| Article
Reviews
Nuclear tests, triangles and Pakistani
security
India-China-U.S.
Triangle: A ‘Soft’ Balance of Power System in the Making, Venu Rajamony,
Visiting Fellow, CSIS* March 15, 2002
One
of the defining characteristics of the contemporary international political system is the
dominance of the United States in the world, and its overwhelming lead over all other
nations in terms of all the important indices of power. The terrorist attacks of September
11th on the U.S. revealed the enormity of the threat that exists to the security of the
U.S. The United States, despite its geographical distance from the region, remains the
single most important power in Asia.
A
similar reality within Asia is the rise of China and India – giant neighbours, both
of whom are countries with populations of over a billion people, nuclear weapons, and the
fastest growing economies in the world. In many ways, ‘rising’ is a word
inadequate to describe the realities of modern day China. It has already propelled itself
into the ranks of the leading nations of the world by accomplishing a remarkable economic
and social transformation in the last twenty years. China, by virtue of its nuclear and
conventional military capabilities, sustained high economic growth, status as a permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council, regime stability and embodiment of an alternate
political model to the “West’, is seen by many as the only possible challenger
to the U.S. in the global power stakes of the future.
India,
too, in the last few years has witnessed a period of unprecedented resurgence. With
economic growth rates averaging 6 percent through the nineties, India also became a
nuclear weapons power in 1998. It has since then embarked on a major all round diplomatic
offensive, forging closer ties than ever before to the United States, without diluting its
traditional friendship with Russia or its commitment to improved relations with China.
Demonstrating a high degree of dexterity, India has shed the ideological blinkers of its
non–aligned past and replaced it with a pragmatic ‘national interest’ based
approach. Consequently, it is actively reaching out and building linkages not just to its
immediate neighbourhood of South Asia but also Central Asia, the Gulf, and East Asia,
which it now identifies as its “strategic frontiers”.
Clearly,
the interrelationships between India, China and the United States will be an important
factor determining the course of events within Asia in the 21st Century. How these three
powers interact and manage their relations with each other will also to a large extent
influence the future of peace and security within the region.
This
paper seeks to explore some aspects of the India–China–U.S. triangle and
identify the broad direction in which relations between these three countries appear to be
moving. Starting with a discussion of the remarkable turn around in India–U.S.
relations over the last two years, the paper points out that September 11 and its
aftermath have provided new strategic glue bringing the countries even closer together.
The
paper draws attention to concern within China that this improvement in India–U.S.
relations is targeted at it and discusses how this concern needs to be seen in the context
of deep-rooted fears within China of the U.S. and its long term intentions. It further
points out that the post September 11 deterioration in China’s strategic situation
and U.S plans for a missile defence system fuel Chinese suspicions in the above regard.
The
paper then proceeds to discuss a fundamental reassessment in China’s policy towards
India that has occurred in the last few years as well as Indian perceptions of U.S.- China
relations. The paper concludes that India and the U.S. are unlikely to enter into any
formal alliance against Beijing. Both countries have substantive interests with respect to
China that they would not like to damage. Instead, what is likely to emerge between the
three is a “soft balance of power” system in which each country seeks to
manoeuvre the maximum diplomatic space for itself vis-à-vis the other two countries,
without entering into any formal alliances. At the same time, by virtue of the fact that
the India–China–U.S. triangle is today at a stage where India-U.S. relations
appear set for rapid improvement while U.S.–China relations remain fragile and core
differences between India and China are still to be addressed, future Chinese policies and
actions will be the key factor in determining whether the system will turn from a
“soft” system to a “hard” system of formal alliances or alternately a
‘concert’ between the three powers. The paper further argues that India’s
goal should be the initiation of a ‘virtuous cycle’ of improving relations with
both the U.S. and China.
The
author Venu Rajamony is a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies He is also a senior civil servant within the Indian Foreign Service. However this
paper is the product of academic work undertaken from September 2001 to March 2002, as an
Asia Foundation Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
In
the view of the reviewers the author has done a very diligent analysis of the historical
perspectives of the three powers and traced the evolution of their relationships. The
author has done this in a succinct and clear manner. The approach is quite methodical and
the author examines the fundamental drivers that influence the dynamics of the
relationships between each of the parties. He also brings into play a good analysis of the
perception of each country on the bilateral relationship between the other two. The
combining by the author of all the threads allows the author to obtain a synthesis and get
a perception of the future dynamics.
Of
particular importance in this article is the author's take on the paradigm shift in the
Chinese perception of India. It is something, which has not been noted by the strategic
community at large. This is a very important development and as the author rightly states,
it is something, which has taken place due to Pokhran II and the subsequent diplomatic
initiatives from New Delhi.
The
authors’ conclusion of a "soft" triangular balance evolving is correct as
are the underlying reasons he enumerates supporting the same. Overall a good analysis
which gives us a glimpse of the strategic thinking that is currently prevalent in the
Government of India, given the author's background his disclaimer notwithstanding.
M.
Rajaram & Raj Kumar
The
May 1998 Pokharan Tests – The Scientific Aspects, R. Chidambaram, written
on October 16, 2000 as an invited article in the book “Technology & Security:
India’s Long Term Interests” , edited by Dr. Brahma Chellaney.)
http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper451.html
Chidamabaram's
paper, published in saag.org site, is as close as it gets to a white paper. Another
version with multiple co-authors was published in Current Science November 2000[1]. In his
paper the author summarizes the rationale for the tests and the results and future plans.The
tests were needed to confirm the dozen new technologies that were tried, some of them in
multiple tests. Chidambaram thus confirms that some of the critical components were tested
multiple times and performed to expectations. He also confirms that the all tests included
actual weapons or those with 'all features needed for integration with delivery vehicles'.
This aspect gives them a reliable capability to develop weapons from sub-kiloton to 200
kiloton yields. 'Great deal of further scientific and technical development has taken
place since the tests.'
Chidambaram
also goes on to rebut claims made by other experts both inside and outside the country. He
asserts that the tests were successful based on seismic, close in accelerations, and
radio-chemical estimates. The computer codes were validated by the tests and should
provide some confidence in the moratorium on further tests. He also quotes experts to show
the independence of the Indian program. He also asserts that India has world-renowned
experts with published credentials, in the field of nuclear weapon design field which
lends credibility to the program. He also goes on to explain that most weapons with the
P-5 are based on earlier technology and hence the pursuit of esoteric weapon designs while
useful from scientific interests is not of practical utility. This could be to answer
criticism from local experts on the moratorium that was announced on May 13, 1998 itself.
He describes the sub-kiloton tests as being very challenging and had achieved the goals of
design validation and developing low yield weapons. He alludes to Indian capability in
this field as being next to the US only.
On
the issue of non-detection of these tests Chidambaram points to the soil geo-physical
properties of the test site, which compound the problem. He points to the graph of the
radio- chemical products from the test holes and shows fission had occurred. He gives
clear crater pictures of all the five tests conducted in May 1998. He has an extensive
section on the thermo-nuclear test conducted on May 11, 1998. He confirms the design was a
fusion-boosted fission primary and the secondary was fusion based. 'All the design
specifications were validated the test.' He suggests that the design is capable of
yielding up to 200 kt. He gives more details of the radio-chemical evaluation performed -
the samples were measured for active products, the cavity radius was determined and a
further comparison of the products of the two tests was made to show the differences due
to fusion. All these measures confirm the test resulted in design specification. Here he
misses a good opportunity to clarify the design details claiming proliferation
sensitivity. The more important issue is the credibility of the test when it is under
attack within and without the country. The radio-chemistry graph probably has more
information for those trained to read it but for the others it does on help much. Hence he
should have discussed it in more detail and set the matter to rest.
In
addition Chidambaram should have discussed the sub-kiloton tests more comprehensively and
if there was any variation in the materials used. What was the doctrine for the low yield
devices? He could have pointed out which of the critical components that were tested
multiple times. All in all a very good opportunity to clarify outstanding issues was
missed. Most of the facts that were presented were already presented earlier in BARC
Newsletters or Current Science. The paper does not convey the imperatives or the goals
that drove the tests and moreover it does not address the challenges to the results
comprehensively.
1.S.K.
Sikka, Falguni Roy, G.J. Nair., et al., 2000. "The recent Indian
nuclear
tests- A Seismic overview", Current Science 79, no. 9, 10 November
2000,
pg. 1359. http://tejas.serc.iisc.ernet.in/currsci/nov102000/1359.pdf
D.Ramana
Political
Institutions and the Army, A Report from the CSIS Project, Pakistan’s Future and U.S.
Policy Options, Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer and Mandavi Mehta, April 17, 2002
This huge
twenty thousand plus word report is the summary of the discussions held at a meeting on US
foreign policy options and Pakistan. The report says little that is new to a person
familiar with Pakistan. It lists Pakistan's basic problems:-
A chronic
sense of insecurity about India, (a surprising concern in a nation that has started three
wars with India)
Concentration
of resources with the army at the center
A political
vacuum for 54 years since the death of Jinnah
The Pakistani
army remains respected, while the political institutions are weak, and made weaker by the
machinations of the army. The judiciary is subservient to the army. However the Pakistani
public is said to be "politically aware" - another surprising conclusion in the
paper about a nation in which neither political nor opinion polls are conducted and the
printed word reaches less than 3% of the population.
The paper goes
on to state "The policy changes the United States wishes to encourage in Pakistan can
only be sustained if Pakistan’s leadership has legitimacy over the long run. This
depends critically on the country’s institutions". This is perfectly valid
statement of the problems that have existed in Pakistan for over 50 years.
The problems
involved in building those institutions are listed in detail, and include the fact that
the Pakistan army will not give up its core interests - its own funding and foreign policy
among other things. And while the army is united and respected, it is composed of an
excessively large proportion of ethnic Punjabis and Pashtuns, who gain power and wealth
from their army connection at the expense of ethnic Sindhis and Mohajirs who are
under-represented in the army. This aggravates the already existing ill feeling towards
the dominant Punjabis. Faced with a fissiparous nation the army and politicians have used
the expensive and bloody Kashmir issue with India as a uniting factor. The idea of
discouraging this negative factor is dismissed by the authors, despite the prohibitive
social and economic cost to Pakistan caused by successive weak leaders using Kashmir as a
"uniting" prop in an otherwise divided nation.
The
"security against external threats" goal
has been made the single predominant issue in Pakistan by both the army and failed
political institutions, completely sidelining the question of education and development. A
quote from the paper is relevant here:
"Missing
from this traditional description of Pakistan’s security goals is the economic and
social dimension - dealing with the grinding poverty and social and ethnic divisions that
have ravaged Pakistan for the past several years. To the extent that the military
leadership as well as civilian politicians begin to regard economic and social development
as central to the country’s security needs, this can form the basis for a much
healthier reappraisal of Pakistan’s government and budgetary priorities."
However. the
paper goes on to give up completely on any new solutions by saying that "we should
expect that the army will continue to be a major player" After concluding that the
Army will continue in power anyway, the paper tries to list "work around"
solutions to improve the 4 pillars of a well governed state, The judiciary, the election
machinery, the Parliament and governance.
There is a
detailed analysis of just how and why the political institutions and judiciary are weak,
and a pessimistic outlook on the forthcoming elections, where is is said that Gen.
Musharraf is already ensuring absolute power over the political establishment by known
ploys such as "the king's party" and a deliberate "hung parliament"
that can be overruled. There is also a description of the attempt at reform of local
government under Musharraf, which appears good on the outside but has done little to
change anything. Also absent is a middle level provincial government - or even clear plans
for one. The army led federal government rules the roost as usual. The Pakistan army's
rogue intelligence institutions are mentioned once, but little mention is made of the
widely and publicly reported complicity of the Pakistani army with terrorists and Islamic
fundamentalism, topics which are brushed under the proverbial carpet.
Idealistic
recommendations are made on how the US must stay engaged in Pakistan, and must not use
Pakistan for temporary goals, and how the US must not rely on one Pakistani leader, but
must try and encourage the building of healthy political institutions and judiciary. The
US must engage the Pakistani army and "encourage a healthy role" for the Army.
The paper also
has a detailed 14-page analysis of Turkey to see if any lessons can be drawn from the US
experience with Turkey. The authors of the paper seem to find some similarities in the
Pakistan situation with that of Turkey, but the similarities are quite far fetched. At any
rate, the conclusions and lessons they draw from the Turkey analogy are no more intuitive
or educative than the conclusions they have drawn without the comparison.
In short this
extremely long paper concludes confusingly that the army is in charge in Pakistan, but
that the power of the army needs to be reduced with respect to political institutions, but
says that the army will continue to be in charge. There is no clear indication of how the
army can be in power and still not be in power in Pakistan. And the paper recommends
continuous US engagement while little changes.
It is to be
hoped fervently that this paper does not become US policy, because it is a singularly
non-intuitive piece of work that offers nothing new or original about Pakistan other than
recommending that the US stay engaged - which the US has anyway done for most of
Pakistan's existence. Important issues like Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism being
used by the army and polity as foreign and internal policy tools, are totally ignored. It
appears as though the paper has been written with a view to not offending anyone,
particularly in Pakistan. The conclusions of this paper can do little to change anything
for the better in Pakistan.
Dr.
Shivshankar Sastry |
