistan) regarding non-proliferation and technology cooperation, apart from its own lead role in such negotiations. 

[xiii] For details on this subject, see Seema Gahlaut, "Export Controls in India," in Michael Beck, Richard Cupitt, Seema Gahlaut, and Scott Jones, To Supply or To Deny: Comparing Nonproliferation Export Controls in Five Key States [Kluwer, forthcoming 2002]. For an earlier version, see Seema Gahlaut, “Export Control Developments in India: An Assessment,” 2001 Report [University of Georgia: Center for International Trade and Security]. 

[xiv] This author has been invited to attend as well as make a presentation at these meetings in Washington, DC. 

[xv] For details on this subject, see Anupam Srivastava and Seema Gahlaut, “Intangibles, Technology Trade and India: Challenges Before A Knowledge-based Economy,” in Parthasarathi Banerjee and Frank Jurgen-Richter, eds., The Knowledge Economy in [UK: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, forthcoming Fall 2002]. 

[xvi] This is part of on-going research that this author, and Dr. Seema Gahlaut, both from University of Georgia, are engaged in, whose report will be published in late Spring 2003. 

[xvii] For an authoritative account on this subject, see R. Chidambaram, “Nuclear energy needs and proliferation misconceptions,” Current Science, 81:1, July 10, 2001.

[xviii] For a detailed treatment of this subject, see G. Balachandran, “Indo-US Technology Relations,” Report prepared for the National Institute for Advanced Studies, 2001. 

[xix] The Chairman of Zangger Committee discussed this issue in detail with the author at a recent meeting in Vienna. 

[xx] For a detailed treatment of this theme, see Seema Gahlaut, “India and the CWC: Disarmament Success or Targeted Arms Control?” in Jean Pascal Zanders, ed., (Untitled book manuscript), forthcoming 2003. 

[xxi] One such exercise was attempted by this author in his chapter, “Up In The Air: Prospects for Indo-US Space Cooperation,” in Gary Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava, eds., Engaging India: US Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy [New York: Routledge, 1999], pp.79-108. On a related theme, see also, Anupam Srivastava,“Strategic Import of Missiles in the Indian Security Policy: Can they deliver the goods?” in Asian Survey, Vol. XL, No.2, March/April 2000, pp. 311-341. 

[xxii] “Draft International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, February 8, 2002.

[xxiii] Indian Express, July 11, 2002.